G. H. Bantock論教育機會均等
Abstract
在學術上對教育中平等問題的討論，一般而言最常見的有兩種立場，主張追求教育機會均等、或是主張追求教育結果均等。當代的教育研究中對此議題之論辯主要都是從政治與經濟的角度著手，嘗試一一說明社經背景、天賦才能、個人努力、因教育而受影響之未來社經地位等因素是否構成給不同族群之學童予以不同種類之教育的正當理由。G. H. Bantock的貢獻在於他從文化的考量來觀察追求教育機會均等或是教育結果均等會對一個社會文化上的健康以及對個人的情緒教育與幸福造成甚麼樣的不良影響，因而構成了另一種教育中追求平等的立場，主張給予文化經驗不同的學生予以不同的課程內容。
然而，這樣的主張需要論證來說明為何在教育哲學中文化的考量應優先於政治或經濟的考量因素。此外，Bantock對教育結果均等的批判奠基於C. P. Snow與F. R. Leavis的「兩個文化」論戰中後者對於科學與文化兩者之差異的看法，尤其是對工業革命後勞動性質的改變以及同時期大眾傳播文化逐漸取代傳統民俗文化這兩點上多有承襲；欲妥善地評估Bantock關於教育中平等問題的論述是否恰當，勢必要回顧F. R. Leavis所屬之文化保守主義這個思想流派中M. Arnold、T. S. Eliot等人如何說明何謂文化，同時兼顧當代思想家如A. O’Hear與R. Scruton等人如何繼續發展此一思路中的各個面向。最後，Bantock對教育機會均等的批判僅止於它和教育結果均等一樣必須預設一個適用於所有學生族群的共同課程，因此在文化上會導致與後者相同的不良後果；Bantock對教育機會均等的批判因而顯得較為薄弱，也無法說明在甚麼意義之下他自身的立場為何不是另一種需要篩選機制來決定不同學生將來何去何從的教育機會均等。
有鑑於以上諸點，本論文企圖論證教育的內在價值應優先於教育的外在價值，以及教育中最重要的內在價值在於文化的傳遞，因此討論與教育有關之政治與經濟問題時須優先從其可能帶來之文化後果來判斷不同理論立場之優劣。同時，透過建構一個文化的理論，本論文從事實與價值的區分以及理由與原因兩者的差異來說明為何J. Dewey與R. S. Peters的教育哲學從文化傳遞的角度來看都有其缺陷。最後，本論文嘗試說明Bantock論證其教育中對平等議題所抱持的立場時，最有力的論據不在於家庭教育與學校教育兩者所牽涉的文化經驗之間可能發生的落差，而是在於學生在學校所學習之課程與學生畢業後所從事之工作兩者所牽涉的文化經驗之間可能產生的衝突與格格不入。由此可以顯現Bantock的課程理論並沒有落入菁英主義的窠臼，歧視職業教育或是剝奪勞動階級家庭之子女接受學術教育的機會；但也由此證明了Bantock的立場若經過本論文對其論證的修正之後，其實是一種文化意義下的教育機會均等。
本論文雖然奠基於Bantock於1950到1980年代這期間的教育思想，但是對當前相關或類似的教育議題亦有理論之蘊含。以教育與工作兩者之間的關係為例，對當代學者C. Winch的職業教育觀點以及追求學生自主決定之能力的培養便有所批判；重點不在於我們是否能取消教育上決定學生何去何從的權威，而是在於甚麼樣的權威才是對文化健康與個人幸福有所助益。又以多元文化與性別平等的問題為例，因為教育的目的在於給予學生適合的文化經驗，所以在教育哲學中應考量的重點在於學生畢業之後所要面對的社會角色；例如是要融入漢族的主流社會還是要生活在原住民傳統的社會中，或是要接受家庭中對女性角色的定位與需求還是要完全捨棄男女的角色差異。即使在全民教育中我們能忽略學生的文化背景對其所造成的影響，我們仍然無法輕視學生在離開學校之後所要面對的更長遠的人生裡總是會遭遇社會中無法改變的體制、現象與困難。最後，從實務面來談，臺灣中學生的PISA成績近年來總是表現亮眼，然而分數的標準差極大、且學習意願與動機的分數持續低迷；如果從本論文的文化角度來理解這個教育現象，那麼解決這個問題的關鍵就在於我們的義務教育一直忽略了不同族群的學生有不同的文化經驗，也因而在教育的課程上有其迥異的需求。忽視了這些需求，才真正是造成了教育平等這個議題中的社會不正義。
As R. S Peters shows, the core problem of equality in education is the identification of morally relevant criteria by which different curricula catering to distinct groups of pupils can be justified. Examination of contemporary debates in political philosophy attests to Peters’ insight. Family values, pursuit of excellence, and concern for the least advantaged class; all these factors are shown to be in conflict with various conceptions of educational equality which take different sets of factors as relevant to the determination of educational distribution. G. H. Bantock’s adoption of the cultural perspective traces further logical consequences of (1) equality of educational outcome construed in terms of J. Dewey’s egalitarian ideal of democracy, (2) equality of educational opportunity in terms of the occupational demand of national economy, and (3) T. S. Eliot’s peculiar conception of educational equality aiming at the cultural health of society. More conflicts of values emerge from this analysis. The setting up of either political democracy or economic growth as the aims of education proves to be corrosive of culture; yet, lacking more fundamental moral principles, we are at a loss as to how the priority among these values of education could be adjudicated. What’s worse, Bantock’s attitude towards meritocracy, despite his criticisms, is also ambivalent. Nor is the meaning of those values of education unequivocal. Further analysis is demanded. The distribution of education constitutes a problem only because the content of education is valuable. The value of education, nevertheless, may be intrinsic or extrinsic. Analysis of the controversy between P. H. Hirst and D. J. O’Connor over the nature and scope of educational theory helps us to locate the basis of value judgment in education. As it turns out, in spite of apparent disagreements, both protagonists hold that (I) values external to education should give precedence to those internal to it. What remains to be demonstrated, therefore, is the identification of the intrinsic aims of education to be distinguished from those external ones. The argument begins from the superficial concurrence of Dewey’s and Peters’ account of the main task of education. The claim that (II) the proper undertaking of education should be the transmission of culture is susceptible to different interpretations of “culture”. Thus, an adequate theory of culture is required to substantiate the conclusion, entailed by (I) and (II), that political (1) and economic (2) conceptions of educational equality must be abandoned in favour of conceptions in which the value of cultural health is placed centre stage. This theory of culture traces back to the debate between M. Arnold and T. H. Huxley concerning the curriculum priority of literature and science. The continuation of this debate in the controversy over the Two Cultures between C. P. Snow and F. R. Leavis shows that the issue at stake is not confined to the problem of curriculum: it involves the unbridgeable gap between the scientific and the cultural approaches to phenomena. It is exactly the differences between them upon which Bantock’s argument against the common curriculum implicitly depends, and, since Bantock’s account is derivative from Leavis’, an examination of the original source is needed. Exposition of Leavis’ account with the help of more recent developments in this issue reveals two distinctions between science and culture. The first is rooted in the logical discrepancy between description and prescription. This leads to a confutation of Dewey’s philosophy of education which takes the scientific method as its sole paradigm of knowledge and thus fails to transmit culture, in the full sense of the term, to the next generation. An account of the logical nature of knowledge of ends involved in cultural understanding is given to illustrate how the study of literature and the various forms of art, namely affective education, is crucial to the cultural health of society and the happiness of the individuals. The second distinction between scientific and cultural modes of understanding is characterized by the difference between first-person and third-person perspectives. Investigation of the notion of “public” enables the argument to refute Peters’ conception of education as initiation into the public traditions of various forms of thought and awareness, and to show that Peters’ transcendental deduction fails as a theory of justification. An alternative account of the initiation into cultural understanding also clarifies the conditions under which the cultural state of a society could become healthy. Finally, recognizing that behind the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic values of education is the resolution to give logical priority to the cultural implications of educational policy (whether it is concerned with political or economic or social or educational aims), the theory of culture developed in this essay modifies proposition (I) and paves the way for my evaluation of Bantock’s theory of curriculum which is primarily concerned with the cultural consequences of educational equality. Critics of Bantock’s philosophy of education usually claim that he relies upon psychological findings concerning pupils’ aptitude or I.Q. to justify his account of a differential provision of curriculum content for different groups of pupils, such that those with lower levels of educational achievement tend to receive an inferior kind of education. Careful reading of Bantock’s writings suggests, nonetheless, that the grouping of pupils is based upon their different levels of cultural consciousness, and that the overall aim of his curricular theory is the cultural health of all groups of society. The ability to understand the cultural meaning conveyed through the curriculum is thus more complicated than what psychology can offer, and the different kinds of education provided for the pupils are equally worthwhile in cultural terms. Bantock’s views on popular education, elite education, and higher education are examined to show that working class background possesses its peculiar cultural advantages lacking in other classes. The advantages, however, are more important in the relationship between cultural experiences involved in school and work, than in that between family and school as Bantock tends to overemphasize. The suggestion that a high-skill advanced economy can obviate the cultural danger of over-education in meritocracy is rejected; pupils’ autonomy in terms of the choice of life-styles is subordinated to the cultural authority by which their education is determined. This, surprisingly, leads to a cultural meritocratic interpretation of Bantock.
As R. S Peters shows, the core problem of equality in education is the identification of morally relevant criteria by which different curricula catering to distinct groups of pupils can be justified. Examination of contemporary debates in political philosophy attests to Peters’ insight. Family values, pursuit of excellence, and concern for the least advantaged class; all these factors are shown to be in conflict with various conceptions of educational equality which take different sets of factors as relevant to the determination of educational distribution. G. H. Bantock’s adoption of the cultural perspective traces further logical consequences of (1) equality of educational outcome construed in terms of J. Dewey’s egalitarian ideal of democracy, (2) equality of educational opportunity in terms of the occupational demand of national economy, and (3) T. S. Eliot’s peculiar conception of educational equality aiming at the cultural health of society. More conflicts of values emerge from this analysis. The setting up of either political democracy or economic growth as the aims of education proves to be corrosive of culture; yet, lacking more fundamental moral principles, we are at a loss as to how the priority among these values of education could be adjudicated. What’s worse, Bantock’s attitude towards meritocracy, despite his criticisms, is also ambivalent. Nor is the meaning of those values of education unequivocal. Further analysis is demanded. The distribution of education constitutes a problem only because the content of education is valuable. The value of education, nevertheless, may be intrinsic or extrinsic. Analysis of the controversy between P. H. Hirst and D. J. O’Connor over the nature and scope of educational theory helps us to locate the basis of value judgment in education. As it turns out, in spite of apparent disagreements, both protagonists hold that (I) values external to education should give precedence to those internal to it. What remains to be demonstrated, therefore, is the identification of the intrinsic aims of education to be distinguished from those external ones. The argument begins from the superficial concurrence of Dewey’s and Peters’ account of the main task of education. The claim that (II) the proper undertaking of education should be the transmission of culture is susceptible to different interpretations of “culture”. Thus, an adequate theory of culture is required to substantiate the conclusion, entailed by (I) and (II), that political (1) and economic (2) conceptions of educational equality must be abandoned in favour of conceptions in which the value of cultural health is placed centre stage. This theory of culture traces back to the debate between M. Arnold and T. H. Huxley concerning the curriculum priority of literature and science. The continuation of this debate in the controversy over the Two Cultures between C. P. Snow and F. R. Leavis shows that the issue at stake is not confined to the problem of curriculum: it involves the unbridgeable gap between the scientific and the cultural approaches to phenomena. It is exactly the differences between them upon which Bantock’s argument against the common curriculum implicitly depends, and, since Bantock’s account is derivative from Leavis’, an examination of the original source is needed. Exposition of Leavis’ account with the help of more recent developments in this issue reveals two distinctions between science and culture. The first is rooted in the logical discrepancy between description and prescription. This leads to a confutation of Dewey’s philosophy of education which takes the scientific method as its sole paradigm of knowledge and thus fails to transmit culture, in the full sense of the term, to the next generation. An account of the logical nature of knowledge of ends involved in cultural understanding is given to illustrate how the study of literature and the various forms of art, namely affective education, is crucial to the cultural health of society and the happiness of the individuals. The second distinction between scientific and cultural modes of understanding is characterized by the difference between first-person and third-person perspectives. Investigation of the notion of “public” enables the argument to refute Peters’ conception of education as initiation into the public traditions of various forms of thought and awareness, and to show that Peters’ transcendental deduction fails as a theory of justification. An alternative account of the initiation into cultural understanding also clarifies the conditions under which the cultural state of a society could become healthy. Finally, recognizing that behind the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic values of education is the resolution to give logical priority to the cultural implications of educational policy (whether it is concerned with political or economic or social or educational aims), the theory of culture developed in this essay modifies proposition (I) and paves the way for my evaluation of Bantock’s theory of curriculum which is primarily concerned with the cultural consequences of educational equality. Critics of Bantock’s philosophy of education usually claim that he relies upon psychological findings concerning pupils’ aptitude or I.Q. to justify his account of a differential provision of curriculum content for different groups of pupils, such that those with lower levels of educational achievement tend to receive an inferior kind of education. Careful reading of Bantock’s writings suggests, nonetheless, that the grouping of pupils is based upon their different levels of cultural consciousness, and that the overall aim of his curricular theory is the cultural health of all groups of society. The ability to understand the cultural meaning conveyed through the curriculum is thus more complicated than what psychology can offer, and the different kinds of education provided for the pupils are equally worthwhile in cultural terms. Bantock’s views on popular education, elite education, and higher education are examined to show that working class background possesses its peculiar cultural advantages lacking in other classes. The advantages, however, are more important in the relationship between cultural experiences involved in school and work, than in that between family and school as Bantock tends to overemphasize. The suggestion that a high-skill advanced economy can obviate the cultural danger of over-education in meritocracy is rejected; pupils’ autonomy in terms of the choice of life-styles is subordinated to the cultural authority by which their education is determined. This, surprisingly, leads to a cultural meritocratic interpretation of Bantock.
Description
Keywords
教育機會均等, 教育結果均等, 職業教育, 學術教育, 「兩個文化」, 菁英主義, 保守主義, equality of educational opportunity, equality of educational outcome, vocational education, academic education, the Two Cultures, elitism, conservatism