陳文政 博士鄭名呈2019-08-282009-1-212019-08-282009http://etds.lib.ntnu.edu.tw/cgi-bin/gs32/gsweb.cgi?o=dstdcdr&s=id=%22GN0095102110%22.&%22.id.&http://rportal.lib.ntnu.edu.tw:80/handle/20.500.12235/85529摘要 本論文研究動機的濫觴主要是針對於臺灣核能四廠歷經停工，旋即又復工個案之荒謬決策過程為研究，同時對於政府最高決策者事後的政治責任亦或是法律責任之追究皆付之闕如，筆者深感有建立相關課責機制之必要，再藉由博奕理論模型建構來解釋論證核四廠爭論始末，最終提出筆者研究後之我國現有課責制度上之改革建言，期許能有效消弭我國行政與立法對於相關重大建設之岐見，減少對立，建立一套行政與立法共同遵循的制約機制。 我國行政權有僭越立法權之態勢，也是造成今日行政、立法嚴重對立難以和解亂象，藉由核四案爭論，可以看到許多行政與立法兩部門互相拔河的明顯軌跡，然此高度政治意識凌駕專業知識的情況之下，行政與立法兩部門互動的良窳，更是決定政策成敗的關鍵因素。 決策者本應受制於國家制度，使得決策者無法隨意為之，方不至於造成社會撕裂及政黨對立。當決策者以意識型態掛帥，一意孤行時，應有相對之課責機制予以制衡。然本論文並非探究核四該不該興建，而是最高層執政者因執著於其政黨意識型態，罔顧國家利益，違背依法行政原則，對於核四停工又復工之決策應負之政治責任為何？其因違法決策所造成之經濟損失，是否應負連帶賠償責任？我國現有的罷免、彈劾制度能否發揮功能？又如何改正現有制度，讓執政當局有所顧忌而不致背離多數民意？本論文首先提出建置國家政治求償制度，並恢復立法院行使行政院長同意權等二個改革面向，或可作為改變目前國家政治亂象參考，使得國家能建立長治久安的政治制度。Abstract This study was inspired by the absurd process of policy-making to halt the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant but yet to resume it soon after. Still, the fact that the highest decision maker having never been held politically or legally liable also greatly prompts me to deliberate upon the necessity of establishing certain accountability mechanism. A model constructed with game theory is utilized to expound the controversy over the fourth nuclear power plant. Suggestions to reform current accountability systems in our country are proposed after my research with the aim to prevent discrepancies between the administration and the legislation in major infrastructure projects; to reduce oppositions; and to install a confinement mechanism to be followed by both the administration and the legislation. The administration in our country tends to overtake the legislation, which has given rise to the severe and irreconcilable political oppositions and unrest between the administration and the legislation nowadays. The dispute of the fourth nuclear power plant has revealed obvious traces of seesaw struggle between the administration and the legislation. In such a situation that political ideology dominates professional knowledge, the success or failure of a policy hinges on the interaction between the administration and the legislation. Policy makers ought to be governed by state institutions so that they will not behave unscrupulously and political infighting and a ripped society can then be avoided. Whenever policy makers act stubbornly under ideological constraints, there should be certain accountability mechanism to check and balance their powers. The issue of whether or not to build the fourth nuclear power plant is not the theme of this paper, but we probe into the following topics instead: What should be the political liability on the head of government after such a policy was made to halt the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant but yet to resume it soon after simply based on political ideology disregarding state interests and violating the principle of administering according to law? Should the head of government be jointly held liable for economic losses due to illegal policy making? Will existing systems of deposition and impeachment function properly? How existing systems can be modified so that the authorities may scruple to deviate from mainstream opinion of people? Suggestions covering three aspects of reforms are proposed: The first is the reform of procedures of appointment of Justices of Constitutional Court, Judicial Yuan. The second is to establish a compensation system to state politics. The third is to resume Legislative Yuan's power of advise and consent in the appointment of Premier. It is anticipated that such reforms can be of reference to rectifying political unrest in our country so that political systems ensuring long term peace and stability can be established.核四預算審議式民主政策課責520號解釋The fourth nuclear power plantbudgetdeliberative democracypolitical accountability. Y. Interpretation No. 520