以基於決策實驗室分析法之網路流程法定義頻譜拍賣機制

Abstract

頻寬使用率最大化是目前政府電信政策的重要目標，適合的拍賣機制是影響頻寬使用率與政府收入最大化和的重要因素。近年來，學者不斷提出各種頻譜拍賣機制，以符合下世代無線通訊之需求，並滿足前述目標。唯如何設計與選擇最適合頻譜拍賣機制對於已開發國家和開發中國家之政府始終是最重要的電信政策。設計良好的拍賣機制可引起廠商參與競標的興趣，經營能力較佳的廠商自然有能力付出較高標金獲取執照，而支付意願最高之廠商通常能使頻譜之價值最大化，而標金也會接近市場價值並可為國家政府帶來可觀的收益。但如何定義頻譜拍賣機制並無絕對的答案，為了設計符合權變理論之決策分析架構以拍賣次世代無線通訊頻譜，本研究 將使用基於決策實驗室分析法(DEMATEL)之網路流程，已DEMATEL建構決策分析問題架構，並以基於決策實驗室分析法之網路流程求取對應因素之權重值，並以前述權重使用VIKOR法對應於各拍賣機制之評估準則績效值訂定適合的拍賣模式作為政府評估拍賣機制和決策之基準。本研究結果顯示出資訊是最重要的構面，而資訊當中的勾結度是最具有影響力來設計頻譜拍賣機制準則並決策公開向上的模式拍賣。本議題的標準可以作為政府電信政策定義選擇最合適的頻譜拍賣機制的基礎。

Maximization of the bandwidth utilization efficiency is the ultimate goal for the telecommunication spectrum management policy. An appropriate spectrum auction mechanism is essential for the maximization of spectrum utilizations and government income. Various spectrum auction mechanisms are available. How the most suitable spectrum auction mechanism can be designed and selected is always the essential issues for national governments. A well-designed auction mechanism will motivate telecommunication service provider’s interests in bidding. Firms with better operation capability always have the intention to pay a higher price to obtain license. The firms which can pay with the highest price usually get the usage right of the spectrum and thus, contribute considerable revenue to the national government. Albeit important, such issues have seldom been addressed and have no definite answers. In order to define a decision making framework for the selection of an appropriate spectrum auction mechanism, the DEMATEL based Network Process (DNP) will be proposed. The criteria will first be summarized by literature review and then confirmed based on experts’ opinions by using the modified Delphi method. Then, the influence weights being associated with the criteria will be derived by DNP. The Vlse Kriterijumska Optimizacija I Kompromisno Resenje (VIKOR) will then be introduced for performance evaluation by aforementioned weighting to define a suitable auction mechanism. An empirical study based on opinions being provided by experts from Taiwanese government, academic as well as research institutes will be introduced to verify the feasibility of the analytic framework. The empirical study results demonstrate that information is the most important aspect, while the collusion on bidders of information is the most influential criteria which may influence the decision of spectrum auction mechanism. Further, the open ascending-bid is selected as the most suitable spectrum auction model being derived by VIKOR. Based on the empirical study results, the proposed criteria and derived open ascending-bid mechanism can serve as the basis for governmental telecommunication policy definitions for the next generation wireless telecommunication spectrum allocations .