中國家族企業接班與租稅規避行為之探究

Abstract

近年來，中國家族企業數量逐年增加，在資本市場佔有重要地位。中國家族企業的股權集中於家族成員，且家族成員多擔任董事。因此，型II代理問題可能較嚴重。此外，中國法規制度不完善，使得家族企業有誘因進行規避租稅。本研究旨在探討相較於非家族企業，家族企業是否傾向進行租稅規避。本研究亦檢視創辦人是否擔任董事長及子女是否接班對中國家族企業租稅規避的影響。本研究選取2010年至2015年在上海及深圳交易所上市之企業為樣本，實證結果顯示，相較於非家族企業，家族企業較傾向規避租稅。實證結果亦顯示，創辦人是否擔任董事長及子女是否接班對於家族企業租稅規避僅有部分年度有顯著影響。In recent years, the number of Chinese family firms increased every year. Family firms play important roles in the capital markets. The ownership of the Chinese family firms is concentrated in the family members, and the family members serve as directors. Thus, Type II agency problems may be more severe. In addition, because the legal system in China is incomplete, family firms may have incentives to avoid taxes. The objective of this study is to explore whether compared to non-family firms, family firms are more likely to avoid taxes. The study also examines whether the founder serving as the chairman and the succession affect the magnitude of tax avoidance. The sample of this study is selected from firms listed in Shanghai Stock Market and Shenzhen Stock Market from 2010 to 2015. The empirical results show that compared to non-family firms, family firms are more likely to avoid taxes. The empirical results also show whether the founder serving as the chairman and succession have significant impact on tax avoidance of family firms only in serveral years.