蔡蒔銓陳慧玲譚義樺2019-09-032013-08-302019-09-032011http://etds.lib.ntnu.edu.tw/cgi-bin/gs32/gsweb.cgi?o=dstdcdr&s=id=%22GN0698550045%22.&%22.id.&http://rportal.lib.ntnu.edu.tw:80/handle/20.500.12235/94736　　本研究主旨在探討公司治理對經理人將員工認股選擇權的認股價格認定在當月的最低點操弄行為之影響，經理人利用員工認股選擇權會賺取報酬。以及經理人的薪酬在不同競爭市場下公司治理的效果，並深入探討不同的公司治理機制對於發放員工認股選擇權的原始認股價格為當月股價最低點，有無監督效果。 　　研究結果顯示，當員工認股選擇權的原始認股價格在當月最低點的機率，會受獨立董事和董事會的影響。而分析師和自然人持股數也有顯著影響。以及當總經理兼任董事長時會減少投機行為的發生。此外，當經理人出任董事席次越多，有投機式員工認股選擇權的機會越大。然而，機構投資人持股數增加卻會增加投機式員工認股選擇權的原始認股價格為當月最低點的機會，另一方面，在主要股東方面並未發現有顯著監督效果。同時本研究也發現在公司在競爭程度較高的市場時，薪酬和公司治理機制關係較顯著。This study finds the relation between opportunistic timing of employee stock option and corporate governance, focusing on lucky options awarded to manager at the lowest price. Manager will use this grants to earn return. This study also examines the impact of manager’s compensation on different type of HHI. And we try to explore the different impact of corporate governance on manager’s behavior. The results show that the opportunity of lucky employee stock option at the lowest price will decrease because of independent directs and board directs. We also find that analyst and individual traders have significant effect. And the opportunity also decreases when the chief of board direct and CEO are the same one. However, we find that institutional investorshaving more company stock share will increase the opportunity of manager grating lucky employee stock option. On the other hand, we didn’t find that blockholder is good governance mechanism. Finally, we show that company in competition market will have significant relationship between corporate governance and compensation.員工認股選擇權公司治理薪酬競爭市場Employee Stock OptionCorporate GovernanceCompensationHHI