中國大陸鄉鎮人大改革的邏輯──以浙江溫嶺市新河鎮「參與式預算」為例

Abstract

中國政治體制改革的努力方向之一即是希望獎勵地方政府進行民主實驗，藉以體現民意政治的實踐。在此激勵下，「民主懇談會」的實驗形式在浙江省溫嶺市下轄的五鄉鎮中逐漸展開來，形成一股風潮，不但引發中國大陸內部的重視，更引起西方學者的重視。1999年溫嶺市開始出現「民主懇談」活動，中國大陸政治學界開始從西方審議式民主（Deliberative Democracy）的角度嘗試對此進行討論，不過本文認為從這一個視野來討論民主懇談會恐會產生理解上的謬誤，民主懇談的特色屬於一種不直接涉及民主選舉的民意表達，是一種選舉之外的政治參與形式，或者說它根本沒有討論到選舉與民主的內在關係，而是把選舉的環節排除在外，嘗試著找出一種沒有選舉的民主形式。 2005年溫嶺民主懇談會開始與人大制度稼接成「參與式預算」。中國近年來有許多新興的公共治理經驗，其中最有民主意涵且受到最多國內外關注的，厥為浙江省台州市溫嶺的「參與式預算」改革。本文擬藉對此案例的研究，來回答一個更大的問題，即在中國目前的環境下，具民主意涵的治理改革是否及如何可能？什麼是其出現的條件，其維持的動力又可能來自何方？ 參與式預算的制度創發後產生了利益的博弈，博弈後又產生了參與者對此制度的路徑依賴，也產生新的社會網絡，並回頭形成了當地的政治文化，形成某種社會符號的意義，這些都會對往後的制度變遷產生影響。本文研究發現，溫嶺之所以出現這樣一個案例具有相當的偶然性，在一開始既非由政治菁英自上而下推動，亦非社會力量自下而上衝撞，而是由某些被本文稱為「政治企業家」(political entrepreneur)的人物在地方奔走串連推動而成。 然而，一旦此一制度出現後，便成為一個可進行利益博弈的「局」，各方力量便進入此局進行博弈，並且形成了一個多次博弈的局面，因而各方力量在此達致某種利益交換的均衡。一旦如此，這個「參與式預算」的制度便具有其自身內在的可持續生命力，因而不再是一個短暫的現象。One of the PRC’s working programs on the political reform is to stimulate the local government to experiment democracy, by which the practice of civil societal politics may be revealed. Under such boost, the model of 「democratic consultation」 within the five townships in Wenlin, Zhejiang forms a trend, which has drawn both domestic government and international scholars attentions. The form of democratic consultation, starting in Wenlin in 1999, by bringing a scope of the so-called 「deliberative democracy」, a western concept in, leads to the discussion of political scientists in China, but such angle is not only a misunderstanding on 「deliberative democracy」 but also a misleading to the democratic consultation」 itself, for the characteristic of latter is no more than opinion expressions which the direct elections were never involved in. That is to say, the democratic consultation has never touch upon the internal relations of election and real democracy, or to put it another way, it is a democratic form excluding the free election.

There are many new models of public governance emerged in recent years in China. One of the cases with democratic implications that have received most attention is the 「participatory budget reform」 in Wenling, Zhejiang. This paper intends to respond to a larger theoretical question by examining this case. The larger question is: How is any reform with democratic implications possible under current circumstances in China? What are the conditions that contribute to such reform, and where do the dynamisms that create such reform come from?

However, they all appear to be insufficient in explaining how the institution emerged from the very beginning. The paper finds that a group of 「political entrepreneurs」 played important roles in making possible the emergence of this institution. They mobilize political resources and explore possibility under the constraints of existing political institutions.

However, once the institution has taken place, the institution allows various social groups and villages to form a 「game」 so that they can bargain among themselves to seek a balance of their multiple interests. Once the equilibrium is reached within such a game, the institution can obtain an internal balance, and the institution becomes no longer a temporary reform.