全球治理與台灣的活絡模式

Abstract

21世紀是具有「中國崛起」特色的「全球化」時代。各種紛至沓來的「全球化」政經變遷與伴隨「中國崛起」而來的全球性挑戰，不只已超越傳統國際關係的論述範疇，對於亟需開展外交空間的中華民國而言，更已成為最具挑戰性的當代課題；變局與危險前所未見，但也潛藏無窮機遇，而危險與機遇間的關鍵，則在於以「全球治理」的視野，找出能使中華民國長治久安的良策。 2008年5月20日，馬英九就任總統、中國國民黨重新在台灣執政，兩岸關係隨即進入和解休兵、共創雙贏的「融冰」階段。面對全球與兩岸新局，馬英九從上台開始即倡議「外交休兵」、「活路外交」的活絡模式，希望藉由「不統、不獨、不武」的「維持現狀」，建構一套能呼應台灣現狀並回應「全球化」與「中國崛起」挑戰的對外關係治理框架。 這個活絡模式的治理框架，以美中台三邊關係為核心，但它所處理的面向則已包含各種以全球為範圍的重要議題，能否妥善因應這些跨域性的全球性議題，已成為評估活絡模式的重要指標。然而，在馬英九政府全力推展活絡模式的同時，卻也面臨一個傳統的「囚徒困境」，主要包括：台灣內部複雜而敏感的族群政治、確保國家安全所必需的對美軍購與進行兩岸和解休兵之間的矛盾，以及馬英九民調聲望下滑所可能導致的政策負面衝擊等。 本文擬從「全球化」、「中國崛起」的視角，以「全球治理」的跨域網絡概念，分析並檢視活絡模式所必須處理的諸多重要議題及實踐成果，同時評估活絡模式可能的局限；最後，本文也對馬政府的活絡模式提出政策建言，包括：有必要深化並鞏固「外交休兵」、活路外交的論述，以及審時度勢，內外兼顧；對內，必須凝聚民意支持，「民無信不立」； 對外，要建構互信、信守承諾，「以小事大以智、以大事小以仁」，如此，活絡模式即有可能達成「以台灣為主、對人民有利」、「要安全、要尊嚴、要有合理的國際活動空間」的國家目標。

21st century is an era of globalization with the characteristic of China's Rising. How to deal with the new challenges have been becoming the core issue of Taiwan's foreign policy. When President Ma Ying-jeou took office on May 20, 2008, “diplomacy truce” and “Flexible diplomacy” officially became the most important guiding principles of Taiwan's foreign policy; at the same time, the cross-strait relations entered a so-called “melting ice” stage of reconciliation and truce. Literally, “diplomacy truce” means a stoppage of offensive competing recognitions that can be categorized as a “zero-sum” game. Furthermore, “diplomacy truce” also represents a suspension of an armed conflict and arms race between Taiwan and China. On the other hand, “Flexible diplomacy” means Taiwan needs more international space with dignity. In short, “diplomacy truce” and “Flexible diplomacy” are sort of modus vivendi strategy customized for Taiwan's status quo. However, since China's “one China” principle, vowing not to give up the choice of force-using reunification with Taiwan, and the long-term containment and suppression on Taiwan's international space, President Ma Ying-jeou repeatedly reaffirmed that “diplomacy truce” is not “national defense truce”, and Taiwan will continue to buy American defensive weapons. As a result, President Ma Ying-jeou's modus vivendi strategy faces a “prisoner's dilemma”: how to keep a good bilateral relation with China while maintaining the arms-buying with the United States? In essence, modus vivendi is similar to a finely balanced lever. Each side of the lever, namely Taiwan-US relations and cross-strait relations. The following is the most sensitive question of Taiwan's foreign relations: Is cross-strait relations the “host choice” of Taiwan foreign the policy? Or Taiwan-US relations is to be the upper one ? This is the core issue of this paper want to explore about.