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The Formation of Semi-Presidentialism and the Constitutional Dilemma Faced by the Minority Government in Taiwan – from the Perspective of Historical Institutionalism
Ph.D. Paul Chao-hiang Chu
為了解釋我國半總統制的形成與運作困境，本文嘗試運用歷史制度主義(historical institutionalism）的假設與研究途徑，以中長期的時間視野、兼容宏觀與微觀的角度，追溯歷史進程與制度的路徑依賴，在關鍵時刻（critical juncture）分析主要行動者的偏好選擇與互動，從探尋我國半總統制的形成歷史及體制爭議中，重新檢視少數政府憲政困境的根源。2008年實施新的立委選舉制度後，一黨多數政府再次出現，在我國半總統制與並立式單一選區兩票制的憲政架構下，少數政府是否仍有重現的制度空間？此亦為本文的關心焦點。|
After many constitutional reforms, semi-presidentialism was established in the constitutional reform of 1997 to act as the constitutional structure of Taiwan. However, this constitutional reform of 1997 was controversial and led to the first party alteration in 2000, also influenced by the special historical environment and constitutional culture of Taiwan, and the party alteration resulted in constitutional dilemma faced by the minority government formed when there was still a clear majority party in the Legislative Yuan. Based on the above, this article first intends to explain the following issues: How was this controversial system established? How was the phenomenon of path dependence, which influenced the establishment of the semi-presidentialism, created under the Constitution and historical structure of Taiwan? Why did the parties finally choose this controversial system in the course of democratic transformation under the existing systems, historical structures and environment? Second, this article tries to figure out what the deficiencies, disputes or grey areas were in the constitutional system of Taiwan that allowed the formation and existence of the minority government without any call for a dismissal of cabinet from opposite parties during the 8 years that the constitutional dilemma faced by the minority government had lasted. In addition, constitutional difficulties were created due to not only the deficiencies in system, but also the hostile relationship and conflicts (which were arisen by historical structure, political environment and different beliefs) between parties. Therefore, this article focuses on important bills and events to analyze the difficulties in the function of a minority government. More importantly, this article intends to find out what effects are imposed on the constitutional system and the current unified government of Taiwan by the minority government which had lasted for a period of time. To explain the difficulties in the establishment and function of the semi-presidentialism of Taiwan, this article traces the path dependence of the progress of history and system; analyzes the preferred choice and interactions that the prime movers make at critical junctures; and examines again the root of the constitutional dilemma faced by the minority government by way of searching the history of the formation of the semi-presidentialism of Taiwan and disputes in systems, based on the hypothesis and research course of the historical institutionalism, mid-long term perspective and both macroscopic and microscopic viewpoints. After 2008 when a new electoral system for legislators was implemented, a unified government showed up again. In view of this, this article also puts emphasis on if there is any room for the restoration of a minority government under the current main constitutional structures of Taiwan formed by the semi-presidentialism and the single-member district, dual ballot system.
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