監察院防腐機制功能與檢討
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2013
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中國監察制度歷久不墜，可見該制度必能發揮相當的正面功能。我國監察院組織始於1931年，並於1948年行憲後正式成立，歷經第一屆、第二屆及第三屆監察委員依憲法賦予的職權獨立行使，維繫憲政機關間的制衡機制。在民主進化的政黨輪替過程中，第四屆監察委員人選卻因朝野政治分歧，立法院遲未行使同意權，至再次政黨輪替後，於2008年7月4日完成同意權行使，第四屆監察委員才於同年8月1日就職，監察院得以恢復正常的運作。惟空懸的三年半，監察院防腐的功能，究有何作為與影響？監察委員由間接選舉改為總統提名立法院同意後任命，又有何癥結？監察院又真有防腐功用？綜上，本文將從民主法治防腐機制及監察院防腐機制功能進行檢討，經由監察院職權行使的成效與實務案例，推敲各項問題原因，並輔以瑞典、芬蘭、西班牙及以色列等監察使或護民官制度運作的探討，與我國現行監察制度進行比較，茲吸取可供我國參研之作法。
本研究結果，從監察委員人選、監察院職權貫徹、廉政系統獨立性、國會職權、資訊公開與透明化、及國家人權保障等問題，提出：一、適才適所善盡所能；二、強化政府防腐機制；三、加強國會職權連結；四、踐實糾彈制度功能；五、資訊公開全民監督；六、貫徹憲法賦予的起訴權；七、人權保障事權統一；八、避免成為政治工具等八項個人淺見。期能對政府相關機關於相關議題規劃上有所助益，同時提供對本文議題之相關研究後進參考，以延展該議題，使監察院防腐機制之功能，得以更為完善，並符合國人之期望。
Chinese supervisory system, having stood the test of time, has proven its positive role in the society. In 1931, works began for the organization of the Control Yuan of the Republic of China, which was formally established in 1948 following the enactment of the Constitution. Ever since its establishment, all members of the first, second and third mandate of the Control Yuan have enjoyed independence in carrying out their duties as stipulated by the Constitution. Such autonomy has contributed to maintaining the checks and balances among various branches of Constitutional Government. Following a transfer of power from one party to the other, serious conflicts among the ruling party and the opposition prevented the Legislative Yuan to approve the nominees of the fourth Control Yuan members. It was only after the second transfer of power did the Legislative Yuan consent to the fourth Control Yuan members on July 4th, 2008. The newly appointed members were inaugurated on August 1st of the same year that saw the Control Yuan restored to normalcy after standing idle for three and a half years. Questions arise as to whether the vacant period has affected Control Yuan’s function to fight corruption? Is it problematic to have the Control Yuan members nominated by the President of the ROC with consent by the Legislative Yuan, as opposed to an indirect election prior to the reform? Does the Control Yuan contribute to anti-corruption endeavor? Accordingly, this study adopts a functional review on the anti-corruption mechanisms of the Control Yuan and the democratic rule of law, with the aim of finding out the causes of problems by looking into the performance and case studies of Control powers. In addition, the study draws comparison between Control Yuan’s supervisory system and the ombudsman/defender systems in Sweden, Finland, Spanish and Israel as points of reference to improve our system. In terms of candidates of Control Yuan members, the implementation of Control powers, the independence of anti-corruption systems, the Legislative powers, the publicity and transparency of government information and the protection of human rights, the study proposes to: (1) Ensure the persona-job fit to maximize productivity in the public sector; (2) Enhance the government’s anti-corruption mechanism; (3) Strengthen communication with the legislature; (4) Exercise the impeachment and censure powers with real effect; (5) Improve freedom of information and public oversight; (6) Carry out the power of prosecution as given by the Constitution; (7) Unify the jurisdictions of human rights protection among different agencies; and (8) Avoid becoming a political machine. Hopefully, the above propositions can facilitate project planning in government agencies and offer useful references for future research, which in turn will boost Control Yuan’s role in anti-corruption to meet the expectation of the public.
Chinese supervisory system, having stood the test of time, has proven its positive role in the society. In 1931, works began for the organization of the Control Yuan of the Republic of China, which was formally established in 1948 following the enactment of the Constitution. Ever since its establishment, all members of the first, second and third mandate of the Control Yuan have enjoyed independence in carrying out their duties as stipulated by the Constitution. Such autonomy has contributed to maintaining the checks and balances among various branches of Constitutional Government. Following a transfer of power from one party to the other, serious conflicts among the ruling party and the opposition prevented the Legislative Yuan to approve the nominees of the fourth Control Yuan members. It was only after the second transfer of power did the Legislative Yuan consent to the fourth Control Yuan members on July 4th, 2008. The newly appointed members were inaugurated on August 1st of the same year that saw the Control Yuan restored to normalcy after standing idle for three and a half years. Questions arise as to whether the vacant period has affected Control Yuan’s function to fight corruption? Is it problematic to have the Control Yuan members nominated by the President of the ROC with consent by the Legislative Yuan, as opposed to an indirect election prior to the reform? Does the Control Yuan contribute to anti-corruption endeavor? Accordingly, this study adopts a functional review on the anti-corruption mechanisms of the Control Yuan and the democratic rule of law, with the aim of finding out the causes of problems by looking into the performance and case studies of Control powers. In addition, the study draws comparison between Control Yuan’s supervisory system and the ombudsman/defender systems in Sweden, Finland, Spanish and Israel as points of reference to improve our system. In terms of candidates of Control Yuan members, the implementation of Control powers, the independence of anti-corruption systems, the Legislative powers, the publicity and transparency of government information and the protection of human rights, the study proposes to: (1) Ensure the persona-job fit to maximize productivity in the public sector; (2) Enhance the government’s anti-corruption mechanism; (3) Strengthen communication with the legislature; (4) Exercise the impeachment and censure powers with real effect; (5) Improve freedom of information and public oversight; (6) Carry out the power of prosecution as given by the Constitution; (7) Unify the jurisdictions of human rights protection among different agencies; and (8) Avoid becoming a political machine. Hopefully, the above propositions can facilitate project planning in government agencies and offer useful references for future research, which in turn will boost Control Yuan’s role in anti-corruption to meet the expectation of the public.
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監察院, 防腐機制, 民主法治, 監察委員, Control Yuan, anti-corruption mechanism, democracy and rule of law, Member of the Control Yuan