中國大陸地方人大監督制度之變遷（1979年-2005年）

Abstract

本文所探討的議題是中國大陸地方人大監督制度的變遷狀況，檢視的時間自1979年至2005年，透過案例報導的蒐集方式，將不同案例加以分類歸納，進一步描寫制度運行及過程，以觀察這段期間其監督制度變遷的趨勢。 本文蒐集了六十七個監督制度創新案例，篩選標準是根據既有法定監督制度之外，由人大代表、地方人大或常委會自行宣稱的監督制度創新。資料來源主要包含網路文章、期刊、論文等。本文透過自變項（時間、地點、層級、法律化）來審視這些監督制度的分佈情況，並從歸納的因變項結果，找出改革效果明顯的十四個案例，並將這十四個案例帶入中介變項。 中介變項從Tanner及相關學者的研究所整理出來的四個模式修改而成，這四個模式包含「命令模式」、「領導權爭奪模式」、「組織模式」及「垃圾桶模式」；在分析其適用性後，本文重新整理為五種模式：「命令模式」、「完善型權力擴張」、「鑲嵌型權力擴張」、「機構增長」和「回應民眾」，並作為中介變項的五個類別。 將依照自變項及中介變項的類別整理，本文觀察到的中國大陸地方人大監督制度變遷的趨勢主要如下：一、改革案例以地級佔多數，沿海城市居多。二、從中介變項發生的原因來看，以「完善型權力擴張」與「鑲嵌型權力擴張」最重要，其次是「回應民眾」，而「機構增長」與「命令模式」則顯得完全不重要。三、改革的力量主要是由下而上。四、有法律化不是制度變遷要件。五、改革效果明顯（出現由下而上、並獲得推廣）的是述職評議、人大助理、聽證、公民旁聽及人大信訪的五個案例，值得後續加以關注。This thesis intends to explore the pattern of transition inthe supervision of China’s local people’s congress from 1979 to 2005 by collecting cases and coding them with contextual variables. This thesis has collected 67 cases of institutional innovation in local people’s congress. These cases contain new institutions developed either by people’s representatives, local people’s congress, or their standing committees. The sources of these cases include website articles, journal articles, and other articles. This thesis finds 14 cases with “conspicuous reform effect” (meaning the reform was initiated from below and was copied in other locations) according to the dependent variable. These cases are categorized according to the independent variables, i.e., when, where, and at which level they happened, and to what extent they were legalized. As for the intervening variable, it is adopted and adjusted from previous literatures. Tanner and other scholars have come up with four models explaining why people’s congress develops their institutions. Adjusted from these four models, this thesis comes up with a five-model analysis of the reason why China local people’s congress initiates new institutions: the “command model,” the “model of self-perfecting power expansion,” the “model of reform-coupling power expansion” the “model of institutional growth and multiplication,” and the “model of response to the people.” According to these independent variables and intervening variables, this thesis has observed the following trends and patterns. First, among all levels, institutional innovation happens most frequently at the precinct level. Second, among the five categories of the intervening variable, the “model of self-perfecting power expansion” and the “model of reform-coupling power expansion” are the most important, whereas “model of response to the people” are less important. The “command model” and the “institutional growth and multiplication model” are the least important, for explaining the institutional innovation in China’s local people’s congress. Third, the major driving force for reform is from bottom up. Fourth, legalization is not a necessary condition for institutional innovation in local people’s congress. Fifth, there are five cases with the most conspicuous reform effect: Officials’ work report and appraisal system, people’s representatives’ assistant, public hearing, citizens’ sit-in session, and public appealing system to the people’s congress.