我國監察權的變遷分析 The analysis on Control power change of R.O.C

Abstract
中國自先秦時期即有為鞏固君權而設計的監察機制,直到漢代御史制度的建立,監察權才有一較完整而有系統的規劃。雖然御史制度最主要的功能在為君王查察群臣,以防貪官污吏破壞政風,然御史功能的彰顯與否,實際上是取決於君主的態度:當開明的君王願意釋放權力且誠心察納諫言時,監察權即能發揮其最大之功效;反之,若遇專制之君主,則往往將所有權力集中於一己之身,讓御史只對百僚進行監督,此時的監察制度就只能淪為御用的報喪之犬了。 西方監察權的興起是為了彌補在三權分立制度下,行政機關在因應福利國家的需求而不斷擴張職權之際,所造成行政效率低落、行政官僚腐敗貪污的現象。然多數三權分立的國家並未設置一獨立的機構來行使監察權,而是以附屬於國會之下的彈劾與調查權來展現,以此方式來針對行政官員與機構而予以監督。但即便是在三權分立之下,監察權也有新的出路,如:瑞典的國會監察長制、美國的獨立檢察官制等,都為監察權的出路提供新的途徑。此外,國際性監察機構「國際監察組織」的成立,亦在在證明「監察權獨立」乃為世界潮流之趨勢。 我國自民國成立後,監察制度幾經變革,監察院從民初的「民意機關」,演變成為現在「國家最高之監察機關」,其中的設計除仿效中國古代御史的職權外,也參考了西方的監察機制,故而糾舉、彈劾、糾正、調查、審計、監試、巡迴監察等等功能,都在監察機制中展現。中國古代的監察機制難以擺脫掉司法的色彩,究其原因除有冤獄辨明此行政訴訟之權外,尚有懲戒之權;然現今之監察機構已無懲戒之權,故而較難收嚇阻、警惕之功效。 不管是三權分立或五權憲政,「權力分立」的設計最主要是在防止權力的集中,意即限制政府權力、保障人民權利。我國現行的監察制度是在政治協商下所設計的妥協產物,在實際的運作上已有難處,再加上憲法不斷的修改,更使得監察權被分化、監察機制被模糊,甚至是監察院被矮化的現象。在此情況下,吾人應做的不是廢除既有的監察院,而是應將監察院的職責釐清,將監察權回歸正常化,讓監察委員的出身不再是監察權無法伸張的藉口與絆腳石。 徒法不足以自行,同樣的,制度的設計是人,制度的奉行者是人,而制度的破壞者,也是人。若當權者無法體認到尊重法律與制度的重要性,仍以「君主人治」的心態來行事,再完美、再合宜的制度,仍無法有效的發揮其應有之功能。
In China, before Chin-Dynasty, there was control system designed for strengthening the monarchical power, until Han-Dynasty censor system established, the control power became a more complete and systematic scheme. The most important function of the censor system is to supervise the officials for monarch, and to avoid the greedy officials to disobey the discipline, but, in fact, the efficiency of censor system depends on the attitude of monarch: if the monarch is enlightened and willing to release his power, and accept the comments from the others sincerely, the control power will work well; if the monarch monopolizes and holds all the powers by himself, the control system is only to supervise his staffs, the system will be away from its original purpose. In west, under the system of division powers, the administration power expanded in order to meet the requirement of the welfare states, it led to administration efficiency is getting lower, and there are more and more corruption and degeneration, the control power arose in this way. However most of division-powers countries do not establish one independent organization to run its control power, the powers to impeach and investigate are belong to parliament. There is also new way for control power under the system of division powers, for example, parliament-control-system in Sweden, the independent public procurator in U.S.A., these are the new ways for control power. Besides, the establishment of international control organization “International Ombudsman Institute” (IOI)proved the trend of “independent supervision” in the world. After the establishment of R.O.C, the controller system reformed several times, in the beginning it was a “public-opinion institution”, and now, it is the highest control government organization, the powers include impeaching, correcting, investigating, auditing, examining, and so on.. However the control power nowadays doesn’t contain the power of punishing, so that it is hard to warn, alert and intimidate. Whether “Division Powers” or “Five-Power Constitution”, the design of separation of powers is to avoid the powers concentrated, in other words, it is to restrict the power of the government, and protect the rights of people. Our control system nowadays resulted from the political negotiations; there is difficulty when work in practice, to further more, our Constitution is amended constantly, the control power is divided, the control function is not clear. Under this situation, we should not abolish the “Control Yuan of R.O.C.”, but clarify the duty of it and normalize it. The law could not work by itself; it is the same that the system is designed by people: people might follow the system, and might destroy it as well. If the leader who holds power could not understand the importance to esteeming the law and system, the system will not work efficiently even though it is proper perfectly.
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Keywords
御史, 監察權, 權力分立, 彈劾, censor, control power, separation of powers, impeachment
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