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Center for Educational Research and Evaluation


研究目的 「德福一體」這個古老的爭議性學說在當前新興的正向心理學中似有復甦跡象,因正向心理學家宣稱要證明正向特質―品格優勢與德行,在促成真實的幸福中扮演不可或缺的關鍵角色。本文主張關心品德教育的人應當深入探討正向心理學關於德福關係的論證,因這將可回應「為何要有德」與「為何德行值得追求」等問題,此些根本問題鮮為當代品德教育論述所處理。據此,本文旨在分析正向心理學的德行觀與幸福觀,繼而檢視其對於德福關係的說明,最終提出由正向心理學視角重訪德福一體說對於當代品德教育的重要啟示。研究設計/方法/取徑本研究屬於教育哲學性質,採用方法主要為概念分析、論證分析與涵義詮釋。針對正向心理學論「德福關係」所牽涉的數個關鍵概念―包含品格優勢、德行、幸福等進行概念分析,著重在探討概念內涵與彼此之間的關係。其次針對正向心理學有關德福一體的論述進行論證分析。最終闡明正向心理學有關德福一體的新詮釋對於當代品德教育的啟示。研究發現或結論檢視完正向心理學有關德福一體的論證過後,本文指出由於正向心理學與當代品德教育所持的德行觀念有異,正向心理學宣稱要為品德教育方案的設計提供理論架構的承諾並無法實現。儘管如此,它廣義的德行觀驅使我們重新思考究竟好品格是什麼(其具體內涵為何)?以及單純從倫理意義上來設想好品格是否恰當?這狹義的品德教育正是當前所推動的。本文將指出英國伯明罕大學品德與美德銀禧中心所推行的品格教育正往正向心理學擘劃的新方向邁進。此外,正向心理學所提出的招牌優勢概念有助於闡明當代品德教育遺漏的重要課題—品格個殊化。研究原創性/價值本研究價值在於揭示正向心理學這門新興品格科學的重要論點―培養德行以達成幸福,實與古希臘幸福論所持「德福一體」這個古老哲學學說益趣相同。重訪此重要論題揭櫫哲學智慧與科學知識皆對於德福關係同感興趣。教育政策建議或實務意涵本研究重要建議與實務意涵主要有二。首先在品德教育教學實務上,正向心理學闡明德行培養與展現對於個人幸福之價值,有助於補足當前品德教育之證成流於工具性論證之不足。本研究指出,可從德行對於個人幸福的意義,來回應學生提出「為何要有德」、「德行為何值得追求」等提問。其次在教育政策上,正向心理學內涵豐富的品格優勢清單驅使我們重新思考「好品格」的意義,以及當前品德教育單純側重於「道德德行」之涵養是否不夠完整與適當的問題。關於此,英國伯明罕大學品德與美德銀禧中心倡導的品格教育可供對照。
PurposeThe age-old controversial doctrine the ‘unity of virtue and happiness’ (UVH) seems reviving in positive psychology (PP), when PP claims to demonstrate that positive traits, i.e. character strengths and virtues, play a decisive role in promoting authentic happiness. The author argues that people concerned with character education (CE) should inquire into PP’s arguments about the relation between virtue and happiness because they can respond to the questions ‘why be virtuous’ and ‘why is virtue worth pursuing’. These fundamental issues are seldom addressed by contemporary CE discourses. Accordingly, this paper is aimed to analyse PP’s conceptions of virtue and happiness, to examine PP’s elaboration on the relationship between virtue and happiness, and finally, to revisit and draw important implications the doctrine of UVH has for contemporary CE from the perspective of PP. Design/methodology/approachThis study belongs to philosophy of education in nature and the major methods applied are conceptual analysis, argument analysis, and implication interpretation. Certain core concepts involved in the relationship between virtue and happiness developed by PP are analysed by investigating their respective connotations and their relations. Next, an argument analysis is conducted on PP’s argument for UVH. Finally, some important implications for contemporary CE are derived from this new interpretation of UVH. FindingsAfter an examination of PP’s argument for UVH, it is found that, given the different conceptions of virtue held by PP and CE, PP’s promise to provide a theoretical framework for design of character development programmes cannot be kept. Nonetheless, PP’s conception of virtue in a broad sense urges us to reconsider what good character amounts to and whether it is appropriate to conceive of good character in a purely ethical sense, where CE is currently proceeding. The author points out that the CE proposed by The Jubilee Centre for Character & Virtues, University of Birmingham, UK, is developed in the new direction of PP. Besides, the concept of signature strength helps to illustrate a missing piece of the puzzle of contemporary CE, the idea of character individualisation. Originality/valueThe distinctive value of this study lies in revealing the fact that cultivating virtue to achieve happiness, the central thesis of the new character science PP, is in actuality in tune with the philosophical doctrine of UVH proposed by ancient eudaimonism. For that matter, it is shown that both philosophical wisdom and scientific knowledge are interested in the intricate relationship between virtue and happiness. Recommendations for Educational Policy / Implications in PracticeTwo important implications it has for CE are to be noted. Firstly, with regard to the teaching of CE, PP’s elaboration on the value of virtue cultivation and exercise for personal happiness helps to make up for the deficient tendency to instrumental arguments that current support for contemporary CE has. In response to students’ queries ‘why be virtuous’ and ‘why is virtue worth pursuing’, personal happiness is arguably an answer. Secondly, in terms of educational policy, the much richer list of character strengths made by PP compels us to reconsider what a good character amounts to and specifically whether it is complete and appropriate for contemporary CE to simply centre on inculcation of moral virtues. In this regard, the new version of CE proposed by The Jubilee Centre for Character & Virtues, University of Birmingham, UK is an important point of reference.