李宗翰Lee, Tsong-Han韋彥廷Wei, Yan-Ting2024-12-172024-07-262024https://etds.lib.ntnu.edu.tw/thesis/detail/ee84a547e0cb233363c141801d6a50dd/http://rportal.lib.ntnu.edu.tw/handle/20.500.12235/122874本文從財政與政治兩大面向，藉由朝廷如何應對當前財政問題，探討北宋仁宗朝沒有正副宰相主導的大規模財政改革之原因。十一世紀初宋遼締結澶淵之盟後，宋遼關係趨於穩定，宋真宗大行封禪，朝政日漸敗壞。仁宗初期由劉太后主持朝政，明道元年（1032）方由仁宗親政。寶元元年（1038）宋夏戰爭爆發，稍後由范仲淹等人所領導的慶曆變法以吏治為主要內容。與此相對，神宗熙寧（1068-1077）年間由王安石所主導的改革則以經濟層面為主。本文依序從決策者、支出和收入等三個角度考察前述核心問題。以「決策者」的視角檢視決策背景，可發現仁宗朝的宰相或參知政事任一群體所具財政職務經歷的人數比例，都介於真宗朝和神宗熙寧年間之間。真、仁兩朝各時段正副宰相具財政職務經歷的比例都是前期較低、後期較高，與財政支出擴大有關，仁宗後期的高比例持續維持到英宗朝和神宗熙寧年間。從兩次變法的中書結構來看，熙寧變法在決策與執行上比慶曆變法更有利。就支出視角而言，慶曆末官員和軍事支出已成為朝廷重要政治問題。仁宗中、後期既著手進行西北的冗兵調查、減放措施並陸續調整西北邊費支付方式，也從科舉與蔭補制度的修正減少入仕人數。就收入視角而言，仁宗中期隨著對外關係趨緩，解鹽和茶法先後改為通商，大方向是增加地方收入以負擔地方支出，導致原本尚需支應地方支出的中央收入減少，卻也使中央收入成為官員批評的對象。糧食上供方面，仁宗前期常減少先前所定的上供額度，宋夏關係趨緩的慶曆中期，增加南方上供數額，引發諫官批評。皇祐年間南方發生動亂，朝廷陸續減少南方上供糧食數額，應有降低納稅負擔、籌措軍事資源和安撫地方民心等用意。綜合本文討論，仁宗朝掌握決策權的正副宰相是在對財政狀況有基本認識下採取非財政的改革或調整措施，而非在實務經驗上完全不了解財政事務。仁宗中期以降已由人事與軍事的業務面進行裁減支出的作為，而收入面則是改變中央與地方的分配方式。從更大的圖像思考，仁宗朝未出現正副宰相推動的大規模財政改革，反映北宋中期祖宗之法的成熟，也可視為朝廷在宋夏戰爭後的喘息或因忙於地方動亂而無暇調整政策之結果。This thesis aims to discuss the reason why there had been no large-scale financial reform initiated by Grand Councilors and Assistant Grand Councilors during Renzong’s reign (1022-1063) in Northern Song China. Viewing from three perspectives, namely (1) decision makers, (2) government expenditure, and (3) government revenue, this thesis answers the question above by describing how the court faced various conditions throughout Renzong’s reign.First, for decision makers, the proportions of those with financial-post experience among every different group (period) of Grand Councilors and Assistant Grand Councilors are relatively low in the first half and high in the second half for both Zhenzong’s and Renzong’s reign. This change has to do with the escalating government expenditure in the middle period of their reign.Second, for expenditure, personnel and military expenditures became major political problems in 1047-1048. In the latter half of Renzong’s reign, the court conducted investigation of excessive troops, turned them back to citizens, adjusted methods of military expenditure payment, and reduced the quota on civil service recruitment through examinations and yin (protection) privilege.Third, for revenue, the policy for tea and Shaanxi salt trade turned from court monopoly to requiring businessmen pay excise tax to the local government. As a result, local government had more resources to cover its expenditure, while central government revenue decreased. In addition, quota on southern-produced grain offering to Kaifeng was often lowered in early Renzong’s reign. The amount greatly increased after Song-Tangut war gradually came to an end, and this act was criticized by policy critics. The quota was reduced afterwards due to the social unrest in southern China.Instead of decision makers’ unawareness of financial affairs, the author argues that there had been institutional reforms for personnel and military service in the second half of Renzong’s reign which may have led to a decrease on government expenditure. From a larger perspective, the “no large-scale reform initiated by Grand Councilors and Assistant Grand Councilors” phenomenon indicated that the idea of following the instructions set by imperial ancestors had matured and consolidated in mid-Northern Song. Finally, this phenomenon may also be seen as a rest after the Song-Tangut war or a result of the court’s incapacity to reform due to southern unrest.宋仁宗財政史財政改革宋夏戰爭慶曆變法Emperor Renzongfinancial historyfinancial reformSong-Tangut war (Song-Xixia war)Qingli reform學術論文