Ernest Sosa德行可靠論(Virtue Reliabilism)與教育知識論的哲學探究

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Department of Education,National Taiwan Normal University


哲學領域中,知識論以探究知識為主要核心任務,教育活動致力於教導學生學會分辨真假並獲致知識,顯然知識是哲學與教育共同關心的重要課題。針對以知識為確證之真信念(justified true belief, JTB)的傳統定義,E. Gettier於1963年提出挑戰並引發熱烈討論,德行知識論遂於1980年代應運而生並逐漸受到重視。E. Sosa同樣質疑以知識為JTB的傳統定義,他提出的德行可靠論是德行知識論的一個派別,主張知識是出自智德的真信念,智德則是使認知者獲致真信念的認知傾向或能力。此外,Sosa把知識區分為動物型知識和反省型知識:前者是認知者展現認知的初階適切性下所獲致的知識,後者則是展現認知的次階適切性下獲致的知識。本文分三大部分:首先,論述Gettier問題對傳統知識之界定的挑戰與Sosa的回應;其次,討論Sosa德行可靠論的重要內涵;最後,省思Sosa德行可靠論中知識與智德的說法,同時對照討論Sosa的知態觀點與教育目標中的認知通觀,尋求相互闡發的可能性。
Both epistemology and education are concerned about knowledge. E. Gettier put forward a potentially devastating problem to challenge the long-held justified true belief (or JTB) account of knowledge in 1963 and his challenge caused much heated discussion. Virtue epistemology emerged in such an intellectual climate. Ernest Sosa as one important representative of virtue reliabilism, one school of virtue epistemology, also questioneds the JTB account of knowledge. Moreover, he claimed that knowledge is true belief out of intellectual virtue and intellectual virtue is the cognitive disposition or ability conducive for the knower to reach true belief. Meanwhile, Sosa suggested that knowledge can be divided into two types, namely animal knowledge, the attainment of which requires the first-order aptness displayed by the knower, and reflective knowledge, the attainment of which the second-order aptness. This paper consists of three sections: the challenge raised by the Gettier problem and Sosa’s response are firstly expounded; secondly, the main ideas inherent in Sosa’s virtue reliabilism are made clear; thirdly, Sosa’s views on knowledge and intellectual virtue are separately examined first and then contrasting discussions between Sosa’s epistemic perspective and cognitive perspective put forward in philosophy of education are carried out in the hope of mutual interpretations.