中國對北韓發展核武的立場與對策之研究
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2023
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中國對朝鮮 推進核開發一貫持反對立場。20世紀90年代以後，朝鮮兩次退出NPT和6次核試驗期間，中國的對朝政策和對朝核政策逐漸發生變化。 本研究將中國的對朝政策大致分爲維持朝鮮體制穩定和朝鮮無核化，中國對朝鮮的戰略價值和朝核問題引起的牽連風險的判斷分析爲政策變化的2個變因。 以這種觀點爲基準, 通過實際事例證明它們的因果關係爲研究目的,在此過程中利用新現實主義理論和同盟理論提出了邏輯依據。透過這樣的研究，可以確認中國對朝鮮的戰略價值和朝核帶來的牽連危險的判斷在對朝政策上起到了主要動因的作用。 在朝鮮核問題成爲國際社會焦點之前的冷戰時期，中國的對朝政策主要是利用朝鮮作爲與美國和蘇聯權力平衡的手段。 即,通過與朝鮮的合作,共同應對美國主導的民主陣營的安全威脅,在中蘇紛爭狀況下,阻止北朝鮮向蘇聯傾斜,努力維持中國的支持者角色。 其代表性的事例有中國參加韓戰、戰後對朝鮮的經濟及軍事支援、簽訂中朝相互友好條約等。20世紀80年代以後，朝鮮爲了消除共產圈解體、冷戰體制崩潰、中國改革開放等帶來的安全威脅，正式進行了核開發，中國作爲朝鮮唯一的同盟，無意中深深地牽連到了朝核問題，朝核問題成爲中國對朝政策的重要變數。 1993年朝鮮退出NPT後形成的第一次朝核危機時,中國對朝核問題沒有特別的政策,主張通過美北兩國直接對話解決。 因此，與其說維持朝鮮體制的穩定或推進朝鮮無核化，不如說最大限度地避免牽連到朝核危機造成的糾葛狀況。另一方面，第一次朝核危機因爲通過美北間直接對話達成妥協，中國在朝鮮問題上經歷了疏遠。根據日內瓦協議，美國承諾向朝鮮提供重油，但美國中斷供應後, 朝鮮重新啓動核設施,退出NPT,引發了第二次朝核危機。 中國通過美國布希政府的對朝鮮攻擊威脅和對伊拉克的軍事攻擊，正視朝核問題是無法避免的現實問題，並開始積極進行斡旋努力。特別是建設向朝鮮供應原油的友好送油管後，首次採取了關閉的超強力措施。 另一方面，向朝鮮提供無償援助， 仲裁美中朝三方會談和六方會談，努力解決朝核問題。 中國之所以積極介入第二次朝核危機，是因爲中國認爲美國的攻擊有可能導致朝鮮政權崩潰。對於朝鮮的第一次核試驗，中國發表了強烈的反對聲明，但在討論聯合國安理會對朝制裁決議的過程中努力降低制裁力度，反而增加了對朝貿易，支持了朝鮮的穩定。 中國與第二次朝核危機不同,沒有積極介入,可以看作是中國認爲以第一次朝核試驗爲契機,無法阻止朝鮮的核開發,因此比起無核化,以穩定朝鮮政權爲優先目標推進的。朝鮮進行第二次核試驗後，中國黨中央決定對朝政策方向是中國不能解決朝核問題，考慮到朝鮮的戰略價值，優先維持朝鮮體制，這是中國黨中央首次決定應對朝鮮問題和朝核問題的政策。 此後，中國的對朝政策根據國際社會對朝核問題的措施，逐漸改變了對朝核問題的應對方式，但維持朝鮮政權的穩定成爲了與局勢變化無關的固定目標。 中國在對朝政策上作爲與美國權力平衡的緩衝地帶，將朝鮮的戰略價值放在首位。對於之後發生的朝鮮第三次、四次、五次，六次核試驗，中國的應對沒有脫離第2次核試驗時中國黨中央決定的基調。 當然，隨着朝鮮核試驗的持續，中國也同意在聯合國安理會對朝鮮制裁中增加越來越強硬的措施，但這只是被動地應對美國和國際社會的強硬態度的水平，不能說這是爲了朝鮮無核化而做出的積極努力。 另外,第四次核試驗後,韓美開始討論部署薩德防空導彈系統,中國提議王毅倡議稱同時促進韓半島無核化和和平協定,並提出瞭解決朝核問題的新方案。 但《王毅倡議》的立場是，只有通過和平協定解決朝鮮的安全憂慮，才能解決朝核問題，因此，與其說是解決朝核問題的提案，不如說是強調本國國家利益反對韓美部署薩德和維持韓半島穩定。 這意味着中國擺脫了因朝核問題而形成的對朝政策困境，開始從本國利益角度出發應對朝核問題，再次確認最符合中國國家利益的縂是朝鮮政權的穩定。最近，隨着美國和中國的霸權競爭加劇，對韓半島的影響力競爭日趨激烈，朝鮮對中國的戰略價值逐漸增加，而對朝鮮無核化的必要性卻逐漸減少。 特別是2018年以後,通過中朝首腦會談,兩國關係得到了改善,中國對朝鮮的影響力增加,中國圍繞韓半島問題的對美協商力大幅擴大。 因此，第六次核試驗以後，每當朝鮮發射導彈時，中國都會微妙地改變過去反對核開發的立場，反對安理會的對朝制裁決議，代表朝鮮的安全憂慮，表現出直接支持朝鮮的態度。綜合以上討論，中國的對朝政策大致可以分爲冷戰時期和朝鮮造成第一次朝核危機後的時期。 冷戰時期的對朝政策是利用朝鮮作爲應對美國和蘇聯的手段，朝鮮核問題浮出水面後，中國的對朝政策大致可以分爲維持朝鮮體制穩定和無核化。 因此，中國的對朝政策與時機和國際局勢的變化無關，作爲對外部威脅的權力平衡手段，維持朝鮮的戰略緩衝地帶是最高目標。 特別是朝核危機以後，中國認爲維持朝鮮體制穩定是與美國權力平衡的’接近動機’，認爲朝鮮無核化是避免牽涉到朝核問題的’回避動機’，因此，今後中國對朝政策中維持朝鮮體制穩定的動力將逐漸加強，對朝鮮無核化的動力將逐漸減弱.
China has consistently opposed North Korea's nuclear program. Since the 1990s, while North Korea has withdrawn from the NPT twice and conducted six nuclear tests, China's North Korea policy and its NK nuclear policy have changed little by little. This study largely divided China's policy toward North Korea into maintaining the stability of the North Korean regime system and denuclearizing North Korea, and analyzed China's judgment on North Korea's strategic value and the risk of involvement due to the North Korean nuclear issue as two variables of policy change. Based on this perspective, the purpose of this study is to prove their causal relationship through actual cases, and in the process, a logical basis was presented using neo-realist theory and alliance theory.Based on these studies, it was confirmed that China's judgment on North Korea's strategic value and the risk of involvement due to North Korea's nuclear weapons program served as a major driver in North Korea policy. Before the North Korean nuclear issue became an international issue, China's North Korea policy during the Cold War was mainly to use North Korea as a means of balancing power against the United States and the Soviet Union. In other words, through cooperation with North Korea, efforts were made to jointly respond to the security threats of the U.S.-led democratic camp, prevent North Korea from turning into the Soviet Union in the face of Sino-Soviet disputes, and maintain it as a supporter of China. Representative examples include China's participation in the Korean War, economic and military support to North Korea after war and the signing of the Sino-NK Mutual Friendship Treaty. Since the 1980s, North Korea has been developing nuclear weapons in earnest to eliminate security threats caused by the dismantling of the communist regime, the collapse of the Cold War system, and China's reform and opening. As the only ally of North Korea, China unintentionally became deeply involved in the North Korean nuclear issue, and the North Korean nuclear issue became an important variable in China's North Korea policy. The first North Korean nuclear crisis created when North Korea left the NPT in 1993, China had no special policy on the North Korean nuclear issue and insisted on a resolution through dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea. Therefore, rather than promoting the stability of the North Korean regime or denuclearization of North Korea, China tried not to be involved in the conflict caused by the North Korean nuclear crisis as much as possible. Meanwhile, as the first NorthKorean nuclear crisis was settled through direct talks between the U.S. and North Korea, China experienced alienation from North Korea issues.As the U.S. stopped providing heavy oil to North Korea, which was mandatory under the Geneva Agreement, North Korea resumed operation of its nuclear facilities and left the NPT, resulting in the second North Korean nuclear crisis. Through the Bush administration's threat of attack on North Korea and military attacks on Iraq, China faced the fact that the North Korean nuclear issue was an inevitable direct problem and began active mediation efforts. In particular, super-strong measures were taken to close friendly pipelines that supply crude oil to North Korea. This was the first time since the pipeline was built. Meanwhile, while providing free aid to North Korea, efforts were made to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue by mediating the U.S.-China-NK trilateral talks and the six-party talks. The reason why China actively intervened in the second North Korean nuclear crisis was because it judged that the North Korean regime could collapse due to the U.S. attack.China issued a strong statement of opposition to North Korea's first nuclear test, trying to lower the level of sanctions in the process of discussing the Security Council's resolution to impose sanctions on North Korea, and supporting North Korea's stability by increasing trade with North Korea. Unlike the second North Korean nuclear crisis, China did not actively intervene, which can be seen as China's priority for the stability of the North Korean regime over North Korea's denuclearization, judging that it cannot prevent North Korea's nuclear development in the wake of the first North Korean nuclear test.After North Korea's second nuclear test, the Chinese Central Party set its policy direction to prioritize maintaining the North Korean regime in consideration of NK's strategic values, which was the first time China decided on its policy to respond to North Korea and the North Korean nuclear issue. Since then, China's North Korea policy has gradually changed its response to the North Korean nuclear issue in accordance with the international community's measures, but maintaining the stability of the North Koreanregime has become a fixed goal regardless of changes in the situation. China has put North Korea's strategic value above all else as a buffer zone for balancing power with the United States in its North Korea policy. China's response to North Korea's third, fourth, fifth, and sixth nuclear tests, which took place later, did not deviate from the tone decided by the Chinese Party's central government during the second nuclear test. Of course, China also agreed to add more and more strong measures to the UN Security Council's sanctions on North Korea as the North Korean nuclear test continued, but this was a passive response to the U.S. and the international community's strong stance, and was a limit to seeing it as an active effort to denuclearize North Korea. Meanwhile, after South Korea and the U.S. discussed the deployment of a THAAD air defense missile system after the fourth nuclear test, China proposed a Wang Yi initiative to simultaneously promote denuclearization and a peace treaty on the Korean Peninsula, suggesting a new way to solve the North Korean nuclear issue. However, the Wang Yi Initiative emphasized its national interest in opposing the deployment of THAAD and maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula rather than a proposal to resolve North Korea's security concerns through a peace treaty. This meant that China began to respond to the North Korean nuclear issue from the perspective of its national interest, breaking away from the dilemma of North Korea policy created by the North Korean nuclear issue, and confirming once again that the North Korean regime's stability is most in China's national interest in its North Korea policy. North Korea's strategic value to China has increased recently as the hegemony competition between the U.S. and China has intensified and the influence competition on the Korean Peninsula has intensified, while the need for North Korea's denuclearization is decreasing. In particular, China's negotiating power over the Korean Peninsula has greatly expanded as bilateral relations have improved through the China-North Korea summit since 2018 and China's influence on North Korea has increased. Therefore, whenever North Korea launches ballistic missiles after its sixth nuclear test, China subtly changes its stance against nuclear test in the past, opposing the Security Council's resolution to impose sanctions on North Korea, and directly supporting North Korea while representing North Korea's security concerns. Taken together, China's North Korea policy can be largely divided into the Cold War period and the period after North Korea created the first North Korean nuclear crisis. North Korea policy during the Cold War was to use North Korea as a means of responding to the United States and the Soviet Union. China's North Korea policy can be largely classified as maintaining the stability and denuclearization of the North Korea after the North Korean nuclear issue broke out. Therefore, regardless of the timing and changes in the international situation, China's top goal in North Korea was to maintain strategic buffer zone of North Korea as a means of balancing power against external threats. In particular, after the North Korean nuclear crisis, China recognized North Korea's stability as a access motivation to balance power with the United States, and North Korea's denuclearization as a avoidance motivation to avoid being involved the North Korean nuclear issue. Accordingly, in China's North Korea policy in the future, the driving force for maintaining the stability of the North Korean regime will gradually strengthen, and the driving force for North Korea's denuclearization will weaken.
China has consistently opposed North Korea's nuclear program. Since the 1990s, while North Korea has withdrawn from the NPT twice and conducted six nuclear tests, China's North Korea policy and its NK nuclear policy have changed little by little. This study largely divided China's policy toward North Korea into maintaining the stability of the North Korean regime system and denuclearizing North Korea, and analyzed China's judgment on North Korea's strategic value and the risk of involvement due to the North Korean nuclear issue as two variables of policy change. Based on this perspective, the purpose of this study is to prove their causal relationship through actual cases, and in the process, a logical basis was presented using neo-realist theory and alliance theory.Based on these studies, it was confirmed that China's judgment on North Korea's strategic value and the risk of involvement due to North Korea's nuclear weapons program served as a major driver in North Korea policy. Before the North Korean nuclear issue became an international issue, China's North Korea policy during the Cold War was mainly to use North Korea as a means of balancing power against the United States and the Soviet Union. In other words, through cooperation with North Korea, efforts were made to jointly respond to the security threats of the U.S.-led democratic camp, prevent North Korea from turning into the Soviet Union in the face of Sino-Soviet disputes, and maintain it as a supporter of China. Representative examples include China's participation in the Korean War, economic and military support to North Korea after war and the signing of the Sino-NK Mutual Friendship Treaty. Since the 1980s, North Korea has been developing nuclear weapons in earnest to eliminate security threats caused by the dismantling of the communist regime, the collapse of the Cold War system, and China's reform and opening. As the only ally of North Korea, China unintentionally became deeply involved in the North Korean nuclear issue, and the North Korean nuclear issue became an important variable in China's North Korea policy. The first North Korean nuclear crisis created when North Korea left the NPT in 1993, China had no special policy on the North Korean nuclear issue and insisted on a resolution through dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea. Therefore, rather than promoting the stability of the North Korean regime or denuclearization of North Korea, China tried not to be involved in the conflict caused by the North Korean nuclear crisis as much as possible. Meanwhile, as the first NorthKorean nuclear crisis was settled through direct talks between the U.S. and North Korea, China experienced alienation from North Korea issues.As the U.S. stopped providing heavy oil to North Korea, which was mandatory under the Geneva Agreement, North Korea resumed operation of its nuclear facilities and left the NPT, resulting in the second North Korean nuclear crisis. Through the Bush administration's threat of attack on North Korea and military attacks on Iraq, China faced the fact that the North Korean nuclear issue was an inevitable direct problem and began active mediation efforts. In particular, super-strong measures were taken to close friendly pipelines that supply crude oil to North Korea. This was the first time since the pipeline was built. Meanwhile, while providing free aid to North Korea, efforts were made to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue by mediating the U.S.-China-NK trilateral talks and the six-party talks. The reason why China actively intervened in the second North Korean nuclear crisis was because it judged that the North Korean regime could collapse due to the U.S. attack.China issued a strong statement of opposition to North Korea's first nuclear test, trying to lower the level of sanctions in the process of discussing the Security Council's resolution to impose sanctions on North Korea, and supporting North Korea's stability by increasing trade with North Korea. Unlike the second North Korean nuclear crisis, China did not actively intervene, which can be seen as China's priority for the stability of the North Korean regime over North Korea's denuclearization, judging that it cannot prevent North Korea's nuclear development in the wake of the first North Korean nuclear test.After North Korea's second nuclear test, the Chinese Central Party set its policy direction to prioritize maintaining the North Korean regime in consideration of NK's strategic values, which was the first time China decided on its policy to respond to North Korea and the North Korean nuclear issue. Since then, China's North Korea policy has gradually changed its response to the North Korean nuclear issue in accordance with the international community's measures, but maintaining the stability of the North Koreanregime has become a fixed goal regardless of changes in the situation. China has put North Korea's strategic value above all else as a buffer zone for balancing power with the United States in its North Korea policy. China's response to North Korea's third, fourth, fifth, and sixth nuclear tests, which took place later, did not deviate from the tone decided by the Chinese Party's central government during the second nuclear test. Of course, China also agreed to add more and more strong measures to the UN Security Council's sanctions on North Korea as the North Korean nuclear test continued, but this was a passive response to the U.S. and the international community's strong stance, and was a limit to seeing it as an active effort to denuclearize North Korea. Meanwhile, after South Korea and the U.S. discussed the deployment of a THAAD air defense missile system after the fourth nuclear test, China proposed a Wang Yi initiative to simultaneously promote denuclearization and a peace treaty on the Korean Peninsula, suggesting a new way to solve the North Korean nuclear issue. However, the Wang Yi Initiative emphasized its national interest in opposing the deployment of THAAD and maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula rather than a proposal to resolve North Korea's security concerns through a peace treaty. This meant that China began to respond to the North Korean nuclear issue from the perspective of its national interest, breaking away from the dilemma of North Korea policy created by the North Korean nuclear issue, and confirming once again that the North Korean regime's stability is most in China's national interest in its North Korea policy. North Korea's strategic value to China has increased recently as the hegemony competition between the U.S. and China has intensified and the influence competition on the Korean Peninsula has intensified, while the need for North Korea's denuclearization is decreasing. In particular, China's negotiating power over the Korean Peninsula has greatly expanded as bilateral relations have improved through the China-North Korea summit since 2018 and China's influence on North Korea has increased. Therefore, whenever North Korea launches ballistic missiles after its sixth nuclear test, China subtly changes its stance against nuclear test in the past, opposing the Security Council's resolution to impose sanctions on North Korea, and directly supporting North Korea while representing North Korea's security concerns. Taken together, China's North Korea policy can be largely divided into the Cold War period and the period after North Korea created the first North Korean nuclear crisis. North Korea policy during the Cold War was to use North Korea as a means of responding to the United States and the Soviet Union. China's North Korea policy can be largely classified as maintaining the stability and denuclearization of the North Korea after the North Korean nuclear issue broke out. Therefore, regardless of the timing and changes in the international situation, China's top goal in North Korea was to maintain strategic buffer zone of North Korea as a means of balancing power against external threats. In particular, after the North Korean nuclear crisis, China recognized North Korea's stability as a access motivation to balance power with the United States, and North Korea's denuclearization as a avoidance motivation to avoid being involved the North Korean nuclear issue. Accordingly, in China's North Korea policy in the future, the driving force for maintaining the stability of the North Korean regime will gradually strengthen, and the driving force for North Korea's denuclearization will weaken.
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Keywords
朝鮮核試驗, 朝鮮體制穩定, 無核化, 權力平衡, North Korea's nuclear test, Stability of the North Korean regime, Denuclearization, Balance of power