Biophilosophy and the Logic of Nonsense: 
A Deleuzian Reading of Lewis Carroll’s 
Two *Alice* Books

Advisor: Dr. Hanping Chiu

Advisee: Yu-Chi Chiang

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生命哲學與荒誕邏輯：
卡洛爾《愛麗絲夢遊仙境》與《愛麗絲鏡中奇遇》的德勒茲式閱讀

中文摘要

本論文檢視路易斯·卡洛爾《愛麗絲夢遊仙境》與《愛麗絲鏡中奇遇》兩本小說中的荒誕邏輯。在視荒誕邏輯為卡洛爾生命哲學的前提下，本文討論卡洛爾如何引發愛麗絲奇遇旅程中語言、主體性及時空記憶的荒誕，以達到顛覆愛麗絲的目的。

時至今日，荒誕學派仍有大量文獻將卡洛爾兩本愛麗絲小說中的荒誕讀成封閉、自我指涉的語言系統。這本論文有別於以往讀法之處，在於檢視生命哲學與荒誕邏輯之間被忽略的關係。鑒於本研究所採取的理论立場，以及上述領域現狀的簡要回顧，本研究探索的問題是：荒誕邏輯在卡洛爾生命哲學的建構中，是否扮演重要角色？為了回答這個問題，我們假設眩暈效果是在愛麗絲的人類有限性之力衝擊到未然夢境中非人無限性之力時產生，而闖入的域外所造成的顛撲如潮汐漲落般刷洗掉兩波海潮間在沙灘上所畫的一張臉，並以迫近此刻的生命力來抵禦宿命，開啟生命哲學頓悟的契機。基於此項假設，我們希望能更了解「人可以怎麼存活」的存有倫理議題。

本論文的主體分成三個章節。核心論述的主旨，在討論荒誕夢境如何以荒誕的眩暈效果解放愛麗絲的語言、主體性及時空記憶。第一章〈卡洛爾怪誕語言中的直覺譫慾力〉處理以下研究問題：何以像〈刦搏沃麒龍〉這樣的荒誕詩，會在愛麗絲無法理解的情況下，反倒激發她的靈感？一反荒誕學派將卡洛爾的荒誕詩讀成封閉、自我指涉的語言系統，我們主張他詩中譫慾役使的語言怪獸已回到地表，遊移於意義與荒誕之間的無人疆界，以直覺感知進行對角線式的橫貫運動。在意義的領域中，卡洛爾的荒誕詩過度生產沒有意義的意義，以達到意義的零度，並以詩作為反實現化力場，將已體制化的現狀流變回直覺式的未然。

第二章〈「你是誰？」—域外之爪下愛麗絲的主體化過程〉，使用傅柯的域外理論及德勒茲在《傅柯》一書中所闡述的域外之爪，檢驗愛麗絲的主體性。本章旨在闡明，愛麗絲對自我視聽檔案的認知，不斷遭受如身形變化(可視感受圖式)及邏輯衝突(可述自發圖示)等域外之力的闖入而天旋地轉。另一方面，人的生命力所潛藏的狂熱的好奇心，驅使愛麗絲域內之力皺摺其他域外之力，使得主體化區域因不斷遭逢「域外內部化」而得以抗拒生命的僵斃，並建立對自我的倫理關係。第三章〈纏擾的記憶：愛麗絲穿越的荒誕時空〉，討論愛麗絲身處的混宇時空所造成的記憶暈眩。瘋狂茶會中時間的凍結及空間的置換，以及紅、白皇后的「兩個國度說」不斷提醒著愛麗絲，這位國家機器派來的城鎮量測官，已進入平滑時空的未然幽微世界。歷史的記憶及空間的經緯敵不過語言及口腹之慾的暴力侵襲，使愛麗絲只能記得，過去的「貧乏」記憶逐漸蛻變為忘卻現在、憶及未來的域外記憶。本章的結論是：愛麗絲越是從記憶中重述奇遇的「歷史」，她就越有可能因生出自野性的記憶而丟掉地圖，走進地下與鏡中的「狼群」中。

關鍵詞：卡洛爾、德勒茲、愛麗絲小說、生命哲學、荒誕邏輯
Biophilosophy and the Logic of Nonsense: A Deleuzian Reading of Lewis Carroll’s Two Alice Books

Abstract
This thesis examines the logic of nonsense in Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass. Viewing the logic of nonsense as Carroll’s biophilosophy, the thesis discusses how Carroll generates nonsense in language, subjectivity, and spatiotemporal memory to unsettle Alice in her nonsensical encounters.

Up to this point, a fairly large body of literature in Nonsense School still reads the nonsense in Carroll’s two Alice books as a closed, self-referential language system. This thesis distinguishes itself from its progenitors by examining the unacknowledged relationship between biophilosophy and the logic of nonsense. Given the theoretical position taken for the study and the status of the field as briefly reviewed above, the study aims to provide an answer to the following question: Does the logic of nonsense play a role in Carroll’s construction of biophilosophy? To answer this question, we propose a hypothesis that the giddy effects arise when Alice’s forces of human finitude encounter forces of inhuman infinity in virtual dreams, and the folding of the intrusive outside washes off Alice’s “face drawn in the sand between two tides” (F 89), and initiates a possible moment of epiphany with this now intimate power of life that helps resist life’s destiny. Given this hypothesis, it is hoped that in answering this question we may gain a better understanding of the ontological issue: “How One Might Live.”

This thesis is divided into three major chapters. Our central argument facilitates a discussion of how the nonsensical dreams liberate Alice’s language, subjectivity, and spatiotemporal memory with the giddy effects of nonsense. Chapter One, “Power of Intuitive Délire in Lewis Carroll’s Monstrous Language,” addresses the question: Why does a nonsense poem like “Jabberwocky” fill Alice with ideas when she does not exactly know what they are? While Nonsense School tends to read Carroll’s nonsense poetry as closed, self-referential language system, we argue that his délire-driven linguistic monsters have returned to the surface to intuit the diagonal movements across the borderline between sense and nonsense. In the domain of sense, Carroll’s nonsense poems overproduce sense-deprived sense to reach sense degree zero, and serve as true sites of counter-effectuation that bring actuality (institution) back to virtuality (intuition). Chapter Two, “‘Who are you?’—the Subjectivation of Alice in the Claws of the Outside,” uses Foucault’s theory of outside and Deleuze’s book on Foucault to examine Alice’s subjectivity. This chapter predicates that Alice’s savoir of herself in audio-visual archive is snatched away by such intrusive forces from the outside as size alterations (the visible) and clash of different logics (the articulable). The study presented here illustrates how passionate curiosity in human power of life drives the forces within Alice to fold in other forces from the outside so that the zone of subjectivation constantly undergoing the “interiorization of the outside” (F 98) to resist life’s impasse and establish an ethical relation to oneself. Chapter Three, “A Memory That Haunts: Time and Space in Alice’s Dreams,” discusses Alice’s memory failures in chaotic time-space. The freezing of time and substituting of space at the mad tea-party, and the issue of “two countries” brought up by Red and White Queens together serve as a constant reminder that the town surveyor Alice sent by the State Apparatus has entered smooth time-space in virtual dreams. The verbal and oral aggressiveness has inflicted violence upon the memory of history and the stration of space to shift Alice’s poor sort of memory that works only backward to memory of the outside that forgets the present and remembers the future. This chapter concludes that the more Alice retells the “history” of her adventures from her memory, the more likely she will throw away her map, and join the “pack of wolves” in two Alices.

Keywords: Carroll, Deleuze, Alice books, biophilosophy, the logic of nonsense
Acknowledgements

Please bear with me, my readers, if my acknowledgements seem lengthy. Read on and you will know why I have so much to say and so many to thank.

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## Notes on the References and Abbreviations

For this study, I have used the Norton Critical Edition of Lewis Carroll’s two Alice books: *Alice in Wonderland*, *Through the Looking-Glass*, and *The Hunting of the Snark*: Backgrounds and Essays in Criticism, ed. Donald J. Gray. 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1992). Following Donald Rackin’s convention in *Nonsense, Sense, and Meaning*, I will use *AW* (when referring to *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland*), *TLG* (when referring to *Through the Looking-Glass*), and *HS* (when referring to *The Hunting of the Snark*) before the page citations. The other following abbreviations will also be used in giving references to more frequently cited works.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deleuze (and friends)</th>
<th>Carroll</th>
<th>Lecercle</th>
<th>Others</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AO</strong> Anti-Oedipus</td>
<td><em>AW, TLG</em></td>
<td>Deleuze and Language</td>
<td><strong>AME</strong> Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ATP</strong> A Thousand Plateaus</td>
<td><em>HS</em></td>
<td>The Force of Language</td>
<td><strong>Bios</strong> Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B</strong> Bergsonism</td>
<td><em>Snark: Backgrounds and Essays in Criticism</em></td>
<td>Philosophy through the Looking Glass</td>
<td><strong>CGL</strong> Course in General Linguistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CI</strong> Cinema 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>GDLS</strong> Gilles Deleuze’s Logic of Sense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C2</strong> Cinema 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>NSM</strong> Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass: Nonsense, Sense, and Meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D II</strong> Dialogues II</td>
<td></td>
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<td><strong>PI</strong> Philosophical Investigations</td>
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<td><strong>DR</strong> Difference and Repetition</td>
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<td><strong>VPI</strong> Victorian People and Ideas</td>
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<td><strong>ECC</strong> Essays Critical and Clinical</td>
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Introduction

Lewis Carroll’s Nonsense Literature: Why Begins with an M?

If there’s no meaning in it . . . that saves a world of trouble, you know, as we needn’t try to find any. And yet I don’t know . . . I seem to see some meaning in them, after all. (AW 95)

Each generation has its own Alice to read. Although Martin Gardner’s definitive edition of The Annotated Alice in 2000 (after his 1960 and 1990 versions) manages to fill the gaps between Carroll’s Victorian wit and contemporary readers’ appreciation, the life and the Alice books of Mr. Charles Dodgson (the real name of Lewis Carroll) seem, according to Virginia Woolf in 1939, hard to grasp as ever. Carroll is said to be the most quoted author after Shakespeare (Philips, “Foreword” xvii), and his elusive yet immortal Alice phenomenon continues its glamour in media other than print publications like musicals, psychedelic songs, animations, video games, and television and film adaptations. Tim Burton’s 3-D action-adventure movie Alice in Wonderland released in USA in March 2010 is a recent tribute to Carroll’s two Alice books, which features a top biller commercial cast and an “empowered” heroine image. This snowball effect is reaching its zenith in the 2010s because 2012 is the 150th Anniversary of the first telling of the story on that memorable boating trip, and 2015 will be the 150th Anniversary of the publication of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. This generation stands on the cusp of the rising Alice frenzy, and the way it reads suggests something about how we place Carroll’s life and the Alice books in our culture.

1 As Woolf put it in 1939, “We ought to be able to grasp him whole and entire. But we fail—once more we fail. We think we have caught Lewis Carroll; we look again and see an Oxford clergyman. We think we have caught the Reverend C. L. Dodgson—we look again and see a fairy elf. The book breaks in two in our hands” (47).
2 Grace Slick’s LSD lyric in Jefferson Airplane’s 1966 hit song “White Rabbit” in a sense reflects this generation’s popular psychedelic readings of Carroll’s Alice books.
3 For further discussion of Tim Burton’s Alice, see Larry Rohter’s “Drinking Blood: New Wonders of Alice’s World,” Manohla Dargis’s “What’s a Nice Girl Doing in this Hole?” and Richard Corliss’s “Tim Burton’s Frabjous Alice.”
We read not to find an all-time definitive version of interpretation, but to put our gloss on the *Alice* stories unique to this generation. If this statement finds no objections, then the next question is how this generation can read Carroll and two *Alices* in its unique way.

**Statement of Problem**

Nonsense has always been a much explored area by Carroll scholars. In fact, one of the major preoccupations of the Nonsense School critics has been investigating the nature of Lewis Carroll’s literary nonsense. In exploring Carroll’s nonsense, the Nonsense School from the 1950s to 1970s provides interesting views on order-disorder dialect, distinction between nonsense and non-sense, the order-conscious guerrillas begrudging and setting back the global centrality of language at a local level of warfare, and a strict self-referential framework not relatable to the everyday world. Curiously enough, there is a gap between 1980 and 2012. Although Carroll’s literary nonsense continues to be a challenging issue, the Nonsense School of Criticism becomes lackadaisical for the past three decades because their theories turn problematic when Carroll’s elusive nonsense is still enclosed within their high walls of language. In fact, it would be terribly mistaken to see Carroll’s madness stay at the level of language. In our reading, Carroll’s logic of nonsense can be viewed as his biophilosophy, which help us better understand our contemporary ontological issue: “How One Might Live.”

**Purpose of the Study**

To date, there has been relatively little research conducted on Carroll’s nonsense fiction in the light of biophilosophy. Thus, the purpose of this dissertation is to study the giddy

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4 The new ontological question “How might one live?” is derived from Todd May’s 2005 book *Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction*, which is aimed at the study of “what new foldings, unfoldings, and refoldings [life] is capable of” (25). All the subsequent references to the question of how one might live are credited to May’s discussion of Deleuze’s new ontology of difference.
effects of nonsense on language, subjectivity, and memory in time-space in Lewis Carroll’s *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland* and *Through the Looking-Glass* through the lenses of Jean-Jacques Lecercle’s theory of intuitive *délie*, Michel Foucault’s and Gilles Deleuze’s concepts of the outside, and Deleuze’s notion of smooth time-space and absolute memory to see if Carroll’s logic of nonsense plays a role in his construction of biophilosophy. How Carroll’s literary nonsense can construct his biophilosophy in two *Alice* books is the focus of this study. This examination is undertaken on the basis of a hypothesis: the giddy effects arise when Alice’s forces of human finitude encounter other forces of inhuman infinity in virtual dreams, and the folding of the intrusive outside washes off Alice’s “face drawn in the sand between two tides” (*F* 89), and initiates a possible moment of epiphany with this now intimate power of life that helps resist life’s destiny.

In our reading, we observe that “the irrational break or the crack” (*F* 65) takes place not only between word and reference (language), but also between “Alice” the name and Alice the person (subjectivity), and memory of history in striated time-space and memory of the outside in smooth time-space (memory in time-space). These initially identical language, subjectivity, and spatiotemporal memory forces gush forth with dual splitting at a dizzy speed in Alice’s two virtual dreams so that the jet of formal order is increased to a maximum while the jet of referential order is reduced to a minimum. The further these two dissymmetrical jets burst, the wider they split. This dissertation is organized into these three chapters because an ethical account of “how one might live” ontology should be based on how a self relates to the world in language and memory. In Wonderland or Looking-Glass dream-world without God or man where anthropomorphic birds, beasts, playing cards, and chess pieces freely confront her, the forces within Alice enter into a relation with other forces from the outside to invest in a new compound or form “that is neither God nor Man. . . . which Nietzsche called “the overman”. Either God-form or Man-form is what imprisons life, whereas “the overman”
operates by *superfold* to set free forces within him. As Deleuze suggests, the advent of this new form for Foucault “is much less than the disappearance of living men, and much more than a change of concept. . .” (*F* 132). What we need to do to the benefit of this new form is to replace the traditional ontology of “how one should live or act” with a new ontology of “how one might live.” It takes an impact, not an impasse, to make a change in such a concept, and the vertiginous effects of Carroll’s literary nonsense are what we need to carry out this project of living otherwise.

**Carroll’s Nonsense Literature**

The kaleidoscope of nonsense unfolds itself as readers turn the pages of the *Alice* books. We are like the Guard in the carriage scene who looks at Alice through different optical lenses: “first through a telescope, then through a microscope, and then through an opera-glass” (*TLG* 130). Why does the Guard say at last that “You’re traveling the wrong way” (*AW* 130)? Does he imply that Alice is not supposed to go among mad people? If Alice slides through the looking-glass again to end her adventure (wakes up from her dream), then she will go back to her common and uninteresting way of life. We are fascinated with Alice’s adventures because, as Lecercle suggests, “reading nonsense texts [is] rewarding” (*PN: IVNL* 162). Nonsense does not bore us with “no meaning”; instead, it fascinates us with its “corkscrew”

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5 Carroll seems to have a liking for a “corkscrew.” In *Looking-Glass*, Carroll uses the image of a “corkscrew” three times. In Chapter 2 “The Garden of Live Flowers,” Alice complains that the path leading seemingly “straight” to the top of a hill near in sight twists curiously like a live corkscrew because every time the path turns Alice back upon the house (*TLG* 120). In Chapter 6 “Humpty Dumpty,” the master of language hears Alice’s recitation out before he begins to explain the first stanza of the nonsense poem “Jabberwocky”: “*Twas brillig, and the slithy toves / Did gyre and gimble in the wabe: / All mimsy were the borogoves, / And the mome raths outgrabe*” (1-4). Among the three kinds of curious creatures mentioned in the first stanza (toves, borogoves, and raths), Humpty Dumpty thinks the first kind of creatures “are something like badgers . . . something like lizards . . . and . . . something like corkscrews” (*TLG* 164). Tenniel’s illustration (*TLG* 165), with these three kinds of creatures wandering on the grass-plot round an artificial sun-dial, shows a striking contrast between chaos and order. In the same chapter, Humpty Dumpty forces Alice to hear him repeat a poem that begins with serene beauty of nature, but gradually edges into the Darwinian nature of oral aggressiveness. The speaker sends a message to the little fishes of the sea to express his implicit wish. When the speaker prepares a
there is some meaning, instead of no meaning, in nonsense. This “out-of-the-way” \(AW\) 12 nonsense has irresistible charm because like Alice “[we] know something interesting is sure to happen” \(AW\) 28. Even though we can not make out this something, “[s]omehow it seems to fill [our] head[s] with ideas” \(TLG\) 118.

This giddy but fascinating something in Carroll’s Wonderland and Looking-Glass world can be elaborated with the letter “M” in the chapter of “A Mad Tea-Party.” In the Dormouse’s impromptu fairy tale, there are three sisters Elsie, Lacie, and Tillie,\(^6\) who live at the bottom of a treacle well, living on treacle and learning to draw treacle and everything that begins with an M.

. . . . “and they drew all manner of things—everything that begins with an M—”

“Why with an M?” said Alice.

“Why not?” said the March Hare.

Alice was silent.

The Dormouse had closed its eyes by this time, and was going off into a doze; but, on being pinched by the Hatter, it woke up again with a little shriek, and went on: “—that begins with an M, such as mouse-traps, and the moon, and memory, and muchness—you know you say things are ‘much of a muchness’—

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\(^6\) After the previous allusion to three Liddell sisters at the end of “The Pool of Tears” chapter—Lorina, Alice, and Edith Liddell as the Lory, Alice, and Eaglet \(AW\) 20, this is, as Donald Gray notes, another reference to the three girls: “Lacie is an anagram of Alice; Elsie is L. C. (Lorina Charlotte); and Tillie is Edith, who was sometimes called Mathilda in her family” \(58\).
Is the letter “M” chosen at random? Is there logic that the letter “M” can put together four seemingly irrelevant words with: mouse-traps, moon, memory, and muchness? Yes and no. Nonsense is a game of repetitions and variations all at once. The relationship between form and meaning always implies an unattributable break. In “The Language of Nonsense in Alice,” Jacqueline Flescher writes:

Meaning is intensified so that language is always in the foreground. Language can be emphasized, either by closing the gap between word and meaning and tightening the relationship, or, on the contrary, by widening the rift and weakening the relationship. In either case the balance between word and meaning is upset and the function of language becomes more apparent. (134)

In our case of “M,” the alliterative metric pattern repeats itself in four M-words and three M-characters: mouse-traps, moon, memory, muchness, and the Mad Hatter, the March Hare, the Dormouse, whereas in the background, variations of meaning depend on the angle of deflection of the new direction from its intended meaning. The widening or tightening of the gap between word and meaning determines the degree of nonsense. More nonsense is achieved when the gap is wider, whereas less nonsense is reached when the gap is tighter.

No matter to what degree the nonsense goes, the power of formal pattern is increased to a maximum, whereas “the power of meaning is reduced to a minimum” (Flescher 137). The four M-words are a disparate group of incompatible elements. They are simply a series of alliterative but unconnected words. If we broaden the pool to include three M-characters, we find that mouse-traps seem to be deadly threats to the story-telling Dormouse; the moon

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7 The fall 2010 Concentric on the special topic of “M” features Frank Stevenson’s editorial essay “Things Beginning with the Letter ‘M’,” which cleverly introduces the following essays by means of his discussion of Dormouse’s four M-words.

8 In “Things Beginning with the Letter ‘M’,” Frank Stevenson suggests that “...’mouse-trap’ must have for the dormouse the greatest existential or ontological gravitas, signifying as it does the very means of his annihilation...” (4). Nevertheless, as Jo Elwyn Jones and J. Francis Gladstone note in The Alice Companion,
might imply the lunatic nature of the three nonsense characters; the Hatter (as the King’s Messenger Hatta in Looking-Glass) is punished before really committing the crime in the White Queen’s memory that works forwards; and the colloquial British phrase “much of a muchness” might mean that the madness of the three M-characters is very much alike. However, looking back on our speculation that suggests the correspondence between word and reference, we seem to have stretched our imagination to justify the meanings of these four M-words. Therefore, Flescher is right about Carroll’s logic of nonsense that “[t]otal coincidence of word and reference is at the core of nonsense” (137). Nonsense hangs by a thread of formal structure while leaving all the beads of referential meanings dangling on their own. Carroll’s literary nonsense follows the logic of an altered version of the Duchess’s proverb: “Take care of the [sounds], and the [sense] will take care of [itself]” (AW 71). The alliterative metric pattern repeats its “M” rhyme to form the regularity, whereas the meaning deflects from its intended target to form the eccentricity. Carroll’s giddy but fascinating something fills our heads with ideas because our minds become unsettled in the paradoxical clash between two orders, among which the formal order in sounds is extremely predictable while the referential order in sense is terribly evasive.

**Carroll’s Nonsense and Biophilosophy through a Deleuzian Lens**

How can Carroll’s terribly evasive sense relate to nonsense, and create its vertiginous effects? Carroll’s giddy nonsense takes place in “the irrational break or the crack” (F 65) between two heterogeneous series: a place of “non-relation” (F 62) that can be explained with Deleuze’s logic of sensation and logic of sense. If we compare Lewis Carroll the English writer to Francis Bacon the Irish painter, we can observe that both artists are not working on a

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“In Alice’s day [dormice] were popular as pets—and are as passive as a pet can be” (72). If dormice were popular pets in Victorian England, naturally mouse-traps were not used for catching them in Alice’s day.

9 The Duchess’s original proverb is “Take care of the sense, and the sounds will take care of themselves.”
white surface because they need to fight with clichés to break with representation: Carroll needs to fight with meanings while Bacon needs to fight with givens. According to Deleuze,

> It is a mistake to think that the painter works on a white surface. . . . Now everything he has in his head or around him is already in the canvas, more or less virtually, more or less actually, before he begins his work. They are all present in the canvas as so many images, actual or virtual, so that the painter does not have to cover a blank surface but rather would have to empty it out, clear it, clean it. *(FB 71)*

In other words, “the task of the painting of the future” *(FB 7)* is not to reproduce these givens all over the blank surface, but to clear “[t]he entire surface [that] is already invested virtually with all kinds of clichés” *(FB 12)* first, and then “render visible forces that are not themselves visible” *(FB 48)*.

As Erwin Straus argues, “Perception . . . is a secondary rational organization of a primary, nonrational dimension of sensation (or ‘sense experience’ . . .)” (qtd. in Smith, “Translator’s Introduction” xiv). In his fight with the cliché, the painter must give sensation precedence over perception. Sensation has the disruptive power to deform perception that synthesizes the nonrational sense experience as an organic body. The artist needs to create a surface of “Body without Organs” that endlessly emanates sensations in a billowing artistic creation. In Deleuze’s logic of sensation, art is not figurative in light of Paul Klee’s famous formula “Not to render the visible, but to render visible” *(FB 48)*. Artists do not render the visible givens (perception), but to render invisible forces (sensation). All the vibrations and spasms sent to perceptible givens are to make sure organic representation will not be sedentary. This gives full vent to Bacon’s logic of sensation that nomadic sensation should prevail over sedentary perception on his canvas because Bacon’s modern painting of the future is to “paint the sensation” *(FB 32)*. In Deleuze’s discussion, there are two ways for
Bacon to speak of sensation: “Negatively, he says that the form related to the sensation (the Figure) is the opposite of the form related to an object that it is supposed to represent (figuration). . . . And positively, Bacon constantly says that sensation is what passes from one ‘order’ to another, from one ‘level’ to another, from one ‘area’ to another” (FB 32). Clearly, the logic of sensation (the Figure) is opposed to the logic of representation (figuration) in a static definition, but “passing in the middle” is a more dynamic description, and more pertinently characteristic of Bacon’s sensation.

In “Literature and Life” of Essays Critical and Clinical, Deleuze argues that a writer’s writing is like “a witch’s line” (ECC 5) that creates a transforming power of becoming, and invents a passage of life within language. Writing is not to impose a form with the “delirium of domination” (ECC 4), but to exert “the power of an impersonal . . . the indefinite” (ECC 3) to create a zone of proximity with “a bastard delirium” (ECC 4). A writer is not a mental patient who writes with neuroses or psychoses, but a physician who “possesses an irresistible and delicate health that stems from what he has seen and heard of things too big for him. . . .” (ECC 3). But how does a writer turn literature into “an enterprise of health” (ECC 3)? To this point, Deleuze proposes three aspects of literature: “a decomposition or destruction of the maternal language,” “the invention of a new language within language,” and “language as a whole . . . being toppled or pushed to a limit, to an outside or reverse side that consists of Visions and Auditions that no longer belong to any language” (ECC 5). The third aspect of literature has a peculiar academic allure because it is a telling explanation of Deleuze’s “passage of life within language.” In order to force language “out of its usual furrows,” a writer must see and hear “Ideas [constituted by the passage of life within language] . . . in the interstices of language, in its intervals” (ECC 5). If Visions and Auditions, as Deleuze emphasizes, “are not outside language, but the outside of language” (ECC 5), we can use Deleuze’s diagram of the outside in Foucault to understand the relationship between these
two as the mutual grappling of the visible and the articulable, with no common form, no isomorphism between them. In this sense, Visions and Auditions are big and strong forces from the outside that can bring good health to literature.

However, the question is whether we can see Carroll as such a writer who can invent a passage of life within language, and whose giddy but fascinating something can become otherwise to cause the irrational break between two wrestling orders in the interstices or intervals of language. In the analogy between the nonsense verse and the abstract painting, Martin Gardner, the annotator of Carroll’s two Alices, says:

The realistic artist is forced to copy nature, imposing on the copy as much as he can in the way of pleasing forms and colors; but the abstract artist is free to romp with the paint as much as he pleases. In similar fashion the nonsense poet does not have to search for ingenious ways of combining pattern and sense. . . . The words he uses may suggest vague meanings, like an eye here and a foot there in a Picasso abstraction, or they may have no meaning at all—just a play of pleasant sounds like the play of nonobjective\(^\text{10}\) colors on a canvas. (150)

It should be noted that Gardner repeats the leitmotif of Carroll’s nonsense in this remarks: repetition of pattern (formal order) versus variation of sense (referential order). In Gardner’s argument, Carroll resembles Picasso in that both of their artistic means express evasive sense. It seems quite proper for us to compare Gardner’s realistic artist and abstract artist respectively to Deleuze’s figurative painter and modern painter of the Figure. However, although Deleuze maintains that a painter can move beyond figuration “either toward abstract form or toward the Figure” (FB 31), he criticizes both figurative painting and abstract

\(^{10}\) It means “nonrepresentational art.” Admittedly, Martin Gardner opposes the abstract artist to the realistic artist in order to praise that Carroll the nonsense poet rivals Picasso the abstract artist in their nonrepresentational artistic merit. However, we need to further our discussion in the framework of Deleuze’s logic of sensation, in which nonrepresentational art can be subdivided into the abstract painting and the modern painting of the Figure.
painting for not being able to “pass through the brain . . . act directly upon the nervous system . . . attain the sensation . . . [and] liberate the Figure” (FB 32). Two issues thus arise: first of all, the role of abstract painting rests awkwardly betwixt the Figure and the figuration; secondly, Gardner’s analogy between the nonsense verse and the abstract painting makes us wonder if Carroll’s nonsense is only mediocre in terms of its transforming power of becoming.

Bacon’s logic of sensation under Deleuze’s discussion is not as simple as two polar oppositions, with perception (figuration) on the one hand and sensation (the Figure) on the other. In addition to the modern painting of the Figure, abstract painting is another offshoot of the nonrepresentational art. It is superior to the figurative painting, and inferior to the modern painting of the Figure. Thus, the three forms of painting are introduced by Deleuze: “. . . the law of the diagram, according to Bacon, is this: one starts with a figurative form, a diagram intervenes and scrambles it, and a form of a completely different nature emerges from the diagram, which is called the Figure” (FB 125). From the figurative pole to the pole of the Figure, we have the figurative form (figurative painting), the diagrammatic form (abstract painting), and the form of the Figure (the modern painting of the Figure). In Deleuze’s Foucault, three ontologies in “Foucault’s diagram of the outside” are comparable to his three forms of painting in Francis Bacon: knowledge (figuration), power (diagram), and self (Figure).11 At each level, there are the articulable (a system of language) on one side and the visible (a system of light) on the other, and what distinguishes one level from another is how close these two sides are to each other: the tightest pair is in Knowledge-Being while the

11 In Deleuze’s critical writings, we juxtapose the three levels in Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, Foucault, and even The Logic of Sense: figuration, diagram, and Figure in FB, knowledge, power, and self in F, and proposition, sense, and sensation in LS. The three levels can be understood in light of a regressive movement from the tertiary order via the static genesis to the secondary organization, and then via the dynamic genesis to the primary order (virtualization), or the other way round (actualization). However, we must be reminded that in spite of their comparable three levels, the pre pictorial Figure in FB, the pre-individual self in F, and the prepropositional sensation in LS all have their respective singularities to speak in painting, self, and language.
widest pair is in Self-Being. Knowledge-Being is a formal and stratified auditory (the articulable) and visual (the visible) archive; Power-Being is an informal, non-stratified diagram of function (spontaneity) and matter (receptivity); and Self-Being has such a wide gap between two sides so that the boundary between word and thing has collapsed. As with Carroll’s literary nonsense, a greater degree of nonsense takes place when the gap is wider, and a lesser degree of nonsense happens when the gap is tighter. “In either case,” Flescher maintains, “the balance between word and meaning is upset and the function of language becomes more apparent” (134). In other words, if the King of Hearts sees some meaning in nonsense verses, he actually sees the pushing-and-pulling of the unresting and dangling words that are resisting the “gravity” of his interpretation even though he stretches his imagination to picture their stillness. There is no correspondence between the formal order and the referential order; there is only coincidence, more or less, between them. Therefore, this explains the recurrent image of “wrestler” or “fighter” in Deleuze’s oeuvre. The battle between two adversaries can not end in a tie. There are always a power to affect and another power to be affected in a perpetual disequilibrium. A most contracted point that reduces the breadth between the articulable (statement) and the visible (light) is a human invention. “Between the two,” Deleuze observes, “there is no isomorphism or conformity, in spite of a mutual presupposition and the primacy of the statement” (F 61). A central fissure that problematizes a common form between the articulable and the visible perpetuates the battle of these two grappling fighters who exchange their threatening words and knockout punches in a non-place (F 64-67): lightweights for knowledge, middleweights for power, and heavyweights for self (coextensive with outside). In this sense, we say that Carroll’s giddy nonsense takes place in “the irrational break or the crack” (F 65) between two heterogeneous series. The more irrational the break is between word and thing, the giddier we feel.

Can we put Carroll in a situation analogous to that of Bacon in painting? That is, can
we say that Carroll, like Proust, “did not want an abstract literature that was too voluntary (philosophy), any more than he wanted a figurative, illustrative, or narrative literature that merely told a story . . . [and] [w]hat he was striving for, what he wanted to bring to light, was a kind of Figure, torn away from figuration and stripped of every figurative function. . .” (FB 56)?

From Carroll’s “M” (evasive sense) to Bacon’s paint (nonrepresentational sensation), both artists’ hands are trying to widen the gap between the representational targets and their new deflective directions in order to maximize nonsense and minimize meaning. At this point, we need to ask ourselves how Carroll’s evasive sense relates to his giddy nonsense, and how his logic of nonsense under Deleuze’s discussion reaches beyond language to life. Instead of using language uncritically, Carroll uses humor and terror to radicalize our opinion on the traditional view of language as representation. His nonsense language is on the one hand humorously enjoyable, but on the other monstrously disruptive. His aggressive playfulness is intent on expressing two ideas: first of all, language does not simply work within the confines of the representational categories; secondly, we can use language as laying our artistic hands upon life to feel its pulsing difference. In our argument, Carroll’s evasive sense can be viewed as biophilosophy because his giddy nonsense maximizes the irrational break between language and the world. The break is irrational because when we believe there is correspondence between them, the disruptive power of Carroll’s nonsense always undermines the link with coincidence. In Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction, Todd May tells us that “[t]here is always more going on than meets the eye” (162). The logic of representation proves untenable in Carroll’s nonsense land where the logic of difference reigns because the second logic is such logic-defying logic (or alogic) as Deleuze’s logic of sensation and logic of sense. In this understanding, Carroll is a philosophical physician who uses his giddy nonsense to

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12 Here the word “voluntary” means illustrative, narrative, whereas “involuntary” means nonillustrative, nonnarrative.
palpate difference rather than represent identity.

As soon as language is used not to communicate, its dark side begins to howl, but the howling nonsense is part of complex workings of language so it should not be rejected as non-meaning, and because nonsense speaks its own sense of life out of bounds of language, nor should it be reduced merely to Elizabeth Sewell’s closed, self-referential system of language which has nothing to do with reality. It has been long noted by several critics that Carroll’s literary nonsense is not non-sense or pure nonsense (non-meaning). For example, both Walter de la Mare’s “sober-sided order of nonsense” in his 1932 article “On the Alice Books” (60) and John Ciardi’s “second sort of performance” in his 1959 article “A Burble through the Tulgey Wood” (260) are proposed to salvage Carroll’s nonsense from non-meaning. In de la Mare’s view, both Alice stories of playing cards and chess abound in Carroll’s “ingenious design” that “we scarcely notice,” and he bids us not to neglect the “intellectual thread” running through the Alices on which “their translucent beads of fantasy are strung. . .” (58). Obviously, Carroll’s nonsense has its own vital sign, and requires further elaboration.

Carroll once wrote, “I am very much afraid I didn’t mean anything but nonsense. . . . But since words mean more than we mean to express when we use them. . . . whatever good meanings are in the book I am very glad to accept as the meaning of the book” (qtd. in Mare 58). Like Humpty Dumpty who dangerously straddles a narrow wall, Carroll’s nonsense maintains a fine balance in fear of tilting to its irrevocable doom. It reminds us of Elizabeth Sewell’s theory of nonsense balance in her essay “The Balance of Brillig”: “Nonsense is a game with words. Its own inventions wander safely between the respective pitfalls of 0 and 1, nothingness and everythingness. . . .” (387). It can be surmised from Sewell’s theory that Carroll’s nonsense language game holds a fear of nothingness or non-meaning while it shies away from everythingness or meaning. Sewell, as Richard Kelly notes in his 1977 book
Lewis Carroll, regards Carroll’s nonsense universe as a closed, self-referential language system which taboos two things: global order and everyday references (49-50). In Sewell’s order-disorder dialect, disorder has order in mind, but begrudges order first of all by laying emphasis on the parts instead of whole and multiplying a subsequent interpretation upon a work that steadfastly denies any consistent reading to avoid any fusion or synthesis, and secondly by cutting off anything relatable to the everyday world so that no interpretations from outside can be applicable to the world of nonsense. Nevertheless, two protests against Sewell’s taboos must be raised here before we get back to Carroll’s “good meanings”: first of all, sense and nonsense are not distinctly separable, nor are they in a relation of One and Many; secondly, Carroll’s elusive nonsense might have logic of its own, but it does not necessarily have to be an entrenched and isolated language system.

Sense and nonsense, according to Deleuze, have a curious way to be paradoxically co-present (LS 68). Oftentimes, sense and nonsense in Nonsense School are conveniently subject to an exclusive dialectic law: global meaning of everyday references on the external side (sense) versus regional meaning of closed, self-referential system on the internal side (nonsense). Meaning can be opposed to non-meaning, but sense and nonsense, not subject to the law of exclusion, are, according to James Williams, “two interdependent but irreducible sides of . . . a disjunctive synthesis” which is “parallel but asymmetrical” (GDLS 27; emphasis original). Hence, on this point, the “or” in “sense or nonsense,” as Williams suggests, “should not be read as an exclusive ‘either, or,’” but rather “best read as ‘together, differently’” (GDLS 53). This kind of inclusively disjunctive relation between sense and nonsense indicates their paradoxical co-presence. Nonsense is watching for its chance to fold back upon sense to have its own logic of sense expressed. Nevertheless, the sense it expresses is not

being precisely that it hasn’t any. . . . When we assume that nonsense says its
own sense, we wish to indicate . . . that sense and nonsense have a specific
relation which can not copy that of the true and false, that is, which can not be
conceived simply on the basis of a relation of exclusion. . . . The logic of sense is
necessarily determined to posit between sense and nonsense an original type of
intrinsic relation, a mode of co-presence. (LS 68)

If the production of sense, as Deleuze suggests, is a function of nonsense (LS 72), then we
can assume that in the eyes of Deleuze, Carroll’s literary nonsense, rather than having
precisely no sense, is a sense-producing machine. Nonsense’s logic of sense is not the domain
of truth that gives meaning, but a domain of sense that produces sense. Meaning is comprised
of good sense and common sense while sense is paradox “which destroys good sense as the
only direction . . . [and] which destroys common sense as the assignation of fixed identities”
(LS 3). There is no denying that meaning is exactly what Carroll’s monstrous language wants
to tear off, but once removed from its throne, what remains is not a hole of lack for other
meanings to fill, but, using Deleuze’s example, Henri Michaux’s dehumanized schizophrenic
table of overstuffed additions that lends itself to no function (AO 6), from which an abundant
excess of meaning springs forth to flood the Euclidean grid. How does such a stalled engine
work in terms of positive production? Admittedly, we draw upon Carroll’s two Alice stories
for reading pleasure, but somehow the anarchy that strikes back always puts its readers deep
in contemplation. If Alice’s two adventures are simply whimsical excursions, we could have
just laughed them off as nonsense and stuff, but somehow Carroll’s nonsense language fills
our heads with ideas even though we can not make sense of it on the instant. Apparently, this
ingine starts all over again after it gets stalled.

Interpreted in a relation of One and Many (or One-All), Sewell’s regional guerilla still
thinks in terms of identity. Her dyad Whole/Parts works when a consistent sense of reading is
constantly beset by subsequent readings that swarm in. By unceasing self-denial, this process
of fragmentation stops a Whole or One from appearing to reign. In response to this kind of thought, Deleuze proposes the concept of multiplicity to oppose the transcendent dyad of One and Many. In *Bergsonism*, Deleuze most notably proposes two types of multiplicity:

One is represented by space . . . It is a multiplicity of exteriority, of simultaneity, of juxtaposition, of order, of quantitative differentiation, of *difference in degree*; it is a numerical multiplicity, *discontinuous and actual*. The other type of multiplicity appears in pure duration: It is an internal multiplicity of succession, of fusion, of organization, of heterogeneity, of qualitative discrimination, or of *difference in kind*; it is a *virtual and continuous* multiplicity that cannot be reduced to numbers. (*B* 38)

As far as Deleuze’s *virtual and continuous* multiplicity is concerned, Jonathan Roffe further explains:

A multiplicity is . . . a complex structure that does not reference a prior unity. Multiplicities are not parts of a greater whole that have been fragmented, and they cannot be considered manifold expressions of a single concept or transcendent unity. . . . The concept of multiplicity makes no reference to a transcendent realm of the world that contains the structures or laws of existence.

(176-77)

To think in terms of actual identity remains within the realm of extensive numerical multiplicity where “space . . . can be divided up into parts” while to think in terms of virtual difference belongs to the realm of continuous intensive multiplicity which “cannot be divided up without changing in nature” (Roffe 176-77). The *difference in degree* in the first type of difference is what Todd May suggests as “the distinction between two identities (which would subordinate difference to identity) or the negation of one of them (which would think of difference only negatively)” whereas the *difference in kind* in the second type of difference
is “a difference in itself, a pure difference that forms the soil for all identities, all distinctions, and all negations” (21). The virtual intensive multiplicity is Deleuze’s highly-appraised multiplicity without transcendent “from on high.” By the same token, Deleuze’s “philosophical concepts” in *What Is Philosophy?* are similar to virtual intensive multiplicities so that the elucidation of the first may shed light upon our discussion of the second at issue here.

> Philosophical concepts are fragmentary wholes that are not aligned with one another so that they fit together, because their edges do not match up. They are not pieces of a jigsaw puzzle but rather the outcome of throws of a dice. They resonate nonetheless, and the philosophy that creates them always introduces a powerful Whole that, while remaining open, is not fragmented: an unlimited One-All . . . that includes all the concepts on one and the same plane. It is . . . a plateau . . . the plane of immanence of concepts. . . . The plane of immanence is neither a concept nor the concept of all concepts. . . . If one were to be confused with the other there would be nothing to stop concepts from . . . losing their singularity, and the plane would also lose its openness. (35; emphasis mine)

Deleuze’s multiplicity is corrective to Sewell’s dyad Whole/Parts. To conclude his fight against this kind of Platonic thought, Deleuze argues: “In this modern moment we are no longer satisfied with thinking immanence as immanent to a transcendent; *we want to think transcendence within the immanent, and it is from immanence that a breach is expected*” (*WIP* 47; emphasis original).

If Sewell has already cut off her nonsense universe from every references, isn’t that an irrational break between language and the world, and aren’t our giddy effects achieved by this operation of mutual exclusion? Sewell’s reading of Carroll’s nonsense as a self-referential language system that is no longer relatable to everyday references is debatable. After the
irrational break, we need a relinking, a mutual grappling between fighters or wrestlers in a non-relation, or a non-place. As argued earlier, Carroll has a fear of nothingness ("didn’t mean anything but nonsense") and everythingness ("I say what I mean"). His monstrous power of terror disrupts everythingness, whereas his delightful power of humor comes from the widening or tightening between the formal order and referential order. Carroll’s aesthetic playfulness puts usefulness aside, and skirts along the border between sense and nonsense. Language and life should be in a metastable status of disequilibrium. As with his primacy of the virtual over the actual, Deleuze does not preserve the virtual (difference) by doing away with the actual (identity). The point for Deleuze is to “make pre-individual and nonpersonal singularities speak” (LS 73). Therefore, on the one hand, we need to have impersonal, virtuality, nonsense, and outside prevail over personal, actuality, sense, and inside, and on the other hand, we also need to keep them in a paradoxical mode of co-presence. They are meant to encounter in a no man’s land to cause the vertigo of immanence and to ignite the sparks of life. They are related to each other as two sides of “a Möbius strip on which a single line traverses the two sides” (ECC 21).

But what does Carroll mean by “good meanings in the book” and how do they work as an ingenious sense-making machine not confined within the bounds of language? In our opinion, Carroll machine is neither a predetermined maze journey where one only needs to

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13 The Möbius strip is originally a mathematical model that was first proposed by “the German mathematicians August Ferdinand Möbius and Johann Benedict Listing in 1858.” A Möbius strip can be easily created by giving a paper strip a half-twist, and then “joining the ends of the strip together to form a loop.” The curious property of the Möbius strip is its “non-orientable” one-sidedness. If a mini motor car were to race along its one single continuous curve, “it would return to its starting point having traversed the entire length of the strip (on both sides of the original paper) without ever crossing an edge.” There is no distinction between inner surface and outer surface because there is only one single line traversing the two sides. Different from the philosophical appropriation of dialectical bind or inversion, Deleuze uses the Möbius strip to mean the conversion of inside and outside. See “Möbius strip,” Wikipedia, Wikipedia Foundation, Inc., n.d. Web, 13 Aug. 2012.

14 Deleuze and Guattari applied the concept of “machine” they initiated in Anti-Oedipus (1972) to Kafka (1975) to dehumanize a writer, and let the desiring-production in him starts to flow. “We believe only in a Kafka politics that is neither imaginary nor symbolic. We believe only in one or more Kafka machines that are neither structure nor phantasm. We believe only in a Kafka experimentation that is without interpretation or significance and rests only on tests of experience. . . . A writer isn’t a writer-man; he is a machine-man, and an experimental man. . . .” (K 7). Five years later, it echoed again in A Thousand Plateaus (1980): “A book itself is a little
add up everything along until it builds up to a complete picture with the last piece of puzzle and finally discovers the way out, nor a withered land where he has uprooted every tree so that others may well plant their own. Carefully, Carroll’s elusive nonsense steers a steady course between both extremes, and sails beyond language. It is the fine balance that keeps his effort of nonsense from speaking none of its sense and reaches beyond language to life. It would be wrong to assume that Carroll anticipates some kind of reader-response criticism welcoming all readers to contribute their “good meanings.” The key is not which uttering subject contributes what good meanings to *Alice*, but “words mean more than we mean to express.” That is, monstrous language has shaken off its straightjacket, and begins to operate off the human grid. Not surprisingly, the more we try to close in on Carroll’s literary nonsense, the less likely it will remain tamed within representational categories. One of de la Mare’s remarks is worth further thought.

. . . Carroll’s Nonsense in itself, in Dryden’s words, may be such that it “never can be understood,” there is no need to understand it. It is self-evident: and indeed may vanish away if we try to do so. Precisely the converse is true of the sober-sided order of nonsense. The longer we ponder on that, the more hollowly the tube resounds, the drabber grows the day. The *Alice* lighten our beings like sunshine, like that divine rainbow in the skies beneath which the living beings of the world went out into radiance and freedom from the narrow darkness of the Ark. (60)

Mare’s statement can be understood as the fact that the sober-sided order of Carroll’s nonsense can be approached, but can not be understood. Our pondering on his elusive nonsense only makes things worse. The universe of Carroll’s nonsense is “endlessly machine. . .” (4). Except for the fact that in *What Is Philosophy?* where the concept of machine is no longer present, this concept appears in all three co-authored books: *AO* (desiring-machine), *K* (writer-machine), *ATP* (abstract machine).
explorable though never to be explored” with human understanding (Mare 60).

Logic of representation sees nonsense through the lens of knowledge, only to find nonsense dead drunk in their narrow darkness. “Representation . . . .” as Deleuze notes, “mediates everything, but mobilises and moves nothing” (DR 55-56). To sit basking in the warm sunshine, one might try to “palpate” Carroll’s elusive nonsense. In contrast with the analytic tradition engaging with the project of knowledge, continental philosophy has been concerned with the problem of life. Its project of living otherwise is not about “what there is,” but about what new vistas life can have. Ever since Nietzsche announces “God is dead” (GS, §108: 167), the vertigo of groundlessness has haunted us till this very moment. Among those continental philosophers who address the question of “how one might live,” Deleuze distinguishes himself from others “not by abandoning ontology, but by embracing it” (Todd May 15), but for him the only kind of ontology worth doing is the project of difference (Todd May 18). In his ontology of difference, Deleuze challenges two assumptions: ontology of discovery and the identity of what is (conceptual stability) (Todd May 18). Deleuze’s ontology rests upon a hypothesis that a vital life of difference shifts into high gear not by being anchored in a haven, but by becoming unsettled in a wild, stormy sea. To back up his ontology of creation, Deleuze often invokes Leibniz’s famous remark: “Having established these things, I thought I was coming into port, but when I started to mediate upon the union of the soul with the body, I was as it were thrown back onto the open sea” (qtd. in N 104). In his opinion, the question of how one might live should be dealt with by an ontology of creation and difference that widens our possibilities of life with problems, rather than an ontology of discovery and identity that constrains and impoverishes our being with unquestioning conformity and solutions (Todd May 15-17). Deleuze’s life philosophy wants

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15 Throughout this dissertation, we cite from Todd May's *Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction* and Leila S. May’s “Wittgenstein’s Reflection in Lewis Carroll’s Looking-Glass.” In order to distinguish one citing source from the other, we need to use their full names in the parenthetical reference to avoid unnecessary confusion.
to dispel our disillusion that life is unchanging, and his interpretation of Nietzsche’s eternal return as the power of difference in his *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, different from Walter Kaufmann’s version of eternal recurrence of the same (11), has its origin in Heraclitus’s famous saying “Upon those who step into the same rivers, different and again different waters flow” (qtd. in Solomon and Higgins 33). That means all things in the universe are constantly changing, and the only thing that remains unchanged is that changes return eternally. Life is abstruse and obscure conundrums by nature. It is the Mad Hatter’s riddle without answer that only wastes one’s time to guess something that is beyond our intellectual comprehension. On the surface of identity, we take conceptual stability as an answer for everything, only to find life chaotic in a way that “slip[s] through our conceptual grasp. . . . defies our understanding . . . resists our attempt to say what there is and to say what it is like” (Todd May 18). One experience of stepping in the river tends to be generalized as a universal law. We need to know that “what can be identified is only . . . a single actualization . . . of what there is” (Todd May 21), and “[t]o embed the concept of living in people is to commit the error of humanism, the error of believing that the proper perspective for understanding the world is centered on the viewpoint of the human subject” (Todd May 24). New possibilities of life depend on the impersonal thought “to see what there is in terms of difference rather than identity” (Todd May 19). Down underneath the membrane of identity, the prebiotic soup of difference is simmering. Knowledge is only good at cognitive grasp of its identity; therefore, where it eludes our knowledge we count on impersonal thought to palpate that difference. “Thought . . . does not identify and so does not give us knowledge. It moves beyond what is known to the difference beneath, behind, and within it. And, since difference outruns thought, thought can only palpate a difference that lies beyond its grasp. There is always more to think” (Todd May 21). Deleuze’s impersonal thought in his life philosophy operates by “continuous creation of concepts” (*WIP* 8). This image of thought is “the plane of
immanence of concepts” (*WIP* 35) that “secures conceptual linkages with ever increasing connections, and it is concepts that secure the populating of the plane on an always renewed and variable curve” (*WIP* 37).

It is from Deleuze’s challenge that the traditional ontology of discovery and identity of what is proves unfit for his philosophy of life. Conceptual stability is but a cross section of a river in flux. How can one ladle out a bucket of water and claims to have the whole river? Therefore, what appears to be identifiable for later discovery is built on the quicksand of difference. If not conceptual stability, why Deleuze’s concept? “A concept,” in Deleuze’s sense, “is a way of addressing the difference that lies beneath the identities we experience. It is a way of articulating the hidden virtual reality out of which the actually experienced reality emerges” (Todd May 19). The virtual difference is not directly comprehensible because, as Todd May suggests, it is “not simply the distinction between two identities (which would subordinate difference to identity) or the negation of one of them (which would think of difference only negatively),” but “a difference in itself, a pure difference that forms the soil for all identities, all distinctions, and all negations” (21). Only by palpation can a philosophical physician, with their newly invented “Interesting, Remarkable, or Important” concepts (*WIP* 82), feel the pulse of it: “a process. . . [that] unfolds . . . with vitality” (Todd May 24). Deleuze’s philosophy of life creates concepts for difference to disturb identity, and palpate difference.

Philosophy does not settle things. It disturbs them. Philosophy disturbs by moving beneath the stable world of identities to a world of difference that at once produces those identities and shows them to be little more than the froth of what there is. And it does this by creating concepts. Concepts reach beneath the identities our world presents to us in order to touch upon the world of difference that both constitutes and disrupts those identities. (Todd May 19)
From this perspective, we can say that Carroll is a philosophical physician who disrupts the conceptual stability (e.g. representation, logic, meaning), and palpates the hidden virtual reality by his elusive nonsense whose ever-increasing concepts of difference (e.g. intuition, alogic, nonsense) “creates a way of seeing this world in which we live that disturbs the verities we are presented with, that opens up new ways of seeing and of conceiving this world that, rather than true or false, are interesting, remarkable, or important” (Todd May 22). Nietzsche argues,

I am still waiting for a philosophical physician in the exceptional sense of that word—one who has to pursue the problem of the total health of a people, time, race or of humanity—to muster the courage to push my suspicion to its limits and to risk the proposition: what was at stake in all philosophizing hitherto was not at all ‘truth’ but something else—let us say, health, future, growth, power, life. (GS, “Preface for the Second Edition,” §2: 35)

Hopefully, through Deleuze’s lens, we can see clearer how Carroll’s monstrous language contributes to a new perspective on “How one might live,” and how he uses his elusive nonsense as a radically different way to approach the question of living. Life, in Carroll’s giddy nonsense, is seen folding, unfolding, and refolding in its peristaltic movement to become otherwise. With his principle of inversion, “EVIL” can be “LIVE” when read backwards. Thus, to avoid mistaking the sober-sided order of Carroll’s nonsense as dead drunk, it is advisable that we touch upon his nonsense universe with the logic of difference so that we may see the radiant beauty of the inexhaustible mythical power of nonsense at work behind two Alices. For Deleuze, “Literature is a health” (ECC, “Preface to the French Edition” lv). Carroll’s two Alices are neither an abstract literature, nor figurative, illustrative, or narrative literature. As with Proust, what Carroll is striving for is a literature of Figure, or a
literature of the Outside. The treacle-well is Carroll’s well of fancy that provides molasses\textsuperscript{16} (illness) and miraculous waters\textsuperscript{17} (healing power) all at once to the listeners or readers who are infatuated with his nonsense stories. Thus, treacle here embodies two opposite connotations: poison and antidote. Carroll’s literary nonsense is a blend of these two co-present but not contradictory effects. As Roberto Esposito writes,

"illness is the something from which health originates and that it carries within as its inalienable internal component. No true health is possible that doesn’t take in . . . illness. . . . The Greeks’ “being dangerously healthy” means that “with respect to the metaphor of the besieged city . . . [illness] is no longer the enemy that makes an attempt on life from the outside, but the enemy is now life’s own propulsive force. (\textit{Bios} 103-04)"

From this perspective, we can argue that the Guard in the carriage scene is not figuratively suggesting to Alice that she should go back to where she belongs, but literally saying that she is embarking on a journey where everything goes awry. As the Cheshire Cat says, Alice must be mad; otherwise “[she] wouldn’t have come here” (\textit{AW} 51). Following Alice closely, we are attracted to the madness in Carroll’s biophilosophy of nonsense because his “M” is a place “where Life exists \textit{par excellence}” (\textit{F} 122).

\textbf{Literature Review}

\textit{Carroll’s Two Alice Books in the Tradition of Fantasy}

Carroll has always fancied himself as a fairy-tale writer. He even has the fictional Alice endorse this idea in “The Rabbit Sends in a Little Bill” episode: “When I used to read fairy

\textsuperscript{16} See Gray’s note 58 and Gardner’s note 76. Alice thinks living solely on treacle will definitely make these three little sisters very ill.

\textsuperscript{17} Gardner notes that treacle means both medicine and miraculous waters in a well at Binsey (76). Also, in \textit{Lewis Carroll’s England}, Charlie Lovett adds: “In medieval times, the word ‘treacle’ meant a healing fluid, and pilgrims flocked here in the thousands over the centuries to partake of the healing powers of the well” (57).
tales, I fancied that kind of thing never happened, and now here I am in the middle of one! There ought to be a book written about me, that there ought” (AW 29)! Today, many Carroll scholars are still debating what genre they should subsume Carroll’s two Alices under. This shows that critics might have a different opinion about the author’s original view about the genre of fairy tale. We must bear in mind that Carroll tries to please his most beloved child-friend Alice Liddell in two ways: oral and written forms. This knowledge is important for us to understand how fairy tale relates to fantasy.

Rebecca J. Lukens distinguishes fantasy in children’s literature into literary fantasy of known authorship and folk fantasy of unknown authorship (20; emphasis added). The division correspond Lukens’s “literary fantasy” and “folk fantasy” to fairy tales in written tradition and folktales in oral tradition. In terms of fantasy, Colin Manlove argues: “There is an extraordinary growth of children’s literature in the nineteenth century, particularly in the area of fantasy. . . . But in this period it was not known as ‘fantasy,’ but as ‘fairy tale.’ This is because its form often took something from the traditional fairy tale . . .” (From Alice 17). That is, modern fantasy literature was called fairy tale in Carroll’s Victorian England. But what does Manlove mean by “traditional fairy tale”? Does it mean that fairy tale can be further divided? According to Perry Nodelman and Mavis Reimer, “[o]nce fairy tales were collected and retold for children, they became models for writers . . . who created similar stories of their own. These stories, based on traditional fairy tales but often substantially different from them, are called ‘literary fairy tales’” (320). It can be concluded from Nodelman and Reimer’s argument that tales (traditional fairy tales) are of oral tradition and stories (literary fairy tales) are of written tradition. On the part of oral tradition, traditional fairy tales and folktales share intrinsically oral feature so that fairy tales can be related to

18 On the golden afternoon of 4 July 1862, a merry crew of five (Carroll, Duckworth, the three Liddell sisters) went on a river outing to Godstow. As Carroll wrote in that day’s diary: “On which occasion I told them the fairy-tale of Alice’s Adventures Underground, which I undertook to write out for Alice, . . .” (“Diaries [1856-63]” 264-65).
folktales by inheritance. “Folktales,” Nodelman and Reimer maintain, “came to be recorded in printed collections only when people in general stopped telling them orally” (304). In essence, folktales of oral tradition have strong power of transformation because each act of story-telling can only follow a recognizable pattern. In their opinion, “[f]olktales are so prone to being told differently” and “the tales changed as they passed from one teller to another, so that the versions we know today have been influenced by many different people over a long period of time. It’s still a quality of the fairy tales people tell today that they can be told in different ways and yet remain essentially the same story” (304). Hence, folktales or traditional fairy tales are of oral tradition, and can be compared to Lukens’s folk fantasy of unknown authorship. On the part of written tradition, Lewis Roberts maintains in “Children’s Fiction”:

The Victorians inherited a long tradition of the fairytale, dating at least from the middle ages. However, the nineteenth century saw a new attitude toward these wonder tales, which stemmed largely from popular reception of the work of the Brothers Grimm in Britain which had previously voiced suspicion of fantasy stories and their influence on British writers of fantasy and collectors of folk tales. As Jack Zipes has written (2001), the fairytale, which had been regarded as an element of oral folk traditions, had developed into a literary form, culminating in the Grimms’ collection. (357)

From his view, we come to realize that the Victorians’ traditional fairy tale can be dated back as far as the middle ages, and the popular reception of Grimms’ tales in the nineteenth-century Victorian England helps the folktales of their oral tradition that feature recurrent story-telling become stable in the form of printed collections. Therefore, it makes sense to say that literary fairy tales are of written tradition and thus can be compared to Lukens’s literary fantasy of known authorship. Therefore, the relation between fairy tale and
fantasy can be viewed in a simple or complex way. To simplify their relation, Manlove is correct in saying that modern fantasy is Carroll’s fairy tale. However, to complicate their relation, Lukens’s fantasy is divided into literary fantasy and folk fantasy, whereas Nodelman and Reimer’s fairy tale is divided into literary fairy tale and traditional fairy tale. That is, both fantasy and fairy tale can be further divided into written or oral tradition. Therefore, it is paradoxically right and wrong to call Carroll a fairy tale writer.

How do we place Carroll’s two Alice books in the tradition of fantasy? A genre, as Lukens suggests, “is a type of literature that has a common set of characteristics” (13). Both Lewis Roberts (360) and Wendy Mass and Stuart Levine (“Literature” 9) espouse the notion that the creation of modern fantasy genre can be traced back to Carroll’s two Alices. However, what common elements of fantasy constitute his works as modern fantasy literature? In this respect, both Colin Manlove (“Introduction” 10) and Richard Matthews (qtd. in Mass and Levine, “What” 13) define “supernatural or impossible” as the common elements of fantasy. In addition, Mass and Levine also define a magic journey or a quest in a distinct yet similar other world as its features (“What” 16). In summary, a fantasy fiction has its setting located in another similar yet distinct wonder-eliciting world where the magic or supernatural beings and impossible things substantially and irreducibly exist during the journey or quest of the protagonist. In spite of the fact that Roberts and Mass and Levine see Carroll as the father of modern fantasy literature, if we use the common elements of fantasy proposed by Manlove, Mathews, and Mass and Levine to examine Carroll’s two Alices, three things are called into question: (1) substantial and irreducible existence of another world, (2) a meaningful journey or quest, and (3) fairies as magic or supernatural beings.

To begin with, believing this “another world” to be true hinges on Coleridge’s “willing suspension of disbelief,” but Carroll means to spoil the credibility of such an imaginary universe by presenting these two stories as dreams at the very last moment. From Edmund
Little’s discussion in his “Re-Evaluating Some Definitions of Fantasy,” both Tolkien and Manlove believe any work that can be classified as fantasy genre must build, in contrast to our “Primary existence,” substantial and irreducible existence of another world whose “inner consistency” inside the Secondary World can inspire in readers “Secondary Belief” (53). Since Carroll reduces Alice’s Wonderland and Looking-Glass adventures to illusory dreams, two *Alices* can hardly be counted as fantasy literature. According to Little, Tolkien . . . excludes any story which uses the machinery of dream, the dreaming of actual human sleep, to explain the apparent occurrence of marvels. A fairy story, he thinks, should be presented as ‘true’, and it cannot therefore tolerate any mechanism which suggests it to be a figment or an illusion. Because of their dream framework Lewis Carroll’s Alice stories cannot be accepted as fairy stories. (56)

In addition, Little continues, “Manlove follows Tolkien in asserting that the supernatural or impossible element in a story must be substantial or irreducible, and therefore rejects . . . the Alice books” (59). It follows that Carroll’s Alice stories are neither Tolkien’s fairy stories nor Manlove’s fantasy. Secondly, since Mass and Levine think a meaningful journey or a quest is characteristic of fantasy, it is debatable to say that Alice’s adventure in either Alice story falls under the fantasy genre. As Mass and Levine suggest,

According to Timmerman, an adventure does not necessarily have a specific goal while a quest always does. An adventure can be initiated for any reason, but a quest is usually a spiritual or meaningful undertaking. . . . Lastly, an adventure can be whimsical in nature. . . . [quests] are essentially serious endeavors, full of life-threatening challenges around every turn. (“What” 22)

Obviously, Timmerman excludes Carroll’s two *Alices* from, say, J. R. R. Tolkien’s *The Lord of the Rings*. Thirdly, the odd denizens in Wonderland and Looking-Glass worlds are never
Manlove’s magic or supernatural beings that range from an angel to a fairy in a typical fantasy.\(^{19}\) Besides, the supernatural element in Alice stories is not substantial or irreducible for Manlove because the supernatural in the Alice books is only “a symbolic extension of a purely human mind” (59).

In *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, Walter Benjamin has already pointed out: “A major work will either establish the genre or abolish it; and the perfect work will do both” (44). From our argument above, it is clear to see that Carroll’s two Alice books first establish the fantasy genre, and then abolish it. Hence, two *Alices* are Benjamin’s perfect works that territorialize and reterritorialize the genre. In our reading, Carroll’s aggressive playfulness maximizes its subversive power by giving a didactic appearance and having nonsense monsters rumble from beneath the surface. In *The Making of the Alice Books*, Ronald Reichertz argues that Carroll, in the tug of war between imaginative and didactic literature, transforms informational and moral literature for children into their opposite: nonsense (10). He radicalizes the evolution within the literary fantasy or fairy tales with his nonsense literature that defies instructive didacticism. As D. L. Ashliman states, “unlike most children’s literature of the Victorian era, Lewis Carroll’s books show no hint of didacticism, allowing children the freedom to read for pleasure and not for training” (162). In *Why Fairy Tales Stick*, Jack Zipes explains how Carroll’s two *Alices* work their way out of traditional children’s literature.

. . . the ‘conventional’ fairy tale for adults had become subverted at the end of the eighteenth century, there was a major movement to write parodies of fairy tales for children, to turn them upside down and inside out. . . . Writers such as . . .

Lewis Carroll . . . began to experiment with the fairy tale in a manner that would

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\(^{19}\) Interestingly, quite a few critics don’t think a fairy tale must feature fairies. For example, “Tolkien himself observes” that “fairy stories need not necessarily contain fairies” (qtd. in Little 54). Besides, Iona and Peter Opie maintain that “a fairy tale is seldom a tale about fairy-folk, and does not necessarily even feature a fairy” (qtd. in Susina 26).
make young readers question the world around them. (86-7)

Today’s critics continue their debate, trying to place Carroll in the tradition of fantasy. Jan Susina, in his 2010 book *The Place of Lewis Carroll in Children’s Literature*, names several scholars who are either for or against the idea that two *Alices* should be read as fairy tales. In his argument, he disapproves of the attempts that situate Carroll’s two *Alices* within the context of traditional folk tales, whose identifiable and recurrent patterns are studied by the folklorist Vladimir Propp. Instead, Susina proposes his hypothesis that an understanding of the original reception of Carroll’s works by their initial children audience within a literary and cultural context in mid-Victorian England will settle the argument over genre. For Susina, Carroll’s *Wonderland* “should be read as a Victorian literary fairy tale for children” because “[c]onsistently in his letters and diary, Carroll referred to it as a fairy tale” (26, 27; emphasis added). However, such a reading is to underestimate two things: first of all, though in written form, Carroll’s *Alices* still retain strong characters of story-telling pattern; secondly, the implication of oral aggressiveness in his nonsense literature is apparently at odds with that of nursery purpose in Susina’s traditional literary fairy tale. It may be true as Susina suggests that Carroll was initially meant to write a fairy-tale story to entertain his beloved child-friend Alice Liddell (27-28), but Carroll also thinks words are far more powerful than their author originally intends to say.20 Our argument here is not to provide a once-for-all answer to the argument over genre, but to call into question any alleged genre against the backdrop of Carroll’s nonsense literature.

*Nonsense School’s Critical Reading*

In April 1932, Alice Liddell Hargreaves arrived in New York City to attend the Lewis

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20 As a writer, Dodgson thinks, “Words mean more than we mean to express when we use them: so a whole book ought to mean a great deal more than the writer meant” (qtd. in Rackin, NSM 18).
Carroll Centenary Celebration and receive the honorary degree of Doctor of Literature for inspiring two *Alice* books at Columbia University. In 1965, according to Robert Phillips, “*Alice’s Adventures* had been translated into forty-seven languages, including Latin, making it one of the world’s most-translated books” (“Foreword” xvii). In 1971, Robert Phillips’s *Aspects of Alice* was first published in the States. It is the first full-scale anthology that features thirty-nine essays under nine categories: “Personal and Biographical,” “Victorian and Children’s Literature,” “Comparisons with Other Writers,” “Philosophical and Others,” “Church and Chess,” “Language, and Parody, and Satire,” “Freudian Interpretations,” “Jungian and Mythic,” and “Psychedelic.” This collection is seen as a major landmark in Carroll study because it spans over one hundred years from 1865 (the publication year of *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland*) to 1971 (100th Anniversary of the publication of *Through the Looking-Glass*). In their 1998 book *The Alice Companion*, Jo Elwyn Jones and J. Francis Gladstone categorize modern Carroll scholars before 2000 into the dominant strands as follows: “Carroll as a Conflicted Clergyman” (e.g. Humphrey Carpenter), “the Liberationist School of Carroll Criticism” (e.g. Nina Auerbach, Juliet Dusinberre), “Carroll as a Pre-Raphaelite Author, Photographer and Illustrator” (e.g. U. C. Knoepflmacher), “Semiotics and Carroll Criticism” (e.g. Rachael Fordyce), “Alice and Victorian Adult Erotic Fantasy” (e.g. James R. Kincaid, Carol Mavor, and Joyce Carol Oates), “Carroll and the Drug Experience” (e.g. Robert Phillips, Thomas Fensch, and Grace Slick), “the Nonsense School of Criticism” (e.g. Emile Cammaerts, Elizabeth Sewell), and “Carroll as Satirist” (e.g. William Empson, Shane Leslie) (50-3). To this day, Carroll’s two *Alices* continue to fascinate

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21 Charles Lutwidge Dodgson, better known as Lewis Carroll, was born in 1832 in Daresbury, England. In 1932 when Alice was eighty, Caryl encouraged his mother to publish for the first time her accounts of her friendship with Mr. Dodgson. Two years later, she died in England. For the accounts, please see Alice Liddell Hargreaves, “The Friendship that Sparked *Alice’s Adventures*;” *Lewis Carroll: Interviews and Recollections*, ed. Morton N. Cohen (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1989) 83-88. Print. For more information about her trip to America, see Rackin, NSM 25, and Carpenter 110, 113.

22 It was first published in the U.S.A. by The Vanguard Press, Inc. in 1971, but the anthology we cite from is a 1977 Vintage Books Edition.
the “children” in us with his nonsense stories. In “Lewis Carroll and T. S. Eliot as Nonsense Poets,” Elizabeth Sewell praises Chesterton highly as a man of marvelous perception who “announced in 1904 that Nonsense was the literature of the future” (119). At the beginning of the twentieth century, the value of Nonsense research has already been pointed out by Chesterton, and Sewell follows his prophecy to significantly develop this area of research.23

Nonsense School’s critical reading can be traced back to the 1930s. Walter de la Mare, in his 1932 essay “On the Alice Books,” along with Edmund Wilson,24 William Empson,25 states that the past study should not have been so negligent of Carroll’s ingenious nonsense stories because “the genius in Carroll seems to have worked more subtly than the mind which it was possessed by realized” (58). Carroll’s timeless and placeless dream realm of Nonsense does have its unwritten laws for local inhabitants to obey without the least awareness of any restrictions. Around the Lewis Carroll Centenary, serious voices are raised for giving his delightful nonsense literature its due professional critical attention. A growing interest in making sense of Carroll’s literary nonsense ferments at this period of time. “In the 1920s and 1930s,” Ronald Rackin observes, “a number of prominent authors and literary critics . . . . came to believe that Carroll had informed these ‘nonsense’ books . . . with much sense”

23 Though Elizabeth Sewell’s The Field of Nonsense is already out of print, my discussion on Nonsense School is made possible with Sewell’s “Lewis Carroll and T. S. Eliot as Nonsense Poets,” “The Balance of Brillig” and Kathleen Blake’s Play, Games and Sport: The Literary Works of Lewis Carroll and Richard Kelly’s Lewis Carroll. In particular, Richard Adelman suggests that Kathleen Blake’s 1974 book is “a direct bearing upon the works of Sewell, notably The Field of Nonsense” while Richard Kelly’s 1977 book is “one of the most lucid and complete critique of Sewell’s book” (22, 18). Besides, essays like John Ciardi’s “A Burble through the Tulgey Wood,” Walter de la Mare’s “On the Alice Books” are also included to illuminate my discussion on traditional Nonsense study.
24 In his article “C. L. Dodgson: The Poet Logician,” originally published in 1932, Wilson bemoans against the injustice done to Carroll’s Alice books: IF THE Lewis Carroll centenary has produced anything of special interest, I have failed to see it. C. L. Dodgson was a most interesting man and deserves better of his admirers, who revel in his delightfulfulness and cuteness but do not give him any serious attention. . . . In literature, Lewis Carroll went deeper than his contemporaries realized and than he usually gets credit for even today. . . . No writer, so far as I know, has ever done a serious portrait of him or made a real study of his work” (198, 201, 203).
25 In his famous 1935 article “Alice in Wonderland: The Child as Swain,” Empson opens his remarks by complaining: “IT MUST SEEM a curious thing that there has been so little serious criticism of the Alices, and that so many critics, with so militant and eager an air of good taste, have explained that they would not think of attempting it” (344).
For example, Mare again, in “On the Alice Books,” famously defines Carroll’s elusive nonsense as “the sober-sided order of nonsense” (60). Similarly, John Ciardi, in his 1959 article “A Burble through the Tulgey Wood,” raises examples from Carroll’s nonsense poem “Jabberwocky,” and argues that “the long way round” is characteristic of the “second sort of performance” that “involves a great deal of ‘sense’” (260). In other words, Ciardi argues that “non-sense,” the first performance, is without any sense while “nonsense,” the second sort, still has a great deal of sense. Both Mare and Ciardi find in Carroll’s giddy nonsense some sense, and thus distinguish the “sober-sided order of nonsense” and “second performance of nonsense” from non-meaning.

From the 1950s on, Nonsense School of Criticism begins its full blossom thanks to Elizabeth Sewell’s critical contribution to Carroll’s literary nonsense. Among her critical works, The Field of Nonsense published in 1952 is lauded by Richard Kelly as “the most perceptive and comprehensive analysis of nonsense to date” (49). Since nonsensical language, as he summarizes from Sewell’s theory of nonsense, is rendered as a closed and self-referential system, anything relatable to the everyday world must be cut off so that no allegorical or symbolic interpretations in reality can ever impose themselves upon the enclosed world of nonsense. It disorders everyday references, or frustrate any line or passage of nonsense when it begins to make sense by multiplying a subsequent interpretation upon a work that steadfastly denies any consistent reading. Therefore, the emphasis is always laid upon the parts instead of the whole since no fusion or synthesis is allowed in nonsense universe. However, without interpretations, how can we approach Carroll’s nonsense verse? Kelly explains how sense is demolished in Sewell’s nonsense world:

The defining characteristic of the game of nonsense, then, is the order-disorder dialect in the mind. Just when a line or passage of nonsense begins to make sense (that is, to be relatable to the everyday world), that sense is cancelled by a
subsequent passage that demands one not go outside of the work, outside of language, for an explanation. The natural tendency of a reader is to ask, what does this line mean? The answer, in nonsense, is that it means what it says and no interpretations apply. (50)

In his remarkable nonsense poem “The Hunting of the Snark,” Carroll concludes his verse by saying that “For the Snark was a Boojum, you see” (HS 234). Take this poem for example, how do words or parts dance on their own, and how does a verse line keep meanings to itself? As Donald Gray notes, “Sewell considers,” in her “The Balance of Brillig,” “how nonsense uses language so that words and syntax maintain a balance between a disorder of discrete objects entirely without relation to one another . . .” (380). In her critique of Sewell’s The Field of Nonsense, Kathleen Blake suggests, “[Sewell’s] thesis is that nonsense is founded on the dichotomy between play and dream, the forces of order and disorder in the mind” (64). To sum up Gray’s and Blake’s opinions, Sewell’s nonsense keeps a fine balance on the tightrope of language, and the acrobat, as Sewell suggests, is exactly Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty sitting on the top of a high, narrow wall (“Balance” 384). Sewell’s nonsense in language, with “a fear of nothingness” as well as a “fear of everythingness” in mind, is also “a game with words” “where ultimately words fail completely” (“Balance” 384, 387-88). On the one hand, her fear of everythingness has nonsense universe cut off from everyday references; word and thing become two asymmetrical series. On the other, her fear of nothingness allows the nonsense universe to work on its own so that local meanings are still possible. In his 1969 article “What Is a Boojum? Nonsense and Modernism,” Michael Holquist similarly argues that Carroll’s literary nonsense is not chaotic gibberish. In its closed field of language, nonsense constitutes a new system of signs which gain their meanings by constantly diverging from an existing language system. Also, nonsense is different from chaotic gibberish in that meaning in nonsense can still be perceived locally in its own system whereas
the unsystematic and meaningless gibberish is totally a chaotic void (Holquist 390-91). If Sewell’s everythingness indicates meaning’s global validity, then her nothingness is Holquist’s unsystematic gibberish of which cannot be made sense on its own. Therefore, Holquist, who agrees with Sewell’s theory, regards Carroll’s literary nonsense as something that operates by diverging from an existing language system and preventing this new system from descending into the abyss of meaningless gibberish.

Two prominent scholars around 1970s undertake their critiques of Sewell’s *The Field of Nonsense*. Kathleen Blake’s 1974 book *Play, Games and Sport: The Literary Works of Lewis Carroll* directly bears upon Sewell’s critical works. Comparing Carroll’s dream to a game, Blake believes that the *Alice* novels “create a world of games, but of games going wild, edging into something else” (19). What is this something else? Blake furthers her discussion: “At the point where the game becomes so unbalanced that the one is playing, the other properly speaking being played, and the winner a foregone conclusion, we have sport . . . meaning cat-and-mouse, the hunt” (19). It turns out into a barbaric hunt where aggression grows out of the competitive nature of games. In terms of nonsense, Blake distinguishes her study from Sewell’s in two ways. First of all, opposing Sewell’s insistence that true nonsense must exclude reference to reality, Blake maintains, “The *Alices* are famous for being playful and moral-less; they are without explicit ulterior motive or benefit. But although the books are nondidactic . . . they do bear a relation to reality and say something about life” (35). Secondly, Blake thinks her study of play shows a major contrast with Sewell’s.

I am concerned with play as a theme in Carroll’s fiction; she is concerned with play in a definition of nonsense: *The Field of Nonsense* is a genre study and a provocative one. Its helpfulness to my work lies in its pointing out that play is important in the *Alices*, and in its workable definition of games. Sewell ceases to be very helpful where her personal convictions lead her simply to condemn a
play-view of life in Carroll. (64-5)

In his 1977 book *Lewis Carroll*, another nonsense scholar Richard Kelly undertakes one of the most lucid and complete critiques of Sewell’s *The Field of Nonsense*. On Kelly’s part, he distinguishes his study from Sewell’s theory of nonsense by three insights. First of all, Kelly agrees with Blake that “[t]here are obviously many aspects of the Alice books that do relate to the everyday life of both Victorian England and our own day” (50). Secondly, Kelly notices that Sewell obviously ignores the fact that “[t]he substitution of ‘soup’ for ‘star’ turns the parody into nonsense” (65). Even more surprising is the third insight when Kelly claims:

If pure nonsense is conceived of as a field of closed language which resists an interpretation based upon some other system . . . then “Jabberwocky” is not pure nonsense. There are not enough “structures of resistance,” as Michael Holquist calls them, to close out of the poem ordinary meaning—in the battle between sense and nonsense, sense wins out in “Jabberwocky,” despite the structures of resistance provided by the nonsense words. (67)

Both Blake and Kelly oppose Sewell’s closed, self-referential nonsense universe by stating that Carroll’s two *Alices* do bear a relation to everyday life. Nevertheless, neither Blake nor Kelly further explores this finding.

Though considerable amounts of criticism shed a light upon the issue of nonsense in Carroll Study, relatively little research is undertaken to read Carroll’s literary nonsense in terms of biophilosophy beyond the bounds of language. Carroll’s giddy nonsense is the explosive dynamite that can be used to blow up Sewell’s high walls of language so that Carroll’s literary nonsense, instead of being confined to a closed, self-referential language system, can say something about life. Why does Carroll’s giddy nonsense have anything to do with biophilosophy? To address the question, Lecercle’s theory of intuitive *délire*, Foucault’s and Deleuze’s concepts of the outside, and Deleuze’s notion of smooth time-space and
absolute memory are used to examine the power of life in Carroll’s two Alices.  

Methodology

This dissertation is designed to analyze Carroll’s two Alice books using Lecercle’s theory of intuitive délire, Foucault’s and Deleuze’s concepts of the outside, and Deleuze’s notion of smooth time-space and memory of the outside. To analyze all the textual episodes with one single theory would be difficult because the application of theory must depend on the attribute of a certain textual episode to yield the most productive finding. This thesis distinguishes itself from its progenitors by examining the unacknowledged relationship between biophilosophy and the giddy effects caused by nonsense in two Alice books. Instead of a broad review of contemporary ethics discourses, this study extracts from two Alices textual examples that fall under our three topics: language, subjectivity, and spatiotemporal memory, and examines them through aforementioned critical lenses. This study tries to prove that although Carroll produces nonsense in language, its giddy effects can help us palpate the pulsing difference beneath the surface of identity, and activate our power of life. The basic framework of each chapter begins by raising the issues respectively related to language, subjectivity, or spatiotemporal memory, to be followed by the relevant literature review based on each chapter’s topic, and then the preliminary part (issue raising and literature review) in each chapter is followed by two sections.

* * *

Chapter One is entitled “Power of Intuitive Délire in Lewis Carroll’s Monstrous Language,” in which we argue from Jean-Jacques Lecercle’s perspective that the linguistic monster resists representation with its power of délire. This chapter plays a pivotal role in the

26 Nonsense School’s Critical Reading spans fifty years from 1932 (the Lewis Carroll Centenary) to 1980, and there is a gap in the following three decades. To avoid reiteration, more modern critical literature (not exclusively nonsense study) associated with language, subjectivity, and spatiotemporal memory will be discussed at greater length at the beginning of each chapter.
overall dissertation since our investigation of the relationship between language and life attempts to submit to a radical critique the Nonsense School’s reading that treats Carroll’s nonsense verse as closed, self-referential language system. Such reading cuts off anything relatable to the everyday life of both Victorian England and our own day, and loses its critical edge for the past three decades. Elizabeth Sewell takes words at their face value: on the one hand, she ignores Carroll’s rich historical implications in Alice books, and on the other hand, she plays down the true value of Carroll’s nonsense verse. We raise a red flag for Sewell’s reading of Carroll’s literary nonsense as closed, self-referential language system not in order to bear testimony to a solid connection between words and the world. On the contrary, we believe there is always an irrational break between word and reference (language), “Alice” the name and Alice the person (subjectivity), and memory of history in striated time-space and memory of the outside in smooth time-space (memory in time-space). To crack open these initially identical forces, we need impact instead of impasse. Only the giddy nonsense can provide us with a speed high enough to make these identical forces gush forth with dual splitting so that the jet of formal order is increased to a maximum while the other jet of referential order is reduced to a minimum. The more irrational the break is between these two dissymmetrical jets, the giddier we feel. We argue that Carroll’s two Alices do bear a relation to everyday life. Between nothingness (a mere mental patient’s gibberish) and everythingness (a methodical scientist’s reason), Carroll as a nonsense poet helps the reality of language slip outside the scientific grasp of psychiatry with his rich and imaginative délie. In doing so, Carroll’s délie-driven linguistic monsters in nonsense verse return to the surface, and skirt the delirious frontier between sense and nonsense. In the no man’s land where philosophy consorts with the March Hare, the desire-tainted language has become its own master.

Chapter Two “‘Who are you?’—the Subjectivation of Alice in the Claws of the Outside” deals with Alice’s epistemological and ontological doubts about her “Self.” In her
dream journeys, the constant size alterations (the visible) and clashes of different logics (the articulable) inflict traumatic violence upon her so that Alice begins to feel anxious about who she really is. In the meantime, she also feels curious about what will become of her the next minute and the novel way the local inhabitants argue here. Obviously, Alice has an ambivalent attitude toward her unstable subjectivity. Alice feels not only anxious but also curious about her becoming epistemologically and ontologically otherwise. If law and curiosity are respectively gifts from God and Life, men are fated to struggle in these two contradictory powers: boundary-marking fascist bio-power (law) and boundary-crossing non-fascist power of life (curiosity). In defiance of darkness of knowledge and threat of death, Alice resists any power that holds her as the object of disciplinarian control. The curiosity inside Alice strives to free the subject itself from the shackles of God and Man because the forces within her enter into a relation with other forces from the outside to invest in another compound or form. On the outside, the constant size alterations (the visible) and clashes of different logics (the articulable) continue to fold in to continue the process of subjectivation. In this fashion, Alice’s old audio-visual archive in her actual waking life gradually gives way to the virtual forces of “the outside which exists as an unformed element of forces” (F 43). In our reading, Alice’s constant size alterations and the clashes of her logic with the local inhabitants’ alogic in the virtual dreams are the intrusive snatching claws of the outside that resist the death of her life and an impasse of her thoughts. At the level of Knowledge Being, Alice’s audio-visual archive of her “Self” in her actual waking life exacts “death in an impasse” from her life. In comparison with the strata or historical formations that continually produce something new to be seen and said, Power Being is the strategic zone whose unformed pure matter and non-formalized pure function on the one hand differentiate the integral relations in the formal categories of knowledge with their affective categories of power, and on the other hand bear a relation to the outside. The third ontology is Self-Being,
which bears a relation to oneself by the folding of the outside into the inside. New modes of
subjectivation are produced by the coextensive inside and outside, a conversion of near and
far. On the part of inside, curiosity continually opens the interiority for auto-affection while
on the part of outside its intrusive claws inflict their violence upon the fissure or central
chamber (zone of subjectivation) to cause metabolic death. This chapter concludes that
curiosity makes possible an ethical subject by the folding of the outside.

Chapter Three “A Memory That Haunts: Time and Space in Alice’s Dreams” improves
upon the past psychobiographical reading of memory in Carroll’s two Alices. Traditionally,
Carroll critics divide the narrative structure of two Alices into frames and adventures.
Framing sections include the poems and scenes that begin and end two Alices while
adventures are Alice’s dream journeys through Wonderland and Looking-Glass countries in
between. Because the strong atmosphere of nostalgia permeate the serene opening and final
scenes and prefatory and closing poems, amateur readers often confuse Alice Liddell and the
fictional Alice in their readings, and professional critics read the haunting memory in two
Alices as Carroll’s nostalgic memory. To deal with this problem, we would like to propose a
new division between Carroll’s nostalgic memory of Alice Liddell on the side of prefatory
and closing poems, and the fictional Alice’s memory problem on the side of opening and
closing scenes and her curious dream journeys. The fictional Alice’s memory, as the White
Queen says, is a “poor sort of memory that only works backwards” (TLG 150). In her former
waking life, the centralized power of the steam-engine in fictional Alice’s Victorian Age
constitutes her idea of a single and objective sense of time and space, and accordingly she
surveys the space and measures the time in her dreams with former imperial yardstick like a
town surveyor sent by the State Apparatus. However, we must bear in mind that in her
waking life, if the coming of the railway age has caused her sense of giddiness, the fleeting
giddiness is only a relative sense of giddiness because it takes place in linear time and
three-dimensional space. It is observable that Alice’s former sense of space and time and her past memory fare badly in the new chaotic time-space in Alice’s virtual dreams. Changing at an infinite speed of birth and disappearance, the new chaotic smooth time-space (Aion time and topological space) in her dream adventures gives Alice absolute sense of giddiness, and makes an absolute memory that works both ways possible. Both *Wonderland* and *Looking-Glass* imply that Alice tells the “history” of her adventures to her sister as if she could retrieve the exact recollection in each act of retelling the story. By bringing in Bergson’s famous metaphor of the cone (the virtual coexistence of the past and the present) and Deleuze’s memory of the outside (present and future), we maintain that Alice does not merely redraw the past, but produce her memory anew at present in each act of retelling her adventures.


Chapter One

Power of Intuitive Délire in Lewis Carroll’s Monstrous Language

“It seems very pretty,” she said when she had finished [reading the poem “Jabberwocky”], “but it’s rather hard to understand!” (You see she didn’t like to confess, even to herself, that she couldn’t make it out at all.) “Somehow it seems to fill my head with ideas—only I don’t exactly know what they are! However, somebody killed something: that’s clear, at any rate—. (TLG 118)

This chapter addresses the following research questions: Why does a nonsense poem like “Jabberwocky” fill Alice with ideas when she does not exactly know what they are? How does Carroll’s nonsense verse relate to everyday life in spite of the irrational break between word and thing? Why can we view the giddy effects of Carroll’s nonsense language as biophilosophy? Simply put, the issue we raise in this chapter is an investigation of the relationship between language and life. To answer these questions, we resort to Jean-Jacques Lecercle’s theory of intuitive délire to analyze the desire in Carroll’s nonsense language. What is Lecercle’s intuitive délire, and why is it important in our study on the relationship between language and life?

When language is a mere instrument for communication, a subjective structure is imposed upon the speaker who believes that he is saying what he means. The speaking subject enforces the representational cooperation between the signifying series and the signified series, and keeps this relation immune to variation. Accordingly, the metamorphosis of the real language is subjugated to the metaphor of the artificial language. An answer always precedes a riddle\textsuperscript{27} that the world gives us as if everything already had a place of its

\textsuperscript{27} The Hatter’s riddle “Why is a raven like a writing-desk?” (\textit{AW} 55) does not come with an answer. Alice thinks asking a riddle without an answer is a waste of time.
own in a forest of arborescent trees. In this logic of representation, interpretation exhausts all possibilities of life, and finds nothing to surprise us under the sun.

However, this is not the reality of our language. Real language grows under the ground of a potato field in transversal or diagonal directions. It grows with its own will, its own desire. The deepest workings of language are all about the rhizomatic assemblage which assembles and disperses its heterogeneous entities in no time. Desire should flow in “a rhizome operating immediately in the heterogeneous and jumping from one already differentiated line to another,” instead of being channeled through the “arborescent descent going from the least to the most differentiated” (ATP 10). “Once a rhizome has been obstructed, arborified, it’s all over, no desire stirs; for it is always by rhizome that desire moves and produces. Whenever desire climbs a tree, internal repercussions trip it up and it falls to its death; the rhizome, on the other hand, acts on desire by external, productive outgrowths” (ATP 14). Desire is not “a freak in a fair” who is “subjected to the wondering gaze of an audience of readers who laugh and gape at his eccentricities . . . before sending him back to his padded cell, like psychiatrists” (PN: IVNL 206). The linguistic imperialism yokes desire to plough its striated furrows. Without yokes, cattle could have meandered and grazed on the meadow like a nomadic herd.

Lewis Carroll’s poetic language is the antidote of the representational yoke. He pushes language to its limit in his experimentation of literary writing to disrupt the coherence of the text with the surprising coincidence. What is characteristic of Carroll’s literary style is that he invokes a linguistic monster to rush out from the darkness breathing forth flames of fire to overcome us with fear, and at the same time rides on it as a rodeo cowboy to amuse us with humor. It is terrible because Carroll’s nonsense is rife with oral and verbal aggressiveness (e.g. the furious cur that tries to condemn the mouse to death in the tail-shaped verse “The
and it is also humorous because the new playful line of flight deflects from its intended serious target. When language loses its signifying function, and meaning is forced out of nonsense texts, the frozen institution begins to thaw out and flow as heterogeneous currents of intuitions.

In his discussion of the philosophy of nonsense, Lecercle draws our attention to the intuitions of Victorian nonsense literature. He thinks mythical power (or force) is at work behind the works of Victorian nonsense in general, two Alice books in particular (PN: IVNL 1). Nonsense has long established itself as a literary genre around the texts of two Victorian nonsense masters in which Edward Lear’s limericks and Lewis Carroll’s portmanteau words abound. Nevertheless, it is debatable for Joyce Thomas, in “‘There Was an Old Man . . .’: The Sense of Nonsense Verse,” to say that “Lewis Carroll is the master of nonsense fiction, whereas Edward Lear is the master of nonsense verse” (121), since any modern reader will more easily recall Carroll’s most renown nonsense poem “Jabberwocky” than any of Lear’s limerick. After all, as Martin Gardner puts it, “[f]ew would dispute the fact that ‘Jabberwocky’ is the greatest of all nonsense poems in English” (149). But for most Carroll scholars, it is not simply because his “Jabberwocky” rings a louder bell than Lear’s verse that Carroll prevails in literary nonsense. It is because humor and terror in both Carroll’s nonsense verse run so ingeniously in tandem; as a result, on the surface level it is more humorously readable than Lear’s poetic language, and down underneath, his monstrous language, like a fiery tiger with beautiful fur but burning eyes, has a carnivorous desire of its own in verse, prowling around outside in the wild waiting to pounce savagely upon Alice, who is “[w]ell schooled in the aboveground principles of regular causality and by now quite determined to assume that the same principles are operative in this Wonderland of impossibilities” (Rackin, “Alice’s Journey” 397).

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28 See Appendix C.
It is interesting for Elizabeth Sewell to say “it may be that Nonsense goes better in verse than in prose” (qtd. in Kelly 50). In comparison with prose, nonsense verse, in Sewell’s opinion, resists more powerfully any consistent reading that tries to impose itself on the verse. In other words, it cuts itself off more clearly than prose from anything relatable to everyday life of both Victorian England and our own day. On this point, Richard Kelly thinks Sewell has put herself “on more dangerous grounds” (50) when stating that verse prevails over prose in nonsense. On Kelly’s part, first of all, he, along with Kathleen Blake, disagrees that nonsense says nothing about life, and secondly, he is not convinced by Sewell’s statement that verse is superior to prose in nonsense. In spite of his disagreement, Kelly does not further his argument in *Lewis Carroll* to explain either dissent. In our observation, prose is not necessarily worse than verse in nonsense because, take four M-words in the Dormouse’s impromptu fairy tale for example (mouse-traps, moon, memory, and muchness), the nonsensical coincidence between the repetitions of the alliterative metric pattern and the variations of their heterogeneous meanings is no less than any found in Carroll’s nonsense verse in two *Alices*, though the dissonance between regular metric pattern and referential eccentricity is admittedly easier to be arranged in nonsense verse. The point is to emphasize language function in the foreground, but to deflect its intended meaning in the background. Whether it is easier or not, the dual operation can be applied to both prose and verse. As to Sewell’s entrenched self-referential language system, how to prove Blake and Kelly’s insight in the late 1970s that nonsense is relatable to life in spite of the irrational break between word and thing, and fill the gap in the past three decades is the focus of this chapter.

Carroll’s literary nonsense is the Hatter’s mad language that “seemed to [Alice] to have no sort of meaning in it, and yet it was certainly English” (*AW* 56). The carnivorous crocodile in the nonsense poem that Alice recites with a hoarse and strange voice is the perfect embodiment of such mad language. Never ask what the monstrous language signifies because
right after the cheerful grinning “welcomes little fishes in” (AW 16), its smiling jaws surprisingly snap shut to crush our cognitive souls from us. Language prevails over its baffled subject of enunciation whose meaning is seriously eclipsed by saying. The desire-tainted language loses its capacity to communicate and increases its power to rule over its subject (PLG 7). Nevertheless, it does not mean words in the shady part of Carroll’s monstrous language simply “fail to express what we mean”; “conversely, they express too much, more than we mean: they utter what we refuse to recognize, what we would rather have left unsaid” (PLG 6). It is exactly this “what has been left unsaid” that haunts meaning, and returns to sabotage the linguistic order intermittently. The deep and obscure workings of Carroll’s monstrous language, instead of giving meaningless gibberish, produce an abundant excess of meaning. To endow “the old philosophical question of the emergence of sense out of nonsense” with “a new formulation,” Lecercle explores the suppressed but persistent tradition of délire dwelling on “the delirious borderline between sense and nonsense,” “on the frontier between science and unreason, in that no man’s land where the madman, the poet and the scientist meet, where the philosopher sits down to tea with the March Hare. . .” (PLG 6). The study we present in this essay attempts to attest to the fact that the fantastic key to all of Carroll’s nonsense texts is his power of intuitive délire. Where the instrumentality of language cannot account for, the desire of nonsense in language must take over to unveil the deepest workings of language. In this chapter, we will examine the inexhaustible mythical power of nonsense in Carroll’s two Alice books through the lens of Lecercle’s intuitive délire. In contrast with the Nonsense School’s self-referential nonsense, Lecercle applies a detour reading through madness to beckon the demented linguistic monster lurking in the darkness of language to locate the source of intuitions embedded in the literary text of nonsense and their power of anticipating serious social institutions. From his synchronic account (resistance of intuition against urge of institution) to his diachronic account (literature preceding theory),
Lecercle’s theory of intuitive délire in nonsense can break through language barriers and embrace life fully with its politics of monstrous resistance. Our argument to be achieved in this chapter is that language and life have the similar self-dissolving tendency: that is, a centrifugal resistance of intuition always dissolves the centripetal urge of institution by an excess of errors that overflow the representational categories. If we can prove this point, then we can conclude that the mythic power of Carroll’s literary nonsense can refer beyond language to life.

For the past three decades, Nonsense School Criticism seems to have lost its critical edge because Elizabeth Sewell insists on a closed, self-referential language system, whereas Kathleen Blake and Richard Kelly, though proposing that language can still relate to everyday references, do not pursue any further study on this point. In 1990, the English translation of Gilles Deleuze’s *Logique du sens* (originally published in 1969) was made available to the English-speaking world. In this critical book about language, Deleuze undertook a 34-series reading of Carroll’s *Wonderland and Looking-Glass* through the lens of his “event” theory. If we understand this esoteric work through the top-bottom process from the tertiary order (e.g. speech, proposition)—through the static genesis—back to the secondary organization (e.g. voice, sense) and then—through the dynamic genesis—further back to the primary order (e.g. noise, sensation), we regress from the actual to the virtual in Deleuze’s “event” theory.\(^{29}\) To be sure, we only need to reverse the whole process to actualize the event. The virtual and the actual constitute the dual structure of the event, only with the primacy of the virtual over the actual. In “Third Series of the Proposition,” Deleuze adds a fourth dimension “sense” to denotation, manifestation, and signification that form the circle of the proposition. In *Logic of Sense*, sense and event are almost interchangeable terms.

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\(^{29}\) In *Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation*, Joe Hughes’s schematic diagram of three levels of genesis (25, 46) is a very useful introduction to Deleuze’s extremely complex *Logic of Sense*. 
Sense is “a pure event which inheres or subsists in the proposition” (*LS* 19). It is neither actions (agent) nor passions (patient); instead, it is an incorporeal, impassive and neutral entity, hovering over “the boundary between propositions and things” (*LS* 22). Extra-Being, *Something (aliquid)*, or effects are all equivalent terms for “sense-event.” Deleuze’s “sense” is neither good sense (one direction only) nor common sense (a fixed identity) in traditional sense of meaning, and “nonsense” is not opposed to lack of sense. Sense and nonsense relate to each other in a paradoxical mode of co-presence, in which nonsense is present within sense, and it produces sense in excess by “mak[ing] pre-individual and nonpersonal singularities speak” (*LS* 73). That is why Carroll’s giddy but fascinating *something* somehow can fill our heads with ideas. However, quite a few critics are reserved about this pre-Guattarian work in Deleuze’s “thinking the multiple” phase. For example, in *Deleuze and Language*, Lecercle is critical of Deleuze’s overtly “psychoanalytic” and “structuralist” *Logic of Sense*:

So *Logique du sens*, a book in which Deleuze still draws on psychoanalysis and its concepts, is a pre-Guattari book lacking . . . what Guattari brought to Deleuze: a critical interest in linguistics and a definite hostility to psychoanalysis. As a result of this, Deleuze’s “book about language” is completely untainted by the science of language, and offers a theory of the genesis of language with definite psychoanalytic flavour: Deleuze himself calls the book a “psychoanalytic novel.”

(100)

On the rich French soil of phenomenology (Husserl), psychoanalysis (Lacan, Klein), and structuralism (Lévi-Strauss) in the late 1960s, it seems inevitable for Deleuze to produce such a “psychoanalytic” and “structuralist” work; nevertheless, his novel ideas of event, sense and nonsense, Aion and Chronos, and chaos-cosmos still have their places of application in the current study.

Alison Rieke’s *The Senses of Nonsense* (1992) discusses how the nonsense in the
modernist experimental writings of James Joyce, Gertrude Stein, Wallace Stevens, and Louis Zukofsky has its secret, enigmatic, coherent sense. In her opinion, literary nonsense defies the sense-making functions in the old language systems, and its new hermetic sense is only attainable if we can invent new rules and patterns to read their ingeniously calculated works. It is very unlikely for writers who experiment with nonsense to “write nonsense in the most absolute sense of the term” (Rieke 4) because “[n]o one wants to read complete nonsense” (Rieke 9). Therefore, modernist nonsense poets have the creative power to pack words with surprises in their radical experimentation. Readers can always find an excess of sense in their literary nonsense. In Ann C. Colley’s review of Rieke’s *The Senses of Nonsense*, she has some trouble with Rieke’s too reductive and narrow definition of nonsense. She questions Rieke about the sense of release or escape—the delight—that nonsense offers . . . about its role as a revealer of incongruity . . . about its anti-establishment nature . . . about its autonomy—its creating a world of its own rules . . . about its tendency to disengage itself from any emotional involvement; and especially . . . about its traditional reliance upon images . . . (436)

In comparison, Rieke’s nonsense “cramp[s] or fill[s] space or hide[s] meaning through the density of its linguistic mask worn on its surface,” whereas Colley suggests that “a text qualifies as a piece of nonsense when it relaxes the tightness and exposes gaps . . . which invite, rather than obscure, a meaning” (Colley 436-37). And this is how we situate ourselves, on Colley’s side, in relation to Rieke’s assumptions about nonsense.

Gabriele Schwab’s “Nonsense and Metacommunication: Reflections on Lewis Carroll” (1994) argues that the new Victorian genre of nonsense literature such as Lewis Carroll’s experimental writing diverges from traditional nonsense literature that is intrinsically linked to nineteenth-century literary realism and mimesis. Carroll’s literary nonsense breaks with the
mimetic tradition of specular nature to allow the proliferation of multiple forms of experimental literature in the twentieth century—including surrealism, dada, high modernism and manifold simulacra of postmodernism—to thrive in the delirious space. Schwab proposes to “analyze Carroll’s texts as an eccentric form of literary communication, a communication which celebrates the excess that literary language is able to produce in relation to a signified imaginary world, a narrative of ‘mere nonsense’” (158). Schwab playfully constructs a culture contact between two imaginary worlds—Victorian nonsense and postmodernism, and finds either world’s approximation with schizophrenia and simulacrum might recuperate the mimetic representation that we claim to have abandoned.

Alan Lopez’s “Deleuze with Carroll: Schizophrenia and Simulacrum and the Philosophy of Lewis Carroll’s Nonsense” (2004) points out that there has been relatively scant attention paid to the philosophical questions raised in Carroll’s Alice books, in particular the subject of nonsense, except for Gilles Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, Peter Heath’s The Philosopher’s Alice, and Jean-Jacques Lecercle’s The Philosophy of Nonsense. Lopez agrees with Lecercle that because of the anticipatory and philosophical character of Carroll’s nonsense, two Alice books can explain all the critical theories already past and yet to come. In his reading, Lopez suggests that “a more productive examination of the question of a critical subject in Alice would occur in the context of the complex negotiations between the madness of nonsense and the epistemic and ontological doubt grounded in the simulacrum” (102).

Mou-Lan Wong’s Ph.D. dissertation Visualizing Victorian Nonsense: Interplays between Texts and Illustrations in the Works of Edward Lear and Charles Lutwidge Dodgson (2009) undertakes a study on the role of illustrations in Victorian nonsense literature. This thesis explores the dual functions of the visual generation of nonsense: illustrations on the one hand distract the reader by providing a parallel visual text, and on the other interact with verbal text to intensify the nonsensicality in language. The significant contribution of this
study is a comparative study of visual nonsense between Lear and Dodgson. In addition to their nonsense language, Dodgson and Lear enhance their resistance against conventional interpretations with their nonsense illustrations.

1.1. Language, Nonsense, and Desire

Why do we use Lecercle’s theory of intuitive délire to read Carroll’s nonsense verse? As a world renowned authority on nonsense, Lecercle creates two important concepts délire (PLG in 1985) and intuition (PN: IVNL in 1994) to analyze the complex workings of nonsense. In his theory, Lecercle’s délire is the dark, dangerous, and disorderly side of language that does not easily lend itself to word-to-word translation. Given its untranslatability, neither “delirium” nor “delusion,” as Lecercle argues, can be the English equivalent term for the French word délire since “delirium” is only narrowly operative in psychiatric contexts while “delusion” is defined in a way that its implication of deception “fails to capture the element of truth that is present in délire” (PLG 8). Both “delirium” and “delusion” suggest mental illnesses. However, Lecercle’s concept of délire is used to indicate the reality of language outside the scientific grasp of psychiatry. To avoid confusion, Lecercle keeps the French word délire untranslated, and introduces a threefold distinction of madness:

first, unreflective delirium, the repetitive and unimaginative discourse of paranoiacs; then a reflexive delirium while I am calling délire, created by talented patients who write down their experience and devote their time to argument and what they take to be science; and finally, the shady activities of a scientist who yields to a mild form of mania, “une idée fixe.” (PLG 3)  
The three kinds of madness correspond to three kinds of “madmen”: first of all, a mental patient whose “[m]ere delirium is poor and repetitive,” then, a poet or a talented inmate whose “délire is rich and imaginative,” and then, a mildly maniac scientist like Saussure
What interests Lecercle the most is a nonsense poet or a talented inmate who skirts the delirious frontier between nothingness (gibberish) of a mere mental patient and everythingness (reason) of a methodical scientist. In his study, Carroll is a nonsense poet who lingers in a no man’s land where “philosophy consorts with the March Hare...” (PLG 3). It is also a three-forked road where the madman (psychiatry), poet (literature) and the scientist (linguistics) meet. Unfortunately, Carroll’s power of délire is often greeted with some suspicion of his sexuality by paranoiacs and scientists.

Is Carroll a poet, a talented schizophrenic, or a pedophile? Nonsense in his monstrous language always arouses busybodies’ conjecture about this Christ Church bachelor don’s loin desire. Many psychobiographers in the first half of the twentieth century misappropriate out of context Freud’s remark that “nonsense words are fragments of repressed sexual words” (qtd. in FL 79) to look into Carroll’s nonsense language for his unusual passion for Alice Liddell. Viewed through psychobiographical lens, Carroll’s sexuality seems to be the sole raison d’être of two Alices. Some speculate that Carroll is Jack the Ripper, a gay, or the first acidhead while others insinuate that he is a sexual pervert. In his 2004 book The Force of Language (coauthored with Denise Riley), Lecercle disagrees with Richard Wallace’s demented interpretations in The Agony of Lewis Carroll (1990) and Jack the Ripper (1997) that see Carroll as “a secret gay, repressed by the moral and legal climate of Victorian Britain, and forced to express his sexuality in Aesopic language, in the shape of nonsense” or as “Jack the Ripper” (FL 78, 80). According to Lecercle, the instrument that Wallace uses to arrive at his two bizarre interpretations is anagrams, which have “the advantage that with a little ingenuity one can prove [to a gullible public] exactly what one wishes to prove...” (FL 80).

Lecercle gives his disapproving comments as follows:

The exact title of the second Alice title is: Through the Looking-Glass, and

What Alice Found There. This, you would hardly have guessed, is the anagram

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for: “Look with a lens through the cute darling, he’s a fag don.” . . . In *The Hunting of the Snark*, there is a famous line that describes the method of navigation of the boat on which the heroes have embarked: “Then the bowsprit got mixed with the rudder sometimes.” This is an anagram of (again, would you have guessed?) “To Mother, Disturbed, I themed the worst pig-sex with men.” . . . There is no doubt, however, that Wallace is mad. Not content with his extraordinary interpretation of Carroll, he published a second book (*fous littéraires* are usually afflicted with a compulsion of repetition), in which he “demonstrated”, through the usual means, that Lewis Carroll was . . . Jack the Ripper.” (FL 79-80)

If Wallace is, as Lecercle claims, a madman, he must be a mental patient or a paranoiac who poorly repeats his mere delirium. Wallace’s anagrams give no hint of the rich and imaginative power of *délire* that Carroll the nonsense poet or Schreber the talented inmate has. He nearly reduces Carroll’s literary nonsense to gibberish.

On the other hand, Carroll’s mysterious relationship with Alice Liddell, his amateur pastime of taking pictures of nude angelic young girls, and most important of all, in two *Alices* the verbal violence, the psychological or physical brutality, and the “primal scenes and overpowering, symbolic renditions of classic Freudian tropes (a vaginal rabbit role and a phallic Alice, an amniotic pool of tears, hysterical mother figures and impotent father figures, threats of decapitation [castration], swift identity changes behind the comforting social façade of a looking-glass, etc.)” (Rackin, *NSM* 22) all together cast clouds of suspicion over Mr. Dodgson who lives behind the amiable mask of Carroll. This shy mathematics don at Christ Church of Oxford University may not be as well known in the world as the writer of two *Alice* books who uses the pseudonym Lewis Carroll; still, his friendship with Alice Liddell, the second of the Dean’s three daughters, has been a source of popular interest among his
biographers and Freudian critics, whose publications are primarily rife in the first half of the twentieth century. Their complicit implication that Dodgson was a pedophile has put his name under a cloud. In *Alice’s Adventures: Lewis Carroll in Popular Culture*, Will Brooker observes that the most representative Carroll biographer Morton Cohen never puts it bluntly that Dodgson was a sexual pervert, but “the idea of an unusual passion that was controlled and channeled into creative writing is central to Cohen’s argument” (56). Freudian critics bring into full play the insinuation that Carroll’s nonsense writing serves as an outlet for Dodgson’s repressed sexual urges. A. M. E. Goldschmidt begins his remarks in “Alice in Wonderland Psychoanalyzed” to justify\(^{30}\) such irrefutable critical interest. Although Freudian approach may not suit the treatment of all fantasy literature, Alice’s dreams as “products of the author’s subconscious mind” give them an ecstasy of joy because “no critic upon whom the Freudian theory has made even the slightest impression can refrain from recognizing sexual symbolism in any medium, when it is very clearly manifested” (279). Nonsense words, in such psychobiographical logic of representation, are symptomatic of Carroll’s repressed sexuality. Sexual symbolism makes interpretation possible because every riddle must imply an answer in advance. In Goldschmidt’s translation, the plunge into a deep well and lock and key represent coitus; the doors of normal size represent adult women; and the little door symbolizes a female child and the curtain before it her clothes (280-81). Goldschmidt concludes with a tone of Freudian sublimation that Carroll’s repressed sexual impulses make him a great author: “Had he lived today he might have undergone analysis, discovered the cause of his neurosis, and lived a more contented life. But in that case he might not have written *Alice in Wonderland*” (282). Both Cohen (the biographer) and Goldschmidt (the Freudian critic) agree that Carroll’s unusual passion is channeled to a socially acceptable end

\(^{30}\) His article is included in Robert Phillips’s *Aspects of Alice*, in which Phillips implies that Goldschmidt’s essay was likely penned to parody the Freudian interpretations in 1930s (438).
in his nonsense creative writing. This psychobiographical view of Dodgson’s “dirty little secret” sublimated into Carroll’s popular child readers ferments trouble among parents. In such insinuation, a sinister image of Dodgson is behind the amiable mask of Carroll. With regard to this contemporary ambivalence, Ian Fitzgerald writes: “Whatever the truth, it is the case that most parents today would be happy for their children to listen to the story of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland—but they probably would not want Dodgson to be the man to read it to them” (qtd. in Brooker 67). There is no way we can recognize whether Carroll is attracted to little girls by their angelic beauty or erotic sexuality. Even so, psychobiographers are still in their frenzy of treasure-hunting in the author’s private diaries, letters, photographs, and accounts from families, colleagues, and friends, trying to reconstruct an “objective” portrait of the author of two Alices. However, the Queen of Hearts’s “Sentence first—verdict afterwards” (AW 96) ironically befalls her creator. Many psychobiographers assume Carroll as a sexual pervert first, and then set their hands on all primary or secondary material to prove their suspicion. As a biographer who has studied Carroll for over thirty years, Edward Wakeling sighs out his worries that some biographers’ desperate search for a “new angle” in the available but limited primary source material has led to pure invention (ix). Whether a fictional image of Carroll is faithfully reflected with factual evidence or twisted with sinister insinuations, Freudian critics appeal to these biographies for their symptomatic readings. As with Saussurian structural linguistics, psychobiographical approach establishes the prevailing transcendence of the signifier over the signified and the speaking subject over the language as if everything that happens could be figured out with reason and a speaker could exactly mean what he or she says. In this logic of representation, Carroll’s nonsense language in Alice texts corresponds to his repressed sexuality in reality, or vice versa. Some other Carroll scholars like Richard Kelly have warned against the psychobiographical interpretation of the Alice
books, which might underestimate their literary value. Whatever the truth of the “dirty little secret” is, David Robinson thinks: “All we really know about Dodgson’s sexuality is that if he was indeed a paedophile it was in thought rather than deed. Whether he was too emotionally immature or controlled, he never acted on those particular impulses” (qtd. in Brooker 60). To put an end to the endless psychobiographical debate on Carroll’s sexuality, Fitzgerald suggests “separating author from text” (qtd. in Brooker 67). On Lecercle’s three-forked road where the madman Wallace, the nonsense poet Carroll, and the scientist Saussure meet, Carroll’s power of délie steers his nonsense language between gibberish and scientific language. In this no man’s land, Carroll is possessed by his delirious language. Language becomes its own master.

In Saussurian structural linguistics, the remainder cannot be subsumed under its representational categories; therefore, it is usually discarded as irrelevant. However, in Lecercle’s study of délie, the “left unsaid” remainder is significant because it resists the communication of meaning with uncompromising interference. This eccentric philosophical tradition of délie has been a source of inspiration and fascination for poets because of “its liberating value” rather than its being reduced as “a symptom of the dereliction of the linguistic order” (PLG 7). In Lecercle’s discussion, délie is the limit of science; nevertheless, the suppressed but persistent tradition of délie, operative against the backdrop of the dominant tradition of controlled and instrumental language, knows no bounds of the latter and shifts beyond truth, sense, abstraction, and method to fiction, nonsense, desire, and the madness of délie (PLG 11, 7). Lecercle’s délie is significant for two things in its account of the relation among language, nonsense, and desire: first of all, the principle of délie is that “language, after all, is master”; secondly, “language becomes tainted by desire, by the actions

31 As Richard Kelly suggests, “[t]he psychoanalytical approach, which uses the poetry to confirm assumptions about the emotional make up of its author, has limited literary value. . .” (54).
and passions of our body, by its instinctual drives” (PLG 10, 7). In the episode of “A Mad Tea-Party,” Alice’s statement that I say what I mean is the same as “I mean what I say” is challenged by the Hatter’s “I see what I eat” and “I eat what I see,” March Hare’s “I like what I get” and “I get what I like,” and the dormant Dormouse’s “I breathe when I sleep” and “I sleep as I breathe” (AW 55). This is a typical motif that science tries to subsume language under its methodical logic. Earlier on, Alice becomes drowsy in her long and slow falling down the rabbit hole and confuses the minimal pair cats and bats by saying that “Do cats eat bats?” or sometimes “Do bats eat cats?” Alice’s self-monitoring in her dreamy state becomes so lax that she transposes verbal equation to algebraic equation. If we see cats as “1” and bats as “2,” then the transposition of “cats” and “bats” does not add up to the same result “3” as we do in an algebraic equation. That is, in an algebraic equation, “1 + 2 = 3” is same as “2 + 1 = 3.” Nevertheless, the algebraic equation is different from the verbal equation because “Do cats eat bats?” does not add up to the same result as “Do bats eat cats?” does. This illustrates the fact that science cannot generalize language because parole always leaks out from langue. The desire in nonsense language is untamed. Therefore, the fact that Alice’s “I say what I mean” is different from “I mean what I say” tells us two things: first of all, to look at a verbal expression through a scientific lens is problematic; secondly, the overtly optimistic correspondence between saying and meaning is called into question by coincidence.

In the foregoing analysis, it is the utterance itself, instead of the speaking subject “I,” that has its privileged place in the game of nonsense language. A speaking subject “I” freezes the heterogeneous elements in language while the utterance finds its power of life by reversing metaphor (institution) back to metamorphosis (intuition). To reverse, language needs to resist cooperative communication with agonistic interference. The life of language resides precisely on this resistant forces, with which language can drive back any despotic impositions upon it and discourage what Lecercle calls the “‘scientific’ linguist’s attitude,
whose sole concern is to clip the wings of language to keep it still and make it manageable for dissection” (*DL* 71). “*Délire*, as an experience of possession, of loss of control by the subject, reverses the relation of mastery. . . . The dominated haunts the dominant, and ‘returns’ within it” (*PLG* 9, 7). As uttering subjects, we think language is completely at our disposal, without the least idea that “the subject of *délire* is not in control of his own speech production” (*PLG* 9). Contrariwise, we are possessed by it when we speak language. “*Délire*, then, is the experience of the body within language, of the destruction and painful reconstruction of the speaking subject, not through the illusory mastery of language and consciousness, but through possession by language” (*PLG* 40). The urge of desire for liberation is so strong that it spurs the remainder in language to utter “what we refuse to recognize, what we would rather have left unsaid” (*PLG* 6). This chaotic power of *délire* throws nonsense part of language into palpable relief, whose result of ego-loss baffles common language users and scientists, but arouses interests in Lecercle’s logophiliacs (delirious lovers of language like Roussel, Brisset, Wolfson, Artaud, etc.):

> Even if *délire* is primarily a psychiatric concept, it should not come as a surprise that it has found its philosophers: for the love of language which is the essential characteristic of delirious writers has reflexive value; it produces, almost by spontaneous generation, amateur linguists. Paradoxically, those (i.e. most of us) who *use* language as a tool treat it as if it were transparent, the mere vehicle of thought . . . . They leave the inquiries into the nature of workings of language to specialists, linguists or philosophers. On the other hand, the logophiliacs of our tradition do care for language; they are interested in its power, in the way it works: they are “natural” philosophers of language. And they anticipate the work of the professional who takes them seriously. . . . (*PLG* 8)

In this understanding, the dominant tradition of controlled and instrumental language is of no
avail in the dark and shady part of language. Since “[d]élires is the incarnation of the
dangerous side of language” (*PLG* 87), what we need is the intuition of *fous littéraires* prior
to our already frozen understanding. “[D]élires, as a form of literature that specializes in
crossing frontiers” and as a place where “the remainder is at work” (*VL* 25), is right for the
study of Carroll’s no man’s land!

**1.2. Life on the Outside of Monstrous Language**

In this section, we plan to study the rich reserve of the latent power of *délires* in
Carroll’s nonsense poems. It seems natural to resort to structural linguistics and
psychobiography whenever the problem of desire is dealt with; nevertheless, the power of
*délires* will seem reduced through their lenses. Viewed from the linguistic and
psychobiographical perspective, nonsense in language is nothing but a pathological symptom
whose hidden causes of the neurosis must be uncovered to relieve whoever is mentally
disturbed of his or her wretched distress. Therefore, it often invites “an account of psychic
processes based on a sort of linguistic analysis, in a way which strongly suggests a relation of
isomorphism between linguistic and psychic phenomena” (*PLG* 51). From the
misappropriation of structural linguists and psychobiographers, Freud’s motto that “nonsense
words are fragments of repressed sexual words” (qtd. in *FL* 79) and Lacan’s maxim that the
unconscious is “structured like a language” (qtd. in *PLG* 51) both seem to suggest the affinity
between language and desire, and this convenient interpretation gives them the mentality that
once they discover the rules of decoding, they have the full access to Carroll’s desire.
Nevertheless, as with Saussure’s science of linguistics, the delirious workings of language are
way beyond the structuralist conception of language—“the abstraction of language as an
instrument of communication and rational argument” (*PLG* 11). According to Lecercle, “. . .
*délires* is not only (as discourse) the embodiment of a second aspect of language, the shady
aspect of the expression of instinctual drives . . . it is also (as concept) the main object of a
different conception of language . . . emphasizing the materiality of words and their relation
to the subject’s desire” (PLG 11). Anything that defies the classification of Saussure’s
linguistics and ends up being ignored as irrelevant must also fly under the radar of
psychoanalysis. What we count on is not a recognizable identity for later discovery since “. . .
what can be identified is only a single manifestation, a single actualization, of what there is”
(Todd May 21). To scepter this onetime representation of “what there is” is to ignore the
turbulent undercurrents of difference beneath the surface of language. As Lecercle maintains,
“. . . poetic language . . . is the solution to the representational danger language contains: in a
gesture characteristic of high modernist aesthetics, art is seen as the antidote of
representation” (DL 169). We need the hands of a culture physician like Carroll to intuitively
touch upon the flux of desire in his nonsense literature. Dédiré does not deserve the negative
reduction of structural linguistics and psychobiography that simply treat it “as a symptom of
the dereliction of the linguistic order” (PLG 7). When poetic language experimentally goes
wild, a far cry deep down a gaping abyss must have been given by the indocile desire. The
demented linguistic monster in Carroll’s nonsense verse is the power of the false that
synchronically resists the unanimous homogenization of institution and diachronically
anticipates serious social institutions to come. This power manifests itself most effectively in
literature.

. . . art is the acme of the “power of the false” . . . . It magnifies the world by the
power of error, it invents lies, creates figments of imagination which, far from
being ghostly and tenuous phantasms, exert affirmative force. Artists discover
new truths in the construction of error and thus invent new possibilities of life.
We remember Nietzsche’s celebrated concept of truth as successful metaphor,
that is to say, as successful lie. Such a conception . . . ascribes to it the highest
creative power. (*DL* 167)

In *Violence of Language*, Lecercle wittily states: “Today’s terrorist leader is tomorrow’s prime minister: today’s solecism is tomorrow’s rule of grammar” (9). Solecism is more than the dereliction of the current linguistic order; it finds its way to the would-be linguistic order. However, no sooner has it become the new rule of grammar than another linguistic cancerization begins to disrupt this newly-established order. The “consequence of the negative prefix in the name of the genre [nonsense], as embodying the dialectics of subversion and support . . . culminates in transversion” (*PN: IVNL* 163). Hence, in Alice’s geography, “London is the capital of Paris, and Paris is the capital of Rome, and Rome . . .” (*AW* 16). Her knowledge in Carroll’s nonsense worlds (Wonderland and Looking-Glass Land) is out of joint. With these double pincers, nonsense can unsettle truth—a successful metaphor also a lie—and activate one counter-actualization after another not by making sense of nonsense, but by sense itself. Lecercle suggests:

> The only site for the Deleuze event is a Grecian Urn; not even the actual urn, but the ode in which the counter-effectuation [*amor fati*] of the event, the passage back from the actuality of the accident to the eternal virtuality of the pure event is achieved. We understand why Deleuze is a high modernist: the poem is the true site of the event, because the event does not make sense, but is sense.

(*DL* 118)

Deleuze’s sense-event is the intuition in advance of our institutionalized understanding. It is a throw of dice that counts on chance instead of a gambler’s calculation of a specific combination. Hence, chance is characteristic of Carroll’s *amor fati* of the sense-event in his nonsense poems that throws the dice: “whatever good meanings are in the book I am very glad to accept as the meaning of the book” (qtd. in Mare 58). However, Carroll’s “good meanings” do not come from readers’ interpretations, but from the linguistic monster. It is
Alice’s “Which way? Which way?” (AW 12) rather than her understanding that Humpty Dumpty’s inevitable fall is written “in a book” (TLG 160). The difference between “Which way?” and “in a book” resides in the fact that the former is the power of simulacrum while the latter is the power of resemblance. In his seminal appendix “The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy” to The Logic of Sense, Deleuze discloses his project of reversing Platonism by contrasting his reading of the world with Plato’s:

one invites us to think difference from the standpoint of a previous similitude or identity; whereas the other invites us to think similitude and even identity as the product of a deep disparity. The first reading precisely defines the world of copies or representations; it posits the world as icon. The second, contrary to the first, defines the world of simulacra; it posits the world itself as phantasm.

(\textit{LS} 261-62)

What Deleuze intends to achieve in his project is on the one hand the subversion of the first reading, and on the other the support of the second reading. To reverse Platonism is to undertake an unreserved critique of identity whose prior model (or the Good) serves as an ultimate point of reference from on high for the copy (removed once from the original) and the copy of the copy (removed twice from the original). The Platonic motivation, in accordance with its graded descent from the Idea, hierarchizes our world (both the realm of the Idea and the sensible world) as the model, the copy, and the copy of the copy. Since our sensible world is modeled on the realm of the Idea, any sensible copy (the copy or the copy of the copy) of the Idea is the degradation of verisimilitude. Take the Idea of “a bed” for example, the carpenter’s “bed” is a functional copy of this Idea whereas the artist’s “bed” is a dysfunctional copy of the carpenter’s “bed.” In Deleuze’s words, Plato compares his method of division to “the testing of gold” (\textit{LS} 254) in which “the motive of the theory of Ideas must be sought in a will to select and to choose. . . . to select lineages: to distinguish pretenders. . . ."
At the heart of Platonism lies the logic of the model or the copy, the true or the false. This exclusive law continues to operate one level below: the copy as the just pretender or the copy of the copy (the simulacrum) as the false pretender. “The copy is an image endowed with resemblance, the simulacrum is an image without resemblance” (LS 257; sic). As a result, simula\textit{r}um is a bad copy that betrays the model by cutting off its umbilical cord that connects itself to the model while \textit{the copy} is a good copy in its eternal search for the Good.

\textit{Copies} are secondary possessors. They are well-founded pretenders, guaranteed by resemblance; \textit{simulacra} are like false pretenders, built upon a dissimilarity, implying an essential perversion or a deviation. It is in this sense that Plato divides in two the domain of images-idols: on the one hand there are \textit{copies-icons}, on the other there are \textit{simulacra-phantasms}. We are now in a better position to define the totality of the Platonic motivation: it has to do with selecting among the pretenders, distinguishing good and bad copies or, rather, copies (always well-founded) and simulacra (always engulfed in dissimilarity). It is a question of assuring the triumph of the copies over simulacra, of repressing simulacra, keeping them completely submerged, preventing them from climbing to the surface, and “insinuating themselves” everywhere. (LS 256-57)

Among the false pretenders, the power of exclusive dialectic works on: the harmless copy of the painter and the malevolent copy of the poet. As Alison Ross suggests in “Plato,”

\begin{quote}
Dramatic poetry . . . is dangerous because it produces a spectacle able to suspend disbelief. . . . For Plato this dissimulation of its status as a copy renders dramatic poetry dangerous to the proper order of the State because it trains in the souls of its citizens a disregard for the distinction between the true and false copy. This distinction in Plato between a harmless copy and the malevolent copy, that itself
becomes a model, is the key to Deleuze’s project of a “reversal of Platonism.”

(209)

To overthrow “Platonism in its will to bring about the triumph of icons over simulacra” (LS 259), Deleuze confronts Plato’s representational understanding of existence with a new world of pure simulacrum that revokes its merely being a degraded copy. “So ‘to reverse Platonism’ means to make the simulacra rise and to affirm their rights among icons and copies. . . . The non-hierarchized work . . . is the triumph of the false pretender” (LS 262). In this vein of thought, we can say that Carroll’s nonsense poetry has the power to suspend disbelief and reverse Platonism because his world of pure simulacrum is Nietzsche’s positive and productive ER machine that returns and affirms the different instead of the Same. “The secret of the eternal return,” Deleuze argues, “is that . . . . it is nothing other than chaos itself, or the power of affirming chaos. . . . It is the power to affirm divergence and decentering and makes this power the object of a superior affirmation. . . . Modernity is defined by the power of simulacrum” (LS 264-65). Thus, Carroll’s nonsense art is the highest performance of the power of the false. In case institution closes in on intuition, language, with such power of the false, can drive the former back, smash it into pieces, rise like a phoenix from the ashes of institution, and then embraces its new life by means of excess of errors.

The Poetry of Wonderland

Many readers will probably wonder about the queer words that are all coming differently in the poems that Alice repeats, and this is particularly true for Carroll’s Victorian contemporaries who are already familiar with their original metrical lines and can recite them from memory at any time. “Most of the poems in the two Alice books,” Martin Gardner notes, “are parodies of poems or popular songs that were well known to Carroll’s contemporary readers” (23). It is likely for Victorians to comment on Alice’ queer recitation of their nursery
rhymes or didactic songs like the Mock Turtle or the Gryphon: “Well, I never heard it before. . . .” “That’s different from what I used to say when I was a child” (AW 83, 82). The oral or verbal aggressiveness in Carroll’s nonsense verse in Wonderland diverges from its original didactic target in nursery rhymes or didactic songs in Victorian England. The new direction is the source of terror, whereas the divergence between new and original directions gives us a sense of humor. Any deviation in fiction from original nursery rhymes or didactic songs in reality is driven by Carroll’s desire to bring into light what has been left unsaid. What is implicitly embedded in these Victorian nursery rhymes or didactic songs is this era’s expectation of each Victorian to assume his or her social role in order to continue the proud story of the British Empire. When this paranoiac power of homogenization comes down upon its citizens, it is exerted through a network of education.

It would be an underestimate to see Carroll’s far-off fantasy land as a haven for his romantic escapism or melancholy seclusion because such reading is to ignore the rich historical implications in Alice books. Lewis Carroll’s Alice books, as Donald Rackin observes, are both a-historical and historical.

Their continuous popularity among large and varied audiences for the past 120 years [148 years now from 1865 to 2012] shows how accessible they are: lay readers seeking to experience and understand their power need not acquire a vocabulary of outdated words and unfamiliar historical facts, of obsolete concepts and attitudes. This does not mean, however, that the Alices are unrelated to their original cultural matrix: like all other artifacts, they are products of their era, bearing inscriptions of numerous transactions with the material and ideological contexts from which they first emerged. So while the Alices provide readers with what often seems a glorious escape from time and space—from historical context itself—some of their most memorable effects
depend on tangible connections to their specific historical milieu. (NSM 3)

Such specific historical milieu can be illustrated by the following passages: the White Rabbit clad in a Victorian gentleman’s outfit who neurotically adheres to his schedules (AW 7), the Victorian domestic space decorated with cupboards, book-shelves, maps, and pictures through which Alice is falling (AW 8), a common scene of bathing machines in the sea and a railway station behind a row of lodging-houses (AW 17-18), John Tenniel’s drawing of Alice’s acceptance of a thimble from Dodo in front of a crowd of birds and animals, among which a Darwinian ape is also present (AW 24), the exotic hookah-smoking practice originated in one of Britain’s colonial countries (AW 34-36, 41), the tea-party reminiscent of Victorian afternoon tea (AW 54-61), Alice’s unexpected railway journey during which the voices of other passengers sing (or think) in chorus “... his time is worth a thousand pounds a minute! ... The land there is worth a thousand pounds an inch! ... the smoke alone is worth a thousand pounds a puff! ... Language is worth a thousand pounds a word” (TLG 129-30), the Sheep’s shop in fiction which was actually a shop across from the Christ Church in Oxford where young Alice Liddell often bought her candies (TLG 153-58), the club battle between White and Red Knights like the violent Victorian Punch and Judy hand puppet show (TLG 180), not to mention so many allusions to education in Victorian era. Our reading of Wonderland poetry rests on the premise that Carroll synchronically resists the capture of Victorian educational institution by the vertiginous madness of his nonsense intuition, and the reason that Carroll’s parodies in Alice in Wonderland are so rife with the aggressive verbal and physical violence is not because Carroll experiences some kind of sexual frustration, but because his “[s]tyle as disruption” that is so essential to “Modernist experimental writing” (Rieke 3) takes language to its limit in order to counter-effectuate our institutionalized understanding to intuitive palpation.

Richard D. Altick, in Victorian People and Ideas, gives us an authentic picture of the
Victorian England. Right before what Rackin calls “Lewis Carroll’s world of the 1860s” (NSM 3), the fermentation of Victorian England’s proud industrial capitalism finally attained its acme of prosperity in mid-century, which was epitomized in the Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations, or more famously the Crystal Palace, that took place in 1851—the same year when “the adjective ‘Victorian’ was coined” (VPI 73). “Housed in the first prefabricated public building in history, a vast construction of iron and glass set in London’s Hyde Park, the exhibition was intended to demonstrate Britain’s supremacy in design and manufacture. . . . Over half the exhibitors were from Britain and the Empire” (VPI 11). In this era, trains rode through beautiful countryside where there used to be many enclosures, against the far backdrop of factory chimneys puffing out great dark clouds of smoke; barriers between regions, like hedges or fences that once separated different lands, were dissolving. The railroads “and the cities they helped build meant the end of the regional cultures and economies into which Britain had been divided so long as bad roads discouraged all but the most determined travel and the most essential communication. . . . Within a generation, provincialism gave way to national cohesion” (VPI 79). Meanwhile, the axiomatic locomotion of industrial capitalism incessantly ripped through any obstacle on its way. In Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, Eugene Holland elaborates on the double rhythm of such a capitalist society as Victorian England:

The process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization accompany the fundamental mechanism of capital, “axiomatization”: it operates by conjoining deterritorialized resources and appropriating the surplus arising from their reterritorializing conjunction. The original capitalist axiom, for example, conjoined deterritorialized wealth—i.e. monetary wealth no longer embodied in landed property—with deterritorialized labor-power bereft of any means of subsistence: the axiomatization of these deterritorialized flows linked liquid
wealth invested in means of production with “free” workers with nothing to sell but their labor-power. (20)

On the social scale, the commercial middle class—below the gentry, but above the manual laborers—became the reverse of being negligible. “Since the middle class regarded itself as the moral heart of Victorian society, a conviction assisted by the shift of the economic center of gravity in its direction, it took the understandable position that what was good for it was ipso facto good for the nation” (VPI 29). In other words, the generating of the Victorian moral didacticism bore directly on the commercial middle class. Whatever this class took to be good defined the Victorian morality.

The snobbishness of the commercial middle class was significant in “His” allotment of roles at two levels. Here, “He” means the middle-class men who wanted to prevail over working-class laborers and “His” inferiors of the other “weaker sex.” “His” morality naturally aimed at making these two objects docile bodies. First of all, education for future factory and farm hands was not meant to be inspiring, but useful and improving pedagogy:

Few people in a position of authority . . . showed the slightest interest in providing . . . encouragement . . . to the exercise of the mind or the feelings. . . . the textbooks and classroom exercises were designed to avoid such liberating, humanizing elements, which, it was widely agreed, were inappropriate for children destined to become factory and farm hands. The essence of pedagogy was committing ‘useful’ and ‘improving’ facts to memory; reading for sheer pleasure was not to be thought of. (VPI 251)

On the second, and more complex, level, education for middle-class Victorian women, “the weaker sex,” resided morally on two “facts”: one was biological, and the other religious. According to Thomas Henry Huxley, girls were educated “to be either drudges or toys beneath man, or a sort of angel above him” (qtd. in Altick 54-55). The purpose of their ruse
was to keep women’s hands out of men’s business. Biological fact devalued women by the wider implication that woman was inferior to man in all ways except the unique one that counted most (to man): her femininity. Her place was in the home, on a veritable pedestal if one could be afforded, and emphatically not in the world of affairs. . . . [because] the female brain was not equal to the demands of commerce or the professions, and women, simply by virtue of their sex, had no business mingling with men in a man’s world. . . . Accordingly, the education which girls of the upper and upper-middle classes received from governesses and from visiting language and music teachers was devoid of intellectual content, let alone intellectual challenge. (VPI 54)

On the other hand, this “doll in the doll’s house” (a term that derives from Charles Dickens’s *Our Mutual Friend*) or the “Angel in the House” (Coventry Patmore’s verse title) resulted from Victorian men’s religious fantasy that a woman was a caring Angel for man. “Woman’s serfdom was sanctified by the Victorian conception of the female as a priestess dedicated to preserving the home as a refuge from the abrasive outside world” (VPI 53). Whether it is biological or religious “fact,” it is intriguing to see Victorian men paradoxically look down upon and look up to their “weak but angelic sex” at the same time. The typical image of a middle-class woman was a dependant who “was to cultivate fragility, leaning always on the arm of the gentleman who walked with her in a country lane or escorted her in to dinner” (VPI 53). She led a ghostly life:

Theirs were lives of elaborate idleness; they worked harder at being decoratively futile than any productive occupation would have required. They passed their days indulging desultorily in the ‘female accomplishments’ learned in girlhood, needlework, making boxes from shells collected at the seaside, sketching and

32 See Altick 54, 53.
watercolor painting, flower arrangement, strumming at the piano or harp. Their only faintly constructive deeds, apart from supervising the household staff, involved charity. . . . (VPI 51-52)

Two images of weaker sex were morally acceptable to Victorian men: decoratively futile doll in the doll house and a caring angel in the house. Such a productive profession as a nurse, schoolmistress, or governess was socially acceptable (VPI 55) because each of them relatively conformed to the image of an angel who took care of her patient, student or tutee. From girlhood to womanhood, “the weaker sex” in Victorian times must calibrate her role against her morally ideal image as a point of reference. Any trespassing was considered inappropriate, and as a result invited moral rebuke.

A middle-class girl as she is, the fictional Alice is intellectually snobbish in many examples. As Donald Gray notes, “[s]he is seven in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, which is set in May; and seven and a half in Through the Looking-Glass, which is set in November” (3). Henceforth, Alice, judged from today’s education system, is a first-grader in primary school. For Alice at such an age, latitude and longitude are grand words to say, but difficult geographical terms to understand. No wonder she makes an amusing mistake of malapropism when she says “antipathies” to mean “Antipodes” (AW 8). Alice’s plan of sending presents to her own feet (like England sending presents to her colonial Antipodes Australia and New Zealand)—when she opens out like the largest telescope after finishing off the cake—probably demonstrates her knowledge, into which the “imperialist project” insinuates by joining the efforts of family and school (Roberts 363), of a colonialist geography. The didactic education started bottom up from family, school, capitalist society and finally to an imperialist world of British Empire to cultivate in a child, especially a muscular Christian one, a seamless coherence of self, world, and God. Not surprisingly, “during the latter half of the century,” Altick suggests, “the public schools were more concerned with prowess on the
playing field and with shaping the morality of prospective Christian gentlemen than with brainwork” (253) because what the British Empire needed in her imperialist expansion was athletic, chivalric and moral teamwork good for colonial expansion instead of some kind of intellectual individualism that might backfire. In “Children’s Fiction,” Lewis Roberts argues that “[t]he school was thought of as a world in miniature, an enclosed society in which boys could test themselves and learn to become part of the larger world outside the school’s walls” (363). Victorian children were prepared for their leadership overseas. The continuation of imperialist glory abroad depended on the vigorous industrial capitalist economy at home. As the economy’s major propulsive force, the commercial middle class laid special emphasis on the masculine industriousness of the self, feminine caring love of the world and evangelical scenic beauty of God to build Victorian morality.

Alice likes to show off the lessons she learns from the school-room. Among her lessons, she is especially fond of repeating poetry with her hands crossed on her lap (AW 16) or hands folded (AW 36). In this respect, Selwyn Goodacre gives an interesting comment on Alice’s posture when she repeats poetry:

I discussed these passages with a retired primary school headmaster . . . and he confirmed to me that that is exactly how children were taught—i.e., they had to repeat their lessons . . . this means learning by rote; she would have been expected to know the lessons by heart—and to cross her hands if sitting, to fold them if standing, both systems intended to concentrate the mind and prevent fidgeting. (qtd. in Gardner 49)

From Goodacre’s discussion, we realize that rote learning must resort to hand-crossing (sitting) or hand-folding (standing) to concentrate one’s mind in order to redraw one’s exact recollection. She repeats to reproduce the same. This effect is essential to didactic education. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze discusses learning in the case of a swimmer who learns
swimming not by reproducing on the sand the movements of the swimming instructor:

We learn nothing from those who say: “Do as I do”. Our only teachers are those who tell us to “do with me”, and are able to emit signs to be developed in heterogeneity rather than propose gestures for us to reproduce. . . . When a body combines some of its own distinctive points with those of a wave, it espouses the principle of a repetition which is no longer that of the Same, but involves the Other—involves difference, from one wave and one gesture to another, and carries that difference through the repetitive space thereby constituted. (DR 23)

“Do as I do” learning is the reproduction of “the Same” (a cadence or bare repetition) whereas “do with me” is the repetition of “the Other” (a rhythm or covered repetition). For Deleuze, education has nothing to do with the static representation of homogeneous elements. This explanation of motor repetition tells us a good deal about Alice’s verbal repetition. Nursery poems or didactic songs are a perfect means of passing down moral knowledge because people tend to unconsciously follow the metrical pattern without thinking too much about the meaning behind the words. For example, on hearing Haigha’s name, Alice acts on her impulse to start a popular parlor game. When she hesitates for a town’s name that begins with H, the King unconsciously joins the game.

“I love my love with an H,” Alice couldn’t help beginning, “because he is Happy. I hate him with an H, because he is Hideous. I fed him with—with—Ham-sandwiches and Hay. His name is Haigha, and he lives—”

“He lives on the Hill,” the King remarked simply, without the least idea that he was joining in the game, while Alice was still hesitating for the name of a town beginning with H. (TLG 170)

33 The mad Hatter and March Hare in Wonderland become the White King’s two messengers Hatta and Haigha in Looking-Glass.
Unlike nonsense verse whose formal order and referential order run in different directions, didactic poetry hypnotizes us into repeating its metrical pattern, closely accompanied by its didactic meaning. It seems quite natural for Alice to remember her poetic lessons uncritically because the metrical part has put her critical thought under anesthesia. Industriousness of the self, caring love of the world and scenic beauty of God are characteristic of many didactic poems Alice would have repeated (but Wonderland has deflected their original didactic meaning to a new direction).

As far as industriousness is concerned, Isaac Watts spares no efforts to instill its moral value unobtrusively into nursery rhymes and popular songs to plant a seed in the younger generation. In his 1715 poem “Against Idleness and Mischief,” he advises and encourages the youth to model on an industrious little busy bee to go about its work cheerfully every minute of its life lest the devil makes work for idle hands. All the hard work is for “Some good account at last” (16). In another 1715 poem “The Sluggard,” Watts describes how a sluggard is confined to his bed “As a door on its Hinges” (3) due to his laziness, and ends up wasting “his hours without number” (6). The sluggard neither does his housekeeping (weedy garden), nor keeps himself neat (ragged clothes) because his words speak louder than actions:

I made him a visit, still hoping to find
That he took better care for improving his mind:
He told me his dreams, talked of eating and drinking;
But he scarce reads his Bible, and never loves thinking.
Said I then to my heart, “Here’s a lesson for me,”
This man’s but a picture of what I might be:
But thanks to my friends for their care in my breeding,
Who taught me betimes to love working and reading. (13-20)

34 See Appendix D for verse quotations and comparison between parodies and original poems.
What Watts preaches in these two didactic poems is that it takes hard work and dogged perseverance to improve “each shining hour” (“Against Idleness and Mischief” 2) and “his mind” (“The Sluggard” 14). To make full use of one’s time depends on one’s persevering mind. If one’s mind is weak, then half the days are easily wasted because one yields himself too readily to a little more sleep, a little more slumber. Interestingly, Carroll changes the little busy bee to carnivorous crocodile whose improvement is made on his deadly allure in the first poem while in the second he—parodying “The Sluggard” with his “The Lobster” and “I passed by His Garden”—changes the sluggard into a snobbish lobster,

- When the sands are all dry, he is gay as a lark,
- And will talk in contemptuous tones of the Shark:
- But, when the tide rises and sharks are around,
- His voice has a timid and tremulous sound. (“The Lobster” 5-8)

and into a relation of high tension between the Owl and the Panther when sharing a pie.

- The Panther took pie-crust, and gravy, and meat,
- While the Owl had the dish as its share of the treat.
- When the pie was all finished, the Owl, as a boon,
- Was kindly permitted to pocket the spoon:
- While the Panther received knife and fork with a growl,
- And concluded the banquet by—” (“I passed by His Garden” 3-8)

This unfinished macabre silence casts the shadow of death upon the prey. As Martin Gardner implies, the growling predatory panther, with a fork and a knife ready, finishes its banquet by “eating the owl” (107). From Isaac Watts’s industriousness of the self to Carroll’s snobbishness in culture and carnivorousness in nature, what does the latter’s nonsense poetry try to do? We cannot resolve this question without continuing our discussion of the original didactic poems and popular songs of caring love of the world and scenic beauty of God. In
terms of caring love, Carroll’s Duchess is far from “an Angel in the House” because she not only looks hideous, but also nurses her child in a savage way.

*Speak roughly to your little boy,*

*And beat him when he sneezes:*

*He only does it to annoy,*

*Because he knows it teases.* (“Speak Roughly” 1-4)

On the contrary, David Bates’s 1848 poem “Speak Gently” allows readers to visualize an angelic figure who speaks gently to the little child, the young, the aged one, the poor, and the erring. She is literally the bearer of good tidings to the world, and embodies the biblical spirit “Better give than take” despite the act itself a small thing to do. With regard to the scenic beauty of God, Jane Taylor’s 1806 poem “The Star” feminizes the twinkling star whose tiny spark provides lights for the travelers in the dark when the blazing sun is gone. A sense of déjá vu resurges: we seem to see the image of a weak (in comparison with the masculine blazing sun) but angelic middle-class woman “leaning always on the arm of the gentleman who walked with her in a country lane or escorted her in to dinner” (*VPI* 53). The star twinkles, but does not blaze. Her beauty is a piece of art on God’s pedestal. On a productive level, she is a caring Angel in the sky who is dedicated to beaconing all night with her “little light” or “tiny spark” to bring comfort and guidance to a traveler in the dark. Her role is to assist the sun with the “remaining” job whenever he does not shine upon the earth. Tennyson’s neurotic hero in “Locksley Hall” resonates with this mentality:

*Nature made them blinder motions bounded in a*

*shallower brain:*

*Woman is the lesser man, and all [her] passions,*

*matched with mine,*

*Are as moonlight unto sunlight, and as water*
James M. Sayles’s “Star of the Evening” demonstrates another ethereal beauty of God’s creation. The bright beautiful star gives silvery light to the earth as it moves afar. The beautiful star twinkles in the darkness as if it blinked its eyes to invite us to join its ethereal journey afar beyond the sky.

*In Fancy’s eye thou seem’st to say,*

*Follow me, come from earth away.*

*Upward thy spirit’s pinions try,*

*To realms of love beyond the sky.* (8-11)

Carroll’s “The Bat” and “Beautiful Soup” parody Jane Taylor’s “The Star” and James M. Sayles’s “Star of the Evening.” Carroll turns Taylor’s and Sayles’s twinkling and beautiful stars into the twinkling bat and beautiful soup. In his nonsense poems, he replaces ethereal beauty with everyday ordinariness. “The Bat” is nonsensical because a little bat can be after something, but cannot twinkle like a star, and it certainly can fly, but cannot be like a tea-tray in the sky. It looks like Carroll’s portmanteau; however, this time it is not two meanings packed into one word, but Carroll’s “The Bat” crashes headlong into Taylor’s “The Star”: two poems packed into one portmanteau verse. As to his “Beautiful Soup,” Carroll’s play is based on the permutations of these two words “beautiful soup.” Like an impromptu singing, each of these two words can be divided into any unit, or add and drop any letters, which results in different auditory effects. Also, some of the letters in these two words can suddenly turn uppercase for visual effect.35

Industriousness of the self, caring love of the world and scenic beauty of God are characteristic of Victorian morality of the commercial middle class. Victorian men, women,

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35 Another interesting example is Carroll’s “pennyworth.” Sometimes it is a cohesive word, but at other times it resembles a group of hikers: some letters walk faster while others fall behind.
and their belief in God constitute the tripod that upholds Victorian morality. What the commercial middle class neurotically cares about is how to “improve” one’s mind before “improving” one’s time. The best brainwashing tool is unquestionable readymade morality. Like the Duchess, the commercial middle class is fond of finding (or founding?) morals in things: “Everything’s got a moral, if only you can find it” (AW 70). If Duchess is the embodiment of morals, then the way she rests her uncomfortably sharp chin on Alice’s shoulder (AW 70) is exactly Carroll’s point: morality hurts. But, at the very beginning of her adventure, Alice does find it before venturing to taste a bottle with a paper label that reads “DRINK ME”:

. . . she had read several nice little stories about children who had got burnt, and eaten up by wild beasts, and other unpleasant things, all because they would not remember the simple rules their friends had taught them: such as, that a red-hot poker will burn you if you hold it too long; and that, if you cut your finger very deep with a knife, it usually bleeds; and she had never forgotten that, if you drink much from a bottle marked “poison,” it is almost certain to disagree with you, sooner or later. (AW 10-11)

Here, it works as morality by death threat. As Donald Gray notes, this “traditional kind of children’s story [is] popular in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries . . . in which clear lessons of obedience and prudence were enforced by visiting terrible calamities upon children who transgressed” (11). To save the fictional Alice from the capture of Victorian institution, Carroll makes two suggestions to her: embracing death and invoking the dark side of language. More than once, Carroll tells Alice to stop growing (into womanhood) and even leave off at seven in a “fairy tale” of his. The subject of growing has been one of the recurring themes in the Alice stories. She is always growing larger at one time and smaller at another, so is her power relation with Wonderland or Looking-Glass Land inhabitants in
constant flux. Alice’s concern about the pros and cons of stopping growing up is that “shall I never get any older than I am now? That’ll be a comfort, one way—never to be an old woman—but then—always to have lessons to learn! Oh, I shouldn’t like that” (AW 29)! But Carroll’s suggestion sounds ultimately radical from the ventriloquist’s dummy Humpty Dumpty:

“Seven years and six months!” Humpty Dumpty repeated thoughtfully. “An uncomfortable sort of age. Now if you’d asked my advice, I’d have said ‘Leave off at seven’—but it’s too late now.”

“I never ask advice about growing,” Alice said indignantly.

“Too proud?” the other enquired.

Alice felt even more indignant at this suggestion. “I mean,” she said, “that one ca’n’t help growing older.”

“One ca’n’t, perhaps,” said Humpty Dumpty; “but two can. With proper assistance, you might have left off at seven.” (TLG 162)

We should direct our attention to Carroll’s pun on “One” here because that is where “embracing death” criss-crosses with “invoking the dark side of language.” Apparently, Alice’s pronoun “one” means “anyone” while Humpty Dumpty’s “One,” with the assistance of “two,” goes suddenly astray to the order of cardinal numbers. “Two” from the divergent order of cardinal number buries a bullet in the skull of the grammatical order of pronoun. Jacqueline Flescher, in “The Language of Nonsense in Alice;” explains that

Nonsense bears stamp of paradox. The two terms of the paradox are order and disorder. Order is generally created by language, disorder by reference. . . . Order dominates the formal pattern, yet disorder seems to dominate reference. . . . [the paradox arises from] a clash of opposing forces. . . . The pun is invaluable as a pivot for redirection. . . . By taking the literal and not the intended meaning, the
conversation is automatically channeled into a new direction.

(128, 137, 129, 138)

Conversation becomes an agonistic battlefield where opposite forces crash headlong into each other so that meaning is murdered and formal structure dangles on its own. Lack of progress is at the core of nonsense because “development of ideas is evaded by deflection of meaning. . . . logical expansion of an idea is avoided” (Flescher 139-40). If “stop growing up” means “leave off at seven,” then Alice can ease her worries of “ever so many lessons to learn!”

In addition, Carroll turns upside down Alice’s knowledge (and her pride?) acquired from school by invoking the dark side of language. For example, when she tries if she still remembers all the things she used to know, the Multiplication Table doesn’t signify, Geography is transposed, and poems do not come the same as they used to (AW 15-16). Another example comes when the subjects of day-school under the sea bear a similar but different resemblance to those of Alice’s. Here the pun works by avoiding intended curricula of Alice and taking deflective marine curricula of the Mock Turtle and the Gryphon. The distance between them and the “coming different” deflective curricula are the source of Carroll’s humor. The topsy-turvy world begins with Mock Turtle’s marine school master, who is a Turtle (marine), but is called Tortoise (land) “because he taught us” (AW 75). It is an example of quasi-portmanteau with two sounds packed into one word. As to the “best of educations” (AW 76) of Mock Turtle and Gryphon, they have “Reeling and Writhing,” “different branches of Arithmetic—Ambition, Distraction, Uglification, and Derision,” “Mystery, ancient and modern, with Seaography: then Drawling . . . Stretching, and Fainting in Coils. . . . Laughing and Grief” (AW 76-77) as regular courses, and “French, music, and washing” (AW 76) as extras. Except for the “extras,” marine subjects distinguish themselves from Alice’s “land” ones by only one feature, which we call minimal pairs. In addition to the
Table 1.1

Subject Comparison between Marine Day-School and Alice’s Day-School

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>subject</th>
<th>Marine day-school</th>
<th>Alice’s day-school</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Literacy</td>
<td>Reeling and Writhing</td>
<td>Reading and Writing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arithmetic</td>
<td>Ambition, Distraction,</td>
<td>Addition, Subtraction,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uglification, and Derision</td>
<td>Multiplication, and Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study of Time and Space</td>
<td>Mystery and Seaography</td>
<td>History and Geography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fine Arts</td>
<td>Drawling, Stretching, and</td>
<td>Drawing, Sketching, and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fainting in Coils</td>
<td>Painting in Oils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classical Course</td>
<td>Laughing and Grief</td>
<td>Latin and Greek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra</td>
<td>French, Music, and Washing</td>
<td>French, Music</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Phonic level, probably the first thing that comes to our mind is the doubt: why are these useless subjects put on school curricula? It is hard to imagine how the old conger-eel’s teaching of Drawling, Stretching, and Fainting in Coils and the old crab’s classical teaching of Laughing and Grief are worth any penny of the tuition. Still, the way Mock Turtle and Gryphon talk about their “best of educations” with seriousness makes us laugh. Among the humorous deflective curricula, Washing and Uglification calls for further elucidation. First of all, Carroll uses the extra subject Washing to highlight its absurdity for both Mock Turtle and Alice. When comparing with Alice’s extras, the Mock Turtle is anxious to know whether his “best of educations” finds no match in the world by the extra subject Washing. To his delight, Alice’s day-school is not really a good one because it provides no such “proud” extra. Alice is enraged at Mock Turtle’s underestimate. Earlier, she already feels unhappy about being ordered about first by the cardboard Queen of Hearts, and then by the animal Gryphon.
“Everybody says ‘come on!’ here” (AW 74).36 This reverses Alice’s power relation with Wonderland inhabitants—e.g. birds, animals, cardboar ds. Now, as one of the proud commercial middle class, the fictional Alice finds it most disagreeable about the suggestion that she has not been to a school and she has been taught any servile task like washing. This is a humiliating class reversal. This middle-class girl’s intellectual snobbishness is provoked. In response, Alice disparages and comments sarcastically on Mock Turtle’s proud extra.

“We had the best of educations—in fact, we went to school every day—”

“I’ve been to a day-school, too,” said Alice. “You needn’t be so proud as all that.”

“With extras?” asked the Mock Turtle, a little anxiously.

“Yes,” said Alice: “we learned French and music.”

“And washing?” said the Mock Turtle.

“Certainly not!” said Alice indignantly.

“Oh! Then yours wasn’t a really good school,” said the Mock Turtle in a tone of great relief. “Now, at ours, they had, at the end of the bill, ‘French, music, and washing—extra.’”

“You couldn’t have wanted it much,” said Alice; “living at the bottom of the sea.” (AW 76)

The extra is absurd for Mock Turtle because at the bottom of sea where one couldn’t have wanted washing much, he regrets that he couldn’t afford to learn it. And the extra is also absurd for Alice because, as Donald Gray notes, “Alice, properly brought-up middle-class girl that she is, is indignant at the suggestion that she has been taught servile tasks, such as doing the wash” (76). Secondly, Carroll points out a contradiction in language: not every

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36 The White Rabbit even mistakes her as his servant girl Mary Ann. At first, Alice is quite excited about this Prince and Pauper thing, but gradually feels uncomfortable about being ordered around so much.
word has its antonym. The King says, important—unimportant—unimportant—important—” (AW 93), trying to figure out which word sounds best. It seems natural to chant the antonyms with or without “un.” Although it is easy to infer that the antonym of strengthen is weaken, similar rule cannot be applied to the word “Uglification” because today’s dictionary only contains “ Beautification.” Our logic contradicts itself, but at present we can do nothing about the institutionalized fact. Fortunately, in Carroll’s fantasy land, we can still intuitively palpate the antonym of Beautification. The Gryphon’s underground logic is that if one knows what to beautify is, he or she surely knows what to “uglify” is (AW 76).

The final epiphany for Alice comes when she compares her lessons with theirs.

“And how many hours a day did you do lessons?” said Alice. . . .

“Ten hours the first day,” said the Mock Turtle: “nine the next, and so on.”

“What a curious plan!” exclaimed Alice.

“That’s the reason they’re called lessons,” the Gryphon remarked: “because they lessen from day to day.” (AW 77)

The homophone of lesson is the word “lessen.” Their dangling formal structure is the identical pronunciation, but the meaning of lesson is reduced to a minimum when “lessen” swerves to a new direction. However, what makes this passage nonsensically inspiring is its mathematical aspect. As days pass by, lessons lessen. “This is quite a new idea to Alice, and she thought it over a little before she made her next remark. ‘Then the eleventh day must have been a holiday?’ ‘Of course it was,’ said the Mock Turtle. ‘And how did you manage on the twelfth?’ Alice went on eagerly” (AW 77). Although the Gryphon is evasive about Alice’s question by “That’s enough about lessons” (AW 77), Martin Gardner does formulate his hypothesis: “On the twelfth day and succeeding days did the pupils start teaching their teacher” (99)? With the dark side of language coming, resistance becomes possible. Examples of seniors taking advantage of their youth abound in Alice stories. The sulky Lory said to
Alice: “I’m older than you, and must know better” (AW 21). Carroll wants us to give those moral values embedded in didactic poems a second thought. They pass from generation to generation as readymade “wisdom.” We stand on the shoulders of such a giant, but how can we accept his self-righteous stance without even bothering to think in the first place? Robert Southey’s 1799 poem “The Old Man’s Comforts and How He Gained Them” talks about how an old man is fearless of his mortal life by trading his youth for some good account at last. However, Carroll turns this original poem into a fight between generations. Father William takes advantage of his son by finishing “the goose, with the bones and the beak”— (19). What’s more, he wants to profit from his moral lesson for his son:

“In my youth,” said the sage, as he shook his grey locks,

“I kept all my limbs very supple

By the use of this ointment—one shilling the box—

Allow me to sell you a couple?” (13-16)

And as the enquiring son continues his question, Father William becomes angry because too many questions from his son have killed his patience.

“I have answered three questions, and that is enough,"

Said his father. “Don’t give yourself airs!

Do you think I can listen all day to such stuff?

Be off, or I’ll kick you down-stairs!” (29-32)

The shaped verse “The Mouse’s Tale” is a good illustration of how to undo the knots of moral wisdom passed down to us. When the Mouse hates Cats and Dogs, he would like to tell us his tale. But somehow Alice visualizes the Mouse’s recitation of his long and sad tale as his tail with five knots. It is interesting to see Alice’s visual series grow out of the Mouse’s audio series. Carroll’s pun on these two homonyms—the Mouse’s long and sad tale and

37 See Appendix C.
Alice’s long (and sad?) tail—go different directions. In his tale, the Mouse tells how the old Fury, also holding the posts of jury and judge, prosecutes a mouse to death simply because he has nothing to do this morning. In the meanwhile, the “absentminded” Alice is following the bends of the Mouse’s visual tail and offers her help: “Oh, do let me help to undo it” (AW 25). Turning sulky, the Mouse says: “You insult me by talking such nonsense” (AW 26). It is exactly Carroll’s nonsense that can challenge and play down the moral values embedded in didactic poems, starts to look for our own wisdom.

In this complementarity of good sense and common sense, the alliance between the self, the world, and God is sealed—God being the final outcome of directions and the supreme principle of identities. The paradox therefore is the simultaneous reversal of good sense and commonsense: on one hand, it appears in the guise of the two simultaneous senses or directions of the becoming-mad and the unforeseeable; on the other hand, it appears as the nonsense of the lost identity and the unrecognizable. (LS 78)

Contrary to the Duchess’s “Take care of the sense, and the sounds will take care of themselves” (AW 71), Carroll’s nonsense puts the sounds before the sense, and lets intuition take the lead.

*The Poetry of Looking-Glass Land*

In this section, given the fact that most poems in *Through the Looking-Glass* are long and dreary, we plan to discuss Carroll’s “Jabberwocky,” the greatest of nonsense poems in English, to show how the power of intuition can diachronically anticipates serious social institutions to come. In order to evade any cognitive capture, Carroll shifts his nonsense in this verse into high gear by two literary devices of verbal doublet: mirror image and
Making sense of Carroll’s nonsense takes at least two steps to “force out meaning.” At first, the bizarre language in “Jabberwocky” keeps Alice at bay until it suddenly strikes her that holding a Looking-glass book up to a glass might make all the words go the right way again. Nonetheless, the words that all go the right way are as perplexing as ever: “’Twas brillig, and the slithy toves. / Did gyre and gimble in the wabe: / All mimsy were the borogoves, / And the mome raths outgrabe” (TLG 116; emphasis original). According to Nancy Goldfarb, “the experience of hearing unfamiliar words in a context that establishes expectations for transparent English signification creates anxiety in the uninitiated reader” (87). It leaves Alice dumbfounded because the words seem “to have no sort of meaning in it, and yet it [is] certainly English” (AW 56). Though bewildered, Alice is allured by this unrecognizable and nebulous power lurking behind language.

“It seems very pretty,” she said when she had finished it, “but it’s rather hard to understand!” (You see she didn’t like to confess, even to herself, that she couldn’t make it out at all.) “Sometimes it seems to fill my head with ideas—only I don’t exactly know what they are! However, somebody killed something: that’s clear, at any rate—.” (AW 118)

Despite the narrator’s patronizing taunt in parentheses, we agree with Karen Alkalay-Gut that “What does it mean?” is never a problem:

The decision . . . to plumb the depths of “Jabberwocky” is based not on a desire to elicit meaning from the poem. . . . The nonsense serves a serious purpose here, to dislodge the reader from the fixed, limited world, and provide the possibility of limitless association. . . . The function of the nonsense is disorientation and reorientation—removing the reader from the world of limited reality and specificity and placing him in a mythical context. (27-30)

38 For more of Carroll’s doublet, please see Appendix E.
In a word, the sense of giddiness Alice feels all around is caused by the mythical power of nonsense in language. It should be noted that Carroll’s verbal doublet in “Jabberwocky,” whether it be mirror image or portmanteau word, defies the logic of representation.

When Alice moves through the misty glass into the Looking-Glass House, she begins to consider whether or not everything there is simply a reverse analogy. To her surprise, “the pictures on the wall next the fire seemed to be all alive, and the very clock on the chimney-piece (you know you can only see the back of it in the Looking-glass) had got the face of a little old man, and grinned at her” (TLG 112-13). This little old man is the mischievous Carroll himself, who also grins at those who assume that language is but a mirror reflecting the reality. Another failure of mirror image takes place, as noted above, when Alice reverses words in a proper way, only to find that she is still as “blindfolded” as ever. In his dreamy world of fantasy, Carroll holds another mirror up to this Looking-Glass mirror to produce infinite regress of meaning which disseminates and permeates in all directions. Meaning, so to speak, slips it moorings and drifts out to sea.

One might protest that the second step to bring meaning into full relief is already done when Humpty Dumpty explains, with his mastery of words, to Alice the meaning of the nonsense words in the first stanza of “Jabberwocky” as he keeps a fine balance on the top of a high but narrow wall.

“Brillig” means four o’clock in the afternoon. . . . “slithy” means “lithe [active] and slimy.” . . . “toves” are something like badgers. . . . To “gyre” is to go round and round like a gyroscope. To “gimble” is to make holes like a gimblet. . . . And “the wabe” is the grass-plot round a sun-dial. . . . “mimsy” is “flimsy and miserable.” . . . A “borogove” is a thin shabby-looking bird with its feathers sticking out all round . . . like a live mop. . . . “rath” is a sort of green pig: but “mome” . . . I think it’s short for “from home.” . . . “outgribing” is something
between bellowing and whistling, with a kind of sneeze in the middle.

(\textit{TLG 164-6})^{39}

As illustrated above, Carroll fabricates his nonsense vocabulary by two techniques:

1. neologism: brillig (n), toves (n), gyre (v), gimble (v), wabe (n), borogoves (n), rath (n), outgrabe (v);
2. portmanteau word: slithy (adj), mimsy (adj), mome (n). With the first arbitrary power, Mr. Egg can render equal A (a signifier) and B (a signified) at will. “‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less’” (\textit{TLG 163}). As a result, “glory” can mean “a nice knock-down argument” when all the words, whether old or new, are at Humpty Dumpty’s supreme command. Another arbitrary power comes from an algebraic equation: \(A + B = C\). “You see it’s like a pormanteau—there are two meanings packed up into one word” (\textit{TLG 164}; sic).

Donald Gray adds, “A portmanteau is a traveling bag that opens, like a book, into two equal compartments” (164). Therefore, this portmanteau word still retains two equal meanings from both sides. In the preface to \textit{The Hunting of the Snark}, Carroll further spells out the fine balance in a portmanteau word.

For instance, take the two words “fuming” and “furious.” Make up your mind that you will say both words, but leave it unsettled which you will say first. Now open your mouth and speak. If your thoughts incline ever so little towards “fuming,” you will say “fuming-furious;” if they turn, by even a hair’s breadth, towards “furious,” you will say “furious-fuming;” but if you have the rarest of gifts, a perfectly balanced mind, you will say “frumious.” (220)

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\(^{39}\) Humpty Dumpty’s explanations of words here are slightly different from those given by young Carroll when his “Jabberwocky” first appeared in \textit{Mischmasch}. Martin Gardener, based on Carroll’s earlier interpretation, gives the literal English of the first stanza: “It was evening, and the smooth active badgers were scratching and boring holes in the hill-side; all unhappy were the parrots; and the grave turtles squeaked out” (149). In “The Balance of Brillig,” Elizabeth Sewell indicates that Eric Patridge “in his classification of the vocabulary of \textit{Jabberwocky} gives four new verbs, \textit{gimble, outgrabe, galumphing} and \textit{chortled}, to ten new adjectives and eight new nouns” (381). I follow Mr. Patridge’s classification—though without the exact knowledge of ten adjectives and eight nouns—to organize Carroll’s nonsense vocabulary in “Jabberwocky.” For more information of Carroll’s neologism, please refer to Appendix F.3. New Nonsense Vocabulary in “Jabberwocky.”
On this point, how do we see Humpty Dumpty as a master of words? Is he a despotic emperor of Saussurian linguistics or a schizophrenic nomad on a Deleuzian surface? Can we assume that portmanteau words fail to help us make sense of nonsense at the second stage if the entire panoply of explanations is already marching in tandem?

“Jabberwocky” plays such a pivotal role in *Through the Looking-Glass* (1871) because it, in our opinion, prophetically takes issue with Ferdinand Saussure’s scientific linguistics. It is widely known that *Course in General Linguistics*, representative of Saussure’s lifelong search for a systematic knowledge of language, is not published by him, but by the editors who put together his students’ notes taken from his lectures between 1906 and 1911 (*CGL* iii). According to Lecercle, “if there ever was one [epistemological break] in linguistics, the name of Saussure should be associated with it” (*PLG* 2). In seeking out “the principles that govern the life of languages,” Saussure elevates *langue* above *parole* by saying that “from the very outset we must put both feet on the ground of language and use language as the norm of all other manifestations of speech” (*CGL* 4, 9; emphasis original). In Saussure’s dualism, *parole* is speech or individual utterance while *langue* is *a priori* language system which all speakers draw upon. “Taken as a whole, speech is many-sided and heterogeneous. . . . Language, on the contrary, is a self-contained whole and a principle of classification” (*CGL* 9). It can be said that Saussure not only pits Apollonian language against Dionysian speech, but also hopes to subsume heterogeneous speech acts under general categories of *langue*. When it comes to principles that govern the life of language, the nature of the linguistic sign is always the first that comes to mind. On Saussure’s evolutionary critical trajectory, instead of a naming-process that links a name and a thing, he thinks sign is essentially an associative bond that unites a sound image and a concept, only to be overthrown by another two-sided entity: signifier and signified (*CGL* 65-67). It can be concluded that for Saussure it is the arbitrary nature of the linguistic sign that combine signifier and signified. “One could here,” Lecercle
suggests, “use the famous metaphor of the two sides of a sheet of paper, used by Saussure to
demonstrate the solidity and closeness of the relation between signifier and signified in the
sign” (PLG 70-71). Nevertheless, a distinction between two signs in a language system is
not made by their respective positive values but by difference-making: “Language is a system
of interdependent terms in which the value of each term results solely from the simultaneous
presence of the others. . . . in language there are only differences without positive terms”
(CGL 114, 120; emphasis original).

Saussure’s scientific linguistics that precedes parole with langue is not “impenetrable”
but contestable. We must bear in mind that Carroll is a great master of double entendre. When
Humpty Dumpty forces his chosen meanings upon words to signify what he wants them to
mean, he looks exactly like a tyrannical despot: “The question is . . . which is to be
master—that’s all.’ . . . ‘They’ve a temper, some of them—particularly verbs: they’re the
proudest—adjectives you can do anything with, but not verbs—however, I can manage the
whole lot of them! Impenetrability! That’s what I say’” (TLG 163)! Although Humpty
Dumpty’s pontification gives him the appearance of a language master, for us it is nothing but
Carroll’s prophetic joke on Saussurian pedants. Our supposition can be more persuasive if we
put “impenetrability” into further investigation. At first glance, Humpty Dumpty’s language
theory (or practice) appears to be impenetrable; however, the signified meaning of
“impenetrability” veritably backfires: “I meant by ‘impenetrability’ that we’ve had enough of
that subject, and it would be just as well if you’d mention what you mean to do next, as I
suppose you don’t mean to stop here all the rest of your life” (TLG 163-64). With Carroll’s
playful juggle, the impenetrability of Humpty Dumpty’s sovereign power over his subjects
(that is, words) transforms into his having quite enough of a subject that bores him.

Our discussion thus far can help us answer our two previous questions. From our

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40 Originally, Saussure writes: “Language can . . . be compared with a sheet of paper” (CGL 113).
reading of the word “impenetrability,” we maintain that a real master of words, inferred from Carroll’s text, is not a despotic emperor of representation but a schizophrenic nomad of production. Next, Carroll’s use of mirror image has already told us that an old man is jeering at those who simply take his interpretation of nonsense vocabulary in “Jabberwocky” as a vivid representation or verisimilitude of neologisms and portmanteau words. “Too often, Carroll’s use of nonsense has been considered a secret kind of anagram, a trick, a ‘portmanteau.’ Using as great an authority as Humpty Dumpty, the words of ‘Jabberwocky’ are dismissed with a ‘reasonable’ explanation. . . . But Carroll himself seemed to find the whole search for ‘portmanteau’ meaning a joke on the adult reader. . . .” (Alkalay-Gut 28-29).

Hence, in spite of given explanations, Carroll’s making sense of nonsense has nothing to do with “What does it mean?” but “How does it work?” Neologisms and portmanteau words in “Jabberwocky” are vehicles for expressing his philosophy of double entendre. In our reading, Humpty Dumpty who masquerades as a master of words is, at best, nothing more than a dummy maneuvered by Carroll the ventriloquist.

There is a Mr. Hyde lurking behind Dr. Jekyll drama in Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty, just as there is one in Lacercle’s Saussure. In Philosophy through the Looking Glass, Lacercle proposes a hypothesis of two Saussures to cast suspicion on a langue-centric Saussure: “there are two Saussures, or rather that, behind (or beneath) the founder of a new science and the author of the celebrated Cours, there is another, Hyde-like, character, the demented seeker of anagrams” (PLG 2). According to Lacercle, when Saussure, during the years 1906-10, was engaged in private research on a variety of texts, he found the composition of a poetic text was a cryptogram concealing a pre-text (anagram) which provided the text with its main theme, but did not necessarily appear on the surface; nevertheless, no sooner had his inner Mr. Hyde crossed the border between sanity and madness than his insistence on the reality of language, his respect for the system of langue, on account of no scientific proof, remerged to
pull his *parole* from dissolving into delirium (*PLG* 3-6). It is a shame that what he takes as a mental patient’s delusion could have been the fantastic key to the deepest workings of language. The March Hare is skirting along the frontier where Saussure’s two sides of a sheet of paper “solidly” and “closely” adhere to each other. As Lecercle suggests, the starting point of Saussurian linguistics will be a distinction, which separates the relevant (*langue*) from the irrelevant (*parole*) by this logic of separation (*PLG* 171). What is internal is the systematic side of language whereas what is external would be the subversive side of it, but these two sides of language, Lecercle notes, are inseparable as Saussure’s metaphor of sign (*PLG* 70-71).

On the bright side, meaning is constructed by differentiation and composition, and the totality, and the closed character of the system, guarantee its correct construction. On the dark side, meaning proliferates, in short threads that can hardly manage to weave a coherent text: there is no totality, no guarantee, and the field is never closed. (*PLG* 71)

“The other Saussure is in fact an anti-Saussure” (*PLG* 199), but, it is sad to say, that demented part of him never prevails over his sanity. In comparison with Saussure’s quarantine against the subversive, monstrous language prowling on the external outside, Carroll is overjoyed at having tea with the March Hare in his world of fantasy. The Saussurian principles that govern language are snares to catch the mythic power of heterogeneous *parole*. To the contrary, the unruly idiosyncrasy of language makes its lively monstrosity, but when caught in a set of systematic coordinates, language becomes a much less mobile (or even a sedentary) force. It is Carroll’s “backward” literary fantasies that breathe new life into the now sick and passive language snared within the confines of science.

In “Blessed Rage: Lewis Carroll and the Modern Quest for Order,” Donald Rackin justifies Carroll’s mad and nonsensical disorder: “The lovable imp Bruno in Carroll’s *Sylvie*
and Bruno Concluded (1893), seeing the letters ‘E-V-I-L’ arranged by Sylvie on a board as one of his ‘lessons’ and asked by Sylvie what they spell, exclaims, ‘Why it’s LIVE, backwards’” (400). Chaotic, nebulous and tumultuous outside is virtually a mad game without rules. Rackin gives an expressive comment: “The fault here lies, of course, in life itself. When Alice complains to the Cheshire Cat that the croquet game seems to have no rules, she couples this with ‘and you’ve no idea how confusing it is all the things being alive.’ A cat literally has no idea of this confusion, but we humans certainly do” (“Blessed Rage” 400; emphasis added). If errors are ever significant to life, it is their being “out of joint” that makes them one of a kind, without recourse to—let’s borrow Deleuze’s terms here—the quadripartite character of the reflexive difference of organic representation: “the identity of the concept, the opposition of predicates, the analogy of judgment and the resemblance of perception” (DR 34). Readers are infatuated with Carroll’s world of fantasy because his leitmotif of doublet—mirror image or verbal duality—is never a reflexive and intermediary concept in the “theatre of representation” (DR 10). The inexhaustible mythical power of nonsense in Carroll’s two Alices builds up to “a condition of movement under which . . . [his] ‘actors or . . . ‘heroes’ produce something effectively new in . . . [t]he theatre of repetition” (DR 10). “When representation discovers the infinite within itself, it no longer appears as organic representation but as orgiastic representation: it discovers within itself the limits of the organized; tumult, restlessness and passion underneath apparent calm. It rediscovers monstrosity” (DR 42). Once difference is carried to its n\textsuperscript{th} power, it ceases to be reflexive and becomes catastrophic (DR 35). As Joyce Thomas observes, “nonsense verse is necessarily confined by the sensible restraints of language”; therefore, it follows that the recurrent themes of the violent or grotesque in two Alices is “a means of testing those restraints or providing a

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41 What Deleuze means by “reflexive” is definitely different from Lecercle’s “reflexive delirium.” The former’s idea is based on a literal meaning of “reflexive” while the latter’s focuses on its figural meaning. The point can be further borne out by saying that Deleuze’s “reflexive” is the reflection in the mirror image of organic representation whereas Lecercle’s “reflexive” is the rich and imaginative fantasy outside psychiatric contexts.
counter-balance to them” (119). The point can be further borne out by Lecercle’s insight of the dark side of language: “The best picture of it can be admired when the borderline [of national language] is crossed at the ultimate level. . . . When this occurs, no satisfactory global meaning can be obtained, only fragments which can never be synthesized. The system gives way to mere chance, or, in other words, to the semiotic processes of the unconscious” (PLG 71).

The White Queen’s “jam to-morrow and jam yesterday—but never jam to-day” (TLG 150) and Humpty Dumpty’s “I can explain all the poems that ever were invented—and a good many that haven’t been invented just yet” (TLG 164) share a similar rejection of boring present and the same liking for whimsical past and future—a point resembling Deleuze’s discussion of Aion, the pure empty form of time that sidesteps the present and stretches out in a straight line, limitless in either direction: “Always already passed” and “eternally yet to come” (LS 165). As Lecercle maintains, “Carroll’s keen awareness of the workings of the language . . . amounts to an intuitive grasp of a philosophical problematic that clearly emerged almost a century after his death” (PN: IVNL 231-32). The vertigo we feel in Carroll’s nonsense is his power of the false that cracks open language and pulls its inside out to establish contact between the Inside (language) and the Outside (life) like “a Möbius strip on which a single line traverses the two sides” (ECC 21). From the above argument, we can say that the mythic power of Carroll’s literary nonsense does refer beyond language to life.

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42 In 1929, Heisenberg proposed his famous uncertainty principle. It is a theory to which many Carroll critics like to refer. The general idea of his theory is as follows: “In quantum mechanics, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle states a fundamental limit on the accuracy with which certain pairs of physical properties of a particle, such as position and momentum, can be simultaneously known. In layman’s terms, the more precisely one property is measured, the less precisely the other can be controlled, determined, or known.” When literary critics are overjoyed that a scientific theory seems to prove the intuition of Carroll’s “out-of-joint” nonsense, we must be careful about the original context of Heisenberg uncertainty principle. See “Uncertainty Principle,” Wikipedia, Wikipedia Foundation, Inc., n.d. Web, 4 Jan. 2012.
Chapter Two

“Who are you?”—the Subjectivzation of Alice in the Claws of the Outside

“Who are you?” said the Caterpillar.

. . . .“I—I hardly know, Sir, just at present—at least I know who I was when I got up this morning, but I think I must have been changed several times since then. . . . being so many different sizes in a day is very confusing.” (AW 35)

“What—is—this?” he said at last.

“This is a child!” Haigha replied eagerly. . . . “We only found it to-day. It’s as large as life, and twice as natural!”

“I always thought they were fabulous monsters!” said the Unicorn.

“Is it alive?”

“It can talk,” said Haigha solemnly.

The Unicorn looked dreamily at Alice, and said “Talk, child.”

Alice could not help her lips curling up into a smile as she began: “Do you know, I always thought Unicorns were fabulous monsters, too? I never saw one alive before!”

“Well, now that we have seen each other,” said the Unicorn, “if you’ll believe in me, I’ll believe in you. Is that a bargain?” (TLG 175)

Throughout two Alices, Carroll proposes many epistemological and ontological doubts about Alice’s status as her “Self” so that what defines Alice as “Alice” is called into question. In her waking life, Alice is sure about her identity as Alice because she grows at a normal pace as a prepubescent girl should be, and learns her lessons as expected of her in a bourgeois family. However, in her dream journeys, the constant size alterations (“‘Oh, I’m not particular as to size,’ Alice hastily replied; ‘only one doesn’t like changing so often, you know.’” (AW 41)) and clashes of different logics (“‘It’s really dreadful,’ she muttered to herself, ‘the way all the creatures argue. It’s enough to drive one crazy!’” (AW 46)) inflict traumatic violence
upon her so that Alice begins to feel anxious about who she really is. Strangely enough, she also feels curious about what will become of her the next minute (“Which way? Which way?”, holding her hand on the top of her head to feel which way she was growing. . . .” (AW 12)), and the novel way the local inhabitants argue here (“This sounded a very good reason, and Alice was quite pleased to know it. ‘I never thought of that before!’ she said.” (TLG 122)). Why does Alice have such an ambivalent attitude toward her subjectivity? That is, why does Alice feel not only anxious but also curious about becoming epistemologically and ontologically otherwise? What can be said to constitute her subjectivity? What makes Alice feel she is not herself? In answering these questions, we hope to gain a better understanding of the nature of Alice’s subjectivity and, most particularly, to be able to determine the role curiosity plays in Alice’s subjectivation when she in the meantime feels anxious about changing.

There have been a number of studies that have investigated the problem of Alice’ subjectivity in Carroll’s two Alices, especially the psychobiographical literary criticism in the 1930s. As we naively think this approach already phases out from the critical picture, the recent publications of Carroll study show that the Psychobiographical School within the past fifteen years is reassembling on the eve of One and a Half Lewis Carroll Centenary Celebration. The authoritative Carroll biographer Morton Cohen published his Lewis Carroll: A Biography in 1995 to incorporate “the files of as-yet-unpublished” Carroll diaries and letters “in the last quarter century” in order to “afford a close look at the development of Carroll’s myriad interests,” to “document and define, as nothing has before, the man’s religious faith,” and to “allow a closer, more assured examination of his mind and his emotional life” (“Preface” xiv). In 2010, Jenny Woolf published The Mystery of Lewis Carroll to cast a new beam of light over the dark corners of Carroll’s adult life by laying hands upon the new primary source material that nobody had ever touched before: Carroll’s
personal and private bank account from 1856 to 1900 in Oxford kept by Barclay’s Bank and one of Carroll’s letters kept in the archives of the University of Colorado that tells of his relationship with the Liddells, especially the “real” Alice (7-9). Although both Carroll biographers make their best efforts to fill the gaps with newly found facts instead of sensational speculation, they have made the diversion from the texts themselves to the relationships between Carroll the author and Alice the muse, leaving Carroll’s two Alice books in eclipse. The subjectivity of the fictional Alice is always a mirror image of its real life counterpart.

In his seminal article “That Hysterical Discourse in Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass: Locating a Critical Subject within Carroll” (2003), Alan Lopez maintains that because of the “lightness” (73, 75) of nonsense within the nineteenth-century Victorian nonsense literature in general and Carroll’s Alice books in particular, traditional readings of Alice “have missed . . . the philosophical or theoretical character of nonsense,” and “failed to discern . . . . the philosophical problems evoked and posed by the Alice books, problems which invariably put into question ontological and epistemological concerns over knowledge and subjectivity” (71). In brief, it is Lopez’s idea that only by philosophizing nonsense in Carroll’s Alice can we conquer the traditional reluctance to locate a critical, hysterical, and postmodern subject within Alice (“Hysterical” 73). Nevertheless, it is debatable for Lopez to see Lecercle’s “nonsense subject” or “Deleuzian schizo” as his Lacanian “hysterical subject” (“Hysterical” 77, 90) because neither Lecercle’s discourse of madness nor Deleuze’s discourse of schizophrenic is unquestionably tantamount to Lopez’s discourse of the hysteric (“Hysterical” 72).

Sara Guyer’s terse but in-depth article “The Girl with the Open Mouth: Through the Looking Glass” (2004) discusses how Alice’s mouth is left gasping open wide because of her confusion of eating and speaking. At her coronation dinner party, Queen Alice is introduced
to every course of her food so that the social relationship thus established with personified Leg of Mutton and Pudding makes eating them a strange act to do because “it isn’t etiquette to cut any one you’ve been introduced to” (TLG 200). However, for the sweet tooth Alice, Pudding is one of the most irresistible desserts, so she gives it a slice. “‘What impertinence! said the Pudding. ‘I wonder how you’d like it, if I were to cut a slice out of you, you creature!’ It spoke in a thick, suety sort of voice, and Alice hadn’t a word to say in reply: she could only sit and look at it and gasp” (TLG 201). In her opinion, Alice’s gasping open mouth due to the profound nonsense regresses from vocality in Carroll’s literature of surface to orality in Artaud’s literature of depth. For the girl whose voice is stolen, and “everything is communication of bodies in depth” (LS 192), she becomes the pre-vocal body without organs. Guyer thinks that “the girl with the lost voice would figure the origin of the subject,” and “the subject is the initial opening of a mouth, a mouth that belongs to no one” (162). It is a mouth of orality that utters noise, not a mouth of vocality that articulates voice. This subject is not the Cartesian subjectivity which constitutes Descartes’s first philosophy, but a schizophrenic mouth that precedes “I.”

Carina Garland argues in her feminist article “Curious Appetites: Food, Desire, Gender, and Subjectivity in Lewis Carroll’s Alice Texts” (2008) that Carroll as an author is exercising his sado-masochist appetite control over his child heroine’s food consumption in order to build the desirable idealized subjectivity. Disagreeing with Nina Auerbach’s and others’ similar readings that have long held Alice to be “a subversive, active heroine” (28), Garland sees the fictional Alice as “a passive heroine who is denied her own feelings of hunger in order to satisfy a desiring male gaze” (37). For Garland, two Alices are the dramatization of a male author’s control of the passive protagonist Alice and the spiteful suppression of adult female sexuality in his child heroine. In her theory, the male author polarizes the female sexuality into idealized female child and disgusting female adult (31). Garland thinks
Carroll’s demonization of female adults reflects his anxiety of aggressive female sexuality, and she applies Barbara Creed’s “vagina dentata theory” (27) to illustrate this male author’s fear of active women’s hungry and violent sexuality. To keep Alice as a passive, desirable, and docile subject, Carroll, as Garland suggests, deprives his idealized pre-pubescent girl of her eating and growing agency: for example, “Carroll was exercising his own desire through Alice’s hunger and his feeding of her” (28), and “[i]t is important to remember that Alice never grows from a child in the texts, even though her size increases” (28). Also, Carroll applies the principle of inversion to the traditional gender roles in his two Alices, in which King occupies the feminine space while Queen becomes dominant, masculine figure. Hot-tempered female adult characters like the Queen of Hearts or the Duchess symbolize a predatory sexuality that disgusts Carroll. However, Garland’s well-organized but unconvincing feminist argument confuses us with several points. First of all, does Garland imply that the hot-tempered Queen of Hearts or Duchess is immoderately gluttonous or sexually loose? Secondly, as Garland notes, “The Queen of Hearts is . . . quite mad but the extent of her insanity and lust for castration and power is only realized when her food (her tarts) is stolen. Her lack of food . . . turns her into a most monstrous being” (31). Such an argument can be easily countered with a couple of textual examples if we pay attention to the occasions where these hot-tempered characters shout “Off with his (or her) head!”43 Thirdly, Garland writes, “In Alice in Wonderland, food is eaten constantly and results in bodily changes but is consumed without any explicit hunger (or desire) being expressed. Alice is continually following (the male author’s) instruction. . . . She eats without desire and without

43 When Alice is showing off her astronomical knowledge about the earth’s axis, the Duchess shouts “chop off her head” (AW 48)! The Queen of Hearts habitually gives her order of executions to anyone who is against her will: for example, “Off with her head!” to Alice who defies her (AW 64), “Off with their heads!” to three cardboard gardeners who paint white roses red (AW 62, 65), “Off with his head!” or “Off with her head!” to croquet players who play all at once (AW 67), and “Off with his head!” to the head of the Cheshire Cat in the air (AW 68). The beheading orders are given not only for reasons other than stolen food, but also to males, females, and animals. After a second thought, is a predatory female adult character’s execution order still a castration threat for a male who straitjackets the other sex’s oral or sexual appetite and fears her “vagina dentata”?
knowledge, her consumption being an innocent and ignorant one that is almost without consent” (32-33). We find it hard to believe that Alice as a sweet tooth does not show any desire before or after her consumption of food or drinks. We can even say that her original ingestive craving has gradually turned into a desire to change her status quo. Either way can be counted as her desire for consumption. Lastly, Garland observes, “the Jabberwocky’s death represents the victory of the male desire over the repulsive, mature, sexual female (the vagina dentata)” (34; my emphasis and sic). We know the nonsense poem “Jabberwocky” is about a young boy’s Beowulf like quest to slay a monster called Jabberwock, but there is nowhere in the poem that we can identify Jabberwock as a horrifying she-dragon, not to mention that this quest can be symbolized as the victory of the male desire over predatory female sexuality. Obviously, if we argue our points in the psychobiographical shadow, the textual analysis will inevitably invite interpretations from outside the Alice texts themselves.

Christopher Lane reconsiders Lacan’s 1966 homage to the eccentric Victorian in his article “Lewis Carroll and Psychoanalysis: Why Nothing Adds Up in Wonderland” (2011). According to Lane, Lacan praises Carroll for his approach to subjectivity, his insight, and his guiding ethic for his protagonist. First of all, “Carroll advanced an approach to subjectivity that has much in common with psychoanalysis, given their shared interest in ontology and the limits of meaning” (Lane 1030). Secondly, in the eyes of Lacan, the powerful, counter-intuitive insight of the Alice stories is that “One only ever passes through a door one’s own size” (Lane 1031). The lesson Carroll prepares for Alice is that “she has to adapt to circumstances. . .” (Lane 1033), but on the other hand, “Carroll’s interest in the asymmetry

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44 For example, when Alice is falling past the shelves on the sides of the deep well, she picks up a jar of orange marmalade, but to her disappointment it is empty (AW 8). After Alice tastes the “DRINK ME” bottle, she finds the mixed flavor (“cherry-tart, custard, pine-apple, roast turkey, toffy, and hot buttered toast”) very nice, and finishes it off soon (AW 11). Even the “EAT ME” cake is inviting because these two words are “beautifully marked in currants” (AW 12). In White Rabbit’s house, Alice drinks a little bottle and eats little cakes without labels “DRINK ME” or “EAT ME” because she desires to see something different happen (AW 28, 32).

45 Garland obviously confuses the title of the nonsense poem “Jabberwocky” with the monster Jabberwock.
between Wonderland and the world beyond it teaches Alice that the symbolic order does not—and cannot—add up” (Lane 1037). Thus, vertigo is inevitable when Alice finds it difficult to adapt to “the peculiar world of language and symbols” (Lane 1035), and just because Alice “struggle[s] to conform to cultural systems to which [she is] not especially well suited” (Lane 1030), the nonsense of Wonderland will generate “unease” and even “malaise” (Lane 1030). That is, “anxiety” arises when Alice “adapt[s] to a world to which she feels peculiarly ill-fitted and ill-suited” (Lane 1039). This leads to Carroll’s guiding ethic for his protagonist. Thirdly, “[o]ne reason Lacan found so much to admire in Carroll’s fiction is that the novelist tended to celebrate in children an unwillingness, even a studied refusal, to adapt to the world . . .” (Lane 1042). In spite of their shared interest in ontology and the limits of meaning, it is polemical to equate Carroll’s subjectivity with psychoanalytic subjectivity since the former purely organizes around the fictional Alice while the latter has the fictional Alice weighted down by Lewis Carroll and Alice Liddell. Lane’s psychobiographical approach models on the psychoanalytic literary criticism in the 1930s to “seek the answers to literary enigmas in the psyches of the author” (Lane 1038). The correlation of the work with its author’s unconscious desires becomes the primary driving force behind such psychobiographical study. Accordingly, Lane theorizes that Dodgson must have repressed his irrational temptation under his appearance of an Oxford don, and the *Alice* stories are a perfect cure for Dodgson’s traumatic experience over Alice Liddell (1034). It is of Lane’s opinion that “details and events in Dodgson’s life . . . are clearly not sufficient, when applied to Carroll’s imaginative fiction, to account for its many varied and brilliant effects” (1035). But to us, Lane’s psychobiographical approach is flawed in terms of the fictional Alice’s subjectivity because the large gaps in Carroll’s inaccessible information will drive desperate psychobiographers to come up with something between fact and fiction.46

46 From our reading of Lane’s psychobiographical essay, three textual citations seem inconsistent with the
The study in this chapter distinguishes itself from the past psychobiographical research by examining the fictional Alice’s subjectivity in Carroll’s two Alices directly. The basic question it asks is why curious human beings embark on unknown quests even when they know the worst price for their unchecked curiosity may result in death. In Carroll’s two Alices, we observe that curiosity plays an important part in Alice’s epistemological and ontological quest for who she is. Curiosity is defined in this chapter as the boundary-crossing non-fascist gift from Life itself. It is different from God’s divine gift because the former maximizes what life can do while the latter puts God’s obligee Adam in the darkness of knowledge and the threat of death. When Adam drew his first breath, God and Life respectively gave their gifts to him: law and curiosity. We notice Carroll’s fictional Alice manifests two contradictory aspirations: on the one hand, she aspires so much to wander in Wonderland and Looking-Glass gardens, but on the other, she is curious about constant size alterations and clashes of different logics disregarding any fatal consequences. We can draw upon Michel Foucault’s preface to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guttari’s Anti-Oedipus to explain the odds. They are contradictory aspirations because Alice’s strong yearning to “wander about among those beds of bright flowers and those cool fountains” (AW 10) is the fascism in her head that causes her to desire her forefather Adam’s nostalgic loss of Eden before the great fall, whereas her non-fascist curiosity is the “art of living [that] counter[s] to all forms of fascism” (Foucault, “Preface” xiii). The garden imagery appears frequently to show an idyllic image of original texts. First of all, “. . . the queen of a chess game transfigured miraculously into a sheep dressed as a grandmother, before she morphs into a kitten whom Alice asks, in turn, whether it dreamed the whole scenario” (Lane 1032). It is the White Queen who cries “Much be-etter! Be-etter! Be-e-e-etter! Be-e-ehh!” (TLG 153) before she metamorphoses into an old sheep in a shop. Nevertheless, the kitten Alice asks about the whole dream puzzle is the Red Queen, and the question is delivered to ask whether it is Alice’s dream or the Red King’s dream (TLG 207-08). Secondly, “[w]hen, for instance, the Red King in Looking-Glass inadvertently blurts out that he is practicing a kind of automatic writing—that his pen records ‘all manner of things that [he doesn’t] intend’ (Lane 1034). However, the one who writes in his memorandum-book is the White King (TLG 115). As to the Red King, he sleeps throughout the whole Looking-Glass story. Thirdly, “As Alice tries progressing by train from the third to fourth squares on the chessboard. . .” (Lane 1036). This statement should be revised as “progressing by train from the second to fourth squares” because as the Red Queen proclaims: “A pawn goes two squares in its first move, you know” (TLG 128). The first two textual citation mistakes, in particular, undermine the credibility of Lane’s argument.
Alice, but at a deeper level, all the gardens in Wonderland and Looking-Glass Land are not what they seem: Wonderland garden (AW 62-69) is a place where white roses are painted red and croquet game goes awry, whereas the garden of live flowers (TLG 120-23) that precedes the chess game is full of many rude talking flowers that try to insult Alice, and the Eighth Square garden (TLG 191) at the close of the chess game is the beginning of Alice’s nonsensical queenship examination and chaotic coronation dinner party. None of these gardens is “the lovelist garden . . . . [with] beds of bright flowers and . . . cool fountains” (AW 10), nor are they God’s idyllic garden of Eden in Genesis.

The garden of Eden is God’s panopticon where His inmates Adam and Eve are victimized by a tricky scheme. The tempting snake allures Eve and then Adam to transgress God’s law and to eat from the tree of knowledge so that they know the binary oppositions of the idea of “shame”: “good” for being clothed and “evil” for being naked. For fear of their gaining immortality, God has the tree of life heavily guarded, and banishes men’s forefathers from the garden of Eden. Ever since then, God’s cleverly built-in moral knowledge becomes men’s internalized panopticon that is programmed for self-monitoring. If viewed at a closer range, the tricky scheme is inconsistent in that Adam and Eve are innocently uncovered in fig leaves before the sin, whereas the same nakedness after the sin becomes morally evil in the eyes of God. This inconsistency shows the arbitrariness of God’s law. In his discussion of Foucault’s subtle correlation between illegalisms and laws, Deleuze writes: “Law administers illegalisms: some it allows, makes possible or invents as the privilege of the dominating class; others it tolerates as a compensation for the dominated classes, or even uses in the service of the dominating class; others again it forbids, isolates and takes as its object and its means of domination” (F 29). The varying changes in the law (first allows them to get around uncovered; then forbids their nakedness) explain that transgression of God’s will is to challenge His sovereignty; as a result, Adam and Eve are victimized as the political object of
God’s legislative power. As Deleuze argues, “[w]hen power becomes bio-power resistance becomes the power of life. . .” (*F* 92; emphasis added). The resistant power of life is “curiosity”—a gift from Life itself. The tricky part we see in Alice is that she is not only curious but also anxious about what happens to her. God has planted in her the double sense of guilt (bad conscience and betrayal), and in our reading we see Alice’s aspiration to return to the bright gardens as a symptom of the original sin. On the other hand, curiosity inside Alice struggles to free the subject itself from the shackles of God and Man because the forces within her enter into a relation with other forces from the outside to invest in another compound or form. We as daring creatures in God’s angry hands still dream beyond our frame because curiosity always gives us the resistant thrust to crack open the law.

In addition to the forces within Alice, we also discuss the forces from the outside. In *Foucault*, Deleuze argues, “An ‘age’ does not pre-exist the statements which express it, nor the visibilities which fill it. These are the two essential aspects: on the one hand each stratum or historical formation implies a distribution of the visible and the articulable which acts upon itself; on the other, from one stratum to the next there is a variation in the distribution. . .” (48). Each age has its particular way of seeing and saying, “[a]nd if things close up again afterwards, visibilities [and statements] become hazy or blurred to the point where ‘self-evident’ phenomena [and discursive practices] cannot be grasped by another age. . .” (*F* 57). Since “knowledge . . . is defined by the combinations of visible and articulable that are unique to each stratum or historical formulation” (*F* 51), Alice’s height and logic in her waking life constitute her knowledge about her age and also about her-self. When the virtual dreams bring about her constant size alterations and clashes of different logics, Alice’s former knowledge in face of “another age” and “another Alice” in Wonderland and Looking-Glass dreams cannot retrieve an identical “Alice” from the old audio-visual archive in her actual waking life so that what she knows about her subject (or identity) gradually gives way to
forms of exteriority, through which either statements or visible things are dispersed” in these forms that “neither enclose nor interiorize anything” (F 43), and finally to the forces of “the outside which exists as an unformed element of forces” (F 43).47

We argue that Alice’s constant size alterations and clashes of logics are “peristaltic” (F 96) savage forces or particular features “on the line of the outside itself” (F 122) that fold back to constitute the “new inside of [the] outside” (F 97). After the extinction of God-form and Man-form, we wonder “what new form will emerge that is neither God nor Man” (F 130). It is definitely not a coincidence that Carroll comes up with scenarios associated with Alice’s fear of darkness and shadow of death because life fears neither darkness nor death. Life is only threatened by “death in an impasse” as a result of the law so that the power of life on the one hand resists this classical conception of death, and on the other welcomes and embraces the “metabolic death.” Curiosity expects encounters with the latter kind of death because this death is life, life death. In her epistemological quest of who she is, Alice’s curiosity resists God’s law and Man’s power that takes life as its political object to enter into a relation with

47 It is a process of counter-actualization from Knowledge-Being (audio-visual archive in the sense of interior/exterior division) to Power-Being (power diagram in the forms of interiority/exteriority), and finally to a Self-Being (the fold of the absolute outside in the encounters of inside and outside). In Foucault, Deleuze distinguishes these three correlative agencies as follows:

There is first of all the outside which exists as an unformed element of forces: the latter come from and remain attached to the outside, which stirs up their relations and draws out their diagrams. And then there is the exterior as the area of concrete assemblages, where relations between forces are realized. And lastly there are the forms of exteriority, since the realization takes place in a split or disjunction between two different forms that are exterior to one another and yet share the same assemblages (the confinements and interiorizations being only transitory figures on the surface of these forms). (F 43)

In our reading, “the forms of exteriority,” “the exterior,” and “the outside” correspond respectively to Knowledge, Power, and Self. It is a significant practice that Deleuze equates “the outside” with “Self-Being” in his theory of subjectivity in Foucault. To illustrate the process of subjectivation, Deleuze repetitively argues that there is “an inside that lies deeper than any internal world [any form of interiority], just as the outside [that] is farther away than any external world [any form of exteriority]” (F 96, 110, 117, 118, 122). Though in the third figure of being (the fold of Being) “the outside” and “Self-Being” seem distant from each other, Deleuze explains the intimacy and intrusion of the outside by saying that: “[t]he most distant point becomes interior, by being converted into the nearest: life within the folds” (F 123). This is how “the outside” can be coextensive with “the inside” or “Self-Being” because Blanchot’s “interiority of expectation” (F 97, 104) or “passion of the outside” (F 120) operates by an “interiorization of the outside,” a “redoubling of the Other” (F 98), the “doubling of the outside” (F 99), or the “folding of the outside into the inside” (F 118). The “central fissure” (120) or the “central chamber” (F 123) crossing the audio-visual archive in strata or historical formations and strategic, non-stratified power-relations in power diagram is Deleuze’s “zone of subjectivation” (F 123) where the intrusive claws of the absolute outside (or the forces from the outside) fall back on the forces within man to produce “new modes of subjectivation” (F 120).
other forces from the outside that remains open to a future so that the fold of self-Being (the third figure of ontological Being) continues to draw new composing forces from the lottery in its ever new modes of subjectivation. We cannot say that curiosity constitutes Alice’s subjectivity because a subject is only “a derivative or the product of a ‘subjectivation’” (F 101). If “man is a face drawn in the sand between two tides” (F 89), curiosity is the ebb and flow of the tides that constantly decomposes her temporary Man-form so that “an always other or a Non-self” (F 98) is invested in Alice’s self-Being: “an ethical subject” (F 118) that relates to her Self by the folding of the outside.

2.1. Curiosity, Knowledge, and Life

Curiosity is an arrow shot toward “a future that comes from outside” (F 119). It makes holes in Alice’s being in order to reach her fold of Being (F 110). In brief, the issue at stake here is Alice’s relation to herself—a relation that requires Alice to embark on “the task of calling up and producing new modes of subjectivation” (F 120). After many bizarre happenings, she exclaims: “Why, there’s hardly enough of me left to make one respectable person” (AW 12)! Many torsional forces tear “Alice” so apart that she cannot help wondering who she really is. If this is already a big question for her, then how does she tolerate such an “unnatural” identity throughout her adventures? How does she see herself as “Alice”? At this point, we might just as well argue that it is her curiosity about how she might become otherwise that gives her strengths against all the odds. She tolerates to see what will become of her. “This is,” Deleuze suggests, “what Blanchot called ‘the passion of the outside’, a force that tends towards the outside only because the outside itself has become intimacy, intrusion” (F 120). What kind of force will tend towards the outside? Why does the outside become intimacy and intrusion? We might be able to draw upon Deleuze’s argument on Foucault’s “Death of Man” to answer these two questions, and then use Blanchot’s concept of “passion
of the outside” in *Foucault* to shed a light on Alice’s identity problem:

One needs to know with what other forces the forces within man enter into a relation, in a given historical formation, and what form is created as a result from this compound of forces. We can already foresee that the forces within man do not necessarily contribute to the composition of a Man-form, but may be otherwise invested in another compound or form: even over a short period of time Man has not always existed, and will not exist for ever. For a Man-form to appear to be delineated, the forces within man must enter into a relation with certain very special forces from the outside. (*F* 124)

Hence, for Alice, the forces within her must form a relation with other forces from the outside, and the latter can become forces of intimacy and intrusion because “the outside, farther away than any external world, is also closer than any internal world” (*F* 118). The intrusive claws of outside, according to Deleuze, are “an original violence inflicted upon thought. . . . Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental *encounter*” (*DR* 139). Therefore, it stands to reason that a relation must be formed, and it is formed by folding. It is because “the inside is constituted by the folding of the outside” (*F* 119) that the outside is intimately closer than any internal world, and thus constitutes four folds of subjectivation, among which the ultimate fold of the outside itself further constitutes what Blanchot calls an “interiority of expectation” (qtd. in *F* 104).

Curiosity is a highly creative and experimental “gift,” not from God, but from Life itself. In Alice’s dreams, none of the gardens is the idyllic garden of Eden in the book of Genesis where Adam and Eve freely ate from every tree of the garden until their advance toward God’s forbidden tree incurred His wrath and punishment—man with arduous physical labor and woman with the pain in child-giving labor. After violating the first of His commandments not to eat the fruit of the forbidden tree (the tree of knowledge of good and
evil), and for fear that they may soon be violating the second commandment of His to eat from the tree of life to possess god-like immortality and wisdom, Adam and Eve were condemned with man’s shameful fall and shall never return to this blissful place of innocence and beauty. Though Alice shows strong nostalgic attachment to Wonderland and Looking-Glass gardens (in much the same way that Adam and Eve feel about lost paradise), no sooner has she entered than she discovers that the croquet game and chess game there are going awry, and both end up chaotic confusion. Thus proved, these gardens in her dreams are not men’s nostalgic and idyllic garden of Eden.

Even the garden of Eden is not what it seems. It is a place where God guards his treasure of knowledge from his created creatures. Before the sin, humans bare of (moral) knowledge do not feel ashamed of their nakedness until they “absorb” the binary forbidden knowledge—“good” for being clothed (not feel ashamed) versus “evil” for being naked (feel ashamed). After the tempting snake initiates the domino effect, Eve and Adam crossed the line in succession because of their aroused curiosity; consequently, God must have them expelled from the garden of Eden and purge this place of snaky curiosity. Nevertheless, we cannot help noticing a glaring inconsistency in God’s attitude towards the “dress code” in His garden. Prior to their sins, the fact that Adam and Eve are naked in His Eden does not seem to bother God a bit who already knows “good” from “evil.” God’s “Let there be light” divides the light from the darkness, but He does not plan to shine upon Adam and Eve with his light of wisdom. Instead, He keeps them innocently divested of knowledge in darkness. He clips their wings—“know good and evil” (moral wisdom) and “live for ever” (immortality)—of these two fledglings lest they “become as one of us” (King James Version, Gen. 3:22).48 If “being naked” is so morally evil that Adam and Eve should have felt ashamed of themselves, why didn’t God say a word about it before the sins? It is self-contradictory to accuse someone

48 The editors of The Bible: Authorized King James Version are Robert Carroll and Stephen Prickett.
of something that did not bother you before. God demands immobile innocent darkness (without knowledge) from man; however, man’s “peristaltic” snaky darkness (curiosity)\(^{49}\) is making attempts to restore those two wings by ridding man of the pull of the fascist life. What man does not know is that the Non-Fascist Life is neither innocence (before sin) nor moral knowledge (after sin). Simply put, the first wing our curiosity regains is not god-like wisdom.\(^{50}\) This fake wing is God’s bait that our forefather takes to internalize God’s supervising panopticon, and we know it takes effect because it implants man’s eternal double sense of guilt: bad conscience and betrayal of God. We are “homesick” for the garden of Eden that lies nihilistically beyond, and we cannot help wishfully thinking of a world of “Adam-non-sinner” in which sin does not exist. Desiring innocence and regretting sin are characteristic of nihilistic human beings who dream of God’s “divine gift” (a life innocently free of knowledge) again. This “homesickness” is what Foucault, in his preface to Deleuze and Guattari’s *Anti-Oedipus*, claims “the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us” (xiii). The divine gift of life (Thou shall not “know”) that God breathes into Adam is the fascist life, whereas the gift from Life itself (curiosity about “the unknown”) that Life breathes into the snake, Eve, and Adam is the non-fascist life. Curiosity is like electricity that passes through them, and interiorizes the Other from the outside in each self. Curiosity is the life-transforming power that happens between Deleuze and Guattari’s wasp and orchid.

The line or block of becoming that unites the wasp and the orchid produces a shared deterritorialization: of the wasp, in that it becomes a liberated piece of the orchid’s reproductive system, but also of the orchid, in that it becomes the object

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\(^{49}\) In *Foucault*, Deleuze uses “peristaltic” to describe the line of the outside.

\(^{50}\) The wrongdoings of Adam and Eve could be easily premeditated by our all-knowing God. The tree of knowledge is simply a fake lure. Afterwards, God pretends He knows nothing about the transgression: “And the LORD God called unto Adam, and said unto him, Where art thou” (Gen. 3:9)? How can our omnipresent and omnipotent God not know Adam’s whereabouts? Therefore, it makes sense to assume that God has all this planned. Man’s shameful fall is already in God’s calculation.
of an orgasm in the wasp, also liberated from its own reproduction. A coexistence of two asymmetrical movements that combine to form a block, down a line of flight that sweeps away selective pressures. The line, or the block, does not link the wasp to the orchid, any more than it conjugates or mixes them: it passes between them, carrying them away in a shared proximity in which the discernibility of points disappears. The line-system (or block-system) of becoming is opposed to the point-system of memory. Becoming is the movement by which the line frees itself from the point, and renders points indiscernible: the rhizome, the opposite of arborescence; break away from arborescence. *Becoming is an antimemory.* (ATP 293-94)

In a conventional reading, the snake tempts Eve to eat from the forbidden tree of knowledge, and then gives Adam another fruit to eat, but if viewed from Deleuze and Guattari’s wasp/orchid becoming, the line or block of becoming that unites Eve and the snake produces a shared deterritorialization: of Eve, in that she becomes a liberated piece of the snake’s reproductive system of curiosity, but also of the snake, in that it becomes the object of the orgasmic curiosity in Eve, also liberated from its own reproduction. Afterwards, the whole process takes place all over again between Adam and Eve. Therefore, Eve is snake-becoming and the snake is Eve-becoming in much the same way that Adam is Eve-becoming and Eve is Adam-becoming.

Carroll’s Wonderland and Looking-Glass gardens certainly gain their full significance by maximizing the power of rhizomatic becoming. In Alice’s case, the discussion must be dealt with on three levels. On the first level, Alice’s strong aspiration for beautiful and innocent gardens results from God’s residual divine gift that is passed down to Adam’s posterity. When God “breathed into his nostrils the breath of life” (Genesis. 2:7), Adam receives from God the divine gift of life (a living soul pretty much like a doll in a house).
Nevertheless, Life itself also gives Adam a Non-Fascist gift (unbridled curiosity that is prone to transgression). These two forces foreshadow God’s binary forbidden knowledge. The divine gift of life plants in us the boundary-marking fascist power while the gift Life gives us is the non-fascist boundary-transgressing force. After the shameful fall, the fascist life in us turns against our curiosity and holds it responsible for our punishment. On the second level, Alice’s knowledge in actual reality is straightjacketed first within religious tribunal court (religious triangle of self, world, and God) and then on psychological couch (familial triangle of daddy, mommy, and me). We are tormented in the dual sense of guilt: first we betray our God in the garden of Eden because of our desire for knowledge; then we betray our father in the family because of our desire for mother. We are swinging like a pendulum between law and curiosity: “Thou shall do this, and thou shall not do that!” versus “Breaking the law!” Transgression out of curiosity is a headlong crash into the high walls that confine us. To lead a non-fascist life, we must take off the straightjacket in this mental asylum first. Nevertheless, God’s and psychoanalysts’ tricky tricks have already internalized a religious and familial panopticon inside us to keep a mobile eye on our curiosity. We are curious, but in the meantime we are also anxious. On the third level, Alice’s knowledge in virtual dream is mostly about the relation to herself. Her curiosity about who she is still under the supervision of law. Her aspiration for gardens can be read as symptomatic of her boundary-marking fascist life. “How she longed to . . . wander about among those beds of bright flowers and those cool fountains” (AW 10). What Alice really needs, in Foucault’s words, is an “art of living” that counters to “all forms of fascism” (“Preface” xiii). “What is needed is to ‘de-individualize’ by means of multiplication and displacement, diverse combinations. The group must not be the organic bond uniting hierarchized individuals, but a constant generator of de-individualization” (Foucault, “Preface” xiv). Carroll’s chaotmic gardens in Alice’s dreams are perfect antidotes to Alice’s fascism in her body because first of all, she can hardly
get along with any of Wonderland or Looking-Glass Land denizens and vice versa for violence, instead of harmony, keeps wrecking “the organic bond uniting hierarchized individuals,” and secondly, she is hardly herself after so many size alterations and failures to perform what she used to know. In Deleuze’s reading of Foucault’s “outside,” Alice’s ultimate “Self” knowledge is more than knowledge-being (the first figure of Being) and power-being (the second figure of Being); it is the self-Being or the fold of Being whose outside folds in to constitute a coextensive inside, and whose foldings are being created in the process of subjectivation (F 105, 111-14).

In this chapter, curiosity plays a pivotal role in Alice’s subjectivation. Alice’s knowledge of the relation to herself should not be grounded on Edenic fascism or human fascism because the former demands “innocence” from humans (no knowledge) while the latter regrets having lost their innocence and turns to pit moral knowledge (good and evil) against humans themselves. Either form of fascist life cracks down on curiosity (the non-fascist life). However, a pure knowledge of the relation to oneself is an arrow of curiosity shot toward “a future that comes from outside” (F 119). It makes holes in one’s being in order to reach one’s fold of Being. In order for Edenic or human fascism to perish, Nietzsche’s death of God and Foucault’s death of man have cleared the way for our new post-human existence of “Superfold” (F 131; emphasis original). Since inside is the folding of the outside, those once distant claws from the outside have folded back intrusively and intimately on the inside which on its side expects the interiorization of the outside passionately. The coextensive inside and outside together create new modes of subjectivation. The sense of giddiness which Alice feels about her ever-shifting subjectivity comes from the encounter between actual reality and virtual dream, and only an absolute sense of giddiness can create Carroll’s nonsense subject: an ethical subject of rhizomatic becoming rather than arborescent memory.
The fear that the invisible darkness causes in humans can be explained with the importance of light for humans at literal and metaphorical levels. Alice expresses more than once her fear of darkness. In Wonderland, the narrator says: “How she longed to get out of that dark hall, and wander about among those beds of bright flowers and those cool fountains” (AW 10). In Looking-Glass Land, Alice begs Tweedledum and Tweedledee for directions: “At any rate I’d better be getting out of the wood, for really it’s coming on very dark. . . . If I could only get to the Eighth Square before it gets dark!” (TLG 146, 137). Of the two examples given above, Alice wants to get out of the dark hall to enter the bright garden in the first, and in the second she wants to ask for directions from Dum and Dee to go out of the wood in order to reach the Eighth Square before it is too dark. In both textual examples (going out of the dark hall into the bright garden and going out of the dark wood into the Eighth Square “garden”), Alice’s fear of darkness is explicable in that light at a literal level brings Alice the sense of security, and light at a metaphorical level is tantamount to knowledge with which we make sense of the irrational world that was once “invisible” to us. Thus, the uttermost sense of security that Alice can ever “dream of” in these two curious adventures is by becoming an invulnerable queen (an inextinguishable “I”) wandering about among beds of bright flowers and cool fountains (a secure world to inhabit). Simply put, if light means something to man, it means an “I” in a “visible” world.

Alice’s spontaneous fear of darkness, no doubt, indicates man’s concern about the sustainability of an “I” (an issue flickering in the shadow of death) because the sedentary power in Alice chickens out of staying in darkness, in comparison with which one would call that non-Christian light. Our craving for the sense of security reflects this kind of sedentary force in us. Our sedentary being at a literal level wants to survive, and at a metaphorical level wants to stay in a comfort zone. Nevertheless, our boundary-crossing curiosity does not mind transgression. This kind of nomadic life force always expects a little more surprises from the
outside even when our lives are at stake. It is easy to observe such a tug of war of these two forces trying to reign supreme and gain control of Alice’s “I.” The sedentary force leads Alice out of darkness into Christian light while the nomadic force takes Alice away from a Christian “I” to become otherwise in a different light. Adam’s rebellious gesture in his pursuit of forbidden knowledge (in spite of the fact that Adam puts the blame on his wife Eve under God’s cross-examination, and a tree of knowledge that is supposed to make them wise only opens their moral eyes to tell “good” from “evil” and make them morally docile after the shameful fall) means that once Adam yields to his boundary-crossing curiosity, his further itch for transgression will further drag him off the visibility in Christian light, and put Adam’s “I” on a shaky ground (sending his sedentary “I” into motion and initiating the metamorphosis). That is, it makes holes in one’s Christian being by the folding of the “invisible” outside. The sense of uncertainty about an “I” can relate to one’s corporeal and incorporeal existence in three realms: (1) the garden of Eden, (2) actual reality, and (3) virtual dream. First of all, in the garden of Eden, “. . . the LORD God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul” (Gen. 2:7). As to his existence, Adam has an ambiguous lifespan because he cannot live forever like God (unless he eats from the tree of life), nor can he die of eating the allegedly poisoned fruit of the tree of knowledge (unless God lies). In spite of his ambiguous lifespan (he is not immortal, nor is he vulnerable to death?), Adam’s living soul comes from God’s fascist breath. After Adam’s sin, God says: “In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground. . .” (Gen. 3:19). Thus, secondly, we can speculate from this biblical statement that in the realm of actual reality, man is mortal (both corporeal and incorporeal), but there is still no telling if there is incorporeal existence beyond the corporeal realm before and after this life. Lastly, the virtual dream might be the most curious realm because when one’s corporeal body is in the state of sleeping, his or her incorporeal consciousness is in
agitation. What’s more, reality can sneak into one’s dream because the dreamer often has no idea that he or she is dreaming until the dreamer wakes up. Take Alice’s Wonderland dream for example, half dreaming, half waking, Alice confuses the dull pastoral reality with her curious dream coming alive so that the long grass rustling at her feet as the White Rabbit hurries by is the rustling in the wind, the pool rippling in the wake of the frightened Mouse’s splashing his way through the neighboring pool is actually caused by the waving of the reeds, the rattle of the teacups as the March Hare, Mad Hatter, and Dormouse share their never-ending tea time is the tinkling sheep-bells, the shrill cries of the Queen of Hearts ordering off her unfortunate guests to their executions are the voices of the shepherd-boy, the sneezing of the pig-baby on the Duchess’s knee with plates and dishes crashing around it, the shriek of the Gryphon, the squeaking of the Lizard’s slate-pencil, and the choking of the suppressed guinea-pigs are the confused clamor of the busy farm-yard, and the distant sob of the miserable Mock Turtle is the lowing of the cattle in the distance (AW 98-99). The sense of giddiness arising from the encounter of actual reality with virtual dream sends the gushing blood of rhizomatic becoming up Alice’s head to make her subjectivation in a dream even more vulnerable to the intrusive claws of the outside. The dream she tells her sister afterwards from her memory is no longer a memory of history of what happens to Alice the bourgeois girl in a Victorian family (daddy, mommy, me) in her most curious adventure, but an absolute memory of what happens to Alice the schizophrenic in the social milieu of Wonderland (hallucination, delirium, a larvae subject). Alice’s Wonderland or Looking-Glass dream does not stop its influence over her after the adventure is over because Alice’s subjectivity has folded in the “peristaltic” visible and the articulable forces from the outside to disturb her dual stratification in her former waking life. These intrusive forces are the double helix of our new post-human superfold, whose virtuality hovers over the actual reality to look for another chance of actualization.
The aforementioned argument on Alice’s fear of darkness tells us that it is absolutely not a coincidence for Carroll to bring up four examples of the theme of death in two Alice stories. In Wonderland, when falling down a deep well, Alice tried to look down and make out what she was coming to, but it was too dark to see any-thing. . . . She took down a jar from one of the shelves as she passed: it was labeled ‘ORANGE MARMALADE,’ but to her great disappointment it was empty: she did not like to drop the jar, for fear of killing somebody underneath, so managed to put it into one of the cupboards as she fell past it.

“Well!” thought Alice to herself. “After such a fall as this, I shall think nothing of tumbling down-stairs! How brave they’ll all think me at home! Why, I wouldn’t say anything about it, even if I fell off the top of the house!” (Which was very likely true.) (AW 8)

Here is an interesting example of inversion. In her unusual falling (Alice does not realize that this falling of hers is already taking place in her dream), Alice handles the jar with care for fear of killing somebody underneath. Although the falling is pretty real to her, it is strange that Alice does not feel a bit scared; instead, she feels quite comfortable looking about her and wondering what to do next in that “slow” falling. On the contrary, she thinks a “slow” falling experience like this will give her such invincible courage back at home that tumbling downstairs or even falling off the top of the house would seem nothing to her. Simply put, in her dreamy “slow” falling, she fears that a falling object might kill someone down there whereas her likely falling off of the house strangely does not worry her about being killed. Another theme of death happens when Alice keeps shrinking to an extent that she begins to worry that her vanishing corporeal existence is like “the flame of a candle” going out:

. . . she waited for a few minutes to see if she was going to shrink any further: she felt a little nervous about this; “for it might end, you know,” said Alice to
herself, “in my going out together, like a candle. I wonder what I should be like then?” And she tried to fancy what the flame of a candle looks like after the candle is blown out, for she could not remember ever having seen such a thing. 

(AW 12)

In Looking-Glass Land, there are also two significant examples of the theme of death. In his game-like conversation with Alice, Humpty Dumpty asks her:

. . . “So here’s a question for you. How old did you say you were?”

Alice made a short calculation, and said “Seven years and six months.” . . .

“Seven years and six months!” Humpty Dumpty repeated thoughtfully. “An uncomfortable sort of age. Now if you’d asked my advice, I’d have said ‘Leave off at seven’—but it’s too late now.”

“I never ask advice about growing,” Alice said indigantly.

“Too proud?” the other enquired.

Alice felt even more indignant at this suggestion. “I mean,” she said, “that one can’t help growing older.”

“One can’t, perhaps,” said Humpty Dumpty; “but two can. With proper assistance, you might have left off at seven.” (TLG 161-62)

This conversation gives us the impression that Humpty Dumpty encourages Alice to commit suicide with his proper assistance to “leave off” at seven so that she will not grow any older.

Another example of the theme of death in the chapter of Tweedledum and Tweedledee is even more philosophical. When Alice hears the Red King’s steam-engine like snoring, Dee tells her that she is nothing but a figment in the Red King’s dream, so is everybody else.

“He’s dreaming now,” said Tweedledee: “and what do you think he’s dreaming about?”

Alice said “Nobody can guess that.”
“Why, about you!” Tweedledee exclaimed, clapping his hands triumphantly.

“And if he left off dreaming about you, where do you suppose you’d be?”

“Where I am no, of course,” said Alice.

“Not you!” Tweedledee retorted contemptuously. “You’d be nowhere. Why, you’re only a sort of thing in his dream!”

“If that there King was to wake,” added Tweedledum, “you’d go out—bang!—just like a candle!”

“I shouldn’t!” Alice exclaimed indignantly. “Besides, if I’m only a sort of thing in his dream, what are you, I should like to know?”

“Ditto,” said Tweedledum.

“Ditto, ditto!” cried Tweedledee.

He shouted this so loud that Alice couldn’t help saying “Hush! You’ll be waking him, I’m afraid, if you make so much noise.”

“Well, it’s no use your talking about waking him,” said Tweedledum, “when you’re only one of the things in his dream. You know very well you’re not real.”

“I am real!” said Alice, and began to cry.

“You won’t make yourself a bit realler by crying,” Tweedledee remarked: “there’s nothing to cry about.”

“If I wasn’t real,” Alice said—half laughing through her tears, it all seemed so ridiculous—“I shouldn’t be able to cry.”

“I hope you don’t suppose those are real tears?” Tweedledum interrupted in a tone of great contempt. (TLG 145)

This episode resonates with the second example of the theme of death, “the flame of a candle,” in Wonderland. “Shrinking till invisible to the naked eye” and “vanishing when the
dreamer leaves off dreaming”51 both question the nature of human existence and a possibility of a life after this by scrutinizing the image “a candle going out.” The former is about infinite divisibility while the latter is about “Which Dreamed It?” (it happens to be the title of Chapter XII). The fourth example of the theme of death gives us overwhelming sense of giddiness because we cannot decide which is which. “Now, Kitty, let’s consider who it was that dreamed it all. This is a serious question, my dear. . . . You see, Kitty, it must have been either me or the Red King. He was part of my dream, of course—but then I was part of his dream, too! . . . Which do you think it was” (TLG 208)? There are two what if’s that make Alice’s already slippery hold on subjectivity and reality even more ungraspable. First of all, what if it is the Red King dreaming? Then, Alice is really what Dee says, a figment in the Red King’s dream. Her subjectivity is called into question. Secondly, what if there is no such thing like a waking reality? Since you cannot tell reality from dream and you cannot be sure whether or not you are dreaming at any given point of time, how can you tell there is a reality you can wake up to? Alice’s dream-within-dream motif gives us the thinking that probably we are dreaming all the time. In this understanding, one is unable to distinguish reality from illusion. It is very likely that we are in the illusory dream all the time. Carroll leaves open the question (“Which do you think it was?”) of whether the heroine is herself dreaming so that the philosophical question echoes the final verse line of Carroll’s acrostic that ends Through the Looking-Glass: “Life, what is it but a dream” (TLG 209)? It is possible that our “waking” life is just part of our “great dream,” which means we believe we have woken up to reality, but this reality is very likely an upper layer of our previous dream, and who knows how many layers our “great dream” has. Is there a final “great awakening” awaiting us, or are we (like

51 In the East, Chinese have similar dream argument called Zhuāngzhōu mèng dié (literally means “Zhuangzi dreamed he was a butterfly”): “One night, Zhuangzi (369 BC) dreamed that he was a carefree butterfly, flying happily. After he woke up, he wondered how he could determine whether he was Zhuangzi who had just finished dreaming he was a butterfly, or a butterfly who had just started dreaming he was Zhuangzi. This was a metaphor for what he referred to as a ‘great dream’.” For further information, please see “Dream Argument,” Wikipedia, Wikipedia Foundation, Inc., n.d. Web, 2 Mar. 2012.
all “imaginary” characters of Looking-Glass Land in the Red King’s dream) from beginning to end simply figments in God’s long divine dream?

From the four examples of Carroll’s theme of death (1. falling down a deep well, 2. shrinking like the flame of a candle going out, 3. leaving off at seven with proper assistance, and 4. vanishing in the dreamer’s waking up like a candle going out), we can assume that the shadow of “death” relates to Alice’s fear of “darkness” in a way that reflects Carroll’s concern about the ethics of Alice’s “Life” (an echo of Todd May’s “How One Might Live”). An illustration as follows can help us grasp better how these literary examples revolve around Alice’s “Life.”

Table 2.1

Carroll’s Concern about the Ethics of Alice’s “Life”

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<tr>
<th>Carroll’s concern</th>
<th>theme</th>
<th>example</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethics of Alice’s “Life”</td>
<td>fear of darkness</td>
<td>ex. 1 dark hall → bright garden (<em>AW</em> 10)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ex. 2 dark wood → the Eighth Square (<em>TLG</em> 146, 137)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>shadow of death</td>
<td>ex. 1 falling down a deep well (<em>AW</em> 8)</td>
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<td>ex. 2 shrinking like the flame of a candle going out (<em>AW</em> 12)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ex. 3 leaving off at seven with proper assistance (<em>TLG</em> 161-62)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ex. 4 vanishing in the dreamer’s waking up like a candle going out (<em>TLG</em> 145)</td>
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But the first question we need to ask is how the shadow of death relates to Alice’s ethics of “Life.” Of the four examples of the shadow of death, they go from active to passive
death on the one hand, and the least threatening to the most threatening on the other. Generally speaking, the gradual momentum that Carroll is building up to has something to do with his three chaotic gardens. What is the force of “Life”? The concept of real life mortal death in these four examples of shadow of death is inspiring to us in a way that can help us reflect upon life in Eden and metamorphous deaths in virtual dreams. There is no telling if life in Eden is immortal. Judging from God’s fear of Adam’s further advance to that tree of life, we are safe to say that Adam cannot live forever like one of them (unless he eats from it). But does he die? In spite of God’s death threat to eat the fruit of knowledge tree, strangely enough what greets him after his sin is not death but shame, but after man’s shameful fall, God announces: “for out of [the ground] wast thou taken: for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return” (Gen. 3:19).

To recapitulate briefly, Adam’s life in Eden is neither immortal nor vulnerable, but his life on earth is definitely mortal (Let’s call Adam’s life in Eden immortal youth for the convenience of discussion). A fascist life in Eden that lasts as long as it pleases God is not life worth living since it stays put like God’s favorite statue on a pedestal. A divine fascist life is deprived of its chance of growing up. The inspiration Carroll gives us who inhabit reality (if that is where we are now) is a lesson of growing up. Immortal youth in God’s time capsule allows Adam no chance to “grow up.” Man makes his decision to be mortal in exchange for knowledge (supposedly true wisdom), but sad to say, nihilists stick to moral knowledge while most of us flatten, or underestimate, our “Life” force because our biological clock is ticking so slow (except the awkward pubescent period) that we start to wonder if it is worthy of Adam’s mortal life to exchange for allegedly immortal wisdom.

Carroll gives Alice (and us) the true wisdom of “Life”: true life changes, and it changes eternally. Someday, we will die in our process of growing up, but before we reach our final limits, we are experiencing one metabolic death after another in each passing instant. From
the axis of active to passive, the first two examples in Wonderland demonstrate that Alice actively manages the shadow of death either at ease (she jokes about it) or “lowly strung” (she only feels a little nervous about it). Then, in the last two examples in Looking-Glass Land, life or death is no longer a matter at her disposal. Others can put an end to Alice’s life any time either by coming to her “aid” (an uninvited one) or by waking up (certainly the most unwanted one). From the axis of the least threatening to the most threatening, the first two examples in Wonderland manifest that Alice thinks nothing of her falling down a deep well because “[e]ither the well was very deep, or she fell very slowly” (AW 8), and after finishing the “DRINK ME” bottle, the now ten-inch-high Alice (almost at the end of the bottle’s full effect) waits to see if she is going to shrink any further. Next, in the last two examples in Looking-Glass Land, an uninvited aid with one’s “leaving off at seven” or the most unwanted “going out like a candle” in other’s dream gives us intimidating realization that our life is in the intrusive claws of the outside; as a consequence, the once-far-away “death” might come upon you any second. From the axis of the least threatening activity to the most threatening passivity, the inside of “Life” folds in the outside to the extent that the outside folds in to tear off each “I” that is just formed.

It would be wrong to see Alice as an “I” in history whose linearity “[b]egin[s] at the beginning . . . and go[es] on till [it] come[s] to the end: then stop” (AW 94), for “I” does not have a beginning and an end. It is a process. It is, as Deleuze suggests, “a movement that neither begins nor ends” (PI: Life 26). It is not enough to say that a line is not composed of numerous points because by saying so we still confuse process with linearity (because we might alternatively ask what constitutes “a line”). A process happens on a transcendental field, or a plane of immanence, whose “a-subjective consciousness, a pre-reflexive impersonal consciousness, a qualitative duration of consciousness without self” (PI: Life 25) “traverses the transcendental field at [such] an infinite speed everywhere diffused” that “nothing is able
to reveal it” (PI: Life 26). Thus, a process is a plane of immanence, rather than a transcendent line segment that has a beginning and an end.

Should we feel frightened at the thought of approaching “death”? As argued above, the true immortal knowledge of “Life” is that we have so many “deaths” before one final great “Death.” Take Caterpillar’s “Life” journey for example, he needs to undergo metamorphosis as follows:

| (life) caterpillar (1st death) → (life) chrysalis (2nd death) → (life) butterfly (final Death?) → dust, energy or other forms of life? |

Fig. 2.1. Metamorphosis of a caterpillar.

The sense of giddiness metamorphosis gives us is similar to the effect that Cheshire Cat gives us when he vanishes and appears in the air by turns. His being or non-being is like the flickering light of Life, on and off alternatively. The lesson of growing up fearless of living dangerously that Carroll gives in two Alices is not sedentary (bare repetition of the same) but nomadic (clothed repetition of difference). The shadow of death in two Alices reflects our fear of darkness: fear of deaths and fear of final Death. No matter what kind of death (one of the deaths or the final Death) it is when the “I” closes its eyes, darkness certainly befalls. Light gives us a sense of security by enabling us to locate our own whereabouts in this world, and knowledge, as light, shines upon the irrational world that was once “invisible” to us. As a consequence, darkness, literally or metaphorically, results in an unlocalized “I” in an invisible world. Carroll’s synergism of the shadow of death and the fear of darkness makes Alice’s already slippery hold on reality and our subjectivity even more vulnerable to the outside. Whenever Alice overcomes her fear of darkness and shadow of death, she is greeted with a possible moment of epiphany that helps her life grow up. If “growing up” originally means
becoming an invulnerable queen (an inextinguishable “I”) wandering about among beds of bright flowers and cool fountains (a secure world to inhabit) to Alice, Carroll definitely deprives her of the sense of security and takes her beyond the comfort zone. He destroys the walls that stabilize Alice’s “I” in a “visible” world, and drags her into the dark world of death.

Ever since the first humans, men have been driven by their curious aggression to trudge through the “comfort” mud of their nostalgic regression. On the one hand, their fear of being all alone in this world pulls them back, and on the other, their curiosity of exploring the infinity and beyond pushes them forward. Where does curiosity lead us: into the darkness of death or into the light of life? How does Alice learn from her adventures the ethics of her “Life” and learn more about herself? After God’s “Let there be light” casts light on this dark world (nature), the command does not brighten up innocent Adam and Eve (man). We have been stating that God breathes a fascist life into Adam’s nostrils and gives him “a doll in the house” kind of living soul. How so? “. . . the Lord God took the man, and put him into the garden of Eden to dress it and to keep it. And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat: But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die” (Gen. 2:15-17). Does Adam’s fear of God’s death threat prevent him from transgression? No, tempting curiosity is so irresistible that Adam crosses the forbidden line at the risk of losing his own life to put an end to his innocence. However, God’s ruse is praiseworthy because his warning is only directed against the tree of knowledge of good and evil that He grows in the midst of the garden. The tree of life, also in the deadly zone of the midst, is one of the trees in the garden Adam is “free” to eat from, but cleverly protected by God’s precautionary smokescreen. After Adam and Eve trigger the preliminary alert by eating the forbidden fruit from the tree of knowledge, God takes the ultimate measure against their further advance:

And the Lord God said, Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good
and evil: and now, lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever: Therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the garden of Eden, to till the ground from whence he was taken. So he drove out the man; and he placed at the east of the garden of Eden Cherubims, and a flaming sword which turned every way, to keep the way of the tree of life. (Gen. 3:22-24)

What is so special about the tree of life? The fascist life that God breathes into Adam’s nostrils is air of obedience that he should be innocently free of knowledge. Adam feels awfully guilty because he and Eve betray God’s trust, eat from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and start to feel ashamed of their nakedness after their eyes are opened. Nevertheless, if Adam and Eve find nakedness so inappropriately evil, how come God, who already knows good and evil, had no problem with that before? Thus, we can say that nakedness is never a problem. The true problem that gives God the headache is man’s curiosity, a gift from Life itself that will sooner or later lead man to the tree of life. To prevent Adam and Eve from possessing god-like immortality and wisdom, God lures curious humans to take another bait—the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Thereafter, humans, on the one hand, feel ashamed of their nakedness, and on the other, feel guilty of their betrayal to God. As a result of immoderate curiosity, their twofold sense of remorse reins their curiosity back, and takes without hesitation the secular fascist life (built-in moral knowledge like an internalized panopticon as their point of reference for every act).52

What is god-like wisdom anyway? It is advisable to say that God’s immortal wisdom is neither innocence (bare of knowledge) in the divine garden of Eden nor binary moral knowledge (good and evil) in the secular world, but the knowledge of the outside in our virtual dream. What matters is not whether Adam and Eve wear the apron of fig leaves, but

52 The divine fascist life is the air that God breathes into Adam’s nostrils (a living soul innocently free of knowledge).
whether knowledge, in Deleuze’s sense, is clothed or naked because the former runs by
clothed repetition (of difference) while the latter runs by bare repetition (of the same). As
Deleuze observes,

Repetition is never explained by the form of identity in the concept, nor by the
similar in representation. No doubt conceptual blockage gives rise to a bare
repetition that we can effectively represent as the repetition of the same. . . . It is
the excess in the Idea which explains the lack in the concept. Similarly, it is the
clothed, singular or extraordinary repetition, dependent upon the idea, which
explains that ordinary, bare repetition which is dependent upon the concept and
plays only the role of the outer garment. . . . What remains outside the concept
refers more profoundly to what is inside the Idea. (DR 220)

In other words, “a repetition superior to that subsumed within the blocked concept” (DR 220)
is the clothed repetition whose excess in the Idea breaks through the conceptual blockage; on
the other hand, bare repetition is the repetition of the same whose lack in the concept gives
rise to the conceptual blockage. In the same vein, we can say that the fruit of the naked
knowledge (bare repetition of the same) grows on the tree of knowledge whereas the fruit of
the clothed knowledge (clothied repetition of difference) grows on the tree of life. Thus, the
clothed knowledge is virtually the immortal god-like wisdom, and that is the reason why God
at last has the tree of life heavily guarded, but little does He know that the gift from Life itself
has already given man enough curiosity to grope for his own light of wisdom in the world.
Human curiosity has killed God and leaves his tree of life to no avail.

2.2. “I” as the Folding of the Outside

In this section, we are arguing that the “mutual grapping and capture” (F 68) of reality
of differentiation⁵³ and a virtual dream gives rise to Alice’s constant size alterations and clashes of different logics or orders of knowledge (ways of the visible and the articulable), which as a result makes her feel giddy about ever-shifting subjectivity. However, we need to define first the Stoic nature of reality and why dream is virtual before our further investigations of Alice’s subjectivation in the claws of the outside. We use reality of differentiation to mean that reality consists of both virtual/real and actual/real. But why is a dream virtual? We call a dream virtual because it is a nonexisting entity in reality. Hence, reality encompasses corporeal bodies that exist and incorporeal events (or effects) that subsist or inhere, and a dream as a nonexisting entity is not literally out of this world, but one of the virtual events in reality hovering over to look for its chance of actualization.

With God out of the picture, next we need to talk about how a self relates to the world. Life, what is it but a dream? However, let’s suppose that life is not a dream, and can be hypothetically divided into corporeal and incorporeal realms. In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze introduces us to the Stoic dualism:

First, there are bodies with their tensions, physical qualities, actions and passions, and the corresponding “states of affairs.” These states of affairs, actions and passions, are determined by the mixtures of bodies. . . . The only time of bodies and states of affairs is the present. For the living present is the temporal extension which accompanies the act, expresses and measures the action of the agent and the passion of the patient. . . . a cosmic present embraces the entire universe: only bodies exist in space, and only the present exists in time. . . .

Second, all bodies are causes in relation to each other, and causes for each other—but causes of what? They are causes of certain things of an entirely

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⁵³ The complex notion of differentiation is easily conceivable by it corresponding pair virtual and actual. According to Deleuze, “[w]e call the determination of the virtual content of an Idea differentiation; we call the actualization of that virtuality into species and distinguished parts differentiation” (*DR* 207).
different nature. These effects are not bodies, but, properly speaking, “incorporeal” entities. They are not physical qualities and properties, but . . . events. We can not say that they exist, but rather that they subsist or inhere . . . . They are not substantives or adjectives but verbs. They are neither agents nor patients, but results of actions and passions. They are impassive entities—impassive results. They are not living presents, but infinitives: the unlimited Aion, the becoming which divides itself infinitely in past and future and always eludes the present. (LS 4-5)

In their new dualism, the Stoics see the world as composed of corporeal bodies and incorporeal events. That is, reality simultaneously consists of the actual and the virtual. In the realm of corporeal existence, physical bodies act and are acted upon according to their respective tensions in the living present (in such a temporal extension bodies exist in Euclidean space, and the present exists in time of Chronos). In the realm of incorporeal inherence, however, events are impassive infinitives hovering over the surface like “a mist over the prairie” (LS 5) in the topological space and in time of Aion. Technically speaking, the former is the actual realm while the latter is the virtual realm. Since they are mutually exclusive realms, it is easy to get the wrong impression that the actual realm is the reality itself while the virtual realm is a dream that is literally out of this world. This impression proves untenable if we take the Stoic ontology into consideration. “For the Stoics . . . states of affairs . . . are contrasted with an extra-Being which constitutes the incorporeal as a nonexisting entity. The highest term . . . is not Being, but Something (aliquid), insofar as it subsumes being and non-being, existence and inherence” (LS 7). Viewed from this perspective, the new dualism of the Stoics has the primacy of Something (impassive extra-Being or non-Being/-Being) over Being. In this sense, we can say that the Stoics reverse Platonism twice in terms of reality: firstly, the virtual presides over the actual, and
secondly, *Something* is the highest term that subsumes both existing being and nonexisting (subsisting or inhering) non-being. In this understanding, we can say that reality consists of the virtual/real (difference) and the actual/real (identity), and the virtual is a higher term than the actual. In Platonic dualism, this mad, unlimited something used to be “pushed deeply into the depth of the body,” rumbling beneath a ground, whereas in Stoic dualism, it now “climbs to the surface of things and becomes impassive”; it turns out that “[t]he most concealed becomes the most manifest” (*LS* 7-8). That means Platonism would have it that identity holds sway over difference, and subjects the latter to the former by degree of similitude; on the contrary, the Stoics reverse Platonism by elevating difference over identity and cutting off the navel of resemblance.

Since most of our lives are stuck in Platonic ontology of identity, it is refreshing for Todd May to reassure us of the importance of Stoic ontology of difference: “All of these lives are actualizations of the virtual, creations of specific identities from swarms of difference” (169). The vertigo of Alice’s dreamy simulacra is “the secret of the eternal return . . . . or the power of affirming chaos” (*LS* 264). The identities in the world are “like the passers-by that might be nudged in a dance” (*B* 110) of the prebiotic soup of Alice’s dreams. “*Will you, won’t you, will you, won’t you, will you join the dance*” (*TLG* 184)? The next moment, it seems quite natural we are dancing in a ring (like Alice with Dum and Dee) where the virtual/real and the actual/real swirl so much that makes us float vertiginously in the air. Viewed from the Stoic perspective, simulacra manifest themselves as surface effects by hovering over the surface of the body.

In “The Actual and the Virtual” (Deleuze’s draft supplemented to *Dialogues II* co-authored by Claire Parnet and himself), Deleuze provides the dynamic interactions between the actual object and the virtual images with further elucidations. In such mutually inextricable dynamics going on around an actual particle cosmos,
Each actual surrounds itself with a cloud of virtual images. This cloud is composed of a series of more or less extensive coexisting circuits, along which the virtual images are distributed, and around which they run. These virtuals vary in kind as well as in their degree of proximity from the actual particles by which they are both emitted and absorbed. They are called virtual in so far as their emission and absorption, creation and destruction, occur in a period of time shorter than the shortest continuous period imaginable; it is this very brevity that keeps them subject to a principle of uncertainty or indetermination. The virtuals, encircling the actual, perpetually renew themselves by emitting yet others, with which they are in turn surrounded and which go on in turn to react upon the actual: “in the heart of the cloud of the virtual there is a virtual of a yet higher order . . . every virtual particle surrounds itself with a virtual cosmos and each in its turn does likewise indefinitely.” (D II 148)

In such a fashion, each actual object is surrounded by a cloud of self-generating virtual images, and in turn these virtuals react upon the actual object they encircle. The following diagram represents the reality we inhabit.

![Diagram of the actual and the virtual](image-url)
As far as the virtual or virtuality is concerned, Constantin Boundas derives from Deleuze’s ontology (whose origin is Stoic) a couple of facts that can help us recapitulate two major points about reality. First of all, he states that the real comprises both the virtual and the actual: “. . . the virtual and the actual are two mutually exclusive, yet jointly sufficient, characterizations of the real. The actual/real are states of affairs, bodies, bodily mixtures and individuals. The virtual/real are incorporeal events and singularities on a plane of consistency. . .” (296-97). Secondly, he argues that the power of becoming is not a linear process; instead, its reversible nature enables the processes of different/ciation to shuttle between the virtual and the actual.

One way of characterising becoming is with the following schema: virtual/real ↔ actual/real ↔ virtual/real. What such diagram points to is that becoming is not a linear process from one actual to another; rather it is the movement from an actualised state of affairs, through a dynamic field of virtual/real tendencies, to the actualisation of this field in a new state of affairs. This schema safeguards the reversible nature of virtual and actual relations. (297)

To sum up, the fact that “[i]t is by virtue of their mutual inextricability” (D II 149) that the reversible processes of different/ciation shuttle between a cloud of self-generating virtual images and an actual object they encircle defines the reality we inhabit. It is the “mutual grappling and capture” (F 68) of reality of different/ciation (the intimacy between inside and outside) that results in Alice’s constant size alterations and clashes of different logics or orders of knowledge (ways of the visible and the articulable), and makes Alice feel giddy when more folds double in her life.

Our basic hypothesis is that a dream is virtual in reality because it subsists and inheres over the surface of the world of identities like an event. On this account, we would like to
read Alice’s Wonderland and Looking-Glass dreams as two intrusive claws of the outside that
dive at any time to come upon her world of identities. Violent as it may seem, the claw of the
outside makes holes in Alice’s being in order to reach her fold of Being, and such a
post-human existence of superfold is particularly able to reveal itself when “[t]he forces
within man enter into a relation with forces from the outside...” (F 131). Thus, we rest upon
the assumption that the virtual dreams are the intrusive claws of outside (forces from the
outside) tearing off Alice’s “I” (forces within man) like the stormy sea waves constantly
breaking over the boat. Identity in Carroll’s two Alice books becomes the Leibnizian boat:
“Having established these things, I thought I was coming into port, but when I started to
meditate upon the union of the soul with the body, I was as it were thrown back onto the open
sea” (qtd. in N 102). Whenever the boat (thinks itself) is going to settle into its mooring, the
force of throwing back from the outside sends the boat back to ride the crest of the wildest
waves of the furious sea. It is enveloped by the line of the outside. As Deleuze observes:

This is a terrible line that shuffles all the diagrams, above the very raging storms.
It is like Melville’s line, whose two ends remain free, which envelops every boat
in its complex twists and turns, goes into horrible contortions when that moment
comes, and always runs the risk of sweeping someone away with it; or like
Michaux’s line “of a thousand aberrations” with its growing molecular speed,
which is the “whiplash of a furious charioteer.” But however terrible this line
may be, it is a line of life that can longer be gauged by relations between forces,
one that carries man beyond terror. For at the place of the fissure the line forms a
Law, the “centre of the cyclone, where one can live and in fact where Life exists
par excellence.” (F 122)

The contorted line of the outside twists and turns to envelop the boat so that “an inside space
[becomes] coextensive with the whole line of the outside. The most distant point becomes
interior, by being converted into the nearest: *life within the folds*” (*F* 123). By converting the most distant into the nearest, the boat becomes coextensive with the line of the outside and forms “this zone of subjectivation: the boat as interior of the exterior” (*F* 123). A relation is established between the inside and the outside like the Möbius strip connecting two realms: the actual/real and the virtual/real.

When Alice’s virtual dreams react upon her world of identities, Alice’s “I” begins to see stars in consequence of her constant size alterations and clashes of different logics or orders of knowledge (ways of the visible and the articulable). When asked “Who are you” by the Caterpillar, Alice shyly replies: “I—hardly know, Sir, just at present—at least I know who I was when I got up this morning, but I think I must have been changed several times since then. . . . being so many different sizes in a day is very confusing” (*AW* 35). In addition to her interminable size alterations, Alice also encounters confusing clashes of different logics or orders of knowledge in her adventures. The most quoted example of them all is when Alice is constantly confronted by the Red Queen with knowledge of her fast sort of country:

“I only wanted to see what the garden was like, your Majesty—“

“That’s right,” said the Queen, patting her on the head, which Alice didn’t like at all: “though, when you say ‘garden’—I’ve seen gardens, compared with which this would be a wilderness.

Alice didn’t dare to argue the point, but went on: “—and I thought I’d try and find my way to the top of that hill—“

“When you say ‘hill’,,” the Queen interrupted, “I could show you hills, in comparison with which you’d call that a valley.”

“No, I shouldn’t,” said Alice, surprised to contradicting her at last: “a hill can’t be a valley, you know. That would be nonsense—”
The Red Queen shook her head. “You may call it ‘nonsense’ if you like,” she said, “but I’ve heard nonsense, compared with which that would be as sensible as a dictionary!” (TLG 125)

In our reading, the fictional Alice is a girl who comes from reality with forces within her Man-form in Victorian historical formation. Out of curiosity (“passion of the outside”), she encounters in her “adventures” a number of bizarre happenings that do not make sense to her in virtue of her ways of the visible (a system of light) and the articulable (a system of language). Our hypothesis can be illustrated by Foucault’s diagram of the outside in Deleuze’s book on him. Before we advance any further textual analysis, it is necessary to sketch the vistas of Foucault’s diagram of the outside. This small but complete diagram illustrates the five major chapters in Deleuze’s *Foucault*: Ch 1. A New Archivist (*The Archaeology of Knowledge*), Ch 2. A New Cartographer (*Discipline and Punish*), Ch 3. Strata or Historical Formations: the Visible and the Articulable (*Knowledge*), Ch 4. Strategies or the Non-stratified: the Thought of the outside (*Power*), and Ch 5. Foldings, or the Inside of Thought (*Subjectivation*).

1. Line of the outside
2. Strategic zone
3. Strata
4. Fold (zone of subjectivation)

Fig. 2.3. Foucault’s diagram of the outside.
Its rich texture can be generally approached from three dimensions or ontologies: knowledge, power and self.

Knowledge-Being is determined by the two forms assumed at any moment by the visible and the articulable, and light and language in turn cannot be separated from “the unique and limited existence” which they have in a given stratum.

Power-Being is determined within relations between forces which are themselves based on particular features that vary according to each age. And the self, self-Being, is determined by the process of subjectivation: by the places crossed by the fold (the Greeks have nothing universal about them). (F 114)

Knowledge-Being is the strata; Power-Being is the strategic zone; and self-Being is the central chamber of fold (also the zone of subjectivation). As three agencies of topology, each Being is responsible for its own task: “The strata have the task of continually producing levels that force something new to be seen or said. But equally the relation to the outside [strategic zone] has the task of reassessing the forces established, while, last of all, the relation to oneself [fold] has the task of calling up and producing new modes of subjectivation” (F 120; emphasis mine). Thus, Foucault’s famous diagram of the outside can be generally grasped as the discussion of these three dimensions—with Ch 1 and Ch 3 discussing the zone of strata (knowledge), Ch 2 and Ch 4 discussing the strategic zone (power), and Ch 5 discussing the fold or zone of subjectivation and the line of the outside (self).

Knowledge-Being (Stratified Zone)

In the zone of strata, the archaeologist-archivist moves along a traversal or mobile diagonal line across each stratum or historical formation to read what could not be apprehended before, namely statements (F 22, 1). Such a diagonal movement not only
ignores “the vertical hierarchy of propositions and horizontal relationship between phrases” in linguistic construction, but also has the “discursive relations become associated with non-discursive milieu. . .” (F 1, 10). Two important facts can be further derived from the above argument: first of all, the anonymous multiplicity of statements precedes the axiomatic structure of vertical propositions and lateral phrases (F 12), and secondly, knowledge is composed of “two elements of stratification: the articulable and the visible, the discursive formations and the non-discursive formations, the forms of expression and the forms of content” (F 49), among which the discursive formation of statement has its primacy over the non-discursive formation of the visible which is historically irreducible (F 49). In this logic, each stratum or historical formulation takes shape only in the wake of the dual stratification of knowledge, not vice versa. As Deleuze argues, the double task of archaeology is to open up words and things: on the one hand, “extract from words and language the statements corresponding to each stratum and its thresholds,” and on the other, “extract from things and sight the visibilities and ‘self-evidences’ unique to each stratum” (F 53). Nevertheless, these two elements of stratified knowledge are only opened up within the available conditions. “[E]ach historical formation sees and reveals all it can within the conditions laid down for visibilities, just as it says all it can within the conditions relating to statements” (F 59).

Therefore, “if things close up again afterwards, visibilities become hazy or blurred to the point where ‘self-evident’ phenomena cannot be grasped by another age [in its discursive statements]” (F 57). Besides the fact that diachronically things in different ages do not have homogeneous visibilities, synchronically the articulable (the spontaneity of determining language) is not in conformity with the visible (the receptivity of the determinable light). Deleuze draws upon Magritte’s drawing of a pipe to indicate the impossibility of “common form” between these two elements, and illustrate the disjunctive separation between figure and text in terms of the pipe. “[F]rom the statement ‘this is a pipe’ to the point
where the statement becomes ‘this is not a pipe’ . . . ‘the drawing of the pipe and the text that
ought to name it cannot find a place to meet, either on the black canvas or above it.’ It is a
‘non-relation’ . . . ‘what we see never lies in what we say’, and vice versa” (F 62, 64).

Foucault, in his seminal article “The Thought of the Outside,” comes up with a simple
assertion “I lie, I speak” to “shake the foundations of Greek truth” on the one hand, and to put
“the whole of modern fiction to the test” (“Outside,” AME 147). As far as truth is concerned,
the language I speak finds no correspondence in the things I refer to; as a result, I speak to lie.

In another article “Life: Experience and Science,” Foucault exposes the ruse of “truth-telling”
as a lie or error: “for today’s scientific truth is itself only an episode of it—let us say, at most,
its temporary outcome. . . . current knowledge is but a moment, and there is no way . . . to
predict the future” (“Life,” AME 473). As to fiction, Foucault famously puts: “I have never
written anything but fictions . . .” (qtd. in F 120). To recapitulate, the disjunction between the
articulable and the visible explains the fictional nature of “true” knowledge as “that which is
capable of error” (“Life,” AME 476). Truth, in a Nietzschean sense, is but a momentary
outcome from a swarm of competing wills constantly struggling to overcome each other. As a
consequence, Foucault, as Deleuze observes, sees such a disjunction between the articulable
and the visible that defines “truth” in light of the thought of the outside as the mechanism of a
double rhythm: “the irrational break or the crack” and “a continual relinking” (F 65). Thus,
truth is the in-between terrain where the battle of two fighters takes place. Their “mutual
grappling and capture. . . . implies a distance across which the adversaries ‘exchange their
threats and words’, and . . . the place of confrontation implies a ‘non-place’ which bears
witness to the fact that the opponents do not belong to the same space or reply on the same
form” (F 68). There is always a disjunction that separates the auditory and visual archives.

*Power-Being (Strategic Zone)*
The strategic zone, however, is a continually evolving diagram or map on which the local and diffuse “microphysics of power” (*F* 25) is operational in a relation that indissolubly links two variables: “unformed and unorganized matter” and “unformalized, unfinalized functions” (*F* 34). At first glance, the pair of matter and functions here in the strategic zone look like the previous pair of the visible and the articulable in the zone of strata. Nevertheless, as Deleuze writes,

The *diagram* is no longer an auditory or visual archive but a map, a cartography that is coextensive with the whole social field. It is an abstract machine. It is defined by its formal functions and matter and in terms of form makes no distinction between content and expression, a discursive formation and a non-discursive formation. It is a machine that is almost blind and mute, even though it makes others see and speak. (*F* 34)

Simply put, we can see the strategic zone as an abstract machine while we can see the zone of strata as a concrete machine. “The concrete machines are two-form assemblages or mechanisms, whereas the abstract machine is the informal diagram” (*F* 39). What does this informal diagram look like anyway? From the archive of the articulable and the visible (knowledge) to the diagram of function and matter (power), a couple of facts must be contrasted point by point lest confusion arises.

To begin with, to answer the above question about this informal diagram, we must first look into Foucault’s definition of power. According to Deleuze, “Foucault’s definition seems a very simple one: power is a relation between forces, or rather every relation between forces is a ‘power-relation’” (*F* 70). Five major points can be summarized about Foucault’s definition of power. “In the first place we must understand that power is not a form . . . and that the power relation does not lie between two forms, as does knowledge. In the second place, force is never singular but essentially exists in relation with other forces, such that any
force is already a relation, that is to say power: force has no other object or subject than force” (F 70). In other words, what constitutes power is relations between unformed or informal forces while what constitutes knowledge is the relations between two forms. Also, the word “power” already implies a relation between forces that know nothing about subject or object. The remaining three of Foucault’s great theses on power are as follows: “power is not essentially repressive . . . it is practiced before it is possessed . . . it passes through the hands of the mastered no less than through the hands of the masters . . . ” (F 71). It is noticeable from these three statements that power, unlike knowledge that is possessed, is all about strategic exercise that is practiced between the mastered forces and the mastering forces. That is to say, “[a]n exercise of power shows up as an affect, since force defines itself by its very power to affect other forces [active affects] . . . and to be affected by other forces [reactive affects]. . . . The power to be affected is like a matter of force [unformed pure matter], and the power to affect is like a function of force [non-formalized pure functions]” (F 71-72). These five major points serve as illuminating footnotes to Foucault’s simple but concise definition of power: a relation between forces.

Secondly, to answer the above question about this informal diagram, we must know how Foucault’s power is different from knowledge from the following five arguments from Deleuze in his book on Foucault. In the first place, the difference between the audiovisual archive and the power diagram can be first illustrated by the following fact:

Knowledge concerns formed matters (substances) and formalized functions, divided up segment by segment according to the two great formal conditions of seeing and speaking, light and language: it is therefore stratified, archivized, and endowed with a relatively rigid segmentarity. Power, on the other hand, is diagrammatic: it mobilizes non-stratified matter and functions, and unfolds with a very flexible segmentarity. (F 73)
We can draw upon Deleuze’s argument that knowledge is contrasted with power in the fact that knowledge consists of a relatively rigid segmentarity of two formal and stratified archive of stable forms (discursive statements and non-discursive visibilities) in space of exteriority, whereas power is made up of a very flexible segmentarity of informal and non-stratified diagram of mobile, diffuse, and non-localizable forces (in their irreducible encounter between active affects that act upon others and reactive affects that are acted upon by others) in space of Outside.

In the second place, Deleuze contrasts receptivity of power’s ability to be affected with spontaneity of power’s ability to affect: “For the power relation has no form in itself, but establishes contact between unformed matter (receptivity) and unformalized functions (spontaneity). On the other hand, relations of knowledge, on each side, deal with formed substances and formalized functions by using the receptive kind of visible element, or the spontaneous kind of articulable element” (F 77). It is remarkable to notice from Deleuze’s words that what distinguishes the power relation from the relation of knowledge is whether it is an informal or a formal pair of spontaneous function and receptive matter. Nevertheless, we must realize that this pair works not only, as mentioned above, respectively within informal (power-relation) and formal (relation of knowledge) pairs, but also between the informal, non-stratified diagram of forces (power pole) and the formal archive (knowledge pole). To put it differently, on a larger scale, the power pole can be regarded as the spontaneous differential relation whose virtually unknown power virtualizes and differentiates particular features and distributes “individual points in a field of vectors”; contrariwise, the knowledge pole can be considered as the receptive “integral curve” which undergoes the effect of actualization or integration of particular features “in their neighborhood” to make them actually known in seeing and speaking (F 78).

In the third place, this mathematical understanding leads us to Deleuze’s observation of
Foucault’s primacy of power over knowledge.

In what sense is there primacy of power over knowledge, and of power-relations over relations of knowledge? The answer is that the latter would have nothing to integrate if there were no differential power relations. It is true that the former would fade and remain embryonic or virtual without the operations that integrate them; this is what leads to mutual presupposition. \((F\ 81-82)\)

If we see power as virtual and knowledge as actual, an irreducible encounter also certainly takes place between the power pole (differential relations) and the knowledge pole (integral relations), and a “non-place” also exists between these two poles. A mutual presupposition is irreducible because the formal categories of knowledge must pass through seeing and speaking in order to actualize the affective categories of power \((F\ 77)\). In terms of this account, we might have reservations about two impressions that it makes: first of all, the primacy of power over knowledge seems to imply the uni-directional becoming from the virtual to the actual; secondly, power is unquestionably virtual. Constantin Boundas, as argued earlier, has introduced us to the reversible nature of virtual and actual relations in Deleuze’s ontology schema of the power of becoming \((\text{virtual/real} \leftrightarrow \text{actual/real} \leftrightarrow \text{virtual/real})\), so it is easy for us to dispel the first wrong impression. For the second, Deleuze has been notoriously ambiguous about the “virtual” status of the power diagram and the space of the outside in his book on Foucault. For example, Deleuze writes, “relations between forces will remain transitive, unstable, faint, \textit{almost virtual}, at all events unknown, unless they are carried out by the formed or stratified relations which make up forms of knowledge . . .” \((F\ 74;\ \text{emphasis mine})\). This phrasing “almost virtual” apparently disqualifies power-relation for its purely virtual status. What’s more, Deleuze always gives us the impression that “forces [in power diagram] operate in a different space to that of forms, the space of the Outside. . .” \((F\ 87)\); consequently, we tend to see the power diagram as the
outside itself. Nevertheless, Deleuze again surprises us by saying that “diagram stems from the outside but the outside does not merge with any diagram, and continues instead to ‘draw’ new ones. In this way the outside is always an opening on to a future: nothing ends, since nothing has begun, but everything is transformed” (F 89). The only possible interpretation for this is that Deleuze’s “outside” covers not just the diagram (there is no denying that the forces of the outside enter into a power-relation in strategic zone; therefore, diagram is certainly part of the outside), but also the great unknown topological space beyond the line of the outside. Despite his ambiguity about the diagram and the outside (and their partial overlapping), Deleuze seems to build up his argument finally to the higher primacy of the outside over the diagram after the primacy of power over knowledge. This gives us a visual impression that a virtual stream flows down from the outside, to the diagram (power), and finally to the archive (knowledge) in Deleuze’s book on Foucault. From the above argument, we have come to realize that power qua purely virtual power needs a second thought.

In the fourth place, Deleuze argues: “If power is not simply violence, this is not only because it passes in itself through [affective] categories that express the relation between two forces . . . but also because, in relation to knowledge, it produces truth, in so far as it makes us see and speak. It produces truth as a problem” (F 83). Here, the violence inflicted upon thought is no ordinary violence because it is caused by the intrusive claws of the outside. “Thinking [not the innate exercise of a faculty] does not depend on a beautiful interiority that would reunite the visible and the articulable elements, but is carried under the intrusion of an outside that eats into the interval and forces or dismembers the internal” (F 87). In such a fashion, the intrusive claws of the outside tear off the eternal face of knowledge to make it problematic.

In the fifth and last place, Deleuze writes:

If the variable combinations of the two forms, the visible and the articulable,
constitute strata or historical formations, the microphysics of power, on the contrary, exposes the relations between forces in an informal and non-stratified element. In this way the supersensitive diagram does not merge with the audiovisual archive: it is like the a priori element presupposed by the historical formation. However, there is nothing lying beneath, above, or even outside the strata. The relations between forces, which are mobile, faint and diffuse, do not lie outside strata but form the outside of strata. (F 84)

It is interesting to notice that before Deleuze’s proclamation “the outside does not merge with any diagram” (F 89), he declares that “the supersensitive diagram does not merge with the audiovisual archive” (F 84). Despite Deleuze’s no-merger announcement, there is still a mutual presupposition between outside and diagram, or diagram and archive. The case in point here suggests that a priori element (diagram) precedes any historical formation (archive), and the former envelopes the latter exactly as its outside. More comparative details between knowledge and power are given in the following table.

Table 2.2
Comparison between Knowledge and Power

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<tr>
<th>Archaeology of Knowledge</th>
<th>Discipline and Punish</th>
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<td>relations of knowledge between forms</td>
<td>power-relations between forces</td>
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<td>study of stratified relations of knowledge</td>
<td>study of strategic power relations</td>
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<td>concrete machine</td>
<td>abstract machine</td>
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<td>techniques of knowledge for possession (audiovisual archive)</td>
<td>strategies of power for exercise (supersensitive diagram)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stratified historical formation/history of forms</td>
<td>a priori element/mutant emergence of forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stable archived states (stratified)</td>
<td>unstable diagrammatic states (non-stratified)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[known] global, stable and centralized relations between forms (Knowledge)</td>
<td>[unknown] local, unstable and diffuse relations between forces (Power)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge passes through <em>forms</em></td>
<td>Power passes through particular <em>points</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>composed forms</td>
<td>composing forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>actual knowledge (integral relations): actualization/integration of particular features</td>
<td>(almost) virtual power (differential relations): virtualization/differentiation of particular features</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the form of the integral curves in their neighborhood</td>
<td>the existence and distribution of individual points in a field of vectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>knowledge as regulation</td>
<td>power as exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euclidean space</td>
<td>Topological space (a place of mutation, evolution; ‘a non-place’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>formal and stratified archive of forms (2 forms of exteriority)</td>
<td>informal and non-stratified diagram of forces (a space of the Outside)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>visibilities (non-discursive multiplicity)</td>
<td>statements/readabilities (discursive multiplicity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(non-discursive multiplicity)</td>
<td>multiplicity of relations between forces/diffusion (The 3rd multiplicity that breaks open the dualism of statements and visibilities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>formed matters (substances)</td>
<td>formalized functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(receptive kind of visible element)</td>
<td>unformed pure matter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(spontaneous kind of articulable element)</td>
<td>non-formalized pure functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seeing/light</td>
<td>speaking/language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>description-scene (contours and colors)</td>
<td>statement-curve (phrases and propositions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the visible element</td>
<td>the articulable element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the visible element</td>
<td>a matter of force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rigid segmentarity, stratifications</td>
<td>flexible segmentarity, strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>formal categories of knowledge</td>
<td>affective categories of power</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
made by power to see and speak | neither sees (blind) nor speaks (mute)
---|---
everything (interior: a beginning and an end; an origin and a destination) | the other thing
strata or historical formations | microphysics of power (enveloping the strata)

**Self-Being (Zone of Subjectivation)**

After our long critical discussion of knowledge in the zone of strata and power in the strategic zone, we have laid a good foundation for understanding Foucault’s diagram of the outside. On such a basis, we are going to embark on our textual analysis through the critical reading of “self” in the zone of subjectivation. Alice’s knowledge of her “self” in Wonderland or Looking-Glass Land is constantly challenged, and two major exciting but meanwhile anxious sources for her sense of giddiness are her size alterations and clashes of different logics or orders of knowledge in her adventures. Usually critics think it is Alice who falls asleep in her dreams, starts her adventures, and wakes up again back to the reality. Nevertheless, using our particle model of virtual images encircling the actual and Foucault’s diagram of the outside, we are reading Wonderland and Looking-Glass stories as two virtual dreams encircle Alice’s actual world of identities and come to react upon it to open up her statements and visibilities of knowledge-being in her world of identities that stabilize her formal categories of knowledge. Therefore, what constitutes Alice’s subjectivity are first of all her pre-pubescent height (the “self-evident” visibility) and secondly her lessons (the statement), both of which irreducibly encounter the virtual images in her dreams. Nevertheless, we need to figure out what roles the informal and non-stratified diagram of forces and the claws of the outside play in virtual dreams. We would say that in Alice’s Wonderland and Looking-Glass dreams, her subjectivity encounters the informal and non-stratified diagram of forces, of which her constant size alterations (unformed pure
matter), and underground and lateral “a-logics” (non-formalized pure functions) make holes in Alice’s subjectivity in reality, opening up things and words without these two forms ever coinciding. But the real role of the claws of the outside is that they constantly fold in to create a coextensive inside in the central chamber of her “self,” and help resist the impasse of the “death” of Alice’s life. The strong clashes between her actual Knowledge-Being and (almost) virtual Power-Being give her sense of giddiness and bestow upon her life an ethical subject: that is, a Self-Being of fold in a process of ever-new modes of subjectivation. Each folding-in means first a clash between Alice’s actual Knowledge-Being and (almost) virtual Power-Being, whose mutual grappling then contributes to a momentary solution for the problematic truth of Alice’s subject. Another lottery-drawing will soon come when the forces of man in Alice’s subjectivity enter into a new relation with other composing forces from the outside. As Deleuze notes, “man is a face drawn in the sand between two tides. . .” (F 89). Thus, we can argue that Alice’s face from her world of identities is washed away by the “ebb and flow” of altering size and deviating logic in her virtual dreams. Interestingly, Alice’s pre-pubescent height in reality becomes a standard for measuring any deviations from it, but those continual size alterations after Alice ingests food and drinks turn back against this “standard” measurement to un-standardize it. By the same token, what Alice sees (visions) and hears (auditions) in reality become a yardstick to measure “out-of-the-way” things in her fantastic adventures in her dreams, but those virtual images turn back against Alice’s world of identities that is bent on controlling her curious dreams.

On the basis of such hypothesis, we will begin our discussion on Alice’s constant size alterations and confusing clashes between different logics or orders of knowledge by looking into Carroll’s fantastic visual device: asterisks. We are under the impression that whenever Alice shuts up or opens out like a telescope, Carroll uses “asterisks” to emphasize her sense of giddiness in Wonderland. As Donald Gray notes, these asterisks are used to “emphasize the
abrupt changes characteristic of the strangely ordered experience of Wonderland” (11). In *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland*, size alterations (sometimes proportional while at other times partial) begin to take place usually after Alice ingests food or drinks. For example, the first block of asterisks appears after Alice finishes the “Drink Me” bottle. She shuts up like a telescope and shrinks to “only ten inches high”: “the right size for going through the little door into that lovely garden” (*AW* 11). However, without the golden key from the now pretty high table, she cannot possibly unlock the door. The second block of asterisks appears when Alice finishes the “Eat Me” cake. She opens out like the largest telescope and grows to “nine feet high” (*AW* 14). This time, Alice is tall enough to reach for the little golden key on the table, but too tall for the now too small door that leads to the garden. It is in this sense that Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle is the most telling when Alice’s height is perfect for the door but without the key, or Alice has the key to the door but without the right size. The third block of asterisks shows up after Alice breaks off a bit of both sides of a round mushroom, and nibbles a little of the right-hand bit and swallows a morsel of the left-hand bit to try out the effect it will have (*AW* 41-42). As a matter of fact, Alice’s size alterations take place on more than these three occasions with blocks of asterisks in Wonderland. In Looking-Glass Land, probably because of no obvious abrupt changes in size, there are fewer changes in Alice’s size and all happen without asterisks: Alice as a God like invisible player of chess (in relation to small chess pieces in her hands), Alice as a Pawn on the chessboard (in comparison with whom the Red Queen is half a head taller), and Alice waking up to her reality (the Red Queen is shaken to a doll-sized RQ and finally to Black Kitten).

Table 2.3

Change of Alice’s Size

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Reason for size alteration</th>
<th>Magic solution</th>
<th>Alice’s height</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ch. 1: Down the Rabbit Hole</td>
<td>a little door of the little passage (15&quot; high)</td>
<td>“DRINK ME” bottle ↓</td>
<td>10” high (p.11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>little golden key on the three-legged table</td>
<td>“EAT ME” cake ↑</td>
<td>9’ high (p.14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. 2: The Pool of Tears</td>
<td>unconsciously fanning herself</td>
<td>White Rabbit’s fan ↓</td>
<td>almost drowned in a pool 4’ deep (shrinking rapidly below 2’ high) (p.17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. 4: The Rabbit Sends in a Little Bill</td>
<td>“tired of being such a tiny little thing!”</td>
<td>little bottle without label ↑</td>
<td>growing so large that she presses her head against the ceiling (p.28)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>make her smaller to get through the door</td>
<td>pebbles turned into little cakes ↓</td>
<td>3” high (p.32; 41)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. 5: Advice from a Caterpillar</td>
<td>Duchess’s house (4’ high)</td>
<td>mushroom: right-hand bit ↓ left-hand bit ↑ right-hand bit ↓</td>
<td>chin pressed closely against her foot (p.42) → an immense length of neck above a sea of green leaves (p.42) → 9” high (p.44)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td>Change</td>
<td>Alice’s status</td>
<td>Other Characters’ height</td>
<td>Relative relation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. 1: Looking-Glass House</td>
<td>Alice as an invisible player of chess</td>
<td>Red/White Kings &amp; Queens as small chess pieces (p.113)</td>
<td>Player vs. chess pieces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. 2: The Garden of Live Flowers</td>
<td>Alice into the garden (chessboard)</td>
<td>Red Queen has grown half a head taller than Alice (p.123)</td>
<td>Alice becomes one of the chess pieces (White Queen’s pawn)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. 9: Queen Alice</td>
<td>“The Eighth Square at last!”, Alice becomes a queen</td>
<td>“Red Queen . . . had suddenly dwindled down to the size of a little doll” (p.204)</td>
<td>Alice vs. doll-sized RQ (RQ→Black Kitten)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nevertheless, asterisks are used by Carroll in *Through the Looking-Glass* in a way other than the indication of abrupt bodily changes in Alice’s first dream. According to Martin Gardner in his *Annotated Alice*, “[t]he six little brooks are the six horizontal lines separating Alice from the eighth square on which she is to be queened. Each time she crosses a line, the
crossing is marked in the text by three rows of dots” (169). Hence, each brook is a “horizontal line” that consists of three rows of dots. Gardner’s “dots” are actually “asterisks” in three rows—an identical visual device already used in Carroll’s first Alice book, but meant

*         *        *        *        *
*         *        *        *        *
*         *        *        *        *

Fig. 2.4. Carroll’s asterisks.

for a different use here. Hence each set of three rows of asterisks appears where Alice as a Pawn (replacing White Queen’s imperial daughter Lily, who is too young to play) crosses one of the six little brooks. The Red Queen briefs Alice about what to expect on a Pawn’s way to queening:

. . . A pawn goes two squares in its first move, you know. So you’ll go very quickly through the Third Square—by railway, I should think—and you’ll find yourself in the Fourth Square in no time. Well, that square belongs to Tweedledum and Tweedledee—and the Fifth is mostly water—the Sixth belongs to Humpty Dumpty. . . .

. . . the Seventh Square is all forest—however, one of the Knights will show you the way—and in the Eighth Square we shall be Queens together, and it’s all feasting and fun! (TLG 128)

In contrast with her wandering in Wonderland, Alice’s advances in her second dream must be made in accordance with the rules of the game of chess. There seems to be a deterministic power behind all the pieces on the grand chessboard—a divine power hovering over and watching. If asterisks in Wonderland appear right after Alice’s abrupt bodily changes to visualize her sense of giddiness, why do the asterisks in Looking-Glass Land appear after
Alice jumps over one of the six brooks if there is nothing giddy about the act? It illustrates the fact that throughout Alice’s moves over the chessboard, there are not any size alterations at all; instead, the block of asterisks appearing right after Alice crosses each of the six little brooks on her way to queening symbolizes her gradual growth to be a queen.

The clash of opposite logics, especially the actual and virtual ones, can be illustrated by quite a few examples of nonsensical remarks in two Alice stories. For example, in Chapter Two “The Pool of Tears” of Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, when Alice grows so large a size as nine feet high, she wants to send Christmas presents to “Right Foot, Esq.” to have her own feet walk the way she wants them to go (AW 13-4). To this odd thought, she says: “Oh dear, what nonsense I’m talking!” (AW 14). Then, in Chapter Three “A Caucus-Race and a Long Tale,” Alice is denounced by the Mouse as being absent-minded, but the truth is that she mishears the Mouse’s “tale” and “not” as their homonyms “tail” and “knot” (AW 24-6). Visually, the longer the tail is, the thinner it grows. Semantically, the longer the tale goes, the wider the difference between the Mouse’s “long and sad tale” series and Alice’s “long and sad tail” series diverts. Being offended, the Mouse walks away and says, “You insult me by talking such nonsense!” (AW 26). Especially, the tale along the bending tail is of predatory nature: the mouse in tale is condemned to death because Fury has nothing to do this morning (AW 25). The Fury here is a foreshadowing of the hot-tempered Queen of Hearts in the Chapter Eight “The Queen’s Croquet-Ground.” The royal procession stops when the Queen spots Alice and asks the Knave, “Who is this?” (AW 63). The Knave of Hearts bows and smiles without giving his answer. The impatient Queen now turns her head to address Alice directly, who politely gives her name but thinks to herself, “Why, they’re only a pack of cards, after all. I needn’t be afraid of them!” (AW 63). When the Queen asks Alice about the three gardeners lying on their faces, Alice flippantly replies, “How should I

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know? . . . It’s no business of mine,” to which the furious Queen shouts “Off with her head!” (AW 64). To contradict her, Alice shouts in a loud and decided way, “Nonsense!” (AW 64). In Chapter Ten “The Lobster-Quadrille,” Alice is ordered by the Gryphon to recite Isaac Watts’s “The Sluggard,” but since her head is so full of the Lobster-Quadrille, the poem she repeats turns out to be very queer, to which the Mock Turtle says, “Well, I never heard it before . . . but it sounds uncommon nonsense” (AW 83). In Chapter Eleven “Who Stole the Tarts?” the growing Alice squeezes the Dormouse so out of his breath that the Dormouse says “You’ve no right to grow here,” to which Alice boldly refutes “Don’t talk nonsense . . . you know you’re growing too” (AW 88). However, the Dormouse sulkily replies, “Yes, but I grow at a reasonable pace . . . not in that ridiculous fashion” (AW 88-9). Although Alice’s bold contradiction against the Red Queen—as mentioned earlier in Chapter Eight—is pardoned for the sake of her young age, their confrontation is even worse later in Chapter Twelfth “Alice’s Evidence” when the Queen insists on “Sentence first—verdict afterwards,” to which Alice reprimands sternly “Stuff and nonsense! . . . The idea of having the sentence first!” (AW 97).

Then in Chapter Two “The Garden of Live Flowers” of Carroll’s *Through the Looking-Glass*, when the Rose advises Alice to “walk the other way” to meet the Red Queen, “[t]his sounded nonsense to Alice” (TLG 123). After Alice’s walking towards the Red Queen proves to be unsuccessful attempts, she tries out the plan of “walking in the opposite direction” and soon finds the Red Queen and the hill near in sight (TLG 124). Later in the same chapter, when Alice’s “garden” is refuted and corrected by the Red Queen as “wilderness” for the first time, Alice dares not to argue the point, but when her “hill” again is contradicted and replaced with “valley,” she instantly declares it to be nonsense. The Red Queen rebukes: “You many call it ‘nonsense’ if you like . . . but I’ve heard nonsense, compared with which that would be as sensible as a dictionary” (TLG 125). In Chapter Four “Tweedledum and Tweedledee,” Dum and Dee tell Alice that she is “only a sort of thing” in the snoring Red King’s dream, and
when he wakes up, Alice would “go out—bang!—just like a candle!” (TLG 145). Even though Alice thinks to herself that “I know they’re talking nonsense,” she can’t help suppressing the noisy Dum and Dee by saying “Hush! You’ll be waking him, I’m afraid, if you make so much noise” (TLG 145). In Chapter Seven “The Lion and the Unicorn,” Alice finds cutting up the cake is the most provoking thing to do because when she has “cut several slices already . . . they always join on again” (TLG 177). Although his remark “sounded nonsense,” the obedient Alice finds the Unicorn’s advice—“[h]and it round first, and cut it afterwards”—useful in managing Looking-Glass cakes (TLG 177). In Chapter Nine “Queen Alice,” Alice is asked a Subtraction sum question to test her qualification of being a new Queen in this nonsense world: “Take a bone from a dog: what remains?” (TLG 194). Instead of Alice’s “nothing would remain,” the Red Queen gives the answer “the dog’s temper would remain” because the Red Queen’s “logic” is that if the dog loses its temper and goes away, then the dog and its temper “might do different ways,” to which Alice thinks to herself “[w]hat dreadful nonsense we are talking!” (TLG 194).

Table 2.4
Clash of Different Logics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Clash of different logics</th>
<th>Actual logic</th>
<th>Virtual logic</th>
<th>Cause of offense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ch. 2 “The Pool of Tears”</td>
<td>Sending a Christmas gift to one’s right foot</td>
<td>Head has power over feet (regular body size)</td>
<td>Feet might revolt against head (abnormal body size)</td>
<td>Growing body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. 3 “A Caucus-Race and a Long Tale”</td>
<td>Mouse’s “long and sad tale” vs. Alice’s “long and sad tail”; Mouse’s “I had not!” vs. Alice’s “A knot!”</td>
<td>Mouse’s “tale” and “not”</td>
<td>Alice’s misheard “tail” and “knot”</td>
<td>Homonyms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. 8 “The</td>
<td>The furious Queen</td>
<td>Alice’s “no”</td>
<td>Queen’s “Off”</td>
<td>Power</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Queen’s Croquet-Ground.” shouts “Off with her head” business of *mine* with her head!” relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ch. 10 “The Lobster-Quadrille”</th>
<th>Alice’s queer recitation of Issac Watts’s “The Stuggard” Original poem Nonsense poem Queer recitation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ch. 11 “Who Stole the Tarts?”</td>
<td>Alice’s body growing not at a reasonable pace, but in a ridiculous fashion Dormouse—normal growing Alice—abnormal growing Growing body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. 12 “Alice’s Evidence”</td>
<td>Queen’s “Sentence first—verdict afterwards” Verdict→Sentence Sentence→Verdict Illogic (procedural)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Clash of different logics</th>
<th>Actual logic</th>
<th>Virtual logic</th>
<th>Cause of offense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ch. 2 “The Garden of Live Flowers”</td>
<td>The Rose’s “walk the other way” to meet the Red Queen</td>
<td>Walk forwards</td>
<td>Walk backwards</td>
<td>Illogic (going backwards)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alice’s “garden” = Queen’s “wilderness”; Alice’s “hill” = Queen’s “valley”</td>
<td>Alice’s garden, hill</td>
<td>Red Queen’s wilderness, valley</td>
<td>Illogic (one’s nonsense is another’s sense)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. 4 “Tweedledum and Tweedledee”</td>
<td>If the snoring Red King wakes up, the “unreal” Alice will vanish into thin air.</td>
<td>Alice: Red King in Alice’s dream</td>
<td>Dum and Dee: Alice in Red King’s dream</td>
<td>Existence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. 7 “The Lion and the Unicorn”</td>
<td>The Unicorn’s “Hand it round first, and cut it afterwards” to manage the Looking-glass cake</td>
<td>Regular cake: cut→hand around</td>
<td>Looking-glass cake: hand around→cut</td>
<td>Illogic (procedural)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. 9 “Queen Alice”</td>
<td>RQ’s Subtraction sum question: “Take a bone from a dog: what remains?”; RQ’s answer: “its temper would remain.”</td>
<td>Math problem</td>
<td>Linguistic puzzle</td>
<td>Illogic (mathematical →linguistic)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Through the Looking-Glass**

In our reading, Alice’s constant size alterations and her atonal alogics are the intrusive
snatching claws of the outside that resist death of her life and an impasse of her thoughts. Our earlier argument has indicated that it is Alice’s curiosity that leads her out of the bare repetition of conceptual blockage despite of the fact that she is meanwhile enamored of “the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us” (Foucault, “Preface” xiii). In addition to the great limit of death itself awaiting all of us for our last breath, Death thus has two multiple meanings for life: metabolic death and death in an impasse. In his discussion of Foucault’s “Life: Experience and Science,” Giorgio Agamben points out in his Potentialities “a curious inversion of what had been Foucault’s earlier understanding of the idea of life”:

It is as if Foucault, who, with The Birth of the Clinic, had begun under the inspiration of Xavier Bichat’s new vitalism and definition of life as “the set of functions that resist death,” ended by considering life instead as the proper domain of error. “At the limit,” Foucault writes, “life . . . is what is capable of error. . . . With man, life reaches a living being who is never altogether in his place, a living being who is fated ‘to err’ and ‘to be mistaken.’” (220)

In terms of this displacement, Agamben appeals to Deleuze’s opinion that Foucault’s crisis after the first volume of The History of Sexuality emerges not only because of his “disappointment or pessimism” (about the prison reform), but also because of his “new experience that necessitates a general reformulation of the relations between truth and the subject . . .” (221). It is Agamben’s observation that a linear epistemological movement has moved from Foucault’s first two axes, knowledge and power, and “opens onto entirely unexplored terrain. . . . which coincides with the field of biopolitics. . . .” (221). Nevertheless, he never clearly points out what this unexplored terrain is. Similarly, Deleuze introduces us to Foucault’s first two dimensions, knowledge and power, without specifying what the ensuing new dimension is: “How can we name this new dimension, this relation to oneself that is...
neither knowledge nor power” (F 106)? It is desirable for us to figure out Agamben’s third axis (an entirely unexplored terrain) and Deleuze’s third dimension (something about the relation to oneself). Nevertheless, one must not confuse “it” with biopolitics or bio-power because either of them is related to the modern disciplinary model that controls and administers life of populations. According to Deleuze, “[w]hen power becomes bio-power resistance becomes the power of life. . .” (F 92; emphasis mine). And the resisting power of life can be understood from two levels. On a large scale, “when power . . . takes life as its aim or object, then resistance to power already puts itself on the side of life, and turns life against power: ‘life as a political object was in a sense taken at face value and turned back against the system that was bent on controlling it’” (F 92). On a small scale, “it is in man himself that we must liberate life, since man himself is a form of imprisonment for man. Life becomes resistance to power when power takes life as its object” (F 92). To recapitulate, it is power of life (instead of biopolitics or bio-power) that resists our death in an impasse. It is Bichat’s life as “the set of functions that resist death” that constitutes Foucault’s early concept of life. Nevertheless, Bichat’s concept of death ambiguously leads to another implication. In Deleuze’s words, “Bichat broke with the classical conception of death, as a decisive moment or indivisible event . . . in two ways, simultaneously presenting death as being coextensive with life and as something made up of a multiplicity of partial and particular deaths” (F 95). Bichat’s concept of multiple death is apparently at odds with “the set of functions that resist death” because the former is metabolic death while the latter is death in an impasse. Judged from his new concept of death, it might be appropriate for us to reconsider that Agamben’s alleged “curious inversion” is not so curious at all because Bichat’s both concepts of death (death in an impasse or metabolic death) correspond to Foucault’s early and late concepts of life: life as “the set of functions that resist death” and “Life is essentially errancy.” Both are not contrasted with each other, but in a sense synergize to initiate “a general reformulation of
the relations between truth and the subject” (Agamben 221). As far as Bichat’s multiple death is concerned, it is nothing like the classical conception of death because “a decisive moment or indivisible event” is an integral power that culminates all your deaths in that one moment while Bichat’s multiple death is infinitely divisible in a differential relation. Henceforth, Bichat’s concept of life is also his concept of death in two senses. As Deleuze suggests, classical conception of death “transforms life into destiny” (F 95), and that is why Bichat defines his life as a set of functions that resist the deadening destiny of biopolitics or bio-power that puts our life as its object in an impasse. Accordingly, Bichat’s “death becomes multiplied and differentiated in order to bestow on life the particular features,\(^{55}\) and consequently the truths, which life believes arise from resisting death” (F 95; emphasis added). Bichat’s concept of life, in another aspect, needs to differentiate the classical conception of death, making the final moment indecisive and the event infinitely divisible.

To get free of oneself from an impasse, one needs multiple or partial deaths as the power of resistance. As Deleuze notes, “Foucault finds himself in an impasse . . . because he found the impasse to be where power itself places us, in both our lives and our thoughts, as we run up against it in our smallest truths. This could be resolved only if the outside were caught up in a movement that would snatch it away from the void and pull it back from death” (F 96). Our smallest truths are no other than our multiple or partial deaths that characterize our life as “that which is capable of error” (“Life,” AME 476). Therefore, Alice’s subjectivity should not prevail over her process of ever new modes of subjectivation. After all, subject as a novel Greek invention is only “a derivative or the product of a ‘subjectivation’” (F 101). Among the four folds of Greek subjectivation of body, power, knowledge, and outside, it is “the fold of the outside itself, the ultimate fold . . . that constitutes what Blanchot

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\(^{55}\) Deleuze’s particular features are of virtual aspect, and thus different from the common forms that coordinate statements and visibilities, words and things, or language and light. “This is not a pipe” in this sense is the most telling embodiment of such particular features.
called an ‘interiority of expectation’” (F 104). The inside is the folding of the outside. Its passionate curiosity about the outside rekindles the fire from the wilderness, and burns down the stifling central chamber for another rebirth. In this sense, we can say that Alice’s relation to herself is the post-human existence of superfold because her curiosity displayed in her virtual dreams expects the encounter with the intrusive claws of the outside that “snatch [the impasse] from the void and pull it back from death” (F 96). In conclusion, Alice’s curiosity makes her relation to herself an ethical subject: that is, a process of ever-new modes of subjectivation that exists to be worthy of what happens to them, and expects encounters with the outside.
Chapter Three

A Memory That Haunts: Time and Space in Alice’s Dreams

Lastly, she pictured to herself how this same little sister of hers would, in the after-time, be herself a grown woman; and how she would keep, through all her riper years, the simple and loving heart of her childhood; and how she would gather about her other little children, and make their eyes bright and eager with many a strange tale, perhaps even with the dream of Wonderland of long ago; and how she would feel with all their simple sorrows, and find a pleasure in all her simple joys, remembering her own child-life, and the happy summer days. (AW 99)

“That’s the effect of living backwards,” the Queen said kindly: “it always makes one a little giddy at first—”

“Living backwards!” Alice repeated in great astonishment. “I never heard of such a thing!”

“—but there’s one great advantage in it, that one’s memory works both ways.”

“I’m sure mine only works one way,” Alice remarked. “I ca’n’t remember things before they happen.”

“It’s a poor sort of memory that only works backwards,” the Queen remarked. (TLG 150)

Memory in Carroll’s two Alices is easily conceived as a means for recalling the nostalgic past because the serene opening and final scenes, along with prefatory and closing poems, help solidify this impression. Traditionally, Carroll critics divide the narrative structure of two Alices into frames and adventures. Framing sections include the poems and scenes that begin and end two Alices while adventures are Alice’s dream journeys through Wonderland and Looking-Glass countries in between. However, such a division leads to two

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56 See Appendix A for prefatory poems in Wonderland and Looking-Glass. Wonderland does not end with a closing poem, whereas Looking-Glass ends with an acrostic. For this terminal acrostic that ends Looking-Glass, please see Appendix B.
problems: first of all, the framing sections befuddle readers by mixing Alice Liddell in the prefatory and closing poems with the fictional Alice in the serene opening and final scenes. Its sequela is significant because amateur readers have little awareness of which Alice the narrator is referring to, whereas professional critics tend to highlight Carroll’s nostalgic memory throughout two *Alices*, and as a result quite a few critics approach these two texts through psychobiographical lenses. Secondly, the framing sections take advantage of being our first and last impressions of two *Alice* stories so that the curious adventures in between are easily idealized as the fictional Alice’s wonderful dreams. We simply forget that the dreams are actually nightmarish.

Table 3.1
Comparison between Two Kinds of Narrative Structure Division

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional Division</th>
<th>New Division</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>framing section</td>
<td>adventure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(poems + scenes)</td>
<td>framing section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alice Liddell</td>
<td>Alice Liddell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fictional Alice</td>
<td>fictional Alice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem:</th>
<th>Carroll’s nostalgic memory of Alice Liddell</th>
<th>fictional Alice’s memory problem:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Amateur readers confuse Alice Liddell with fictional Alice.</td>
<td>fictional Alice’s poor sort of memory (that works backwards) of the town surveyor sent by State Apparatus</td>
<td>?!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Professional critics see the haunting memory as Carroll’s nostalgic memory.</td>
<td>fictional Alice’s absolute memory (that works both ways) of the war machine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As far as memory is concerned, we would like to propose a new division: Carroll’s nostalgic memory on the side of prefatory and closing poems, and the fictional Alice’s memory on the side of opening and closing scenes and her curious dream journeys. That is, the fictional Alice’s memory problem should be distinguished from Carroll’s nostalgic memory of Alice Liddell. Nevertheless, this new division runs the risk of giving us the impression that two Alice stories are ahistorical; that is, Alice Liddell is historical while the fictional Alice is ahistorical. As a matter of fact, Carroll’s most favorite child-friend Alice Liddell was a middle-class girl in Victorian England, and his fictional Alice, either in her waking life or dream adventures, is a character who also comes from a bourgeois family in the same period of time. With the new division in mind, we must be reminded that the following argument puts the historical background of Victorian England solely to the fictional Alice’s waking life and dream adventures. In this logic, we will talk about how the centralized power of the steam-engine which compresses time and space in Victorian Age constitutes the fictional Alice’s idea of a single and objective sense of time and space, and how she surveys the space and measures the time in her dreams with waking life’s imperial yardstick like a town surveyor sent by the State Apparatus.

Railroad, as the most significant new technology in the nineteenth century Victorian England, has radicalized the basic perceptions of human existence, and caused an irresistible global sense of giddiness. However, such modern vertigo is still caused by diverse human perceptions of linear time and three-dimensional space no matter how the speed can radicalize our perceptions of them. Therefore, we can argue that a relative sense of giddiness happens to those who still adhere to linear time and three-dimensional space, and it is of little avail to liberate the fictional Alice’s “poor sort of memory that only works backwards” (TLG 150). In the two Alices, Carroll also has many allusions to trains.57 But how can trains

57 In Wonderland, for example, when Alice falls into the sea (which is actually her own pool of tears), she
achieve an absolute sense of giddiness if their compression of time and space is still based on linear time and three-dimensional space? From his use of train imagery in two *Alices*, Carroll sneaks the familiar motif of trains in Victorian England into his mythical lands. The train, symbolizing the fictional Alice’s idea of a single and objective sense of time and space, is turned topsy-turvy in a different space-time where Alice’s railway station cannot give her sense of direction since the salt-water up to her chin is not the sea she thinks but her own pool of tears; the train appears from nowhere, and rapidly carries Alice from the second square through the forest to the fourth square, and then vanishes into thin air; the Red King’s snoring, as loud as the puffing of a steam-engine, suggests a terrifying possibility that she might be simply a figment in the Red King’s dream; and the White Queen’s screams, which sound like the whistle of a steam-engine, imply a principle of inversion that screaming precedes pricking. The familiar-yet-strange effect is Carroll’s unique literary device. As Carroll’s fellow Oxford don T. B. Strong observes, “Mr. Dodgson has shown the existence of all sorts of pitfalls and surprises round the ordinary course of conversation” (42). Strong praises Carroll for “combin[ing] the appearance of familiarity with continual surprise (43). Such skill achieves better effect because if eccentricities exist through and through in two *Alices*, then “all sorts of pitfalls and surprises” are out of the question. Carroll’s most unexpected surprises pop out from under the appearance of familiarity.

As with trains, it can be argued that Alice’s former sense of space and time fares badly in the new chaotic time-space in Alice’s virtual dreams, so is her past memory. The time (both directions at once) and space (in all directions) can qualify as chaosmos because Deleuze defines chaos “not so much by its disorder as by the infinite speed with which every

imagines there must be a railway station behind a row of lodging houses near the sand so she can always find her way back by railway (*AW* 17-18). In Looking-Glass world, Alice the Pawn finds herself unexpected on a train moving rapidly through the forest from the Second Square to the Fourth Square because a Pawn goes two squares in its first move (*TLG* 128-32); the Red King’s snoring “sounded to [Alice] like the puffing of a large steam-engine in the wood near them. . .” (*TLG* 144); and before the White Queen pricks her finger, [h]er screams were so exactly like the whistle of a steam-engine” (*TLG* 152).
form taking shape in it vanishes. It is a . . . virtual, containing all possible particles and drawing out all possible forms, which spring up only to disappear immediately, without consistency or reference, without consequence. Chaos is an infinite speed of birth and disappearance” (WIP 118). The fugacity is characteristic of the chaomos with Aion time and topological space, and the chaotic time-space operates exactly with the double rhythm of appearing and vanishing. Such textual examples of meteoric Cheshire Cat and dream-rushes are abundant in two Alices. Therefore, in our argument, we propose that only by chaotic smooth time-space in her dream adventures can the fictional Alice be liberated with the absolute sense of giddiness, and acquire her absolute memory that works both directions.

In Wonderland, Carroll introduces the readers in the prefatory poem to the famous river expedition to Godstow during which Alice’s Adventures Underground was told in that golden afternoon.58 At Alice Liddell’s request, Carroll writes down this “fairy tale” as a token of gift for his muse who can “Lay it where Childhood’s dreams are twined / In Memory’s mystic band” (39-40). The first Alice story ends without a poem, but with an interesting scene that has its academic allure for many critics. After Alice wakes up, she tells her sister “all her wonderful Adventures” (AW 98), which causes her sister’s reverie about Alice’s dream just now and happy after-time in the future. In a conventional reading, the motherly sister symbolizes the domestic bliss at two levels: at present, she kisses Alice and bids her to run in to her tea (AW 98), and in the future, she pictures to herself that Alice in her riper years will tell her little ones gathering about her the same dream of Wonderland long time ago (AW 99).

From the bliss as a child to the bliss as an adult woman, the “simple and loving heart of

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58 In 1931, Alice Liddell Hargreaves recalled this event in her distinct recollection: “Nearly all of Alice’s Adventures Underground was told on that blazing summer afternoon with the heat haze shimmering over the meadows where the party [of five: Dodgson, Duckworth, and the three Liddell sisters] landed to shelter for awhile in the shadow cast by the haycocks near Gostow. I think the stories he told us that afternoon must have been better than usual, because I have such a distinct recollection of the expedition, and also, on the next day I started to pester him to write down the story for me. . . .” (86). Alice Liddell Hargreaves, “The Friendship that Sparked Alice’s Adventures,” Lewis Carroll: Interviews and Recollections, ed. Morton N. Cohen (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1989) 86.
[Alice’s] childhood” (AW 99) seems to be preserved in Alice’s memory as if it could be retrieved for the exact recollection to occur in Alice’s each act of retelling the story.

Such issue of memory continues in the prefatory poem to Carroll’s Looking-Glass, but the anxiety that Alice will forget his “fairy tale” of those “happy summer days” is revealed when frosty winter nights like envious years befall Carroll’s second fairy land: “The rhythm of our rowing— / Whose echoes live in memory yet, / Though envious years would say ‘forget’” (16-18). At the end of the prefatory poem, he reassures himself that the deadly power of amnesia shall not touch “The pleasance of our fairy-tale” (36). The pun “pleasance” on the one hand refers to the archaic form of the word “pleasure,” and on the other, as Donald Gray suggests, refers to “Alice Liddell’s middle name” (103). And the second implication alludes to Carroll’s acrostic that ends Looking-Glass because, as Gray notes, “[t]he initial letters of each line in this poem, when read downward, spell Alice Pleasance Liddell” (209).

Nevertheless, the echoes of their rowing that once lived in memory have turned pale in this acrostic: “Echoes fade and memories die: / Autumn frosts have slain July. / Still she haunts me, phantomwise” (8-10). An issue about memory can thus be raised here: If Alice haunts Carroll like a phantom in his dream, how does the memory die? As we argued earlier, because of the strong atmosphere of nostalgia abounding in the serene opening and final scenes, and prefatory and closing poems, many psychobiographical critics have read two Alice books as if they were simply about Carroll’s nostalgic and anxious memory that tries to fix Alice Liddell in a memory which is capable of redrawing the exact past. The major contribution of the current study in this chapter is to analyze what causes the confusion between Alice Liddell and the fictional Alice, provide a new division between Carroll’s nostalgic memory in the framing sections (prefatory and closing poems) and the fictional Alice’s memory in the core sections (opening and closing scenes and her curious dream journeys), and most important of

59 See Appendix B.
all, turn the conventional psychobiographical readings of two *Alice* books into a Deleuzian examination of the fictional Alice’s memory in the smooth space-time.

Another interesting point that concerns us is that *Looking-Glass* does not come to an end like *Wonderland*. In the first *Alice* story, Alice wakes up in the lap of her sister, and tells her sister all the strange events in this curious dream she has had. After Alice rushes home for tea, her sister remains by the river, watching the setting sunset and thinking of little Alice’s adventures until she too begins dreaming all the curious events in Alice’s dream, and pictures to herself a grown-up Alice telling this strange dream to her little children around in the happy after-time. In the second *Alice* story, Alice wakes up in the drawing room with a suspicious mind that Kitty (the black kitten) is the Red Queen, Snowdrop (the white kitten) is the White Queen, and Dinah is the Humpty Dumpty in her looking-glass dream. Alice ends up wondering philosophically whether it was the Red King or she who had had the dream. In spite of the absence of a motherly sister who listens to Alice’s dream at the end of *Looking-Glass*, Alice does tell her sister this dream sometime afterwards. It is seldom observed by Carroll scholars that the narrator’s additional remarks in parentheses (*TLG* 139, 156, 202, 203) have indirectly proved the fact that Alice somehow manages to tell her sister this Looking-Glass dream after the story is over. Two parenthetical examples relate directly to Alice’s sister: “(Alice said afterwards, when she was telling her sister the history of all this,)” (*TLG* 139), and “(‘And they *did* push so!’ she said afterwards, when she was telling her sister the history of her feast. ‘You would have thought they wanted to squeeze me flat’)” (*TLG* 202). From these two examples, we are sure that Alice must have told the “history” of her second adventure to her sister sometime after the final scene of *Looking-Glass*. But does the fictional Alice merely redraw the history of her adventures from her past memory, or does she give a new life to the memory she invokes in terms of the present circumstances? We find Carroll’s ambiguous use of the word “history” in *Looking-Glass* intensively interesting, and
plan to analyze it to examine whether the fictional Alice’s memory in her dream journeys is still the memory of history, or whether it, under the sway of an absolute sense of giddiness, has transformed from her past poor sort of memory to the White Queen’s memory which can work both ways. In our study on the memory that works both ways, we will draw upon Deleuze’s discussion on Bergson’s famous metaphor of the cone (the virtual coexistence of the past and the present) in *Bergsonism* and Deleuze’s memory of outside (present and future) in *Foucault* so that we can gain a better understanding of what the memory that works both ways is like. Unlike Rackin’s conclusion that Alice leaps back to her aboveground certainties, we maintain that Alice does not merely redraw the past, but produce her memory anew at present in each act of retelling her adventures.

Ever since the publication of Carroll’s two *Alices*, there has been unusually scarce research undertaken to tackle the problems of memory or time and space in Carroll’s two Alice stories. Few articles exclusively deal with memory or time and space, not to mention a substantial study on these issues all together. Because of the affinity between memory and time, space is either completely left out or simply interspersed among the major argument on memory and/or time. Due to this limitation, my literature review can only trace back as far as four decades ago to extract from the sparse past studies and map out the “latest” development associated with these three terms.

In 1966, an authoritative Carroll scholar Donald Rackin published his seminal article “Alice’s Journey to the End of Night” in *PMLA* to celebrate the centenary of the publication of *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland*. In this study, he offers his own insights to rectify the

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Rackin’s “Alice’s Journey” first appeared in *PMLA* in 1966, and then was selected by Robert Phillips to be included under the category “Jungian and Mythic” in *Aspects of Alice* in 1971, “a Festschrift for Alice—a critical celebration originally published one hundred years after *Through the Looking-Glass*” (“Foreword” xvii). Finally, Rackin modified “Alice’s Journey” as “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland: An Underground Journey to the End of Night” and put this article in his 1991 book *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass: Nonsense, Sense, and Meaning*. In our review, we will quote his “Alice’s Journey” from *Aspects of Alice*, the same article that made its debut in *PMLA*. 

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previous prejudices toward Wonderland. For example, Rackin maintains that Carroll study should be accessible to the majority of readers, including lay ones (“Alice’s Journey” 391, 392); Wonderland is “a complete and organic work of art” and “a self-contained fiction” independent of Looking-Glass (“Alice’s Journey” 391); confusing “Charles Dodgson the man with Lewis Carroll the author” often “leads to distorted readings of Alice that depend too heavily on the fact . . . that Dodgson was . . . with curious pathological tendencies” (“Alice’s Journey” 391-92); Wonderland is more than “a dream vision” that tends to be dismissed “as simply a whimsical excursion into an amusing, childlike world . . .” (“Alice’s Journey” 392); and (he concludes by saying that) “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland solves the problem [of the disorder beneath man-made order] by a kind of alogical dreamwork affirmation of man’s artificially constructed universe” (“Alice’s Journey” 416).

Rackin’s main line of argument considers Alice as “the reader’s surrogate on a frightful journey into meaningless night” (“Alice’s Journey” 393), and “[h]er literal quest serves, vicariously, as the reader’s metaphorical search for meaning in the lawless, haphazard universe of his deepest consciousness” (“Alice’s Journey” 392). During the journey that leads her to crash headlong into underground chaos with her aboveground logic, Alice looks like a curious “treasure” hunter who descends the stairs all the way down to the bottom of a secret chamber where “the subversion of the aboveground system of meaning” seems the most overwhelmingly irresistible. In Rackin’s synoptic analysis of twelve chapters, Chapter Seven “A Mad Tea-Party” plays the most pivotal role because the destruction of time is completed here when Alice reaches the “rock bottom in her descent into chaos” (“Alice’s Journey” 406). At this midway point, the sense of time and space is lost “in the confused memory of the befuddled but obstinate visitor from aboveground” (“Alice’s Journey” 393). It is probably not

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61 In Rackin’s reference convention, Alice and Looking-Glass are two shortened titles for two Alice books. To avoid confusion, we use Wonderland and Looking-Glass to refer to Carroll’s two Alice throughout this dissertation. Wherever we quote from Rackin’s essay, his reference convention remains unaltered; however, we still use Wonderland to mean Rackin’s Alice in our argument.
an uncommon scene to see guests shooting the breeze pointlessly at a tea-party, but the maddening nature of Wonderland, red in tooth and claw, is gradually devouring Alice’s “linear and progressive” conception of time by the Hatter’s “nonsensical personification of time” (“Alice’s Journey” 405):

Since time is now like a person, a kind of ill-behaved child created by man, there is the unavoidable danger that he will rebel and refuse to be consistent. That is exactly what has happened in this Wonderland tea-party . . . it is always tea-time. Time is thus frozen, and one of the most important concepts of common human experience is laughed out of existence. (“Alice’s Journey” 405-6)

As Rackin suggests, the sense of timelessness is compensated by “substituting space—the creatures move around the tea-table in a kind of never-ending game of musical chairs” (406). In other words, the subversion of Alice’s aboveground concept of time and space is done by eternally suspending time—“It’s always six o’clock now” (AW 58), and endlessly deferring space—“let’s all move one place on” (AW 59). At this point, Wonderland confuses Alice’s memory, freezes her time and substituting her space to such an extent that she can barely carry on her quest of meaning. In the chapters that follow “A Mad Tea-Party,” Wonderland becomes even more topsy-turvy by the inversion of animate and inanimate objects. At last, she loudly proclaims “You’re nothing but a pack of cards” (AW 97) to terminate her nightmarish adventure and leaps back to her aboveground certainties.

It seems to us that Rackin’s overtly optimistic view alleging that it is Alice’s unconscious (not the reader’s) that matters because her nightmarish dream can serve to affirm man’s artificial reality after her survival (or waking) from the fruitless quest for meaning in her unconscious dream state is as a matter of fact a hasty conclusion rather than a satisfactory one as he claims. It is paradoxical for him to compare Alice’s escape from Wonderland’s anarchy to “a symbolic rejection of mad sanity in favor of the sane madness of ordinary
existence” (“Alice’s Journey” 414). Why is our ordinary existence a realm of sane madness and why should we affirm it against the backdrop of a nightmarish dream? If Wonderland is “a comic myth of man’s insoluble problem of meaning in a meaningless world” (“Alice’s Journey” 414-15), how does such “an extraordinary experience familiar to us all” in the dream (mad sanity) relate to our “ordinary experience” in man-made reality (sane madness)? Is it a reminder that our normal conscious mind only sees what interests and makes sense to it, and gives us the realization that “out-of-the-world” chaos in our dream state is as a matter of fact already “invisible” in the world here and now? It is a shame that Rackin’s conclusion could have been more veritably satisfactory if he could thread all these “colorful beads” onto a string. In particular, the nonsensical elements of confusing memory, timelessness, and spacelessness do not get a higher proportion of elaboration that is worthy of their complexity. At least, we should know what to expect at the beginning of a bright day after Rackin concludes that Alice puts an end to her unbearable journey at night.

Lionel Morton, points out in his “Memory in the Alice Books” (1978) that it is Lewis Carroll’s nostalgic memory of a boating trip in that golden afternoon that tries to fix or enshrine that experience in memory because the always curious Alice Liddell who looks eagerly forward to everything new in her life causes Carroll’s distressing “anxiety about memory” (287-88). When Through the Looking-Glass was published in 1871,62 Alice Liddell was leaving her phase of adolescence and on her way to womanhood. Carroll’s relationship with her was increasingly hopeless, and his anxiety was embodied in the parting scene when the now exciting but sympathetic fictional Alice checks herself temporarily (Carroll’s wishful thinking?) from running down the hill. In order to comfort the melancholy White Knight a little bit, the fictional Alice perfunctorily consoles him with a few words before she bounds

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62 For the age comparison between Alice Liddell and Lewis Carroll (or Charles Dodgson), please refer to Appendix H.
across the last brook to be queened.

As the Knight sang the last words of the ballad, he gathered up the reins, and turned his horse’s head along the road by which they had come. “You’ve only a few yards to go,” he said, “down the hill and over that little brook, and then you’ll be a Queen—But you’ll stay and see me off first?” he added as Alice turned with an eager look in the direction to which he pointed. “I sha’a’t be long. You’ll wait and wave your handkerchief when I get to that turn in the road? I think it’ll encourage me, you see.”

“Of course I’ll wait,” said Alice: “and thank you very much for coming so far—and for the song—I liked it very much.”

“I hope so,” the Knight said doubtfully: “but you didn’t cry so much as I thought you would.” (TLG 190)

There is nothing Carroll can do in real life to stop Alice Liddell’s process of growing up that will divide the storyteller and the listener so he relieves himself of the anxiety of such fleeting and painfully estranged relations with Alice in the introductory poem of Looking-Glass by his own words of comfort: “No thought of me shall find a place / In thy young life’s hereafter— / Enough that now thou wilt not fail / To listen to my fairy-tale” (9-12).

In his study, Morton finds out the ambivalence of Carroll’s attitude towards memory: on the one hand, Carroll wants to preserve the past from fading in his two fantasy worlds by recurrent “patterns of fixing experience in memory” (287), and on the other, he projects his anxiety of losing his last foothold into the evanescent dream-rushes that melt away like snow (289). Carroll’s significant patterns of preserving nostalgic memory include describing the memorable boat-trip in prefatory poems (“Memory” 285-86), framing Alice’s adventures in memory by invoking the dream twice at the close of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland—after Alice wakes up she tells the dream to her sister, and afterwards her sister goes through the
same dream again and imagines a grown-up Alice who still remembers her dream and tells it to her children (“Memory” 287)—and personifying time to make it more controllable (“Memory” 290). The Hatter’s mentality reflects Carroll’s: “if you only kept on good terms with [Time], he’d do almost anything you liked with the clock” (AW 56). Nevertheless, as Morton suggests, “the memory of past time is often distorted by strange anxieties, and most characters seem to be on bad terms with their own pasts” (291). In his biographical interpretation of the relation between memory and time in two Alices, Morton splendidly explains the ambivalence of Carroll’s attitude towards memory: Carroll desires to fix experience in memory in spite of his unspeakable anxiety of losing it. Nevertheless, Morton never directly explains why Carroll’s desire to remember is counterbalanced by Wonderland or Looking-Glass characters’ desire to forget. Does these characters’ desire to forget have anything to do with aforementioned “strange anxieties” that Carroll projects to the creatures? Still, this hypothesis soon proves untenable when Morton opposes creatures who feel panic about time (e.g. the White Rabbit, the railway guard, the Red Queen, and the Anglo-Saxon Messengers) to characters who live at a leisurely pace (e.g. the Lion and the Unicorn, Tweedledum and Tweedledee) (289-90). Does it mean that there are “two nations” in Carroll’s fantasy lands that respond to the stress of time in such drastically different ways?

Admittedly, with Morton’s biographical interpretation, we can sniff around two Alices and easily find that Carroll has written into them many correlative things that Victorian (bourgeois) readers would find familiar in their daily life: 1. Domestic space: cupboard, book-shelf, map, picture, hookah, thimble, chimney-piece, hearth, rug, fender, jar, poker, corkscrew, fireplace, clock, plate, fork, knife, tablecloth, cauldron, saucepan, soup ladle, mock turtle soup, pet like cat, dog or other animals (e.g. Dinah, the enormous puppy, and Dormouse); 2. Leisurely or holiday activity: afternoon tea-party which “kills” time, card or chess game, croquet game in the garden, bathing machine in the sea, Punch and Judy show,
Guy Fawkes Day; 3. Royal or nursery-rhyme characters: White Rabbit (the King’s Herald), Duchess, King and Queen of Hearts, Knave, Red King and Queen, White King and Queen, Red and White Knights, Fish-Footman and Frog-Footman (royal servants), Tweedledum and Tweedledee, Humpty Dumpty, the Lion and the Unicorn; 4. School education: school subjects and school lessons, didactic poetry, governess, “feather” or “catching a crab” (boat-rowing slang), Gryphon (emblem of Oxford’s Trinity College), the Sheep’s shop (Alice’s shop across from Christ Church); 5. Historical condition or social progress: Victorian gentleman, curtsey, railway, carrier, newspaper, umbrella, telescope, microscope, opera-glass, Darwinism (theory of evolution: Dodo and ape), “a thousand pounds” exchangeable for a minute of time, an inch of land, a puff of smoke, and a word of language. To undertake a comparative study that opposes two fantasy worlds point by point to Carroll’s Victorian England surely has its light-hearted fun, but in doing so it does not lend itself to a more convincing analysis in the light of memory and time. In particular, Morton’s conclusion that Carroll escapes by dreaming (308) is an underestimate of the latter’s contribution to nonsense literature at the cost of memory and time that could have been more splendidly elaborated.

Another article “Time and Stress: Alice in Wonderland” published in 1985 by Calvin R. Petersen briefly analyzes the relationship of time and stress on the basis of two insights: first of all, “Time is the culprit”; secondly, “common sense may be no more than the product of our particular cultural prejudices” (427). Petersen’s main line of argument tries to find out what makes Time itself a culprit, and how it relates to common sense and stress. According to Petersen, “[a]s conceptions of time have increasingly come to taunt common sense, it may well be the ironist who has the greatest insight into the modern relationship of time and stress” (427). Up to this point, it is still obscure for Petersen to state that conceptions of time keep on bad terms with common sense; therefore, we need to wait and see if his later argument unfolds itself.
But at least, we are sure that Petersen likens Lewis Carroll to Jonathan Swift in that both are ironists whose vertiginous “loss of space-time dimension” in their alternate “Lilliputian” and “Brodgignagian” visions is not a clinical problem of their own, but a critical response to the “common sense” of their *times* (428; emphasis mine). In this respect, Swift and Carroll have their own ways of satirizing what Normon O. Brown calls “the ascendant ‘Excremental Vision’” (qtd. in Petersen 428). If time is the culprit for Swift, it is because Time is the “[a]ll devouring, all destroying” force that never unclenches its jaws “[t]ill [it] eat[s] the world at last” (Petersen 428). On the other hand, if time is the culprit for Carroll, it is because the fact that such didactic verse as “How doth the little busy bee” internalizes the moral sense of “time as [industrious] effort” (Petersen 429) in us is so unbearable to him that he mockingly replaces it with his parody “How doth the little crocodile” to make fun of this conception of time. After Alice plunges into the Rabbit hole, she follows the skittish White Rabbit who neurotically adheres to his schedule to embark on a stressful journey. In her pursuit of the White Rabbit, Alice seems to take his contagion: anxiety of not improving each hour shining enough and as a result making herself satanically idle. For example, no sooner has she realized that the Hatter just asked a riddle without an answer than she sighs wearily and says that “I think you might do something better with the time . . . than wasting it in asking riddles that have no answers” (*AW* 56). But the absent-minded Hatter suddenly finds his line of flight to escape from time’s devouring by converting “it” (time) to “him” (Time). With this operation, Carroll derails Alice from the track of “How doth the little busy bee,” and makes her plunge into the mad world of “How doth the little crocodile.”

At this point, Petersen supports his argument that “the escape from time’s devouring, ‘excremental’ demands seem to result in a confrontation with madness” (429) by appealing to Michel Foucault’s new definition of madness: “In the classical age, for the first time, madness was perceived through a condemnation of idleness and in a social immanence guaranteed by
the community of labor. This community acquired an ethical power of segregation, which permitted it to eject, as into another world, all forms of uselessness” (qtd. in Petersen 429-30). This new definition of madness brings the idea of progress into the Western conception of time, and secularizes the original sacred salvation as Max Weber’s “worthiness through worldly striving and accomplishment” (qtd. in Petersen 430; sic). In his conclusion, Petersen claims that such a progressive view of time will definitely overwhelm us with inevitable stress because the “‘Era of Progress’ had brought . . . an ‘all devouring, all destroying,’ ‘dark resistless stream.’ It may be that the stream and the conception of time which it carries that bring on the stress of modern existence. . . ” (432). In this sense, time is a culprit because it becomes a monstrous clock God who feeds on us to make its own progress.

In Petersen’s short but forceful article, I find four points that require further attention. First of all, our earlier question remains unresolved because the relationship between time and common sense remains obscure to the end. Secondly, how Carroll as an ironist resists the progressive conception of time and its accompanying stress with his giant or dwarf Alice is still unclear. Thirdly, Petersen’s study is still a comparative one between the fictional world and its real counterpart. This makes us wonder if Carroll’s *Alice in Wonderland*, when cut off from its real life counterpart, can still have any literary value in itself. Last, instead of the “loss of a comprehensible space-time frame of reference” (Petersen 427; emphasis mine), we would suggest that creative writing is the power of liberation that sets us free from the Euclidean spatiotemporal point of reference. Therefore, it is liberation rather than loss.

As this literature review has shown, only Lionel Morton’s “Memory in the Alice Books” (1978) exclusively deals with the problem of memory in Carroll’s two *Alices*. Yet the fact that his biographical interpretation of the relation between memory and time by corresponding reality to fiction posits Carroll’s ambivalence towards memory (nostalgia and anxiety) purely bases the literary value of two *Alices* on Carroll’s psychological turmoil (Can
Carroll remember the boat trip in that golden afternoon? Or will Carroll forget it in the long run?). This makes us wonder if two Alices can be self-contained literary works distinctly independent of their “haunting past” (that is, Carroll’s memory). In Donald Rackin’s article “Alice’s Journey to the End of Night” (1965), memory is only mentioned once to serve as an indicator of the validity of one's self-identity. That is, the more the power of underground chaos devours Alice, the weaker her memory is. All aspects of memory failures finally lead to her identity crisis: “Who in the world am I?” (AW 15).

As far as time and space are concerned, it is Rackin’s idea that the freezing of time and the substitution of space characteristic of the mad tea-party hosted by the Hatter are Wonderland’s ultimate weapon of subversion that turns Alice’s quest of meaning in this chaotic land into a nightmarish dream. At the end of Rackin’s argument, Wonderland’s disorderly time and space at best serve as a perfect foil for their orderly counterparts aboveground. When Rackin vows to treat Alice “as a complete and organic work of art... distinct from Through the Looking-Glass . . .” (“Alice’s Journey” 391), he does not go far enough to also “decolonize” the chaotic underground from the aboveground reality. The “out-of-the-world” time and space can do a lot more than exemplify “a comic myth of man’s insoluble problem of meaning in a meaningless world” (“Alice’s Journey” 414-15). They should be the invaluable source of inspiration in themselves. In terms of the stress of time, Morton, in “Memory,” argues that Carroll anxiously tries to make up to time so that he can fix the “golden afternoon” experience in his nostalgic memory in two Alices, whereas Petersen, in his 1985 article “Time and Stress,” maintains that the modern conception of time is the source of our stress because its moral tone of “time as effort” (429) throws any idle “madman” under the wheels of social progressive Juggernaut because he or she who escapes from time’s devouring is as useless as excrement. Petersen’s “Time is the culprit” is only used to explain historically why quite a few modern men suffer from migraine headaches. It is a
pity that he does not delve into his findings of vertigo and the loss of space-time dimension in a critical sense.

The study we present in this chapter is an attempt to improve upon the readings of these earlier studies. It is similar to Rackin’s study discussed above, but his sole discussion on Wonderland is broadened to include two Alices, and the weight will be shifted from aboveground reality to not only underground, but also looking-glass worlds. It differs from previous studies, however, in the following ways. For example, the focus will no longer stay on how Alice Liddell “haunts” Lewis Carroll the writer like a phantom. Instead, we will address the fictional Alice’s memory problem, and investigate how the extraordinary spatiotemporal aspect of these two fantasy lands relates to Alice’s memory. In our argument, memory is not just about how Alice remembers her past or identity, and the disorderly time and space in Wonderland and Looking-Glass are not just a foil for their aboveground counterparts. Thus, we will first analyze how the sense of giddiness is caused by the liberation (not the “loss”) of space-time dimension, and then discuss how Alice’s memory resists the faculty of human memory not by recalling, but by forgetting. Our thesis statement in this chapter is: Alice’s memory haunts her, not only because she fails to recall what she used to remember, but also because she has lost belief in her memory that can resist the return of the same and fold in new spatiotemporal modes of existence.

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63 Carroll, in the acrostic that ends his Through the Looking-Glass (1871), writes:

- Long has paled that sunny sky:
- Echoes fade and memories die:
- Autumn frosts have slain July.

- Still she haunts me, phantomwise,
- Alice moving under skies
- Never seen by waking eyes. (7-12)

At the close of his article, Donald Rackin mentions that, according to some critics, “Alice would be better classified as a ‘nightmare-vision’ because a nightmare is an unsuccessful dream, while a dream is a method whereby the dreamer successfully works out and solves in dramatic form a deep-seated problem, often a problem whose existence the conscious faculties will not allow themselves even to admit” (“Alice’s Journey” 415). No matter Alice is a phantom in an unsuccessful nightmare or a muse in a successful dream to Carroll, the fantasy lands he creates are “treasures” in themselves, rather than an underground chamber (the repressed “unconscious”) right for psychobiographical quest of meaning.
3.1. Vertiginous Time and Space

Both of the opening scenes in *Wonderland* and *Looking-Glass* feature a sleepy Alice who has nothing particular to do in a hot summer afternoon or on a cold winter night, and soon she plunges into the rabbit hole or gets through the looking-glass to start her dreamy adventure. Nevertheless, the novel, queer, and “out-of-the-world” experience of time and space in these two topsy-turvy worlds strikes Alice so much that her original “still-water” kind of comprehensible space-time frame of reference starts to spin around, drain away, and drag everything to the center of a whirling vortex. Not surprisingly, her sense of giddiness experienced in two *Alices*, to some extent, reflects what Carroll’s contemporaries in Victorian England felt about their rapidly changing age.

From a historical perspective, the great Victorian England faced a crucial moment in modern history. In *Victorian People and Ideas*, Richard D. Altick asserts that Victorians (a term coined as early as 1851) on the one hand adjusted themselves to the new material conditions that completely revolutionized their sense of time and space, and on the other self-consciously took on the mission of a “steam engine” that led the rest of the human life and Western civilization to their unprecedented progress (73). However, not everyone in such an era of change was prepared to meet the demand of what John Stuart Mill called “the spirit of the age”: “Mankind are then divided, into those who are still what they were, and those who have changed: into the men of the present age, and the men of the past. To the former, the spirit of the age is a subject of exultation; to the latter, of terror; to both, of eager and anxious interest” (qtd. in Altick 74). It can be argued that some Victorians still adhered to the past, some looked forward to the future, but most of them had progress complex with their feet striding old and new worlds.
Among the new material inventions,\textsuperscript{64} the railway counted as the most important revolution that changed the landscape of Victorian England, and compressed Victorians’ sense of space and time. Those who had lived before the railway came to disturb their tranquil life frowned upon such technological innovations in transportation,\textsuperscript{65} but this immense steam-engine kept rolling on with its “continuous process of demolition and reconstruction” (Altick 74) to broaden its network that connected “urbanizable” cities and towns, and cut through the rural checkerboard landscape consisting of farmlands enclosed by hedgerows and ditches. The network of railroads resembled that of arteries in that it pumped “the life blood of commerce and crowds into population centers, some old, some recently transformed from country towns” (Altick 75-76) to build up to what Wordsworth called “the monstrous ant-hill” (qtd. in Altick 77).

Railroad, according to Altick, had its patriotic sense for the nineteenth-century Victorian England because its spreading network, a proud “equivalent of ancient Rome’s military roads and aqueducts” (78), “did more than any other Victorian innovation to infiltrate the national consciousness with the idea of speed” (96). In the past, the sense of time for

\textsuperscript{64} Apart from railroad, Victorian England also boasts the steamship, the telegraph, submarine cable, the typewriter, the newspaper, steam-powered factory, photography, just to name a few. The national power of Victorian England reached her apex in 1851 when she hosted the first world’s fair: . . . the great event of the year was the first world’s fair, officially called the Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations but familiarly known then and ever since as the Crystal Palace. Housed in the first prefabricated public building in history, a vast construction of iron and glass set in London’s Hyde Park, the exhibition was intended to demonstrate Britain’s supremacy in design and manufacture. The design, most modern authorities agree, was atrocious; the manufacture was most ingenious. Over half the exhibitors were from Britain and the Empire. (Altick 11)

\textsuperscript{65} In addition to Ruskin and Wordsworth who “were denouncing [railroad’s] desecration of the Lakes” (qtd. in Altick 78), Thackeray also gave his expressive reproach in 1860: Your railroad . . . starts the new era, and we of a certain age belong to the new time and the old one . . . . We elderly people have lived in that prae-railroad world, which has passed into limbo and vanished from under us. I tell you it was firm under our feet once, and not long ago. They have raised those railroad embankments up, and shut off the old world that was behind them. Climb up that bank on which the irons are laid, and look to the other side—it is gone. (qtd. in Altick 75)

Christopher Keep, in “Technology and Information: Accelerating Developments,” quotes Carlyle’s words to describe the latter’s apocalyptic fears of the unifying forces initiated by steam in Victorian England that the unceasing change in communication and transportation would leave the world “one huge, dead, immeasurable Steam-engine, rolling on, in its dead indifference to grind [us] limb from limb” (137). This \textit{be part of it or perish} kind of “railway mania” (Altick 78) fills the conservatives with disgust, and often causes more opposing responses from parochialism in rural areas even at the cost of their economic growth in exchange for “tranquil picturesqueness” (Altick 80).
slow-paced Victorians living in rural areas was no more than watching the sun moving across the sky or “the shadow creeping across a sundial . . .” (Altick 97), and most common people, in their entire life, hardly moved “more than a few miles from their birthplace” (Altick 80). Nevertheless, their old sense of time and space was annihilated by the speed of the steam-engine. Altick’s “feeling of immediacy” (97) is a result of the compression of space and time. In “Technology and Information: Accelerating Developments,” Christopher Keep attributes such feeling to the new technologies which “had transformed space from a geographical quantity into a temporal one: increasingly, distance was no longer measured in inches, yards, and miles, but in the hours, then minutes, and finally seconds required to traverse it” (Keep 137-38). Instead of asking how far, Victorians living in the world of the railroad asked how long it took someone to travel from one place to another. The temporalization of space gave Victorians “new ways of perceiving the nature of distance and duration” (Keep 138).

On a larger scale, the fact that English imperialism joined hands with major capitalist powers to set globalism in motion gave Victorians a more irresistible global sense of dizziness. In *The Condition of Postmodernity*, David Harvey argues that “[t]he expansion of the railway network, accompanied by the advent of the telegraph, the growth of steam shipping, and the building of the Suez Canal, the beginnings of radio communication and bicycle and automobile travel at the end of the [nineteenth] century, all changed the sense of time and space in radical ways” (264). From leisurely countries to bustling cities, and from the island-based Victorian England to the entire British Empire all over the world, an “imagined community” as Benedict Anderson called it in 1991 (qtd. in Keep 138) for Victorians was sprawling, and the only miracle that kept it from falling apart was time. “The

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66 Although we draw upon David Harvey’s *The Condition of Postmodernity*, we have no intention to claim Carroll’s two *Alices* as postmodern fiction. We only use his ideas to explain the expansion of traffic and communication, the radicalized sense of space and time, and the questionable idea of a single and objective sense of time and space in nineteenth-century Victorian England.
necessary corollary of imperial space,” as Keep suggests, “was standardized time, as the local differences in timekeeping gave way to the ‘universal standard time’ set by railway companies in order to coordinate their complex schedules” (138). Different senses of time and space must be synchronized and calibrated on a centralized basis of Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) and Prime Meridian Line in London, Queen’s England because each new day and year officially start from the “center” of the world. Once established, an idea of a single and objective sense of time and space is hardly contentious since most ordinary Victorians only used them as practical frame of reference for their everyday routine, let alone its patriotic sense of using them in their national and even imperial interest. As with Anderson’s “imagined community,” such a single, objective yardstick is but another example of imagined fabrication. For Harvey, “[s]pace and time are basic categories of human existence” that are “‘naturalized’ through the assignment of common-sense everyday meanings” “to provide a sense of security in a world” “as if everything has its place upon a single objective . . . scale”
Fig. 3.2. The dolphin sundial (two tails cast a shadow of the gnomon onto the dial plate which is engraved with curved lines).

Fig. 3.3. Prime Meridian Line (Longitude 0° 0' 0" which defines GMT, Greenwich Mean Time).

Fig. 3.4. Standard time zones of the world (Greenwich is marked with a red point).
(201-3). Nevertheless, he encourages us to “challenge the idea of a single and objective sense of time or space, against which we can measure the diversity of human conceptions and perceptions” (Harvey 203).

In *Wonderland* and *Looking-Glass*, Carroll has gone to great lengths to expose the absurdity of the idea of a single and objective sense of time and space. However, he does not carry his ridicule of the fictional Alice’s human sense of three-dimensional space and unidirectional time to its full effect at one fell swoop. With an operation similar to Jean-Jacques Lecercle’s “dialectics of subversion and support” (*PN: IVNL* 112), Carroll plays many familiar-yet-strange tricks in his two *Alices*. For example, the aforementioned literature review on Lionel Morton’s article “Memory in the Alice Books” (1978) has already pointed out the fact that Carroll employs such literary elements as Victorian domestic space, leisurely or holiday activities, royal or nursery-rhyme characters, school education, and historical condition or social progress to add verisimilitude of Victorian age in his fictional worlds. It is against this familiar backdrop that his ridicule of Alice’s human sense of space and time begins to heat up.

In two *Alices*, our seven-year-old heroine (like a fledgling practicing her skills) seizes every chance to repeat to herself or other Wonderland or Looking-Glass characters the geographical and temporal knowledge that she knows even when she has only a vague idea about such grandiose concepts. For example, in her long and slow subterranean descent that violates Galileo’s free fall and Newton’s gravitational pull, Alice thinks she must have travelled “four thousand miles down” through “the centre of the earth,” and wonders what “Latitude or Longitude” she has got to (*AW* 8). She cannot help thinking that in such a fall she will eventually “fall right through the earth” to Victorian England’s “antipathies” (a mispronunciation of antipodes), and “come out among the people that walk with their heads downwards” in New Zealand or Australia (*AW* 8). However, she is diffident about using those
grand words that are not perfectly at her command. In addition to those grand words that are apparently beyond a seven-year-old girl’s knowledge, Alice’s greater epistemic crisis comes from her loose grip on the past memory: she cannot remember things she used to know. “London is the capital of Paris, and Paris is the capital of Rome, and Rome—no, that’s all wrong, I’m certain” (AW 16)! Alice can only sense that things are strangely mixed up, but she has no idea why. Judged from the above examples, we can say that she has a liking to say things over to show off her knowledge like a young pioneer of the British Empire surveying Queen’s colonies; nevertheless, either she has no idea what those grand words (“Latitude” and “Longitude” as floating signifiers) refer to, or she says it wrong (the malapropian “antipathies” instead of “antipodes,” which also denotes, apart from England’s antipodal colonies, a world of chaotic anarchy diametrically opposed to its aboveground counterpart).

What’s worse, her amnesia extends to facts she used to know. It is confusing to hear people say that London is the capital of Paris because such statement has undergone double slippage in its signifying chain: Paris is not a country but the capital of France; France is still not the right country because England is. The fact that her imprecise command of language shows the abstract and arbitrary nature in words is also a vote of no confidence from Wonderland cast against the human knowledge about the world we inhabit.

Like a town surveyor sent by the English Queen, Alice is used to applying her former point of reference to examine a new world. In Looking-Glass, when she is on the top of a “hill” (or what the Red Queen calls a “valley”), Alice excitedly stands on a vantage point that

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67 Another colonial motif often discussed comes from an Alice who grows more than nine-feet tall after she eats a small cake. As she opens out like the largest telescope, she looks at her feet which are getting so far off out of sight, and feels sorry for even not being able to put on shoes and stockings for them (AW 13-14). “Oh, my poor little feet, I wonder who will put on your shoes and stockings for you now, dears? I’m sure I sha’n’t be able! I shall be a great deal too far off to trouble myself about you: you must manage the best way you can—but I must be kind to them . . . or perhaps they wo’n’t walk the way I want to go! Let me see. I’ll give them a new pair of boots every Christmas” (AW 14). The idea of sending someone’s feet Christmas presents easily reminds the readers of the historical condition of the British Empire that used to have colonies all over the world. To maintain her sovereignty over her “extremities,” Victorian Queen needs to duly show her “substantial” love and care to her subjects to maintain their loyalties.
commands a broad view of a strange-yet-familiar country landscape that resembles a large chessboard. “For some minutes Alice stood without speaking, looking out in all directions over the country—and a most curious country it was. There were a number of tiny little brooks running straight across it from side to side, and the ground between was divided up into squares by a number of little green hedges, that reached from brook to brook” (TLG 125). After Alice discloses her intention to join the game, the Red Queen takes her to the “starting point” for a Pawn by running faster and faster till they skim through the air. Oddly enough, in Red Queen’s fast sort of country, running fast will only keep them in the same place; therefore, they must run at least twice as fast as they have been doing to get somewhere else (TLG 127). However, such a Pawn as Alice has quite limited mobility; they, as a result, never pass the tree where they began. After the Red Queen marks off distances within the square next to Alice, announces the latter’s destined fate, she “vanishes into thin air” with her ultimate mobility. As Alice waits for her turn to move, she spends a while looking again at what lies ahead now with a restricted sight of a Pawn.

Of course the first thing to do was to make a grand survey of the country she was going to travel through. “It’s something very like learning geography,” thought Alice, as she stood on tiptoe in hopes of being able to see a little further.

“Principal rivers—there are none. Principal mountains—I’m on the only one, but I don’t think it’s got any name. Principal towns. . . . (TLG 129)

For a town surveyor like Alice, it is to her advantage to map in mind the space to be covered

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68 The Red Queen announces the White Pawn Alice’s destined future:
A pawn goes two squares in its first move, you know, So you’ll go very quickly through the Third Square—by railway, I should think—and you’ll find yourself in the Fourth Square in no time. Well, that square belongs to Tweedledum and Tweedledee—the Fifth is mostly water—the Sixth belongs to Humpty Dumpty. . . . the Seventh Square is all forest—however, one of the Knights will show you the way—and in the Eighth Square we shall be Queens together, and it’s all feasting and fun! (TLG 128)

The announced fate seems to be Alice’s destiny that will unfold itself along the Pawn’s moves; nevertheless, something unexpected always springs up to rewrite her destiny. For example, as Alice reaches the Eighth Square and gets queened, what awaits her is not “all feasting and fun,” but qualification exam of all nonsensical sorts that bewilders her, only followed by a chimerical dinner party that brings more embarrassment.
prior to her movement because “the mapping of the world,” as David Harvey suggests, “opened up a way to look upon space as open to appropriation for private uses” (228). In Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, Deleuze introduces us to Bergson’s most famous thesis on movement: “According to the first thesis, movement is distinct from the space covered. Space covered is past, movement is present, the act of covering. . . . the spaces covered all belong to a single, identical, homogeneous space, while the movements are heterogeneous, irreducible among themselves” (1). Along with Harvey’s argument, Bergson’s thesis on movement introduced by Deleuze is significant to our readings here because “the space covered” that is already appropriated for private uses means that a flag symbolizing one’s hegemonic power has been planted in “a single, identical, homogeneous space.” Therefore, map-making is an effective practice to make way for one’s movement, and meanwhile close in on other’s act of covering. Put simply, map-making is the privilege of a victor who subjugates other’s movement within his or her own striation of space. It is all about power struggles, and the objective quality of space is simply the result of them. In this respect, Harvey asserts, “[t]he common-sense rules which define the ‘time and space for everything’ are certainly used to achieve and replicate particular distributions of social power . . .” (227). However, it is mistaken to see a victor’s temporary triumph as an eternal reign because, as Harvey suggests, “[s]hifts in the objective qualities of space and time, in short, can be, and often are, effected through social struggle” (227). That is why he encourages us, as mentioned earlier, to put to the test the deceiving idea of a single and objective sense of time and space so that diverse conceptions and perceptions of them can be disclosed. We need to, as Todd May suggests, reach beneath the surface of conceptual stability to palpate the world of difference (20-21).

In addition to plateau twelve “1227: Treatise on Nomadology:—The War Machine,” Deleuze and Guattari’s dualism in terms of space is the most telling in plateau fourteen “1440: The Smooth and the Striated” in their co-authored A Thousand Plateaus. They begin by
distinguishing two kinds of space: “Smooth space and striated space—nomad space and sedentary space—the space in which the war machine develops and the space instituted by the State apparatus—are not of the same nature” (ATP 474). In plateau fourteen, Deleuze and Guattari envision technological, musical, maritime, mathematical, physical, and aesthetic models to illustrate various aspects of and the relations between smooth space and striated space. Citing Plato’s model of weaving as the paradigm for “royal science,” they liken “the art of governing people or operating the State apparatus” to the technique of weaving fabric (ATP 475). Fabric constitutes its striated space by knitting vertical warp and horizontal woof to exquisitely pattern the central theme or motif of embroidery; felt, on the other hand, constitutes its smooth space by crocheting its patchwork in all directions piece by piece to add its infinite and successive additions (ATP 476). For Pierre Boulez, there are also two kinds of space in musical model: a striated space-time (metric, dimensional, and musical multiplicity) one counts in order to occupy and a smooth space-time (nonmetric, directional, and sonorous multiplicity) one occupies without counting (qtd. in ATP 477). In the maritime model, the striated space which is an optical and extensive space of properties filled by formed and perceived things subjugates trajectories to points, whereas the smooth space which is a haptic and intensive space of affects filled by events or haecceities subordinates points to trajectories (ATP 478-79). As to the mathematical model, Euclidean space is the numerical, homogeneous, and discrete multiplicity of magnitude while Riemann space is the qualitative, fusional, and continuous multiplicity of distance (ATP 484-85). In the physical model, “work” in striated space and “free action” in smooth space are distinguished, but “the State apparatus, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, found a new way of appropriating the war machine. . .” (ATP 490).

During the nineteenth century a two-fold elaboration was undertaken: of a physicoscientific concept of Work (weight-height, force-displacement), and of a
socioeconomic concept of labor-power or abstract labor (a homogeneous abstract quantity applicable to all work, and susceptible to multiplication and division).

There was a profound link between physics and sociology: society furnished an economic standard of measure for work, and physics a ‘mechanical currency’ for it. (ATP 490)

The State apparatus imposes the physicosocial model of Work upon the free action of the war machine to discipline its “laziness” and normalize its eccentric law of the nomos so that the hands of a standard-man can be used in a construction site or factory. Lastly, the aesthetic model contrasts striae (organic line) with traits of expression (abstract line) in that the former is “the organic domination of a central point” while the latter is “a machinic force that multiplies its effect and pursues an infinite movement” (ATP 498-99).

Table 3.2

Comparison between Two Kinds of Space

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>model</th>
<th>space</th>
<th>smooth space</th>
<th>striated space</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simple opposition</td>
<td>nomad space, the war machine</td>
<td>sedentary space, the State apparatus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Technological Model</td>
<td>felt (space of the outside), crochet: all directions, patchwork, “appliqué”/”pieced” quilts</td>
<td>fabric (a closed space), knitting: warp + woof, embroidery, “plain” quilts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Musical Model</td>
<td>one occupies without counting (smooth space-time),</td>
<td>one counts in order to occupy (striated space-time),</td>
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<tr>
<td>points subordinated to trajectories, filled by events or haecceities, space of affects, haptic perception, forces, intensive space of distances, <em>Spatium</em>, a body without organ, sonorous and tactile qualities, Kleist/English (or American)/rhizome travel</td>
<td>multiplicities of distance (inseparable from a process of continuous variation), qualitative, fusional, continuous multiplicity, acentered/flat/frequency,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trajectories subordinated to points, filled by formed and perceived things, space of properties, optical perception, a matter, extensive space of measures and properties, <em>Extensio</em>, organism and organization, measurable visual qualities, Goethe/French/Tree travel</td>
<td>multiplicities of magnitude (distribute constants and variables), numerical, homogeneous, discrete multiplicity, centered/numerical/breaks,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Physical Model</td>
<td>Aesthetic Model (Nomad Art)</td>
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<td>--------</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>189</td>
<td>“free action” in smooth space, smooth capital</td>
<td>close-range vision, haptic space, abstract line, repetition as power, <em>machinic</em> force that multiplies its effect and pursues an infinite movement, abstract line as the affect of smooth space, traits of expression describing a smooth space and connecting with a matter-flow</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>198</td>
<td>“work” in striated space, striated capital</td>
<td>long-distance vision, optical space, concrete line, symmetry as form, <em>organic</em> domination of a central point, organic representation as the feeling presiding over striated space, striae that convert space and make it a form of expression that grids and organizes matter</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

We have been comparing Alice to a town surveyor of the State (*ATP* 386) who uses her former striated space-time to “count” with metric measurements in order to “occupy” this new world by superimposing her grid reference onto this “out-of-the-world” space. Nevertheless, her sense of space and time is greatly at odds with the local inhabitants’. Earlier on, for example, when Alice says she has lost her way, the Red Queen contradicts her by saying that “all the ways about here belong to me...” (*TLG* 124). It foreshadows the coming aggravating clash of their different logics.

“I only wanted to see what the garden was like, your Majesty—”

“That’s right,” said the Queen, patting her on the head, which Alice didn’t like at all: “though, when you say ‘garden’—I’ve seen gardens, compared with which this would be a wilderness.”
Alice didn’t dare to argue the point, but went on: “—and I thought I’d try and find my way to the top of that hill—”

“When you say ‘hill’,” the Queen interrupted, “I could show you hills, in comparison with which you’d call that a valley.”

“No, I shouldn’t,” said Alice, surprised into contradicting her at last: “a hill can’t be a valley, you know. That would be nonsense—”

The Red Queen shook her head. “You may call it ‘nonsense’ if you like,” she said, “but I’ve heard nonsense, compared with which that would be as sensible as a dictionary!” (TLG 125)

Alice uses her former logic of space to subsume the physical features of the Looking-Glass landscape under her epistemic categories, only to find that the local inhabitants have drastically different ways and logics to address things in their own country. Although Alice tries hard to forbear herself from contradicting these locals, she never agrees with them about their nonsensical arguments. She often thinks to herself: “It’s really dreadful . . . the way all the creatures argue. It’s enough to drive one crazy!” (AW 46). With her sense of superiority, Alice jumps to the conclusion that she cannot understand their argument because she does not “believe there’s an atom of meaning in it” (AW 95). Leila May, in “Wittgenstein’s Reflection in Lewis Carroll’s Looking-Glass,” poses a question concerning the logical or social possibility of such insane worlds humorously depicted in Carroll’s books: “Isn’t Wittgenstein bound to declare that language, in this case, has gone on permanent, irrevocable holiday, and that the Cheshire Cat is indeed correct in his declaration, ‘we’re all mad here’” (84)? Are Carroll’s Wonderland and Looking-Glass Land places of insanity or two possible worlds that are merely different from ours? In Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, two examples can be raised to explain a possible presence of an alternative form of life. In Section 185, Wittgenstein challenges our imagination by giving the example of “odd” method of adding to
show the pupil’s alternative form of counting a series beyond 1,000. Instead of counting 1000-1002-1004-1006, he writes a different series 1000-1004-1008-1012 (PI, Sec. 185). In response to this, Leila May asks us: “Can we imagine a culture in which this person’s apparently very odd method of adding would be the natural one?” (85). Similarly, is it possible for us to “naturally” react to “the gesture of pointing with the hand [✉] by looking in the direction of the line from finger-tip to wrist, not from wrist to finger-tip” (PI, Sec. 185)? When things are getting “curiouser and curiouser” (AW 13), it seems to Alice that her former rules are broken and nonsense happens. It is of May’s opinion that Wittgenstein’s “language goes on holiday” is actually suggestive of the fact: “the rules have not been broken; rather, they have been understood differently by players from somewhat different language-games” (85). In other words, when you try to understand another language-game’s rule with one’s own, the rule of another world would no doubt seem very nonsensical.

The foregoing issue of “two countries” singles out the fact that humans are slaves of their habits because they feel comfortable using a fixed perspective to look at the world. When Alice is in the garden of live flowers, she wonders why flowers can talk. Tiger-lily replies that flowers can talk “when there’s anybody worth talking to” and when the ground of the flower bed is hard so that flowers will not fall asleep (TLG 120, 122). This bright idea strikes Alice in such a novel way that she exclaims “I never thought of that before,” to which the Rose rebukes “[i]t’s my opinion that you never think at all” (TLG 122). What the “Alice flower” needs is not her former soft logic that makes her dormant—fancying that there is only her logic. For Alice, the crystal clear former logic is seamless and streamlined, but Wittgenstein reminds us that “the crystalline purity of logic was . . . not a result of investigation: it was a requirement”; human logic cannot tolerate vagueness, uncertainty and

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69 Interestingly, live flowers in the garden take Alice and the Red Queen as flowers with petals too. The only difference is that they think Alice and the Red Queen are the kind of flowers that can move freely about.
conflict so it hypnotizes and pushes us “on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal” (PI, Sec. 107). Nevertheless, on such a slippery and frictionless surface we constantly fall, split our legs and sit on our bottoms. Not a single step is manageable. In this respect, Wittgenstein says: “just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!” (PI, Sec. 107). He expects us not to be sloppy thinkers but to think against the friction of the rough ground. Wittgenstein’s rough ground is similar to Tiger-lily’s hard ground of the flower bed. Carroll has Alice stand on the hard ground of Wonderland and Looking-Glass Land to experience the power of chaosmos in which frictionless and nonsensical logics crush into each other and make Alice overwhelmingly giddy.

Up to this point, the issue of “two countries” in terms of space and time seems easily understandable, but we should not trivialize it as little more than the clash of different spatiotemporal logics between “two countries.” The more profound significance can be accorded to this issue if on the one hand we can submit a traditional reading to a radical critique, and on the other provide a spur to a new reading. Traditionally, the conflict between adult figures and Alice in two Alices is engaged critically by generalizing it as a reflection of her issues of growing up in an adult world in real life. The motif of “the clash of different logics” implies an argument between two opponents who stick to their own points of view on an equal footing. On the surface, what is specific about Alice’s conflict with adult figures surrounding her is that it is in a disproportionate power relation that one after another agonistic conversation takes place. In aforementioned conversations about the difference between “two countries” (one’s garden or hill is another’s wilderness or valley, fast or slow sort of country), Alice dares not to heat up the debate, and chooses instead to succumb to the will of the Red Queen probably because of her inferior status in age (she is a child), in height (the Red Queen is half a head taller than Alice), and in power (Alice is only a Pawn before
she reaches the eighth square). As this kind of conflict between angry and ill-tempered adult figures and Alice is a perennial scene, it naturally has aroused quite an amount of critical attention in Carroll study.

In “‘All Sorts of Pitfalls and Surprises’: Competing Views of Idealized Girlhood in Lewis Carroll’s *Alice Books*,” Jennifer Geer argues that this kind of disproportionate power relation between “bullying adults and resistant children” in Alice’s adventures works to satisfy two desires: “the adult’s desire to dominate children and the child’s desire to resist that domination” (7). Alice’s “You’re nothing but a pack of cards!” (*AW* 97) and “I ca’n’t stand this any longer!” (*TLG* 204) at the close of two *Alices* especially cater to readers who identify with power-gaining Alice. In Geer’s words, “Alice’s adventures allow readers of all ages to indulge their fantasies of rebelling against unjust authority figures . . .” (11) since “the adventures themselves present Alice with a fantasy world that casts her as a child who must resist the domineering adult figures who supposedly populate moral or informational literature” (8). However, we are not satisfied with Geer’s reading that two *Alices* are simply a reflection of the highly tensional generational conflict in Victorian England. Instead of reading this as a didactic tension between adults and children, we plan to read the clash of different logics as power struggle between the State apparatus in the striated space and the war machine in the smooth space.

In the de jure distinction between the two aforementioned spaces, Deleuze and Guattari compare the striated space-time instituted by the State apparatus to chess, and smooth space-time in which the war machine develops to Go:

In chess, it is a question of arranging a closed space for oneself, thus of going from one point to another, of occupying the maximum number of squares with the minimum number of pieces. In Go, it is a question of arraying oneself in an open space, of holding space, of maintaining the possibility of springing up at
any point: the movement is not from one point to another, but becomes perpetual, without aim or destination, without departure or arrival. The ‘smooth’ space of Go, as against the ‘striated’ space of chess. The nomos of Go against the State of chess, nomos against polis. The difference is that chess codes and decodes space, whereas Go proceeds . . . [by] territorializing or deterritorializing it . . . [with] [a]other justice, another movement, another space-time. (*ATP* 353)

In their metaphor of board games, Deleuze and Guattari think chess is a game of the State apparatus which moves from one point to another within the “milieu of interiority” (closed, striated space-time) while Go is a game of the war machine which holds space in a “milieu of exteriority” (open, smooth space-time) (*ATP* 353). If each chess piece is “a subject of the statement” and each Go piece “an anonymous. . . . nonsubjectified machine assemblage” (*ATP* 352-53), it can be argued that Deleuze and Guattari are reintroducing here the double structure of Deleuze’s early event philosophy in *The Logic of Sense*.

With every event, there is indeed the present moment of its actualization, the moment in which the event in embodied in a state of affairs, an individual, or a person, the moment we designate by saying “*here*, the moment has come.” . . . But on the other hand, there is the future and the past of the event considered in itself, sidestepping each present, being free of the limitations of a state of affairs, impersonal and pre-individual. . . . It has no other present than that of the mobile instant which represents it, always divided into past-future, and forming what must be called the counter-actualization. . . . On one side, there is the part of the event which is realized and accomplished; on the other, there is that “part of the event which cannot realize its accomplishment.” There are thus two accomplishments, which are like actualization and counter-actualization.

(*LS* 151-52)
That is to say, they are implying that a chessboard is in a personal, individual, and actual space-time while a Go board is in an impersonal, pre-individual, and virtual space-time. Given their preference for the virtual, Deleuze and Guattari’s dualism in terms of space (the striated vs. the smooth) and time (present/Chronos vs. future-past/Aion) is very significant to us because it is our belief that the recurrent conflict between “two countries” in two Alices, rather than a reflection of a didactic tension between adults and children, results from the fact that Alice makes illegitimate use of life by claiming the precedence of an actual space-time over a virtual one. The debate between Alice and the Red Queen is thus symbolic of the power struggle between these two competing views: an actual space-time from the perspective of the privileged mind of man versus a virtual space-time from as many “irrational” perspectives as possible so that a synthesized space-time from any privileged observer is carried to its nth power and rendered impossible.

Viewed from this perspective, some critics have mistakenly seen Alice as a schizophrenic war machine crisscrossing her smooth space in a nomadic mode of existence throughout her dream journeys. In our argument, she begins more like a one man army, a town surveyor sent by the State to appropriate maniac war machines populating these two chaotic lands. However, some might argue that the straited space and regulated moves in Looking-Glass show that the game Alice and other chess pieces play is no other than an orderly chess game. Such an illusion can be dispelled if we see it as a result of Alice’s metric chessboard superimposed onto Looking-Glass characters’ nonmetric Go board. Chess is a game for two (White moves first and then Black) played on a board of sixty-four squares of alternate colors with each player having sixteen pieces. Each player starts with a King and a Queen (the monarchy), two Rooks (the castle), two Knights (the horsemen), two Bishops (the church), and eight Pawns (the foot soldiers). The game is won when the opponent's King is captured. Go, on the other hand, is a game for two (Black moves first, and then White) played...
on a board of 324 squares. Two players take turns placing a stone-shaped game piece of their own color on an intersecting point of the grid on a Go board to strengthen their own position and weaken their opponent’s. The goal is to deprive enemy pieces of their liberty by surrounding them with one’s own “army,” and capture the opponent’s pieces. The player who has captured more opponent pieces is the winner.

As Alice the Pawn moves forward on a chessboard, she basically moves like a Pawn, but other chess pieces do not necessarily stick to such law-abiding spirit. Alice often feels dizzy during the game because when she thinks she is playing the chess game as a Pawn on the board, other *Looking-Glass* characters are actually playing the game of Go in all directions. Many inconsistent chess game examples can be raised here to prove our point. For example, it is hard to find for each *Looking-Glass* character its corresponding role as a chess piece. If Alice is a white Pawn, why are the chess pieces on her side as harsh as the enemy pieces on the other (with the only exception of the amiable White Knight who is said to be the avatar of Carroll himself)? Why does not the Red Queen (and other Red chess pieces)
capture the white Pawn Alice? Why does the White Queen become a sheep? Why does the White Queen run away from the Red Knight when she can overpower him? Why does the White Queen disappear (in the soup) if she is not captured? How can the Red Knight and the White Knight “check” the same enemy King? How can the Red Queen, the White Queen, and Alice be castled if a regular chess game only allows a King to do the castling? These curious questions give rise to a possibility that the other *Looking-Glass* characters might not be playing the game by the rules of chess. As with the other games in two *Alices* (e.g. Caucus-race, croquet game, even the trial, the dances, the battles, and verbal games like jokes, riddles, and agonistic conversations), the chess game that constitutes the major narrative framework of *Looking-Glass* seems to proceed without consistent rules. If a game looks nonsensical to Alice, it is probably because she does not know how to play a game “in all directions.”

In two *Alices*, the conflict between adult figures and Alice is often related by critics like Jennifer Geer to struggle between domineering master and dominated but resistant slave “since each party attempts to satisfy her own interests at the expense of the other” (8). In a mixed Nietzschean and Marxian fashion, Geer illustrates that the moral-preaching Duchess’s “attempts to position Alice in subordinate roles” and Alice’s “own desire to gain power” are nothing but the “products of an arbitrary and self-interested will to power” (9). It can be derived from this logic to say that either *Wonderland* or *Looking-Glass* is a world primarily made up of “self-interested” conscious or unconscious wills that are ever-shifting, struggling, and constantly competing for dominance. In their parallel reading, critics like Geer tend to imply that the fantasy worlds Alice falls or slides into are similar to her real world in that recalcitrant Alice (with her progressive rebellion from latent to manifest) gradually musters her courage to stage the final uprising against those overbearing adults, and gain her independence at last. At first glance, Geer’s “didactic tension between adults and children”
seems to resemble our “power struggle between the State apparatus and the war machine” in that space (public or domestic sphere in Geer’s reading and striated or smooth space in ours) is the site of confrontations of both parties. However, we can appropriate Nietzsche’s sick and healthy kinds of will to power to further distinguish Geer’s reading from ours. In spite of the fact that Geer’s reading and ours are both based on the idea of conflict or struggle between master and slave, we only mark (as shown in Table 3.3) in the left bottom white box and in the right bottom grey box with war machines in smooth space with master morality, and leave the remaining three white boxes to slave morality. That means Geer’s self-interested master

Table 3.3
Comparison between Geer’s Reading and Ours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>character reading</th>
<th>Adult figures</th>
<th>Alice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geer’s reading (master and slave in class conflict)</td>
<td>self-interested master (slave morality)</td>
<td>self-interested slave → master (slave morality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>our reading (Nietzschean master and slave)</td>
<td>war machines in smooth space (master morality)</td>
<td>State apparatus in striated space (slave morality) -&gt;? war machine in smooth space (master morality)</td>
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</tbody>
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and slave, along with early Alice (the town surveyor sent by the State apparatus) in striated space, have sick kind of will to power while our highly-appraised war machines in smooth space (that is, all those *Wonderland* or *Looking-Glass* creatures), along with late Alice (who will hypothetically become a war machine), have healthy kind of will to power. Also, Geer’s reading focuses on Alice’s growth from a vulnerable child (slave) to a giant Alice or a powerful queen (master) in her quest of self-interested power, whereas our reading
emphasizes that Wonderland and Looking-Glass characters are war machines in a smooth space that resist the State apparatus’s appropriation and its striation of their mad space and time, and as a result turn the town surveyor (early Alice) into a war machine (late Alice).

Nietzsche’s theory of will to power, at the inception, bears an infamous reputation because it is often misunderstood as a lust for power over others (secular domination of the world) or oneself (spiritual self-mastery). In comparison with mastery over others (as was the case with the Nazis), Nietzsche is more infatuated with the inner struggle for self-mastery. Nevertheless, the latter can be subdivided into life-affirming (free spirit) and life-denying (herd) self-mastery. In his division, the knightly-aristocratic master sees his “exalted, proud states of the soul” (BGE, §260: 204) as good and noble, and despises the lot of his cowardly opposite as bad and contemptible, whereas the priestly slave resents the “evil” power of his master who is rich, healthy and cheerful, and sees all the sickly characteristics (e.g. poor, sick and unhappy) in himself as good. In other words, life-affirming “free spirit” is rich, healthy and cheerful because he willingly submits himself to his fate (amor fati) while a life-denying “herd” of Christians or nihilists are poor, sick and unhappy because they “serve to ease existence for those who suffer” (BGE, §260: 207), and look for comfort somewhere else beyond this life. For Nietzsche, “life itself is will to power” (BGE, §13: 21); therefore, his strong, healthy “will to power” is seen in an overman (Übermensch) who loves his fate in this life in spite of its constant suffering and struggle, whereas the weak and sick “will to power” is seen in those who assert power over others (physical mastery over others) or themselves (religious or nihilist self-mastery). Viewed from the perspective of “freedom,” strong-willed

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70 In their introductory article “Nietzsche’s Works and Their Themes,” Bernd Magnus and Kathleen Higgins write about Nietzsche’s contentious will to power:

The formulation “will to power” has received considerable attention by Nietzsche scholars and by a larger spectrum of society as well. Easily exploited by the Nazi war effort and utilized by murderers Leopold and Loeb as justification for their crime, this theme has had an unsavory history beyond the world of scholarship. Scholars have endeavored to set the record straight, but they have disagreed as to the significance and importance of “will to power” in Nietzsche’s thought. (The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche 41)
people who has the master morality maximize what life can do because they say yes to their inner struggle and welcomes any change in this life while weak-willed people with slave morality minimize what (others’ or self’s) life can do by enforcing their domination of the world or denying this life in favor of a promised “beyond.” To sum up, Nietzsche’s master morality is “value-creating” “aristocratic way of thinking” while his slave morality, on the other hand, “has to be undangerous in the slaves’ way of thinking” (BGE, §260: 207). If Nietzsche’s master or slave morality can be compared to an attitude of thinking, then it can be said that “free spirit” as an active thinking force looks at the world from as many different perspectives as possible to go to the limit of what life can do; contrariwise, “herd” as a reactive thinking force turns against life to restrict what it can do with a fixed perspective named truth.

In Geer’s reading model, Wonderland or Looking-Glass is a reflection of the didactic tension between adults and children, and also a drama of the vulnerable Alice who progressively gains her power in order to become a master at last. If, according to Geer, “Alice is well aware” that “the Duchess’s morals . . . . are products of an arbitrary and self-interested will to power” (8-9), then both realize that morality is but a game of power: each tries to tip the balance in his or her favor. “The question is . . . which is to be master—that’s all” (TLG 163). Out of their self interests, adults try to impose their will on the world, and force others to see the world as they see it. On the other end of the scale, we can compare Alice to an unhappy little slave who outwardly pays respectful homage to adult figure masters, but actually disapproves of their liking for ordering people around. The more respectful she is on the surface, the more disapproving she feels in private. At the close of her adventures, Alice either grows very large at the court of law, or becomes a queen at her celebration dinner party. It is at this moment that Alice virtually gains the ultimate power that can qualify herself as a master of Wonderland or Looking-Glass creatures although it only
lasts for a short while before she wakes up. To recapitulate Geer’s reading, *Wonderland* or *Looking-Glass* is a drama of the competing wills of self-interested master and slave who respectively strive for domination over others with their single, universal, and linear perspective. Although it is Nietzschean thought that life is a jumble of forces competing for domination, Geer’s self-interested power looking for a fixed perspective makes both master (from adult figures to Alice) and slave (from Alice to adult figures) in their conflict slaves with sick “will to power.” They both want to assert their power over the other(s).

Two misreadings need to be clarified here with our reading, though. For example, it is tempting, in Geer’s reading, to see Alice start as a vulnerable child or a Pawn and end by growing into a giant Alice or a powerful queen. The story looks like her progressive development of independence from adults or masters. In spite of her occasional fear of those curious-looking creatures that might bite, most of the time she contradicts them by shouting “Nonsense!” She is the town-surveyor, a one man army on behalf of the State apparatus to striate the space in these two curious worlds: she wants to impose her former logic upon these hard-to-manage creatures, or at least learn the ropes of their maddening logics (or alogics?) in order to win out in these games. In *Play, Games, and Sport*, Kathleen Blake analyzes why Alice endures the impudence of the adult figures throughout her journey:

\[\ldots\] Alice is still eager enough to believe that the systems she encounters will be decipherable, rational. Her reasoning goes something as follows: it is true, the creatures assume authority over me in the most galling manner and order me about as if I were at lessons, but if I can figure out by observation \ldots the terms and rules by which the system operates, then when I’m in power \ldots I’ll be able to employ them according to my will, in effect, enjoy the pleasures of mastery.

(127)

We are implying that Alice, although often picked on, knows for sure from the start that she is
superior to them (e.g. curious-looking birds and animals, playing cards, chess pieces, etc.) because she is a human child. For the second, what Geer reads as negatively self-interested masters are in our reading positively-appraised war machines who own Nietzschean “free spirits.” The key is not to treat Wonderland or Looking-Glass characters as the bullying adults who exploit their youths for their own interests, but to see them as schizophrenic nomads who occupy without counting their smooth space-time. In our opinion, it is not appropriate to read the verbal and oral aggressiveness found in angry and often ill-tempered characters as a sign of their self-interests. Rather, it is the power from the outside. All the violence and hostility is there because “[t]he warrior is in the position of betraying everything. . .” (ATP 354). Those angry and ill-tempered warriors are ready at all time to mount assaults against any griding or striation of their smooth space-time. The respect Alice shows those rude Wonderland or Looking-Glass creatures is out of an expectation that they will do the same thing to her like people will do in her own country. This expectation of normalization by being more polite in her Anglo-Saxon manners is already itself an attempt of appropriating the war machines which develop the smooth space-time on a Go board with her respectful gestures set by the State apparatus which institutes the striated space-time on a chessboard. According to Deleuze and Guattari, “State apparatuses appropriate the war machine, notably by arranging a striated space where opposing forces can come to an equilibrium” (ATP 397), only to find that the appropriated war machine “will continually cause it problems” (ATP 355). The problems arise because it is the nature of the latter’s free spirits that occupy the smooth space without counting with the State apparatus’s metric frame of reference. “If work constitutes a striated space-time corresponding to the State apparatus” (ATP 491), then “free action” constitutes a smooth space-time correspond to the war machine. Alice cannot pay those war machines extra “respect” to do work her way. Just as work and free action are incommensurable, so a chessboard should not be superimposed on a Go board. In our reading,
Wonderland and Looking-Glass characters are war machines with Nietzschean master morality rather than the bullying adults. If Alice feels surrounded by a crowd of verbally or orally aggressive adult figures, it is because of the effect of the game of Go that enemy pieces throng to close in on her (the one man army or town surveyor representative of the State apparatus).

3.2. To Remember or to Forget?

As far as time is concerned, many allusions to the “golden afternoon” boating in two Alices give us the impression that Carroll indulges himself in a taste for trips down memory lane; on the other hand, many of Carroll’s familiar-yet-strange tricks of time seem to solidify one single, objective sense of time. We have already argued in the preceding section how the war machines’ smooth space-time demonstrates its disruptive power (playing the game in all directions) against the striation and appropriation of the State apparatus. In this section, we will take advantage of the affinity between time and memory to do away with one single, objective sense of time and Alice’s human memory, and suggest the notion that if Alice can

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71 As Morton Cohen (probably the most authoritative Carroll biographer) observes in Lewis Carroll: A Biography:

It happened on that “golden afternoon” in the summer of 1862. The circumstances were ideal: Charles [Dodgson] was in his element, with the three Liddell sisters, ranging in age from eight to thirteen, and Duckworth, with his singing voice, together gliding languidly over the shimmering water. There they were, alone on the watery sanctuary, secluded in the world of the boat, self-contained, close to one another, far away from family, governess, society, duty, unified by their banter, their joviality, their unaffected laughter. “Tell us a story,” the little priestesses demanded. And out it poured, the story of Alice down the rabbit hole. (123)

Thus, many readers find much relish in hunting for the textual clues to locate their original inspirations. The most delightful example is a scene that happens when Alice and the Mouse, along with many other birds and animals that have fallen into the pool of tears, swim to the shore to get themselves dry. “It was high time to go, for the pool was getting quite crowded with the birds and animals that had fallen into it: there was a Duck and a Dodo, a Lory and an Eaglet, and several other curious creatures. Alice led the way, and the whole party swam to the shore” (AW 20). Correlatively, Duck, Dodo, Lory, and Eaglet here remind us of Canon Duckworth, Charles Dodgson, Lorina, and Edith and their river expedition on 4 July 1862. In his diary entry of the same day, Carroll writes:

. . . Duckworth and I made an expedition up the river to Godstow with the three Liddells: we had tea on the bank there, and did not reach Christ Church again till quarter past eight, when we took them on to my rooms to see my collection of micro-photographs, and restored them to the Deanery just before nine. . . . On which occasion I told them the fairy-tale of Alice’s Adventures Underground, which I undertook to write out for Alice. . . . (264-65)

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transform herself from a town surveyor of the State apparatus to a schizophrenic war machine, it is because Carroll’s chaotic sense of time and space provides a spur to it.

What is time anyway? In Greek mythology, the early Greeks personify “time” to rationalize this immense great Unknown. In contrast with Christian concept of the genesis of the universe that God creates the universe in seven days, Edith Hamilton introduces us to the Greek concept of the genesis of universe:

The Greeks did not believe that the gods created the universe. It was the other way about: the universe created the gods. Before there were gods heaven and earth had been formed. They were the first parents. The Titans were their children, and the gods were their grandchildren. . . . The Titans, often called the Elder Gods, were for untold ages supreme in the universe. They were of enormous size and of incredible strength. . . . The most important was CRONUS, in Latin SATURN. He ruled over the other Titans until his son Zeus dethroned him and seized the power for himself. (24)

The major difference between these two perspectives of time is that Greek mythology believes that “the universe creates the gods,” whereas the Christian concept of genesis believes that “God creates the universe in seven days.” If God is the cause of everything, then the Judaeo-Christian concept of earthly time is linear with a beginning (God creates the world, including time and space) and an end (the prophecy of the last Judgment Day). On the other hand, the Greeks believed the universe (heaven and earth) was the agent who gave birth to the Elder Gods, Titans (e.g. Chronus), and then Titans begot gods (e.g. Zeus). Interestingly, if Chronus, who was “for untold ages supreme in the universe,” is the personification of time, then Greek cosmology has it that the universe (heaven and earth) had been formed before

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72 In authorized King James Version of The Bible, it begins with the origin of the world: “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. . . . And God said, Let there be light: and there was light. . . . And on the seventh day God ended his work which he had made; and he rested on the seventh day from all his work which he had made” (Gen. 1:1, 3; 2:2).
Chronus (time) was born. That means space gave birth to time (although both had already existed for untold ages), and then Chronus begot Zeus who created men.\textsuperscript{73} Therefore, when men were made (in either way) in Greek mythology, space and time had already been there for them: they looked around to see heaven and earth basked in visible light; as to the abstract and invisible time, apart from their personification of it, they could only speculate about its existence by those visible in space: stars moving across the sky, day and night alternating, and seasons changing with time. “Ancient cultures such as . . . Ancient Greeks . . . have a concept of a wheel of time, that regards time as cyclical and quantic consisting of repeating ages that happen to every being of the Universe between birth and extinction.”\textsuperscript{74} From a river of no return or an arrow shot with a bow, we “see” time flow in irreversible succession from the past through the present to the future. An hourglass is the embodiment of such an idea,

![Hourglass](image)

Fig. 3.7. Hourglass.

and a perfect way to visualize elapsed time (sand at the bottom section), time to come (sand

\textsuperscript{73} According to Hamilton, there are two stories of creation—the story of Prometheus and Epimetheus, and the story of the five ages (71-72). In the first, the gods delegate the creation of men to Prometheus (forethought) and Epimetheus (afterthought). After his scatterbrained brother Epimetheus messes up this mission, Prometheus creates men upright and gives them fire to make them superior to the animals. In another story, the gods themselves create five races of men: gold, silver, brass, godlike heroes, and iron.

at the top section), and the fleeting time at present (sand passing through the small opening in between). If it is a Judaeo-Christian hourglass, once it is set (genesis), it will stay there till the last particle of sand passes through the “present” (last Judgment Day). On the other hand, from the motion of the sun across the sky and the phases of the moon, we “see” day in and day out in a cyclic repetition like a pendulum swinging back and forth. Nevertheless, this cyclic time still has an idea of linear time embedded in it. In Greek mythology, Hamilton writes:

[It is in] the place that is wrapped in clouds and darkness . . . [that] Night and Day draw near and greet one another. The house within never holds both Night and Day, but always one, departing, visits the earth, and the other in the house awaits the hour for her journeying hence, one with far-seeing light for those on earth, the other holding in her hands Sleep, the brother of Death. (69)

It seems that ancient Greeks had both ideas in mind. Still, their temporal order as Alice’s “only one day at a time” is very different from the Red Queen’s: “Now here, we mostly have days and nights two or three at a time, and sometimes in the winter we take as many as five nights together—for warmth, you know” (TLG 195). Some might devalue the latter with exclamation “It’s all his fancy . . . you know” (AW 74), but we believe this whimsical fancy is Carroll’s intimidating powers of the false that can disrupt the alleged single and objective sense of time.

The abstract concept of linear or cyclical time as a product of human imagination often comes from their observation of the change of things in nature. In the past, when most mankind made a living by drawing the plowshare through the furrows, they needed to stick to their farming season for a good harvest. The piece Humpty Dumpty repeats to delight Alice is at first a reflection of the changing seasons:

“In winter, when the fields are white,
I sing this song for your delight—

In spring, when woods are getting green,

I’ll try and tell you what I mean:”

In summer, when the days are long,

Perhaps you’ll understand the song:

In autumn, when the leaves are brown,

Take pen and ink, and write it down. . . .” (1-8)75

So far, Humpty Dumpty seems happy about the song he sings to praise the cycle of life, and encourages the listener to write about the serene beauty of nature. But after that, this musical piece grows into a Darwinian plot of oral aggressiveness like what we read in Carroll’s parodies “How doth the little crocodile” or “Twinkle, twinkle little bat.” The speaker sends a message to the little fishes of the sea to express his wish (without disclosing to the readers what it is), and the reply from little fishes is no less ambiguous because it suspends its cause. “The little fishes’ answer was / ‘We cannot do it, Sir, because—’” (13-14). When the speaker prepares a large kettle for cooking, someone comes to report that his fishes are all asleep. Then the speaker shouts his order to the man’s ears; he wants him to go and wake them up. The man agrees to do so only on an ambiguous condition: “And he was very proud and still: / He said ‘I do and wake them, if—’” (33-34). The deal is not done, so the speaker takes a corkscrew to do it himself, only to find the door is locked. “And when I found the door was shut, / I tried to turn the handle, but—” (39-40). Up to this point, Humpty Dumpty’s poem seems to pause with a long caesura; nevertheless, to Alice’s amazement, it has come to an end—so sudden that Alice can hardly believe the poem stops. Another similar example

75 As most readers might have noticed, Wonderland is set on a hot summer day in May while Looking-Glass is set on a cold winter night in November. Two Alice books are set six months apart, implying the cycle of life. When Through the Looking-Glass is “officially” published in 1872, Carroll writes in its prefatory poem; “Child of the pure unclouded brow / And dreaming eyes of wonder! / Though time be fleet, and I and thou / Are half a life atonser” (1-4). When Alice Liddell is twenty years old in that year, forty-year-old Carroll is twice as old as Alice. It seems that Carroll sighs with regret the elapse of fleeting time in nature, and in age.
happens when Alice is ordered by the Gryphon to repeat “I passed by his garden”:

“I passed by his garden, and marked, with one eye,

How the Owl and the Panther were sharing a pie:

The Panther took pie-crust, and gravy, and meat,

While the Owl had the dish as its share of the treat.

When the pie was all finished, the Owl, as a boon,

Was kindly permitted to pocket the spoon:

While the Panther received knife and fork with a growl,

And concluded the banquet by—” (1-8).

Although Martin Gardner has suggested that the grim final words are “eating the owl” (107), the cruel-natured poem comes to an end by a dangling long caesura that implies something red in tooth and claw. Both poems share two features in common: oral aggressiveness and sentence that ends suddenly. But in what way do they relate to a single, objective sense time measurement?

In “Children’s Fiction,” Lewis Roberts maintains the reason that “[w]hy a particular book finds its way into the hands of a particular child at a particular historical moment has much to do with how childhood is understood at that moment,” and “[f]or many Victorians, childhood was an idealized life quite apart from the corruption of adulthood, and for that very reason, childhood and children represented an ideal to strive for, and to protect, especially through the medium of children’s literature” (354). If didactic poetry found its way into the hands of Victorian children, it showed that a prevailing image of a romantic and evangelical child in the minds of the Victorian adults must have embodied their idealized moral characters these adults hoped to preserve and protect for their young children. In that case, Alice is not Carroll’s romantic and evangelical child because he subverts those qualities in his two Alices. However, that does not mean Carroll corrupts Alice. Instead, we can say that
Carroll gets rid of what Roberts says “clothing didacticism in amusement” (356), moves beyond the purpose of utility, and endows play with aesthetic value. That is, play may be useless in terms of didactic purpose, but is definitely aesthetically interesting. In *Play, Games, and Sport*, Kathleen Blake analyzes Carroll’s attitude towards aesthetic playfulness: “. . . there is something directly utilitarian (life-serving) about feeding the body, in contrast with the relatively ineffable, even useless (for practical purposes) feeding of the mind” (39; sic); therefore, “[t]he more the dissociation from usefulness in the sense of sustaining life, the more a sense impression can be engaged in purely aesthetically, in play rather than work” (38). However, the playful games Carroll creates in his fantasy worlds are “going wild, edging into something else. . .” (Blake 19). Many critics have observed an abundance of oral cannibalistic aggression (playing = eating) in Carroll’s two *Alice*’s, particularly in poetry. “There is,” Richard Kelly notes in *Lewis Carroll*, “a great deal of hostility and aggressiveness throughout Carroll’s writings, and it is particularly refreshing to find those qualities in poems and stories about children; for it leads away from the conventional pietistic treatment of childhood that grew out of the romantic period and flourished in the Victorian era” (53). We have argued that the verbal aggressiveness found in angry and often ill-tempered characters in *Wonderland* or *Looking-Glass* should not be regarded as the moralistic and didactic piercing power those unjust adult figures of authority want to assert over their youths who bear it badly. Similarly, the oral aggressiveness in poetry has nothing to do with children’s moral education or the didactic tension between adults and their youths. The hostility and aggressiveness in two *Alice*’s, no matter verbal or oral, can be compared to Nietzschean birds of prey from the outside which cannot stand “Bad Air” (*GM/EH, §12: 43*)! When in the Looking-Glass House, the “immense” Alice appears invisible to the chess pieces “down in

76 Coincidentally, Carroll’s play and work can correspond to Deleuze and Guattari’s pair in physical model: “free action” in smooth space and “work” in striated space.
the hearth among the cinders” (TLG 113). Her invisible hand plays naughty jokes on White Queen and King by picking them up from hearth to the table, and the swiftness for them is just like “the rapid journey through the air” (TLG 114). However, when she walks outside into the garden to join the chess game (after her giddy descent floating down the stairs), Alice finds the Red Queen has “grown a good deal”: “when Alice first found her in the ashes, she had been only three inches high—and here she was, half a head taller than Alice herself” (TLG 123)! It is interesting to hear the Rose say “It’s the fresh air that does it . . . wonderfully fine air it is, out here” (TLG 123). If the Looking-Glass House is simply a reverse of her old room, Alice can still grasp the logic of everything in reverse order, but the seemingly orderly chess game she joins outside is of a more maddening nature because of the confusing space and time, and the verbal and oral aggressiveness. The farther Alice is from her old room, the fresher the air is, but the fresh air first helps the Red Queen grow taller, and makes Alice shrink into a Pawn-sized chess piece. Thus, those Looking-Glass characters surrounding her can be seen as Nietzsche’s birds of prey, whereas Alice is like a lamb. “That lambs dislike great birds of prey does not seem strange: only it gives no ground for reproaching these birds of prey for bearing off little lambs. And if the lambs say among themselves: ‘these birds of prey are evil; and whoever is least like a bird of prey, but rather its opposite, a lamb—would he not be good’” (GM/EH, §13: 44-45)? In other words, the fact that a lamb resents a bird of prey for evil killing, and considers itself good for not killing is self-deceiving because being unable to kill is not equivalent to refraining from killing. Isn’t Alice whining along the way about the spatiotemporal anarchy and the nonsensical remarks they make? That is because she is unable to “kill” her past—killing her striated space-time in favor of smooth space-time. These “birds of prey” hovering over Alice on the Go board have what Deleuze calls “the claws of absolute necessity”:

An original violence inflicted upon thought; the claws of a strangeness or an
enimity which alone would awaken thought from its natural stupor or eternal possibility: there is only involuntary thought, aroused but constrained within thought, and all the more absolutely necessary for being born, illegitimately, of fortuitousness in the world. Thought is primarily trespass and violence, . . . Do not count upon thought to ensure the relative necessity of what it thinks. Rather, count upon the contingency of an encounter with that which forces thought to raise up and educate the absolute necessity of an act of thought or a passion to think. . . . Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter. (DR 139)

Only by inflicting upon Alice’s thought with their violence can they transform Alice from a town surveyor of the State apparatus in striated space-time to a schizophrenic war machine in smooth space-time, but the first thing to do is have Alice lose her balance in topsy-turvy world(s) where time can be stopped and memory goes both directions. We can now return to the question raised earlier: oral aggressiveness (violence inflicted upon thought) and sentence that ends suddenly (freezing of time) are ways to put an end to Alice’s former single, objective sense of time because the concomitant effect of giddiness is right for her transformation.

Also, in the two Alices, almost all time measurement devices go wrong in one way or another. The most famous example of time and its measurement is in the chapter of “A Mad Tea-Party” in Wonderland. Generally speaking, a watch or clock usually tells us seconds, minutes, hours, and days. For days, months, and years, we have calendars to keep track of, but not for longer passage of time like decades, centuries, and eras. What is strange for Alice about the Hatter’s watch is that “[i]t tells the day of the month, and doesn’t tell what o’clock it is” (AW 56)! Usually, we keep to our routine on an hourly basis, but the Hatter revokes its practical utility by the reduction ad absurdum: the Hatter argues that Alice’s watch does not
tell her what year it is “because it stays the same year for such a long time together” (AW 56), and that is just the case with his: it does not tell what o’clock it is because it stays the same o’clock as long as Alice’s year. This absurd reasoning stands because Time has gone mad and “[i]t’s always six o’clock now. . . . it’s always teatime” (AW 58). Consequently, there is no point in showing the hours (nor the days that the Hatter is so anxious to know since Time is frozen). Still, the Hatter is worried about his broken watch and blames the March Hare for lubricating it by putting butter in with the bread-knife covered with crumbs, only to hear the March Hare grumble again “It was the best butter, you know” (AW 56). Two Alices have jokes about proper names like the Hatter’s “Time” in Alice, and the White King’s “Nobody” in Looking-Glass. In the Hatter’s example, he tells Alice not to beat “Time” (for Alice, it is “time”) when learning music because “if you only kept on good terms with him, he’d do almost anything you liked with the clock” (AW 56). However, the hatter’s quarrel with “Time” last March at the concert of the Queen of Hearts has taken the bloom off their friendship. Just before he finishes the first verse, the Queen shouts out “He’s murdering the time! Off with his head” (AW 58) because the Hatter can’t sing in tune. The Queen’s “murdering the time,” which means “disturbing the beat,” is the same as Alice’s “beat time” in that both refer to the musical beat; however, the quarrel between the Hatter and “Time” arises because both of them understand “murder” in the literal sense of the word. Hereafter, the tea-party stays timeless; they have to repeat everything again and again. In “Alice’s Journey to the End of Night,” Donald Rackin observes that Chapter Seven is pivotal because “Time is thus frozen, and one of the most important concepts of common human experience is laughed out of existence. . . . Besides, the concept of space, as we have seen, has already been demolished. At this midway point in the narrative, then, the destruction of the foundations of Alice’s old order is practically complete” (406). To us, the question is whether we can see the substitution of space as a compensation for the frozen time, and what remains
is only the sense of timelessness. We can propose to read that the way the Hatter, Dormouse, and the March Hare keep moving round the table (substituting space) resembles the ticking of a watch or clock; thus Alice’s linear, progressive time is replaced with “live” watch or clock with second hand (the Hatter), minute hand (the Dormouse), and hour hand (the March Hare) moving together in step at the same rate. Although Rackin is ambiguous about the compensation of the substitution of space for the frozen time, he is right about “Time” on this point:

Such a view of time as finite and personal, of course, comically subverts the aboveground convention of time’s infinite, orderly, autonomous nature. This finally puts time in its proper place—another arbitrary, changeable artifact that has no claim to absolute validity, not binding claim, in fact, to existence. Since time is now like a person, a kind of ill-behaved child created by man, there is the unavoidable danger that he will rebel and refuse to be consistent.

(“Alice’s Journey” 405-06)

Any man-made order will turn back against itself. In spite of the Hatter’s fantastic personification of “Time” (a gesture of befriending the abstract concept of time), this now ill-behaved child takes beating or killing time literally, and refuses to cooperate. He leaves the “ticking” job to the Hatter, Dormouse, and March Hare who substitute space by moving round the table so that a new live watch or clock formed by these three can take over his job. In this sense, this operation (from the “frozen” time to the substitution of space like the ticking of a watch or clock) literally murders Alice’s old abstract time, and sets the new live one in motion.

Another example of a time measurement device we would like to bring under discussion is original and inspiring, but much less discussed. Humpty Dumpty is adept at explaining words, and he proudly says: “I can explain all the poems that ever were
invented—and a good many that haven’t been invented just yet” (*TLG* 164). What Humpty Dumpty says is Deleuze’s virtual power of pure event in the time of Aion: “Always already passed and eternally yet to come.” . . . “never an actuality. . . . This present does not contradict the Aion; on the contrary, it is the present as being of reason which is subdivided ad infinitum into something that has just happened and something that is going to happen, always flying in both directions at once” (*LS* 165, 63). Alice is very happy to know that, and repeats the first stanza of “Jabberwocky” to Humpty Dumpty for its meaning: “*Twas brillig, and the slithy toves / Did gyre and gimble in the wabe: / All mimsy were the borogoves, / And the mome raths outgrabe*” (*TLG* 164). John Tenniel’s illustration shows a sundial surrounded by curious-looking creatures that gyre (“go round and round like a gyroscope”) and gimble.

Another similar example occurs when the White Queen offers to hire Alice as her maid: “The rule is, jam to-morrow and jam yesterday—but never jam to-day” (*TLG* 150).
(“to make holes like a gimblet”) in the “wabe.” As Humpty Dumpty explains, “... ‘the wabe’ is the grass-plot round a sun-dial. ... It’s called ‘wabe’... because it goes a long way before it, and a long way behind it. ... And a long way beyond it on each side....” *TLG* 165. Those curious looking creatures include toves (badgers + lizards + corkscrews), borogoves (“a thin shabby-looking bird with its feathers sticking out all round—something like a live mop”), and raths (“a sort of green pigs”) (TLG 164-66). This illustration is a reflection of entropy—the maddening chaotic power running rampantly under man-made order. What this illustration really tries to convey is that man’s artificially constructed universe is an illusion, so the sundial, as the embodiment of a single, objective sense of time, is but another fancy that finds its way onto the top of the pedestal. The curious looking creatures down there symbolize the swarm of other virtual forces that are lively around, with each waiting to strive for its domination.

In the two *Alices*, history, as another aspect of time, is often laughed off as light-hearted joke without any critical edge given to it. In our study, history and memory, as Carroll’s extended discussion on time, are interrelated in both Alice books, and his burlesque of the seriousness of history can serve as a point of departure to help us move beyond a traditional reading that focuses on the nostalgic memory of that “golden afternoon” to a new reading that sheds some light on Alice’s memory, and explores if Alice can transform herself from a town surveyor of a State apparatus in striated space-time to a schizophrenic war machine in smooth space-time, and if yes, what is that driving force behind such a transformation.

After Alice splashes into the pool of tears, she asks a Mouse swimming nearby for directions out of the pool, but his nonchalant appearance makes Alice wonder if he is French, having come to England with William the Conqueror. With limited knowledge of French, she greets him with “Où est ma chatte” (“Where is my cat?”)? On hearing this, the Mouse almost
leaps out of the water, quivering all over with fright. After a casual apology, Alice goes on with her talk about her cat Dinah, and then a farmer’s dog, both of which are good at mice-catching. Alice’s one after another heedless mention of carnivorous animals, of course, offends the Mouse again and again, who now determines to go ashore to tell a crowd of birds and animals his “history” of hating cats and dogs. The Mouse, with an air of authority, begins his driest “history” about William the Conqueror’s invasion of the early English people to dry the dripping wet crowd, but to no avail. After the Caucus-race, they still urge the Mouse to tell his long and sad “tale” about how the Fury (a cur) accuses a mouse to death for fun, but Alice mishears and thinks the Mouse is telling his long and sad “tail,” and offers to help undo the knots when it goes to the fifth bend. After the outraged Mouse storms off in disgust, Alice wishes she could have Dinah with her here to fetch the Mouse back. This episode has a peculiar critical allure at many levels, but a common thread running through them is “history.” Our reading is to see the Mouse as representative of the dry history itself (both William the Conqueror’s invasion and the Fury’s deadly accusation are of aggressive nature—a projection of Alice’s aggressiveness), and Alice’s verbal and oral sadistic teasing playfulness is to torture (frighten) him for her own delight. Alice’s verbal and oral aggressiveness, of carnivorous nature, can be regarded as the power of the outside that inflicts violence upon the dry history that has tied itself too tight with knots.

We have demonstrated the issue of “two countries” in space (Alice’s slow sort of country versus the Red Queen’s fast sort of country (TLG 127)) and time (Alice’s country has “only one day at a time” while the Red Queen’s country “mostly [has] days and nights two or three at a time, and sometimes in the winter [it] take[s] as many as five nights together” (TLG 78). But how can we explain that Alice, as a town surveyor of the State apparatus, is as aggressive as other hot-tempered war machines in smooth space-time? We can argue that under her civil exterior, she has the same drive of oral cannibalistic aggression; therefore, these are few moments that Alice’s fits of aggression drive her to play with her prey prior to eating. It is also because of these “primeval qualities” catalyzed by Carroll’s chaotic space-time that Alice can transform herself to a schizophrenic war machine.
In such curious space-time, Alice either feels quite pleased with her slow sort of country, or thinks Red Queen’s country of “multiple durations” is like the Hatter’s riddle with no answer. In this chapter, the third axis (axes?) after space and time that makes Alice feel giddy is memory. The White Queen’s world is a world of Deleuze’s event: things are always already past or yet to come. Thus, one can live forwards or backwards in either direction. According to the White Queen, “[t]hat’s the [giddy] effect of living backwards. . . . that one’s memory works both ways” (TLG 150). In Alice’s “poor sort of memory that only works backwards” (TLG 150), she can only remember things after they happen, whereas in the White Queen’s good sort of memory she can also remember things before they happen.

“What sort of things do you remember best?” Alice ventured to ask.

“Oh, things that happened the week after next,” the Queen replied in a careful tone. “For instance, now,” she went on, sticking a large piece of plaster on her finger as she spoke, “there’s the King’s Messenger. He’s in prison now, being punished: and the trial doesn’t even begin till next Wednesday: and of course the crime comes last of all.”

“Suppose he never commits the crime?” said Alice.

“That would be all the better, wouldn’t it?” the Queen said. . . . (TLG 150-51)

The White Queen’s effect of living backwards and her memory which can also work

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79 When the moral preaching Duchess utters, “[i]f everybody minded their own business . . . the world would go round a deal faster than it does” (AW 48). Alice feels more than happy to take this chance to show off her knowledge. “Just think what work it would make with the day and night! You see the earth takes twenty-four hours to turn round on its axis—” (AW 48). On hearing this, the Duchess shouts like the Queen of Hearts: “Talking of axes . . . chop off her head” (AW 48)! Here, Carroll plays a pun on “axes.” Alice’s “axis” is an imaginary line through the center of the earth, around which the earth turns. The plural form of “axis” is “axes.” The Duchess’s “axes,” however, are battleaxes that are used in battles and executing prisoners. In our reading, Alice’s astronomical “axis” can be seen as metric multiplicity while the Duchess’s intimidating “axes” can be seen as nonmetric multiplicity. Thus, space, time, and memory are more than three “axes” because in our study the smooth space-time and inhuman memory are three “aggressive” weapons that are brandished to kill Alice’s striated space-time and human memory, and make it ready for the coming of Alice the war machine.

80 The White Queen’s bleeding before pricking her finger (TLG 152), Alice’s cutting Looking-glass cakes by handing it round first, and cutting it afterwards (TLG 177), and the Queen of Hearts’ “Sentence first—verdict afterwards” (AW 96) are also examples of the effect of living backwards.
forwards seem hard for Alice to believe. “‘I daresay you haven’t had much practice,’ said the Queen. ‘When I was your age, I always did it for half-an-hour a day. Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast. . .’” (TLG 153). It is of the White Queen’s idea that practicing makes impossible things believable. Thus, a memory that works forwards is possible if Alice, as the White Queen suggests, has enough practice to believe it.

At the inception of our argument, we propose to distinguish the fictional Alice’s memory from Carroll’s nostalgic memory. In doing so, we can observe Alice’s memory in itself regardless of the pervasive sense of nostalgia in Carroll’s two Alices. Admittedly, Alice at the beginning of her journeys is complacent about her memory (or knowledge) of her former historical formation (the visible and the articulable), but consequent memory failures have put her on a shaky ground. Chaotic time-space in virtual dreams, along with verbal and oral aggressiveness, has inflicted an absolute sense of giddy violence first upon Alice’s striated time-space and then upon her memory of history, thus making way for a reversible memory. Nevertheless, how can Alice believe in such an impossible thing as a memory that works both ways, and how does it work? Is there a chance that Alice can improve upon her poor sort of memory, and start to remember things not just in the general past, but also in the future? In his Bergsonism and Foucault, Deleuze respectively draws upon past-present and present-future to talk about memory. Is there an irreducible difference between these two models, or is there a way that we can reconcile these two models, and apply them in our discussion of the White Queen’s memory that works both ways?

Fig. 3.9. “Bergson’s First Great Schema” illustrates how “electricity” of memory passes around a continuous spiral circuit to crystalize the present instant. In Cinema 2, Deleuze reminds us that “[t]he difficulty evident in this schema arises from ‘the narrowest’ circuit which is not presented in a form A A’, but A O. . .” (279). In other words, it is not A-A’, B-B’, C-C’, or D-D’ closed circuit, but a spiral circuit O-A-B’-B-C’-C-D’-D to infinity. In the
beginning, our instantaneous pure sensation of the object O sends its image to our minds, and produces memory-image A; continuing the relay, our minds send the initial object image (now a memory-image) back to contract our ongoing sensation of a new object image B', and create our first perception. Now this new slightly modified object-image again sends its image to our minds to create memory-image B, and they in their stead send the projected memory-image to contract the current sensed object-image C' so that another partly virtual and partly actual perception is formed by compressing the general past with the instantaneous present. This spiral circuit can go on ad infinitum.

In Chapter Three “Memory as Virtual Coexistence” of Bergsonism, Deleuze gives a comprehensive introduction to Bergson’s famous metaphor of the cone. Although Bergson’s inverse cone on a plane resembles the top section of an hourglass (with sand particles passing through the most contracted “present” opening in between), “[i]t would, in fact, be a mistake
to think that, in order to be actualized, a recollection must pass through more and more contracted levels in order to approach the present as the supreme point of contraction or the summit of the cone” (B 64). Bergson’s theory of memory, according to Deleuze, is “one of the most profound, but . . . the least understood . . . aspects of Bergsonism. There must be a difference in kind between matter and memory, between pure perception and pure recollection, between the present and the past.” (B 55). However, because “[w]e are too accustomed to thinking in terms of the ‘present’” (B 58), our “difference in degree” logic still adheres to a successive linearity of time. Simply put, Bergson divides time into two types of multiplicities: virtual coexistence of difference in kind that appears in pure duration and actual succession of difference in degree that is represented by space (B 85, 38). Thinking time in terms of space (like Einstein’s spatialization of time in his Relativity hypothesis) confuses “actual spatial multiplicity and virtual temporal multiplicity” by recognizing the fact that “there can only be a single livable and lived time” (B 85, 84), whereas the “Bergsonian theory of simultaneity . . . tends to confirm the conception of duration as the virtual coexistence of all the degrees of a single and identical time” (B 85). The simultaneity, coexistence, or contemporaneity of the actual spatial multiplicity (matter, pure perception, the present) and the virtual temporal multiplicity (memory, pure recollection, the past) in Bergson’s duration provides an important foundation for his memory theory. Bergsonian duration revolutionizes our traditional view of successive time with the inverse cone hypothesis that more-or-less contracted sheets of past coexist virtually with the peak of the actual present. In this logic, the “past and the present do not denote two successive moments, but two elements which coexist” (B 59). In our old sense of time, “we believe that the past as such is only constituted after having been present . . . that it is in some way reconstituted by the new present whose past it now is” (B 58). Such belief has the past caught between “the old present that it once was and the actual present in relation to which it is now past” (B 58).
But Deleuze wants us to think twice: “How would a new present come about if the old present did not pass at the same time that it is present? How would any present whatsoever pass, if it were not past at the same time as present” (B 58)? Thus, Deleuze confirms Bergson’s new sense of time that “[t]he past is ‘contemporaneous’ with the present that it has been” (B 58). The present, rather than succeeds, coexists with the past. To avoid thinking in terms of the present, Bergsonian duration revolutionizes our “natural” reaction to temporal order by thinking in the direction of the line from the past to the present, not from the present to the past: “We do not move from the present to the past, from perception to recollection, but from the past to the present, from recollection to perception” (B 63). In such a temporal order, Bergson’s memory works as an inverse cone on a plane:

The past AB coexists with the present S, but by including in itself all the sections A′B′, A″B″, etc., that measure the degrees of a purely ideal proximity or distance in relation to S. Each of these sections is itself virtual, belonging to the being in itself of the past. Each of these sections or each of these levels includes not particular elements of the past, but always the totality of the past. It includes this totality at a more or less expanded or contracted level. (B 59-60)

Although Bergson only depicts two circular layers between the present point S (the most contracted) and the cone’s widest past layer AB (the least contracted), there are in fact numerous circular layers of virtual memory-images that widen to varying degrees of expansion or contraction between his “primary aspect of memory” (recollection-memory) and “second aspect of memory” (contraction-memory) (B 53). In this model of past-present, everything in this inverse cone constitutes our virtual past or pure memory (le tout), in which “[w]e must place ourselves at once . . . in a leap, in a jump” (B 57; emphasis mine).

81 In Bergsonism, Deleuze uses alternative terms like “a pure past,” “past in general,” “a pure being of the past,” “a being in itself of the past,” or “an ontological Memory” to call le tout (all the layers between the point S and the most expanded circular layer AB) “that is capable of serving as the foundation for the unfolding of time” (B 59).
However, if the plane is actual, and the whole inverse cone is virtual, what is their contact point S like, and how does the genuine leap make the operation of Bergson’s memory possible?

In Chapter Four “The Crystals of Time” of *Cinema 2*, Deleuze defines the point S in Bergson’s cone as a point of indiscernibility: “...this point of indiscernibility is precisely constituted by the smallest circle, that is, the coalescence of the actual image and the virtual image, the image with two sides, actual and virtual at the same time. ... This is a crystal image...” (67). As a contact point of the actual plane and virtual cone, the point S as the latter’s most contracted part has two distinct, but indiscernible images of the crystal: “the actual image of the present which passes [never cease to pass] and the virtual image of the past which is preserved [never cease to be]” (C2 79). If we say a crystal image is also a mutual image, it means not only its double crystalline faces, but also its dual tendencies: “Distinct, but indiscernible, such are the actual and the virtual which are in continual exchange” (C2 68). The continual exchange reminds us of the aforementioned continuous spiral circuit (O-A-B’-B-C’-C-D’-D to infinity) in Bergson’s first great schema. At each instantaneous moment, while a virtual memory is contracted with an actual image to crystallize at the point S (tendency of actualization), the new crystal image with the simultaneous contraction of the past and present is already on its way back to the virtual past (tendency of virtualization). And just as the newly crystallized image is doing its genuine leap into the past in general, the whole process will start all over again ad infinitum. Bergson summarizes his memory theory as follows:

We become conscious of an act *sui generis* by which we detach ourselves from the present in order to replace ourselves, first in the past in general, then in a certain region of the past—a work of adjustment, something like the focusing the camera. But our recollection still remains virtual; we simply prepare ourselves
to receive it by adopting the appropriate attitude. Little by little it comes into
view like a condensing cloud; from the virtual state it passes into the actual . . .

(qtd. in B 56)

Alice’s poor sort of memory that works only backwards is not Bergson’s genuine leap into
the past in general because it recalls specific past in chronological time (one image relates
chronologically to other images). In Bergson’s theory of pure memory, a genuine leap into the
general past locates the most relevant circular layer to access memory in “non-chronological
time” (C2 80). Therefore, the most relevant circular layer (“Cronos”) is different from the
specific past (“Chronos”) because “[e]ach of these sections or each of these levels includes
not particular elements of the past, but always the totality of the past. It includes this totality
at a more or less expanded or contracted level” (C2 79, B 60). But the question is: can we use
Bergson’s theory of pure memory (past-present) to explain the White Queen’s memory that
works both ways? Do we need to use Deleuze’s memory of the outside (present-future) in
Foucault to cover the un-discussed future in Bergson’s memory model?

Fig. 3.11. Bergson’s third schema.

To resolve these questions, we must first understand why Deleuze says that even
though the non-chronological time is fundamental to crystal-image, the crystal-image that we
have been discussing cannot be deemed as time itself:

What constitutes the crystal-image is the most fundamental operation of time:
since the past is constituted not after the present that it was but at the same time, time has to split itself in two at each moment as present and past . . . it has to split the present in two heterogeneous directions, one of which is launched towards the future while the other falls into the past. Time has to split . . . in two dissymmetrical jets, one of which makes all the present pass on, while the other preserves all the past. Time consists of this split, and it is this, it is time, that we see in the crystal. The crystal-image was not time, but we see time in the crystal. We see in the crystal the perpetual foundation of time, non-chronological time, Cronos and not Chronos. This is the powerful, non-organic Life which grips the world. (C2 78-79)

In his discussion of Bergson’s “Third Schema” in Cinema 2, Deleuze reassures us of the contemporaneity of the present and the past: the former never ceases to pass while the latter never ceases to be. As with “a dividing in two” (C2 79) in the crystal-image (actual perception and virtual recollection), the non-chronological time also gushes forth with dual splitting as it unrolls itself. With regard to Bergson’s major theses on time, Deleuze notes, “the past coexists with the present that it has been; the past is preserved in itself, as past in general (non-chronological); at each moment time splits into present and past, present that passes and past which is preserved” (C2 80). That is, every moment we experience in our life is the simultaneous contraction of the virtual past which is preserved and the actual present which passes. But if Bergson’s duration resembles his crystal image in the coalescence of the virtual past and the actual present, what kind of role does the future play in Bergson’s memory and time? As Bergson’s “Third Schema” shows, two dissymmetrical jets start to split in two heterogeneous directions at the instant that we sense the object O. Our actual perception in the upper jet makes all the present pass on towards the future while the same perception in the lower jet preserves all the past by duplicating itself along with our virtual
recollection. If we turn Bergson’s third schema 90° clockwise with the upper jet gushing forth downwards and the lower jet curling back upwards, we can think time’s duality in terms of Bergson’s cone: “the ‘present’ that endures divides at each ‘instant’ into two directions, one oriented and dilated toward the past, the other contracted, contracting toward the future” (B 52). The point S is the site where time splits itself: the virtual past preserves itself in the jet that continually curls back upwards to form the whole inverse cone while the actual present keeps passing on in the jet that gushes forth downwards toward the future to renew the point S. This duality can even be understood with Bergson’s first schema if we imagine the narrowest circuit A O keeps billowing outward vertically in Bergson’s cone from O (actual) at the point S to A (virtual) in the cone, and then downwards to B’ (actual) at the point S in order to curl back to B (virtual) in the cone, and continues with this fashion (C’-C-D’-D . . .) to infinity.

The more or less broad, always relative, circuits, between the present and the past, refer back, on the one hand, to a small internal circuit between a present and its own past, between an actual image and its virtual image; on the other hand, they refer to deeper and deeper circuits which are themselves virtual, which each time mobilize the whole of the past, but in which the relative circuits bathe or plunge to trace an actual shape and bring in their provisional harvest. (C2 78)

A genuine leap always jumps back at once to the deeper and deeper virtual circuits in the general past, and then plunges to crystallize its provisional actual shape. The non-chronological time in Bergson’s crystal-image shuttles between “the present” that never ceases to pass on the actuality side and “the past” that never ceases to be on the virtuality side. It is in the crystal-image in Bergson’s past-present model of memory that we see each momentary present split at once into the future and the past. And it is in time that we feel the power of the vertigo in its absolute sense: “The dividing in two, the differentiation of the two
images, actual and virtual, does not go to the limit, because the resulting circuit repeatedly takes us back from one kind to the other. There is only a vertigo, an oscillation” (C2 82). This division in two is “the unlimited Aion, the becoming which divides itself infinitely in past and future and always eludes the present” (LS 5). The non-chronological time is never the living present. It is not only the contemporaneity of always already past and yet to come, but also “an entity infinitely divisible into past and future” (LS 5). Thus, the point S is never itself in its continual exchange between the contraction of the actual present and the expansion of the virtual past.

When Alice is dreaming, the operation of her memory is like the inverse cone moving around the actual plane of experience: a moving tornado that sweeps everything spirally upwards. “Since sleep is like a present situation requiring nothing but rest, with no interest other than ‘disinterest,’ it is as if the contraction were missing, as if the extremely expanded . . . relationship of the recollection with the present reproduced the most expanded . . . level of the past itself” (B 66-67). It should be noted that Deleuze is not suggesting the contraction is really missing. He just wants to emphasize how the pure Memory in the inverse cone plunges to actualize its contraction-Memory because the former (the virtual past) is literally the future of the latter (the actual present). The future does not come from under the actual plane of experience; it comes from the growing virtual cone hovering above.

In Deleuze’s Foucault, there is also an intimate connection between time and memory because “time as subject, or rather subjectivation, is called memory” (F 107). A third term “subject” between time and memory does not take us by surprise as Deleuze’s Bergsonism in Cinema 2 similarly uses “the affection of self by self” as the definition of time: “duration is subjective, and constitutes our internal life. . . . the only subjectivity is time, non-chronological time grasped in its foundation, and it is we who are internal to time, not
the other way round” (80). Deleuze’s “absolute memory” is the “memory of the outside” (F 107). An ethical relation to oneself is achieved by memory on the outside coextensive with forgetting on the inside: “forgetting is the impossibility of return, and memory is the necessity of renewal” (F 108). In “The Memory of Resistance,” D. N. Rodowick draws largely upon Deleuze’s *Foucault* to explain knowledge (the formed relations in audiovisuality of contemporary culture or historical formation), power (relations of [inside] forces), and force (relations of [outside] forces). Understood in Bergson’s cone, knowledge is the after-image remnants of the point S, and the more contracted circular layer is power while the more expanded upper base is force. In his discussion of Deleuze’s three axes (knowledge, power, force), Rodowick distinguishes virtual memory from actual history: “memory is not what is recalled, but rather that which returns. This is what Deleuze calls an absolute memory. . . . The relation of history and memory is equivalent to that of power and resistance. The memory of resistance is not a ‘human memory’ . . . ” (“Memory of Resistance” 49). Therefore, Alice’s memory that can only work backwards is human memory that recalls things of the past while the White Queen’s memory that can also work forwards is Rodowick’s memory of resistance which invokes the force of time as eternal recurrence, and invents or chooses new modes of existence by forgetting the present.

This redoubling constitutes an absolute memory, a memory of the outside that should not be confused with an archival or commemorative memory. This absolute memory is the “real name” of the affection of self by self. Time is the form through which the mind . . . affects itself, while space is the form through which the mind is affected by something else. Time as subjectivation, division of the temporal I from the spatial self, is Memory in this absolute sense: a splitting of time where Memory “doubles the present and the outside and is one with forgetting, since it is endlessly forgotten and reconstituted. . . . Time becomes a
subject because it is the folding of the outside and, as such, forces every present into forgetting, but preserves the whole of the past within memory: forgetting is the impossibility of return, and memory is the necessity of renewal.”

(“Memory of Resistance” 45)

Viewed from this perspective, the White Queen’s superior sort of memory awakens our active, affirmative life forces to “forget” the return of the same, and welcome the direct time-image as a force of change. Therefore, the White Queen’s absolute memory of the outside or resistance is incommensurable with Alice’s archival or commemorative memory.

[I]t is the pure and impersonal form of time that divides us from ourselves in identity and in thought. What is personal and human is what we continually actualize in our bodies and brains to cement our identity and render it impervious to movement and change. What Deleuze sees in the time-image is the opportunity to confront these constraints with an inhuman potential that is outside us as the pure form of time. . . . It is confronting the virtual as an Other we have not yet become that pitches us into becoming. . . .

(“Memory of Resistance” 54)

In a Nietzschean sense, Lewis Carroll is “the physician of culture whose tasks are the diagnosis of becomings in every passing present and the invention of new and unforeseen modes of existence” (“Memory of Resistance” 51). It is not Alice who haunts Carroll, but Carroll who haunts Alice’s memory with curious space-time and inhuman memory. His Wonderland and Looking-Glass machines interrupt Alice’s repetition of the same that looks up to a transcendent world from on high, and replace the “history” of her adventures with “a line of flight that passes from the actual to the virtual” (“Memory of Resistance” 46-47). From her retelling of the dreams to her sister (AW 98-99; TLG 139, 156, 202, 203) or to her little ones in happy after-time (AW 99), these Vampiric thoughts (ATP 377) still haunt her.
Instead of merely redrawing the history of her adventures from her past memory, the fictional Alice gives a new life to the memory she evokes in terms of the present circumstances. Although Alice begins her dream journeys with the illusory memory of history (because she illegitimately generalizes the after-image remnants of the point S as the “history” of her adventures), under the sway of an absolute sense of giddiness, each act of Alice’s retelling of her adventures is the creative evocation of pure memory that will peel off her illusory memory of history to reveal the absolute memory that works both ways inside. In the chaotic space-time where the giddy fugacity reigns, Alice’s memory resists her illusory human memory not by recalling, but by forgetting. Forgetting the after-image remnants of the point S to forbid the return of history, and remembering her belief that everything in the virtual cone is the force of the outside that can be used to renew the point S. In each act of retelling her adventures, the power of the false will again put Alice at the very beginning to relive her stories anew. The more she retells her adventures, the greater chance she has to throw away the maps. Looking at the field of tracks ahead, Alice seems to be ready to join a pack of wolves that are waiting on the far horizon as long as she realizes that “I is an other” (ECC 29).
Conclusion

Life Is a Process of Folding Errors

From this thesis, we have examined the giddy effects of nonsense caused by the irrational break between word and reference (language), between “Alice” the name and Alice the person (subjectivity), and memory of history in striated time-space and memory of the outside in smooth time-space (memory in time-space) in Lewis Carroll’s *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland* and *Through the Looking-Glass*. As early as 1904, Chesterton already stated that Carroll’s literary nonsense was to be the literature of the future. Elizabeth Sewell who has written extensively on the subject of nonsense firmly believes this brilliant guess. From 1950s to 1970s, the Nonsense School majorly drew upon Sewell’s nonsense principles to develop their criticism: “All tendencies towards synthesis are taboo. . . . Whatever is unitive is the great enemy of Nonsense, to be excluded at all costs. . . . The Nonsense poet, therefore, faces a constant paradox of self-denial” (Sewell, “Lewis” 120). Through Sewell’s looking glass, nonsense becomes closed, self-referential language system, in which anything relatable to everyday references is cut off. In spite of the fact that Carroll has a fear of nothingness (“didn’t mean anything but nonsense”) and everythingness (“I say what I mean”), his “good meanings” in literary nonsense are not yielded by cutting off language and life so that a nonsense poet can tenaciously defend his entrenched and isolated beachhead. Instead, language and life in Carroll’s literary nonsense still relates to each other in a way that resembles the mutual grappling between two fighters or wrestlers. They resonate with each other by a double rhythm: irrational break and relinking. In *Deleuze and Language*, Jean-Jacques Lecercle writes: “The essence of radical nonsense lies . . . in the destabilization of our idealized represented reality by the shocking incoherence and brutal actuality of assemblages. . . . Victorian nonsense is also the genre that makes sure that language, which
temporarily opens up in nonsense, soon closes up again” (60). The opening-up in nonsense is to open up to the logic of assemblage “AND” while the closing-up in nonsense is to shut its door to the variation of nonsense so that a relinking between formal order and referential order is rendered possible again. No sooner has it closed up than nonsense wages another vigorous offensive against the logic of representation with a battering ram, trying to break open the door.

For the past three decades, the Nonsense School loses its critical edge because Carroll’s elusive nonsense is still enclosed within their high walls of language. Although new nonsense studies appear between 1980 and 2012, none of them undertakes to examine the unacknowledged relationship between biophilosophy and the logic of nonsense. This thesis distinguishes itself from its progenitors by viewing Carroll’s literary nonsense as his biophilosophy. In our argument from Chapter One to Chapter Three, we have discussed how Carroll generates nonsense in language, subjectivity, and memory in smooth space-time to unsettle Alice in her nonsensical encounters. In terms of language, Carroll as a nonsense poet takes language to its limit so that problems that lie beyond the reach of common words can be revealed. The reality of language cannot be grasped through a scientific lens because Carroll’s délire-driven linguistic monsters have returned to the surface to intuit the diagonal movements across the borderline between sense and nonsense. In the domain of sense, Carroll’s nonsense poems overproduce sense-deprived sense to reach sense degree zero, and serve as true sites of counter-effectuation that bring actuality (institution) back to virtuality (intuition). If a nonsense poem like “Jabberwocky” fills Alice with ideas when she does not exactly know what they are, it is because the intuitive délire restores the vital sign of language whose wings have been clipped by scientific linguistics. In terms of subjectivity, Alice’s “Self” is called into question throughout her adventures due to many epistemological (clashes of different logics) and ontological (constant size alterations) doubts. As far as these
uncertainties are concerned, Alice has ambivalent attitude toward her subjectivity. Ontologically, on the one hand she feels anxious about who she really is, and on the other she also feels curious about what will become of her the next minute. Epistemologically, on the one hand she thinks the way all the creatures argue here is enough to drive one crazy, and on the other she also feels pleased to know the novel way the local inhabitants argue here. We argue that the source of anxiety comes from law (God’s divine gift for Adam), whereas the source of curiosity derives from law-breaking curiosity (the gift from Life itself). Men are fated to struggle in these two contradictory powers: boundary-marking fascist bio-power (law) and boundary-crossing non-fascist power of life (curiosity). Alice’s savoir of herself in audio-visual archive is constantly snatched away by such intrusive forces from the outside as size alterations (the visible) and clash of different logics (the articulable). The current study shows that the passionate curiosity in human’s power of life drives the forces within Alice to fold in other forces from the outside so that the zone of subjectivation constantly undergoes the “interiorization of the outside” (F 98) to resist life’s impasse and establish an ethical relation to oneself. In terms of memory in space-time, we find that the traditional division of the narrative structure of two Alices (frames and adventures) has caused the confusion of Alice Liddell with the fictional Alice in the readings of amateur readers, and also the misrecognition of the haunting memory in two Alices as Carroll’s nostalgic memory in the readings of professional critics. To correct this problem, we propose a new division of the narrative structure between Carroll’s nostalgic memory of Alice Liddell on the side of prefatory and closing poems, and the fictional Alice’s memory problem on the side of opening and closing scenes and her curious dream journeys. This new division helps us focus on the fictional Alice’s memory problem itself without psychobiographical confusion. In her former waking life, the centralized power of the steam-engine in fictional Alice’s Victorian Age constitutes her idea of a single and objective sense of time and space, and accordingly
she surveys the space and measures the time in her Wonderland and Looking-Glass dreams with former imperial yardstick like a town surveyor sent by the State Apparatus. Alice’s memory failures in the new chaotic smooth time-space (Aion time and topological space) are caused by an absolute sense of giddiness, which renders possible the fictional Alice’s absolute memory that works both ways. Through the discussion of Bergson’s famous metaphor of the cone (the virtual coexistence of the past and the present) and Deleuze’s memory of the outside (present and future), we conclude that Alice does not merely redraw the past, but produce her memory anew at present in each act of retelling her adventures.

“By virtue of a striking coincidence,” as Giorgio Agamben observes in “Absolute Immanence” of Potentialities, “the last texts published by Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze before their deaths have at their center the concept of life” (220). Foucault’s “Life: Experience and Science,”82 paying his teacher Georges Canguilhem a great homage as an introduction to the latter’s work, curiously characterizes his shift from what he earlier knows about life. According to Agamben, life for early Foucault, under Xavier Bichat’s inspiration, is “the set of functions that resist death” while life for later Foucault is, as his teacher proposes, “error” (220). Nevertheless, Agamben strangely gives later Foucault’s unexplored life a disproportionately brief sketch, which we would like to elaborate. In his apprentice’s account, Canguilhem, as a historian of science, “has proposed a philosophy of error, of the concept of the living, as a different way of approaching the notion of life” (AME 477). Foucault continues, “[t]he history of the sciences is not the history of the true . . . it cannot hope to recount the gradual discovery of a truth . . . except by imagining that today’s knowledge finally possesses it in such a complete and definitive way that it can use that truth as a standard for measuring the past” (AME 471). Canguilhem’s self-rectifying and

self-correcting history of “truthful discourse” operates by recursive method that
“truth-telling” perpetually undergoes erasure of error. “Error is eliminated not by the blunt
force of a truth that would gradually emerge from the shadows but by the formation of a new
way of ‘truth-telling’” (AME 471). Hence, today’s knowledge possesses “truth” in the same
way as Alice picks beautiful and scented dream-rushes: “though she managed to pick plenty
of beautiful rushes as the boat glided by, there was always a more lovely one that she couldn’t
reach”; when she sits back into her place to arrange them, it is surprising to her that “her
new-found . . . rushes had begun to fade, and to lose all their scent and beauty, from the very
moment that she picked them” (TLG 156). The prettiest “truth” is shy away when one
approaches; nevertheless, the urge for “truth” always drives us to capture its after-image. We
are happy with the make-do substitute, but it is transient “for today’s scientific truth is itself
only [knowledge’s] temporary outcome” and “current knowledge is but a moment” (AME
473). In this sense, Foucault argues, truth is not only Nietzsche’s “greatest lie,” but also its
“most recent error” in Canguilhem’s extraordinary notion of life (AME 476). Under his
teacher’s inspiration, later Foucault defines life as “that which is capable of error. . . . with
man, life has led to a living being that is never completely in the right place, that is destined
to ‘err’ and to be ‘wrong’” (AME 476). From our study, we can say that Carroll’s giddy but
fascinating something shifts to cause the irrational break between two wrestling orders. The
giddy effects of nonsense play a role in the construction of Carroll’s biophilosophy because
life is a process of folding errors.
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Appendix A

Prefatory Poems

_Alice's Adventures in Wonderland_ (1865)

*All in the golden afternoon*  
*Full leisurely we glide;*
*For both our oars, with little skill,*  
*By little arms are plied,*
*While little hands make vain pretence*  
*Our wanderings to guide.*

_Alice's Adventures in Wonderland_ (1865)

*Ah, cruel Three! In such an hour,*  
*Beneath such dreamy weather,*
*To beg a tale of breath too weak*  
*To stir the tiniest feather!*
*Yet what can one poor voice avail*  
*Against three tongues together?*

_Alice's Adventures in Wonderland_ (1865)

*Imperious Prima flashes forth*  
*Her edict “to begin it”:*
*In gentler tones Secunda hopes*  
*“There will be nonsense in it!”*
*While Tertia interrupts the tale*  
*Not more than once a minute.*

_Alice's Adventures in Wonderland_ (1865)

*Anon, to sudden silence won,*  
*In fancy they pursue*
*The dream-child moving through a land*  
*Of wonders wild and new,*
*In friendly chat with bird or beast—*  
*And half believe it true.*

_Alice's Adventures in Wonderland_ (1865)

*And ever, as the story drained*  
*The wells of fancy dry,*
*And faintly strove that weary one*  
*To put the subject by,*
*“The rest next time”— “It is next time!”*  
*The happy voices cry.*

_Alice's Adventures in Wonderland_ (1865)

*Thus grew the tale of Wonderland:*  
*Thus slowly, one by one,*
*Its quaint events were hammered out—*  
*And now the tale is done,*
*And home we steer, a merry crew,*  
*Beneath the setting sun.*

_Alice's Adventures in Wonderland_ (1865)

_Alice! A childish story take,*  
*And, with a gentle hand,*
*Lay it where Childhood’s dreams are twined*  
*In Memory’s mystic band.*
*Like pilgrim’s wither’d wreath of flowers*  
*Pluck’d in a far-off land.*

_Through the Looking-Glass_ (1871)

*Child of the pure unclouded brow*  
*And dreaming eyes of wonder!*
*Though time be fleet, and I and thou*  
*Are half a life asunder,*
*Thy loving smile will surely hail*  
*The love-gift of a fairy tale.*

_Through the Looking-Glass_ (1871)

*I have not seen thy sunny face,*  
*Nor heard thy silver laughter;*
*No thought of me shall find a place*  
*In thy young life’s hereafter—*
*Enough that now thou wilt not fail*  
*To listen to my fairy-tale.*

_Through the Looking-Glass_ (1871)

*A tale begun in other days,*  
*When summer suns were glowing—*  
*A simple chime, that served to time*  
*The rhythm of our rowing—*  
*Whose echoes live in memory yet,*  
*Though envious years would say “forget.”*

_Through the Looking-Glass_ (1871)

*Come, hearken then, ere voice of dread,*  
*With bitter tidings laden,*
*Shall summon to unwelcome bed*  
*A melancholy maiden!*
*We are but older children, dear,*  
*Who fret to find our bedtime near.*

_Through the Looking-Glass_ (1871)

*Without, the frost, the blinding snow,*  
*The storm-wind’s moody madness—*  
*Within, the firelight’s ruddy glow.*  
*And childhood’s nest of gladness.*
*The magic words shall hold thee fast:*  
*Thou shalt not heed the raving blast.*

_Through the Looking-Glass_ (1871)

*And, though the shadow of a sigh*  
*May tremble through the story,*
*For “happy summer days” gone by,*  
*And vanish’d summer glory—*  
*It shall not touch, with breath of bale,*  
*The pleasance of our fairy-tale.*
Appendix B

Terminal Acrostic of *Through the Looking-Glass*

A  *A boat, beneath a sunny sky*
L  *Linger ing onward dreamily*
I  *In an evening of July—*

C  *Children three that nestle near;*
E  *Eager eye and willing ear;*
P  *Pleased a simple tale to hear—*

L  *Long has paled that sunny sky:*
E  *Echoes fade and memories die:*
A  *Autumn frosts have slain July.*

S  *Still she haunts me, phantomwise.*
A  *Alice moving under skies*
N  *Never seen by waking eyes.*

C  *Children yet, the tale to hear;*
E  *Eager eye and willing ear;*
L  *Lovingly shall nestle near.*

I  *In a Wonderland they lie,*
D  *Dreaming as the days go by,*
D  *Dreaming as the summers die:*

E  *Ever drifting down the stream—*
L  *Linger ing in the golden gleam—*
L  *Life, what is it but a dream?*
Appendix C

Emblematic, Figured, or Shaped Verse ("The Mouse’s Tale")

"Fury said to

a mouse, That

he met in the

house, 'Let

us both go
to law: I

will prose-
cute you.—

Come, I'll
take no de-
nial: We

must have
the trial;

For really
this morn-
ing I've
nothing
to do.'
Said the
mouse to
the cur,
'Such a
trial, dear
sir. With
no jury
or judge,
would
be wast-
ing our
breath.'
'I'll be
judge,
I'll be
jury,'
said
cun-
ing
old
Fury;
'I'll
try
the
whole
cause'
and
condemn
you to
death."
## Appendix D

Parodies in two *Alices* and Their Original Poems

*Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland* (1865) [*The Annotated Alice, the Definitive Edition*]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Parody</th>
<th>Original Poem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chap II: The Pool of Tears (parody, p.23; original, p.23-24, note 5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“How Doth the Little Crocodile” by Carroll</td>
<td>“Against Idleness and Mischief” by Isaac Watts (from <em>Divine Songs for Children</em>, 1715)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How doth the little crocodile Improve his shining tail, And pour the waters of the Nile On every golden scale!</td>
<td>How doth the little busy bee Improve each shining hour, And gather honey all the day From every opening flower!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How cheerfully he seems to grin, How neatly spreads his claws, And welcomes little fishes in. With gently smiling jaws! (1-8)</td>
<td>How skilfully she builds her cell! How neat she spreads the wax! And labours hard to store it well With the sweet food she makes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>In works of labour or of skill, I would be busy too: For Satan finds some mischief still For idle hands to do. In books, or work, or healthful play, Let me first years be passed, That I may give for every day Some good account at last. (1-16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chap V: Advice from a Caterpillar (parody, p.49-52; original, p.49, note 3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“You Are Old, Father William” by Carroll</td>
<td>“The Old Man’s Comforts and How He Gained Them” by Robert Southey (1799)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“You are old, Father William,” the young man said, “And your hair has become very white; And yet you incessantly stand on your head—Do you think, at your age, it is right?”</td>
<td>“You are old, father William,” the young man cried, “The few locks which are left you are grey; You are hale, father William, a hearty old man; Now tell me the reason, I pray.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“In my youth,” Father William replied to his son, “I feared it might injure the brain; But, now that I’m perfectly sure I have none, Why, I do it again and again.”</td>
<td>“In the days of my youth,” father William replied, “I remember’d that youth would fly fast, And abus’d not my health and my vigour at first, That I never might need them at last.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“You are old,” said the youth, “as I mentioned before, And have grown most uncommonly fat; Yet you turned a back-somersault in at the door—Pray, what is the reason of that?”</td>
<td>“You are old, father William,” the young man cried, “And pleasures with youth pass away. And yet you lament not the days that are gone; Now tell me the reason, I pray.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“In my youth,” said the sage, as he shook his grey locks, “I kept all my limbs very supple By the use of this ointment—one shilling the box—Allow me to sell you a couple?”</td>
<td>“In my days of my youth,” father William replied, “I remember’d that youth could not last; I thought of the future, whatever I did, That I never might grieve for the past.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“You are old,” said the youth, “and your jaws are too weak For anything tougher than suet; Yet you finished the goose, with the bones and the beak—Pray, how did you manage to do it?”</td>
<td>“You are old, Father William,” the young man cried. “And life must be hast’ning away; You are cheerful and love to converse upon death; Now tell me the reason, I pray.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“In my youth,” said his father, “I took to the law; And argued each case with my wife; And the muscular strength, which it gave to my jaw Has lasted the rest of my life.”</td>
<td>“I am cheerful, young man,” father William replied, “Let the cause thy attention engage; In the days of my youth I remembered my God: And he hath not forgotten my age.” (1-24)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
“You are old,” said the youth, “one would hardly suppose
    That your eye was as steady as ever;
Yet you balanced an eel on the end of your nose—
    What made you so awfully clever?”

“I have answered three questions, and that is enough,“
    Said his father: “Don’t give yourself airs!
Do you think I can listen all day to such stuff?
    Be off, or I’ll kick you down-stairs!” (1-32)

Chap VI: Pig and Pepper (parody, p.62; original, p.63, note 4)

“Speak Roughly” by Carroll

“Speak roughly to your little boy,  
    And beat him when he sneezes:
He only does it to annoy,  
    Because he knows it teases.”

CHORUS  
    “Wow!   wow!   wow!”

“I speak severely to my boy,  
    And beat him when he sneezes:
For he can thoroughly enjoy  
    The pepper when he pleases!”

CHORUS  
    “Wow!   wow!   wow! (1-10)

“Speak Gently” by David Bates (1848)

Speak gently! It is better far  
    To rule by love than fear;
Speak gently; let no harsh words mar  
    The good we might do here!

Speak gently! Love doth whisper low  
    The vows that true hearts bind;
And gently Friendship’s accents flow;  
    Affection’s voice is kind.

Speak gently to the little child!  
    Its love be sure to gain;
Teach it in accents soft and mild;  
    It may not long remain.

Speak gently to the young, for they  
    Will have enough to bear;
Pass through this life as best they may,  
    ’Tis full of anxious care!

Speak gently to the aged one,  
    Grieve not the care-worn heart;
Whose sands of life are nearly run,  
    Let such in peace depart!

Speak gently, kindly, to the poor;  
    Let no harsh tone be heard;
They have enough they must endure,  
    Without an unkind word!

Speak gently to the erring; know  
    They may have tilled in vain;
Perchance unkindness made them so;  
    Oh, win them back again!

Speak gently! He who gave his life  
    To bend man’s stubborn will,
When elements were in fierce strife,  
    Said to them, “Peace, be still.”

Speak gently! ’tis a little thing  
    Dropped in the heart’s deep well;
The good, the joy, that it may bring,  
    Eternality shall tell. (1-36)
“The Bat” by Carroll

“Twinkle, twinkle, little bat!  
How I wonder what you’re at!  
Up above the world you fly,  
Like a tea-tray in the sky.  
Twinkle, twinkle—” (1-5)

“Twinkle, twinkle little star!  
How I wonder what you are.  
Up above the world so high,  
Like a diamond in the sky.  
When the blazing sun is gone,  
When he nothing shines upon,  
Then you show your little light,  
Twinkle, twinkle, all the night.  
Then the traveler in the dark  
Thanks you for your tiny spark:  
He could not see which way to go,  
If you did not twinkle so.  
In the dark blue sky you keep,  
And often through my curtains peep,  
For you never shut your eye  
Till the sun is in the sky.  
As your bright and tiny spark  
Lights the traveler in the dark,  
Though I know not what you are,  
Twinkle, twinkle, little star.” (1-20)

“Will you walk a little faster?” said a whiting to a snail,  
“There’s a porpoise close behind us, and he’s treading on my tail.  
See how eagerly the lobsters and the turtles all advance!  
They are waiting on the shingle—will you come and join the dance?  
Will you, won’t you, will you, wo’n’t you, will you join the dance?  
Will you, wo’n’t you, will you, wo’n’t you, wo’n’t you join the dance?  
“You can really have no notion how delightful it will be  
When they take us up and throw us, with the lobsters, out to sea!”  
But the snail replied “Too far, too far!” and gave a look askance—  
Said he thanked the whiting kindly, but he would not join the dance.  
Would not, could not, would not, could not, would not join the dance.  
Would not, could not, would not, could not, would not join the dance. (1-11)

“The Spider and the Fly” by Mary Howitt (1834)

“Will you walk into my parlour?” said the Spider to the Fly,  
“Tis the prettiest little parlour that ever you did spy.  
The way into my parlour is up a Winding stair,  
And I’ve got many curious things to show when you are there.”  
“Oh no, no,” said the little Fly,  
“to ask me is in vain,  
For who goes up your winding stair  
Can ne’er come down again.”
### The Lobster by Carroll

'Tis the voice of the Lobster: I heard him declare
You have baked me too brown, I must sugar my hair.
As a duck with his eyelids, so he with his nose
Trims his belt and his buttons, and turns out his toes.
When the sands are all dry, he is gay as a lark,
And will talk in contemptuous tones of the Shark:
But, when the tide rises and sharks are around,
His voice has a timid and tremulous sound.” (1-8)

### The Sluggard by Isaac Watts (1715) Part 1

‘Tis the voice of the sluggard: I hear him complain,
“You have wak’d me too soon, I must slumber again.”
As a door on its Hinges, so he on his bed,
Turns his sides and his shoulders and his heavy head.

### The Sluggard by Isaac Watts (1715) Part 2

‘I pass’d by his garden, and saw the wild brier,
The thorn and the thistle grow broader and higher;
The clothes that hang on him are turning to rags:
And his money still wastes till he starves or he begs.

### Star of the Evening by James M. Sayles (unknown but Carroll heard the Liddell children sing in August 1862)

Beautiful star in heav’n so bright,
Softly falls thy silv’ry light,
As thou movest from earth afar,
Star of the evening, beautiful star.

CHORUS

Beautiful star,
Beautiful star,
Star of the evening, beautiful star.

### Star of the Evening by James Orchard Halliwell (later Halliwell Phillipps), The Annotated Alice (parody, p.107; original, p.108, note 10)

In Fancy’s eye thou seem’st to say,
Follow me, come from earth away.
Upward thy spirit’s pinions try,
To realms of love beyond the sky.

### Star of the Evening (quadrille (parody, p.108; original, p.108, note 10)

Shine on, oh star of love divine,
And may our soul’s affection twine
Around thee as thou movest afar,
Star of the twilight, beautiful star. (1-15)
The Queen of Hearts, she made some tarts,
All on a summer day:
The Knave of Hearts, he stole those tarts
And took them quite away!" (1-4)
The White Rabbit’s Evidence by Carroll

(verses read by the White Rabbit)

“They told me you had been to her,
And mentioned me to him:
She gave me a good character,
But said I could not swim.

He sent them word I had not gone
(We know it to be true):
If she should push the matter on,
What would become of you?

I gave her one, they gave him two,
You gave us three or more;
They all returned from him to you,
Though they were mine before.

If I or she should chance to be
Involved in this affair,
He trusts to you to set them free,
Exactly as we were.

My notion was that you had been
(Before she had this fit)
An obstacle that came between
Him, and ourselves, and it.

Don’t let him know she liked them best,
For this must ever be
A secret, kept from all the rest,
Between yourself and me.” (1-24)

“She’s All My Fancy Painted Him” by Carroll

(Earlier version)

“She’s all my fancy painted him
(I make no idle boast);
If he or you had lost a limb,
Which would have suffered most?

He said that you had been to her,
And seen me here before:
But, in another character;
She was the same of yore.”

There was not one that spoke to us,
Of all that thronged the street:
So he sadly got into a ‘bus,
And pattered with his feet.

They sent him word I had not gone
(We know it to be true):
If she should push the matter on,
What would become of you?

They gave her one, they gave me two,
They gave us three or more;
They all returned from him to you,
Though they were in mine before.

If I or she should chance to be
Involved in this affair;
He trusts to you to set them free,
Exactly as we were.

It seemed to me that you had been
(Before she had this fit)
An obstacle, that came between
Him, and ourselves, and it.

Don’t let him know she liked them best,
For this must ever be
A secret, kept from all the rest,
Between yourself and me.” (1-32)

“Alice Gray” by William Mee (1815)

(Initial inspiration)

She’s all my fancy painted her,
She’s lovely, she’s divine,
But her heart it is another’s,
She never can be mine.

Yet loved I as man never loved,
A love without decay,
Oh, my heart, my heart is breaking
For the love of Alice Gray.” (1-8).

Through the Looking-Glass (1871) [The Annotated Alice, the Definitive Edition]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Parody</th>
<th>Original Poem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Chap VIII: “It’s My Own Invention” (parody, p.244; original, p.244, note 13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
"Sitting on a Gate" by Carroll

"I'll tell thee everything I can:
There's little to relate.
I saw an aged aged man,
A-sitting on a gate.
'Who are you, aged man? ' I said.
'And how is it you live?'
And his answer trickled through my head,
Like water through a sieve.

He said 'I look for butterflies
That sleep among the wheat:
I make them into mutton-pies,
And sell them in the street.
I sell them unto men,' he said,
'Who sail on stormy seas;
And that's the way I get my bread—
A trifle, if you please.'

But I was thinking of a plan
To dye one's whiskers green,
And always use so large a fan
That they could not be seen.
So, having no reply to give
To what the old man said,
I cried 'Come, tell me how you live!
And thumped him on the head.'

His accents mild took up the tale:
He said 'I go my ways,
And when I find a mountain-rill,
I set it in a blaze;
And thence they make a stuff they call
Rowland's Macassar Oil—
Yet twopence-halfpenny is all
They give me for my toil.'

But I was thinking of a way
To feed oneself on batter;
And so go on from day to day
Getting a little fatter.
I shook him well from side to side,
Until his face was blue:
'Come, tell me how you live,' I cried,
'And what it is you do!'

He said 'I hunt for haddocks' eyes
Among the heather bright,
And work them into waistcoat-buttons
In the silent night,
And these I do not sell for gold
Or coin of silvery shine,
But for a copper halfpenny,
And that will purchase nine.

'I sometimes dig for buttered rolls,
Or set limed twigs for crabs;"
I sometimes search the flowery knolls
For wheels of hansom-cabs.
And that’s the way” (he gave a wink)
I get my living here,
And very gladly will I drink
Your Honour’s health in beer.”

I heard him then, for I had just
Completed my design
To keep the Menai bridge from rust
By boiling it in wine.
I duly thanked him, ere I went,
For all his stories queer;
But chiefly for his wish that he
Might drink my noble health.

And now, if e’er by chance I put
My fingers into glue,
Or madly squeeze a right-hand foot
Into a left-hand shoe;
Or if I drop upon my toe
A very heavy weight,
I weep, for it reminds me so
Of that old man I used to know—
Whose look was mild, whose speech was slow,
Whose hair was whiter than the snow,
Whose face was very like a crow,
With eyes, like cinders, all aglow,
Who seemed distracted with his woe,
Who rocked his body to and fro,
And muttered mumblingly and low,
As if his mouth were full of dough,
Who snorted like a buffalo—
That summer evening long ago,
A-sitting on a gate,” (1-83)

(Initial inspiration)

“Resolution and Independence” by William Wordsworth (1807)

He told, that to these waters he had come
To gather leeches, being old and poor:
Employment hazardous and wearisome!
And he had many hardships to endure:
From pond to pond he roamed, from moor to moor:

‘How is it that you live, and what is it you do?’
He with a smile did then his words repeat:
And said, that, gathering leeches, far and wide
He travelled; stirring thus about his feet
The waters of the pools where they abide.
‘Once I could meet with them on every side;
But they have dwindled long by slow decay;
Yet still I persevere, and find them where I may.’
While he was talking thus, the lonely place,
The old Man’s shape, and speech—all troubled me:
In my mind’s eye I seemed to see him pace
About the weary moors continually,
Wandering about alone and silently.
While I these thoughts within myself pursued,
He, having made a pause, the same discourse renewed.
And soon with this he other matter blended,
Cheerfully uttered, with demeanour kind,
But stately in the main; and when he ended,
I could have laughed myself to scorn to find
In that decrepit Man so firm a mind.
‘God,’ said I, ‘be my help and stay secure;
I’ll think of the leech-gatherer on the lonely moor!’

(99-103, 119-40)
### Chap. IX: Queen Alice (parody, p.257; original3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12</th>
<th>The Red Queen’s Lullaby by Carroll</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Hush-a-by lady, in Alice’s lap!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Till the feast’s ready, we’ve time for a nap.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When the feast’s over, we’ll go to the ball—</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Red Queen, and White Queen, and Alice, and all!” (1-4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nursery Rhyme: “Hush/Rock-a-by baby” (18th-century)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Hush-a-bye baby, on the tree top.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When the wind blows, the cradle will rock.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When the bough breaks, the cradle will fall,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And down will come baby, cradle and all.” (1-4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Chap. IX: Queen Alice (parody, p.260; original, p.260, note 13)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>13</th>
<th>The Song that Greets Alice by Carroll</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“To the Looking-Glass world it was Alice that said</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘I’ve a scepter in hand, I’ve a crown on my head,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Let the Looking-Glass creatures, whatever they be,</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Come dine with the Red Queen, the White Queen, and me!”</td>
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<td></td>
<td>“Then fill up the glasses as quick as you can,</td>
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<td>And sprinkle the table with buttons and bran:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Put cats in the coffee, and mice in the tea—</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>And welcome Queen Alice with thirty-times-three! . . .” (1-8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Bonny Dundee” by Sir Walter Scott</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To the Lords of Convention ‘twas Claver’s who spoke,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Ere the King’s crown shall fall there are crown to be broke;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>So let each Cavalier who loves honour and me,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Come follow the bonnet of Bonny Dundee,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Come fill up my cup, come fill up my can,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Come saddle your horses, and call up your men;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Come open the West Port, and let me gang free,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And it’s room for the bonnets of Bonny Dundee! . . .” (1-8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**b** Neither Gardner’s *The Annotated Alice* nor Gray’s Norton Critical Edition provides readers with its original verse. Therefore, I consulted Adelman 274.
Appendix E

Carroll’s Doublet

*Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland*

<table>
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<th>Doublet</th>
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<th>Page No</th>
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<td>Latitude or Longitude</td>
<td>minimal pair</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>antipathies (actual utterance) instead of Antipodes (intended utterance)</td>
<td>malapropism</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Do cats eat bats?” or “Do bats eat cats?”</td>
<td>spoonerism</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. 3 A Caucus-Race and a Long Tale</td>
<td>the mouse’s “tale” → Alice’s “tail”</td>
<td>homonym</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. 5 Advice from a Caterpillar</td>
<td>Father William vs. the young man</td>
<td>antagonism</td>
<td>36-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pigeon vs. serpent (or little girl)</td>
<td>antagonism</td>
<td>42-43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. 6 Pig and Pepper</td>
<td>Fish-Footman &amp; Frog-Footman</td>
<td>character doublet</td>
<td>45-46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pig or fig</td>
<td>minimal pair</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a cat without a grin or a grin without a cat</td>
<td>spoonerism</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. 7 A Mad Tea-Party</td>
<td>March Hare vs. Mad Hatter</td>
<td>antagonism; minimal pair</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alice: “I mean what I say” or I say what I mean; Hatter: “I see what I eat” or “I eat what I see”; Hare: “I like what I get” or “I get what I like”; Dormouse: “I breathe when I sleep” or “I sleep when I breathe”</td>
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<td>Tortoise = Taught + us (blend)</td>
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<td>“Visitors’ Bell” and “Servants’ Bell” on each side of an arched doorway with the words “QUEEN ALICE” over it</td>
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<td>“it must have been either me or the Red King. He was part of my dream, of course—but then I was part of his dream, too!”</td>
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<td>“Life, what is it but a dream?”</td>
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<td>life vs. dream</td>
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Appendix F

Nonsense Verse “Jabberwocky”

F.1. The First Stanza of “Jabberwocky” in Reversed Form

JABBERWOCKY

’Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe;
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.

F.2. “Jabberwocky” Reflected from a Glass

’Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe:
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.

“Beware the Jabberwock, my son!
The jaws that bite, the claws that catch!
Beware the Jubjub bird, and shun
The frumious Bandersnatch!”

He took his vorpal sword in hand;
Long time the manxome foe he sought—
So rested he by the Tumtum tree,
And stood awhile in thought.

And, as in uffish thought he stood,
The Jabberwock, with eyes of flame,
Came whiffling through the tulgey wood,
And burbled as it came!

One, two! One, two! And through and through
The vorpal blade went snicker-snack!
He left it dead, and with its head
He went galumphing back.

“And hast thou slain the Jabberwock?
Come to my arms, my beamish boy!
O frabjous day! Callooh! Callay!”
He chortled in his joy.

’Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe:
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.
## F.3. New Nonsense Vocabulary in “Jabberwocky”

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<td>4 new verbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>gimble (meaning)</td>
<td>“To make holes as does a gimlet” (wikipedia). According to the <em>Oxford English Dictionary</em>, gimble is a variant spelling of gimbal (Gardner 152).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>outgrabe (meaning)</td>
<td>Humpty says “‘outgrabe’ is something between bellowing and whistling, with a kind of sneeze in the middle” Carroll’s book appendices suggest it is the past tense of the verb to “outgribe,” connected with the old verb to “grike” or “shrike,” which derived “shriek” and “clegg” and hence “squeak” (wikipedia).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>galumphing (portmanteau) → OED</td>
<td>Perhaps used in the poem a blend of “gallop” and “triumphant.” Used later by Kipling, and cited by Webster as “To move with a clumsy and heavy tread” (wikipedia). This Carrollian word has entered the <em>Oxford English Dictionary</em>, where it is attributed to Carroll. . . (Gardner 154).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>chortle (portmanteau) → OED</td>
<td>“Combination of ‘chuckle’ and ‘snort’” (wikipedia). Chortled, a word coined by Carroll, also has worked its way into Oxford English Dictionary. . . (Gardner 154).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 new adjectives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>slithy (portmanteau)</td>
<td>Humpty Dumpty says: “‘Slithy’ means ‘lithe and slimy.’ ‘Lithe’ is the same as ‘active.’ You see it's like a portmanteau, there are two meanings packed up into one word.” The original in <em>MischMasch</em> notes that ‘slithy’ means “smooth and active.” The <em>i</em> is long, as in <em>withe</em> (wikipedia). The <em>Oxford English Dictionary</em> lists <em>slighy</em> as a variant of <em>sleathy</em>, an obsolete word meaning slovenly, but in Chapter 6 Humpty Dumpty gives <em>slithy</em> a different interpretation (Gardener 152).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>mimsy (portmanteau)</td>
<td>“‘Mimsy’ is ‘flimsy and miserable’” (wikipedia). In Carroll’s time, according to the <em>Oxford English Dictionary</em>, mimsy (with an <em>e</em>) meant “prime, prudish, contemptible.” Perhaps Carroll had this in mind (Gardner 152).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>jubjub (bird) (meaning)</td>
<td>“A desperate bird that lives in perpetual passion,” according to the Butcher in Carroll's later poem <em>The Hunting of the Snark</em>. “Jub” is an ancient word for a jerkin or a dialect word for the trot of a horse (OED). It might make reference to the call of the bird resembling the sound “jub, jub” (wikipedia).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>frumious (portmanteau)</td>
<td>Combination of “fuming” and “furious.” In <em>Hunting of the Snark</em> Carroll comments, “[T]ake the two words ‘fuming’ and ‘furious.’ Make up your mind that you will say both words, but leave it unsettled which you will say first. Now open your mouth and speak. If your thoughts incline ever so little towards ‘fuming,’ you will say ‘fuming-furious’; if they turn, by even a hair's breadth, towards ‘furious,’ you will say ‘furious-fuming’; but if you have the rarest of gifts, a perfectly balanced mind, you will say ‘frumious’” (wikipedia).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>vorpal=? (meaning)</td>
<td>Carroll said he could not explain this word, though it has been noted that it can be formed by taking letters alternately from “verbal” and “gospel” (wikipedia).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>manxome (portmanteau)</td>
<td>Possibly “fearsome”; a portmanteau of “manly” and “buxom,” the latter relating to men for most of its history; or relating to Manx people (wikipedia).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Tumtum [Carroll’s invention?] (meaning)</td>
<td>“Tum-tum was a common colloquialism in Carroll’s day, referring to the sound of a stringed instrument, especially when monotonously strummed” (Gardner 153).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>uffish (meaning)</td>
<td>“The Bellman looked uffish, and wrinkled his brow,” <em>Snark</em>, Fit 4, verse 1. In a letter to child-friend Maud Standen, 1877, Carroll wrote that “uffish” suggests to him “a state of mind when the voice is gruffish, the manner roughish, and the temper huffish” (Gardner 153).</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>tulgey=? (meaning)</td>
<td>Carroll himself said he could give no source for Tulgey. Could be taken to mean thick, dense, dark (wikipedia).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>frabjous (portmanteau) → OED</td>
<td>Possibly a blend of <em>fair</em>, <em>fabulous</em>, and <em>joyous</em>. Definition from Oxford English Dictionary, credited to Lewis Carroll (wikipedia).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 new nouns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>brillig (meaning)</td>
<td>Following the poem, the character of Humpty Dumpty comments: “‘Brillig’ means four o’clock in the afternoon, the time when you begin broiling things for dinner.” According to <em>Mischmasch</em>, it is derived from the verb to <em>bryl</em> or <em>broil</em> (wikipedia).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>toves (meaning)</td>
<td>Humpty Dumpty says “‘Toves’ are something like badgers, they’re something like lizards, and they’re something like corkscrews. [...] Also they make their nests under sun-dials, also they live on cheese.” Pronounced so as to rhyme with <em>groves</em>. They “gyre and gimble,” i.e. rotate and bore (wikipedia).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>wabe (meaning)</td>
<td>The characters in the poem suggest it means “The grass plot around a sundial,” called a ‘wa-be’ because it “goes a long way before it, and a long way behind it.” In the original <em>MischMasch</em> text, Carroll states a “wabe” is “the side of a hill (from its being soaked by rain)” (wikipedia).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>mome (portmanteau)</td>
<td>Humpty Dumpty says following the poem: “A ‘rath’ is a sort of green pig: but ‘mome’ I'm not certain about. I think it's short for ‘from home,’ meaning that they’d lost their way.” Carroll’s notes for the original in <em>MischMasch</em> state: “a species of Badger [which] had smooth white hair, long hind legs, and short horns like a stag [and] lived chiefly on cheese.” Explanatory book notes comment that “Mome” means to seem “grave” and a “Rath”: is “a species of land turtle. Head erect, mouth like a shark, the front forelegs curved out so that the animal walked on its knees, smooth green body, lived on swallows and oysters.” In the 1951 film version, the mome raths are small, multi-colored creatures with tufty hair, round eyes, and long legs resembling pipe stems (wikipedia).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>raths (meaning)</td>
<td>Following the poem Humpty Dumpty says, “‘borogove’ is a thin shabby-looking bird with its feathers sticking out all round, something like a live mop.” In explanatory book notes Carroll describes it further as “an extinct kind of Parrot. They had no wings, beaks turned up, made their nests under sun-dials and lived on veal.” In <em>Hunting of the Snark</em>, Carroll says that the initial syllable of <em>borogove</em> is pronounced as in <em>borrow</em> rather than as in <em>worry</em> (Wikipedia).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>borogoves (meaning)</td>
<td>The jabberwock is not mentioned in the <em>Snark</em>, but in a letter to Mrs. Chataway (the mother of one of his child-friends) Carroll explains that the scene of the <em>Snark</em> is “an island frequented by the Jubjub and the Bandersnatch—no doubt the very island where the Jabberwock was slain” (Gardner 153). When a class in the Girls’ Latin School in Boston asked Carroll’s permission to name their school magazine <em>The Jabberwock</em>, he replied: “The Anglo-Saxon word ‘wocer’ or ‘wocor’ signifies ‘offspring’ or ‘fruit.’ Taking ‘jabber’ in its ordinary acceptation of ‘excited and voluble discussion’” (wikipedia).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Bandersnatch (meaning)</td>
<td>A swift moving creature with snapping jaws, capable of extending its neck. A “bander” was also an archaic word for a “leader,” suggesting that a “bandersnatch” might be an animal that hunts the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are basically two mechanisms in Carroll’s neologism in “Jabberwocky”: fabricating a new word (meaning) and coining two known words to create a new one (portmanteau). In “The Balance of Brigg,” Sewell writes: “Mr. Partridge in his classification of the vocabulary of Jabberwocky gives four new verbs, gimble, outgrabe, galumphing, chortled, to ten new adjectives and eight new nouns” (381). Since Sewell only brings Patridge’s four new verbs into light, there is no way we can verify our selection of adjectives and nouns against Mr. Patridge’s. Our doubts thus arise. First of all, Carroll invents vorpal and tulgey, but lets them dangle without referents. Secondly, since “Tum-tum was [already] a common colloquialism in Carroll’s day,” can it qualify as Carroll’s invention (since nowhere else can I find another potential adjective)? Thirdly, if “mome raths” makes a noun phrase, how can “from home” or “lost their way” function as a noun? Nevertheless, for those nonsense words that have made their way into Oxford English Dictionary, we mark them as “→OED.”

Appendix G

Traditional Nursery Rhymes in Two Alices

G.1. “Tweedledum and Tweedledee”

“Tweedledum and Tweedledee
Agreed to have a battle;
For Tweedledum and Tweedledee
Has spoiled his nice new rattle.

Just then flew down a monstrous crow,
As black as a tar-barrel;
Which frightened both the heroes so,
They quite forgot their quarrel.”

G.2. “Humpty Dumpty”

“Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall:
Humpty Dumpty had a great fall.
All the King’s horses and all the King’s men
Couldn’t put Humpty Dumpty in his place again.”

G.3. “The Lion and the Unicorn”

“The Lion and the Unicorn were fighting for the crown:
The Lion beat the Unicorn all round the town.
Some gave them white bread, some gave them brown:
Some gave them plum-cake and drummed them out of town.”
Appendix H

Age Comparison between Alice (born on 5/4/1852) and Carroll (born on 1/27/1832)

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<th>pub. yr.</th>
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<th>Alice Liddell</th>
<th>Lewis Carroll</th>
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<td>7 (May 4)</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td><em>Through the Looking-Glass</em> (1871)&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>7.5&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt; (November 4&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>19&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<sup>a</sup> As Donald Gray notes, “*Through the Looking-Glass* was published in December 1871; its title page bears the date 1872” (103).

<sup>b</sup> Donald Gray, in his Norton Critical Edition (2<sup>nd</sup> Ed.) of Carroll’s *Alices*, notes that “[Alice] is seven in *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland*, which is set in May; and seven and a half in *Through the Looking-Glass*, which is set in November” (3). In *Looking-Glass*, there are two conversations that indicate the age of the fictional Alice. First of all, when the White Queen inquires about her age, Alice replies “I’m seven and a half, exactly” (*TLG* 153). Then, when game-maniac Humpty Dumpty deceivingly lures Alice to “repeat again what she just said about her age” (which she didn’t say at all), she replies, “Seven years and six months” (*TLG* 161).

<sup>c</sup> In Note 6, Chapter 7 of the first Alice book in *The Annotated Alice*, Martin Gardner specifies a date from textual clues for Alice’s first adventure: “Alice’s remark that the day is the fourth, coupled with the previous chapter’s revelation that the month is May, establishes the date of Alice’s underground adventure as May 4. May 4, 1852, was Alice Liddell’s birthday” (73). This date makes meaningful sense when we know that Carroll’s hand-lettered manuscript of *Alice’s Adventures Under Ground* was originally intended as a birthday gift for his muse Alice Liddell. As to the date of Alice’s looking-glass adventure, Donald Gray, along with Gardner (138), speculates that Alice’s adventure in *Looking-Glass* happened on November 4: “If ‘tomorrow’ is Guy Fawkes Day, on which the frustration of a seventeenth-century attempt to blow up the house of the Parliament is commemorated by the
building of bonfires, then the date of the story is November 4” (108).

d Two sources of Alice Liddell’s age at the time of the publication of *Looking-Glass* seem contradictory. Donald Gray indicates in his Norton Critical Edition that “Alice Liddell was sixteen and a half years old at the end of 1871” (*TLG* 103) while Jo Elwyn Jones and J. Francis Gladstone argue that the real Alice “was 19 at the time of the publication of *Looking-Glass*” (8). Judged from the Alice Liddell’s actual birthday (5/4/1852), Jones and Gladstone’s “19” sounds more credible.