敵對下的接觸:兩岸密使對話與協商談判(1988-2000)
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2024
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75年間,敵對的臺灣與中國大陸,因各有其兩岸定位,兩岸主權與治權主張,深陷棘手衝突。此2元素,影響的是彼此統治當局,執政的合法性與正當性,兩造的一貫行徑,即相互否認,拒絕承認。大部分的兩岸問題,由此而生。本研究關注,溝通,是讓臺灣與中國大陸兩造,從政治光譜兩端逐漸靠攏的唯一途徑。比起公開渠道、幕前渠道,兩方在秘密渠道、幕後渠道,因有意隱瞞的前提,能真正地進行溝通,且即便是在軍事緊張的最關鍵時刻,接觸還在持續。兩岸間,起碼存在50年的兩岸秘密渠道,即「兩岸密使」渠道的運作。本研究採文獻分析法,自臺灣視角出發,針對1988年至2000年,李登輝時期的兩岸秘密渠道,展開研討。研究發現,因中國大陸的主動探意,臺灣方面,同意建立至少3個秘密渠道,分別對接其鄧小平指定接班人、解放軍與中共元老。兩岸秘密渠道,是敵對的海峽兩岸政治實體,故意完全/部分隱瞞「國內」和國際的行為者,並藉由最高當局授權的兩岸密使,進行包括談判與非談判的任何溝通,其中明顯涵括,高度政治性的「對話」,與事務性、高度政治性的「協商談判」,不論目的為何。並且,兩岸秘密渠道,與公開渠道一樣掌握「最高當局授權」的最高原則, 不一樣的是「具保密性」。兩岸是達到一定程度的「準備妥當」,展開兩岸渠道。兩岸密使,有同時達到第1和第2階段,政治掩護和真正挖掘彼此的潛在利益和優先事項,但沒有來到第3階段,產生一個可實施的協議。
Over the past 75 years, Taiwan and Mainland China had been in an adversarial position due to their respective cross-strait position, sovereign and jurisdictional claims, and these had caused them to be in intractable conflicts. Also, these factors have influenced the legality and legitimacy of each side's ruling authorities, both parties denied and refused to admit this. Since then, most of the cross-strait issues have arisen from this dynamic. This study focuses on the idea that effective communication is the one and only way for Taiwan and Mainland China to converge from opposing ends of the political spectrum. If they intend to be more private in their communications, both parties can opt to communicate through secret or back channels, as compared to open channels. Even during the most critical times of military tension, the contact still continues. There have been at least 50 years of secret channels between the two sides, known as the"cross-strait emissaries” channels. This study uses a document analysis method, examining the secret channels during Lee Teng-hui's presidency from 1988 to 2000. From Taiwan’s perspective, the research finds that due to Mainland China's proactive approach, Taiwan had agreed to establish at least three secret channels, connecting respectively to Deng Xiaoping's designated successors, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials. The cross-strait secretchannels, involved the two adversarial political entities intentionally and partially or entirely concealing activities from"domestic" and international actors. These channels, authorized by the highest authorities on both sides, facilitate all forms of communication, including both high level political dialogues and practical, high level political negotiations, regardless of their ultimate goals. Like open channels, the secret channels operate under the highest principle of "authorization by the highest authorities," but differ in their “secrecy”. Both sides reached readiness to initiate these channels. The emissaries on both sides achieved the first and second stages of political cover and exploration of underlying interests and priorities, but unfortunately, it did not reach the third stage of implementation of agreement.
Over the past 75 years, Taiwan and Mainland China had been in an adversarial position due to their respective cross-strait position, sovereign and jurisdictional claims, and these had caused them to be in intractable conflicts. Also, these factors have influenced the legality and legitimacy of each side's ruling authorities, both parties denied and refused to admit this. Since then, most of the cross-strait issues have arisen from this dynamic. This study focuses on the idea that effective communication is the one and only way for Taiwan and Mainland China to converge from opposing ends of the political spectrum. If they intend to be more private in their communications, both parties can opt to communicate through secret or back channels, as compared to open channels. Even during the most critical times of military tension, the contact still continues. There have been at least 50 years of secret channels between the two sides, known as the"cross-strait emissaries” channels. This study uses a document analysis method, examining the secret channels during Lee Teng-hui's presidency from 1988 to 2000. From Taiwan’s perspective, the research finds that due to Mainland China's proactive approach, Taiwan had agreed to establish at least three secret channels, connecting respectively to Deng Xiaoping's designated successors, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials. The cross-strait secretchannels, involved the two adversarial political entities intentionally and partially or entirely concealing activities from"domestic" and international actors. These channels, authorized by the highest authorities on both sides, facilitate all forms of communication, including both high level political dialogues and practical, high level political negotiations, regardless of their ultimate goals. Like open channels, the secret channels operate under the highest principle of "authorization by the highest authorities," but differ in their “secrecy”. Both sides reached readiness to initiate these channels. The emissaries on both sides achieved the first and second stages of political cover and exploration of underlying interests and priorities, but unfortunately, it did not reach the third stage of implementation of agreement.
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李登輝, 兩岸秘密渠道, 兩岸密使, 棘手衝突, 準備妥當, Lee Teng-hui, Cross-Strait Secret Channels, Cross-Strait Emissaries, Intractable Conflict, Readiness Theory