性表意自由之研究—以大法官解釋及相關規範為論述中心

Abstract

我國關於性言論的大法官解釋主要為釋字第407號解釋及釋字第617號解釋，這兩號解釋均涉及刑法第二百三十五條猥褻罪中有關「猥褻」與否的認定，惟大法官以性慾是否獲得滿足、是否引起普通一般人羞恥或厭惡感作為判斷是否構成猥褻的標準，本文認為有斟酌、檢討的空間。 本文將從美國學者納思邦(Martha C. Nussbaum)的噁心與羞恥之情感哲學取徑，檢視我國大法官以「引起普通一般人的羞恥或厭惡感」作為刑法規制猥褻物品或言論的理由所可能產生的問題，並論述國內學者對相關議題的觀點，以期更瞭解相關規定的合憲性。最後，本文將討論焦點集中在大法官對性言論規制的「價值」選擇，藉此說明「價值」在憲法解釋中的運用直接影響了性言論的保障，並進一步尋找刑法性言論規制之違憲審查的合理操作模式。

In our country, Chief Justice Interpretations about sex expression are mainly included in the Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 407 and No. 617, both of which involve whether to judge "obscenity" that is also stipulated in Crime of Obscene Act in Article 235 of the Criminal Code. But only Chief Justice Interpretation takes whether sexual desire has been satisfied and whether shame sense or disgust is caused in ordinary people as standards for judgment of obscenity. This article sees it that there are spaces for consideration and review. This article, from views of disgust and shame philosophy raised by US scholar Martha C. Nussbaum, views possible problems caused by our justices' standards that "whether sexual desire has been satisfied and whether shame sense or disgust is caused in ordinary people" are taken as standards for judgment of obscene material or expression. It also discusses about opinions of domestic scholars on related topics in order to understand constitutionality of related regulations. Finally, this article focuses discussions on choices in "value" of sex expression regulations by justices to explain that use of "value" in constitution interpretation directly affects protection of sex expression. It further seeks rational operation modes for judicial review of sex expression regulations that is stipulated in the Criminal Code.