股吧投資專家對分析師盈餘預測影響之探究

Abstract

財務分析師可能因所屬券商業務不同而產生利益衝突，發布具有偏頗的盈餘預測。然而，分析師可能因為競爭，為維護聲譽而提升盈餘預測準確性或是減少盈餘偏頗。中國網路投資平台崛起，股吧投資專家在股吧發表看法受到許多關注，對於追蹤同一公司的分析師而言，形成一股外部競爭壓力。本研究目的係檢視股吧投資專家對某公司發表意見與否對追蹤該公司分析師的盈餘預測錯誤及偏頗影響。實證結果顯示，當有影響力股吧專家於本季發表看法時，前季及下一季均追蹤該公司分析師一致性盈餘預測錯誤會減少;然而，對於前季及下一季均追蹤該公司分析師一致性盈餘預測偏頗並無顯著影響。額外分析部分，當有影響力股吧專家發表意見時，在前季及本季均追蹤該公司分析師一致性盈餘預測錯誤以及分析師一致性盈餘預測偏頗會增加。

Financial analysts may have conflicts of interest due to different businesses of their brokerage firms. They may issue biased earnings forecasts. However, analysts may improve the accuracy of earnings forecasts or reduce earnings forecast bias in order to maintain reputation due to competition. With the rapid growth of China's online investment platforms, investment experts' opinions on Gub have attracted a lot of attention. Analysts may face external competitive pressure when investment experts provide opinions related to the same company on Gub. The purpose of this research is to examine whether financial analysts' forecast error and forecast bias will change when the Gub's investment experts express opinions on the company which analysts follow.

The empirical results show that when influential Gub's experts express their opinions in the current quarter, the magnitude of analyst consensus earnings forecasts errors is significantly lower for those analysts following the company in the previous and next quarters. However, the magnitude of analyst consensus earnings forecasts biases is not significantly lower for those analysts following the company in the previous and next quarters. In the additional analyses, when influential Gub's experts express their opinions, the magnitude of analyst consensus earnings forecasts errors and biases significantly increases for those analysts following the company in the previous and current quarters.