Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://rportal.lib.ntnu.edu.tw:80/handle/20.500.12235/94719
Title: 中國上市公司定向增發盈餘管理行為之探究
Exploring Earning Management of Chinese Private Placement Firms
Authors: 陳慧玲
Hueiling Chen
吳雅婷
Ya-Ting Wu
Keywords: 定向增發
大股東掠奪行為
盈餘管理
閉鎖期
Private placements
Large shareholders’ tunneling incentives
Earnings management
Lock-in period
Issue Date: 2015
Abstract: 本研究旨在探討中國進行定向增發的上市公司之盈餘管理行為,檢視大股東有無掠奪小股東誘因及定向增發認購人種類是否會影響公司於定向增發通過日前盈餘管理的方向。本研究認為大股東有誘因掠奪小股東之定向增發公司,在定向增發通過日前,可能會進行向下盈餘管理;此外,大股東無誘因掠奪小股東之定向增發公司在定向增發通過日前,可能會進行向上盈餘管理。本研究亦認為,定向增發對象僅為機構投資人之定向增發公司,在定向增發通過日前,公司可能會進行向上盈餘管理。此外,本研究認為大股東基於私利,可能於閉鎖期結束前進行向上盈餘管理,以利其在閉鎖期結束後出售股票。因此,本研究亦檢測大股東認購之公司是否會於大股東閉鎖期結束前向上盈餘管理。 實證結果顯示,相較於配對公司,大股東有誘因掠奪小股東之定向增發公司,會在定向增發通過日的前一年,透過提高裁決性應計項目與賒銷來向上管理盈餘。此外,相較於配對公司,大股東無誘因掠奪小股東之定向增發公司及無大股東認購之定向增發公司在定向增發通過日的前一年,會利用增加裁決性應計項目與增加賒銷向上操縱盈餘。定向增發對象為大股東之定向增發公司,在閉鎖期結束的前一年,會透過減少營業外支出向上盈餘管理。
This research aims to investigate the earning management activities of Chinese listed private placement firms. The study examines whether the tunneling incentives of large shareholders and the identity of purchasers may influence the earning management direction before the date of private placements approved by the board of directors. We propose that the private placement firms whose large shareholders have tunneling incentives may engage in downward earning management. In addition, firms whose large shareholders have no tunneling incentives may engage in upward earning management. We also propose that firms may manipulate earnings upwards when large shareholders are not private placement purchasers. Furthermore, we propose that large shareholders for their own interests may have incentives to manipulate earnings upwards before the lock-in period ends. Thus, we examine whether firms whose large shareholders are purchasers may manage earnings upwards when lock-in period ends. The empirical results reveal that comparing with the matched firms, the private placement firms whose large shareholders have tunneling incentives increase credit sales and discretionary accruals. Moreover, comparing with the matched firms, the private placement firms whose large shareholder have no tunneling incentives and firms whose large shareholders do not purchase shares increase the discretionary accruals and credit sales before the date of private placements approved by the board of directors. Furthermore, firms decrease the non-operating expense before lock-in period ends.
URI: http://etds.lib.ntnu.edu.tw/cgi-bin/gs32/gsweb.cgi?o=dstdcdr&s=%22http://etds.lib.ntnu.edu.tw/cgi-bin/gs32/gsweb.cgi?o=dstdcdr&s=id=%22GN060155012O%22.&%22.id.&
http://rportal.lib.ntnu.edu.tw:80/handle/20.500.12235/94719
Other Identifiers: GN060155012O
Appears in Collections:學位論文

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