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The Impacts of Enlarged Contacts between the CCP and the KMT on Cross-Strait Relations,2004-2006
Lien-Soong's Visits to China
Cross-Strait Economic Forum
研究生姓名：余莓莓 指導教授：陳延輝 博士
National Taiwan Normal University Graduate Institute of Political Science Title of Thesis：The Impacts of Enlarged Contacts between the CCP and the KMT on Cross-Strait Relations, 2004-2006 Year: 2009 Student：Yu, Meimei Advisor : Chen,Yenhui Ph.D. Abstract : President Chen, Shuibian and Vice President Annette Lu won the presidential election 2000 thanks to the split of the pan-blue camp. With a Taiwan-born party, President Chen was given unusual opportunities and resources to change domestic political ecology and to foster cross-strait relationship refraining from the burden of selling Taiwan out. Nevertheless, the rush and rough policy process for ceasing the Fourth Nuclear Project had antagonized the disorganized Kuomintang and the People's First Party and coincidentally pushed them to reunite together, fighting against the ruling Democratic Progressive Party. Since then, Chen administration had lost confidence and got involved endless boycotts from the pan-blue opposition parties. As for cross-strait relations, Beijing authorities, excepting for its strategic concerns, had been highly suspicious of Chen's independence position even though Chen tried very hard to reach out his olive branch to Beijing. Beijing even grasped Taiwan's diplomatic ally Nauru away during Chen inaugurating his DPP chairmanship. Being humiliated by Beijing and, in addition, suspected by the green camp for his not earning much support from the middle-liners over China policy, Chen turned back to the dark-green line by putting forth a series of pro-independence countermeasures, such as proposing “One country on Either Side, ” “Referendum, ” “Rectification of Names,” and “ Rewriting the Constitution ” etc. Nevertheless, Chen's radical approaches appeasing his green supporters were interpreted as a move toward changing the status quo, as was opposed to the US position as well as China and the pan-blue's political interests. Chen became a trouble-maker for the temporarily strategic triad. Apparently, the cross-strait stalemate and the deteriorating US-Taiwan relationship offered an advantageous space for Lien-Soong's visits to China. Lien and Hu Jintao even initiated the Cross-Strait Economic Forum. Lien and Soong signed with Hu respectively “ Lien-Hu Joint Announcement” as well as “Soong-Hu Joint Announcement.” Ironically, Chen administration seemed helpless and pale in dealing with Lien-Soong's visits to China before and after, as were obviously opposed to “The Act Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area”. From then on, the ruling DPP had been further marginalized while the closer cooperation and contacts between the KMT and the CCP had brought about more vibrant social and economic exchanges across the Taiwan Strait. The Red-Blue alliance to constrain the Green is emerging. In coping with this trend, Chen decided to alleviate China's economic magnetic effects by replacing “Active Opening” with “Active Management”, but his policy was severely challenged by the KMT's triumph at the legislature as well as the strong presenceof tycoons' business interests. Chen's another move to abolish both the Unification Guidelines and the National Unification Council also encountered fierce protests and strong backfire from the pan-blue camps, China, and the US. The ruling DPP become the opposite party against the triad of anti-independence. The DPP then was pushed to the corner of the quadrangular relations. From a historical point of view, Lien-Soong' China visits, though a small step in the history of cross-strait relations, do play as a significant switch or facilitator to make Taiwan lean toward China.
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