國立臺灣師範大學管理研究所陳慧玲2016-06-032016-06-032013/01-20http://grbsearch.stpi.narl.org.tw/GRB_Search/grb/show_doc.jsp?id=2860233http://rportal.lib.ntnu.edu.tw/handle/20.500.12235/78958中國政府自1999年起，積極推動國有企業民營化，「國退民進」蔚為風潮。國有企業於民營化前，控制股東或經理人員基於自利動機，可能操縱盈餘以提高其出售轉讓價格。然經理人員亦可能因民營化後仍可繼續留任，遂有誘因於民營化前刻意壓低盈餘，使民營化後企業相對績效較佳。目前未有文獻檢視國有企業於民營化前盈餘管理行為。為彌補此類文獻之缺漏，本研究檢視國有企業於民營化前盈餘管理行為。當國有企業民營化後，因股權結構與控制權改變，對經理人員操縱盈餘之誘因應所影響，進而影響其盈餘品質。因此，本研究亦檢視國有企業於民營化後，其盈餘品質有否提昇，及影響民營化企業盈餘品質之因素為何。Extant studies compare the performance change before and after privatization. The empirical results are mixed because these studies do not consider managers’incentives to manage earnings before privatization. To fill the gaps, the first-year project examines whether managers of state-owned firms may manipulate earnings before privatization. This project also compares the earnings quality changes two years before and two years after privatization. Finally, this project examines how the board structure affects the earnings quality after privatization. Institutional investors may have an impact on the way firms produce accounting information. Firms with active institutional investors may engage in less opportunistic earnings management. Thus, this project investigates the relationship between the fractions of shares owned by institutional investors and the earnings quality of privatized companies.民營化盈餘品質經理人員更迭董事會結構Privatizationearnings qualityCEO turnoverboard of directors