當委外走不下去？地方政府社會服務契約委外收回之研究

Abstract

本文旨在研究哪些因素影響政府從委託社會福利機構到選擇收回委外契約。藉由深度訪談縣市政府社會局處資深委外承辦人員，了解夥伴關係生變的過程以及契約收回之前因後果，進一步分析現階段臺灣社會服務契約委託中政府收回自辦的考量，最後提出政策與實務運作之建議。以公私夥伴關係的治理模式創造三贏局面，究竟是理想還是真實情境？難道在服務輸送的過程中都沒有困難嗎？本研究主要有三個研究問題：1.為何會有政府「收回委外契約」，意即「政府收回來自己做」的問題？2.政府執行收回與否之考量為何：契約收回會涉及哪些問題與考量？如果不收回自辦，通常的解決方法為何？3.為何無法在事前控制好？是否可能在事前就判斷問題，或如何能做更好的篩選？本研究所得主要發現如下： 1.政府機關委外前因：私部門具有較高彈性、民間單位的能量和資源，以及因應公部門業務膨脹。 2.影響政府考慮收回的因素：發生嚴重衝突、民間單位專業度不足、沒有機構投標又須繼續提供服務、民間單位不易使力、民間單位窗口特質。 3.影響政府執行收回的問題與考量：提前布局與前端規劃、情況緊急不收回更麻煩、看案件性質，以及難收回的考量。 4.不收回自辦的解決方法：依業務性質為法定項目/非法定項目決定、拆解業務內容、做出模式或框架、調整自我，以及調整他人。 5.要做到事前判斷有困難，但確實有做到更好篩選的方法。 綜合上面的主要研究發現和過去文獻，本研究歸納出三點研究發現的意義： 1.影響政府收回委外契約的關鍵因素是民間單位的狀態，尤其和民間單位的數量及單位品質有著極大關連。當民間單位來投標的數量不足甚至為0（當地根本沒有單位或單位很少），或者單位表現不佳，正是影響收回的關鍵。所以，機構資源稀缺的地方縣市更容易發生契約收回。 2.執行收回之考量在於這份夥伴關係究竟是「減輕政府負擔」或「增加政府麻煩」。當委外單位為政府帶來麻煩的程度大於收回自辦的麻煩程度時，會選擇收回委外契約。 3.事前控制困境的關鍵在於沒有廠商或沒有好廠商得挑，把關功能因此失靈。This study aims to explore the factors influencing government decisions to transition from outsourcing social welfare services to taking back these contracts in-house. Through in-depth interviews with experienced personnel in county and city government social departments, the research examines the process and consequences of changes in partnerships, as well as the considerations behind the government’s decision to bring outsourcing contracts back in-house. The study further analyzes the current considerations in Taiwan regarding the re-implementation of social service contracts and provides recommendations for policy and practical operations.The study addresses three main research questions: 1. Why does the government decide to "bring outsourcing contracts back in-house"? 2. What are the considerations involved in the decision to bring contracts back in-house, including issues and challenges? What are the typical solutions if the contracts are not brought back in-house? 3. Why is it difficult to manage these issues beforehand? Is it possible to anticipate problems in advance, or how can better screening be achieved?

Key findingsof the study are as follows:1. Reasons for government outsourcing include the flexibility of the private sector, the energy and resources of private entities, and the expansion of public sector responsibilities.2. Factors influencing the government’s decision to bring contracts back in-house include severe conflicts, inadequate professional expertise of private entities, lack of bidders requiring continued service provision, private entities face difficulties in driving progress, and characteristics of private sector contacts.3. Issues and considerations in executing the decision to bring contracts back in-house include early planning, the complexity of emergencies if not brought back in-house, the nature of the case, and difficulties associated with the process.4. Solutions for not bringing contracts back in-house include differentiating between statutory and non-statutory services, deconstructing service content, creating models or frameworks, and adjusting both self and others.5. It is challenging to preemptively control issues, but there are methods for better screening.Based on the key findings and existing literature, this study identifies three significant implications: 1. The critical factor affecting the government’s decision to bring outsourcing contracts back in-house is the status of private entities, particularly their number and quality. A lack of bidders or poor performance of private entities significantly impacts the decision to bring contracts back in-house. Thus, counties with scarce institutional resources are more likely to experience contract back-in. 2. The consideration for executing the decision to bring contracts back in-house hinges on whether the partnership alleviates government burdens or increases complications. When the trouble caused by the outsourced unit exceeds the trouble associated with bringing it back in-house, the decision is made to bring the contract back in-house. 3. The challenge of preemptive control lies in the absence of vendors or the presence of inadequate vendors, which disrupts the screening function.