集團核心公司股權重組上市之子公司管理層選任
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2018
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Abstract
企業從傳統手工業到高科技產業，產業升級的同時，規模也隨之擴大，繼而形成了對現今台灣發展舉足輕重的集團企業，然而規模擴大同時也對管理面、策略面、成本面等面向造成負面影響。在如今物聯網及工業4.0的時代，產品由少樣多量轉變為少量多樣，客製化也讓使得大型組織規模不一定優勢，因此透過各種公司分離的活動來保持組織的活化，其中股權重組便是一種將在本研究談及的方法。
股權重組分為分拆、分離、權益分割，三者皆會在重組後更換管理層，其中帶領企業做決策的總經理尤為重要，然而在股權重組之後的管理層選任可能會對組織帶來不確定性，因此本研究將從華人本土心理學的親忠才員工歸類模型加以調整，以親緣關係與忠誠度做為總經理選任的標準，分為內部晉升者與外部繼任者，本研究從2017年總資產排名前一百的集團中選出的股權重組上市子公司，探討其控制機制、業務相關性對管理層選任的影響做研究。
最後本研究發現，股權重組後的上市子公司業務範圍若與核心公司在同一條產業鏈上(縱向重組)，做為調節因子，將會選擇內部晉升者，不會因為與核心公司業務範圍不同而選擇外部繼任者，反而因為兩者在產業內的核心能力相似，且內部晉升者還具有集團內部的隱性知識，而偏向選用內部繼任者
The corporation scale is growing bigger when industries keep upgrading from traditional handicraft industries to hi-tech industries. It becomes significant business group in Taiwan nowadays. However, it causes lots of negative effects in management, strategy and cost. In the era of Internet of Things and Industry 4.0, products transfer from flow production to batch production. Besides, Customized products do not make large scale corporation more beneficial. Therefore, we find that corporate divestiture can activate organization in which equity restructuring is one of the method we discuss in this research. Equity restructuring divides into three classes : spin-off, spilt-off and equity carve out. These three change management after equity restructuring and general managers play a significant role of making decision in the corporation. Nevertheless, the election of management, general manager succession, after equity restructuring probably brings uncertainty to the organization. This research modifies the model of employee-classified(relative, loyalty and talented) from indigenous psychological in Chinese societies. This research uses family relation and loyalty as criteria to elect general manager and divides them into two classes : inside successor, outside successor. Also, using top 100 net assets groups that listed subsidiary after equity restructured of core company to research the influence of control mechanism, business scope in management election. At last, this research find that if listed subsidiaries' business scope of equity restructuring is on the same industry chain as core company which is called vertical restructuring, as moderator, we will choose inside successor. The corporation will not elect outside successor by its different business scope of core company because the inside successor and outside successor has similar core ability. Besides, inside successor has tacit knowledge inside the group. So, the corporation will prefer electing inside successor in this situation.
The corporation scale is growing bigger when industries keep upgrading from traditional handicraft industries to hi-tech industries. It becomes significant business group in Taiwan nowadays. However, it causes lots of negative effects in management, strategy and cost. In the era of Internet of Things and Industry 4.0, products transfer from flow production to batch production. Besides, Customized products do not make large scale corporation more beneficial. Therefore, we find that corporate divestiture can activate organization in which equity restructuring is one of the method we discuss in this research. Equity restructuring divides into three classes : spin-off, spilt-off and equity carve out. These three change management after equity restructuring and general managers play a significant role of making decision in the corporation. Nevertheless, the election of management, general manager succession, after equity restructuring probably brings uncertainty to the organization. This research modifies the model of employee-classified(relative, loyalty and talented) from indigenous psychological in Chinese societies. This research uses family relation and loyalty as criteria to elect general manager and divides them into two classes : inside successor, outside successor. Also, using top 100 net assets groups that listed subsidiary after equity restructured of core company to research the influence of control mechanism, business scope in management election. At last, this research find that if listed subsidiaries' business scope of equity restructuring is on the same industry chain as core company which is called vertical restructuring, as moderator, we will choose inside successor. The corporation will not elect outside successor by its different business scope of core company because the inside successor and outside successor has similar core ability. Besides, inside successor has tacit knowledge inside the group. So, the corporation will prefer electing inside successor in this situation.
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集團企業, 股權重組, 繼任者, 管理層選任, business group, equity restructuring, successor, executive selection