國立臺灣師範大學公民教育與活動領導學系黃信豪2014-12-022014-12-022009-06-011027-0221http://rportal.lib.ntnu.edu.tw/handle/20.500.12235/42155本文主旨爲探討中國大陸1978至2008年曾出任黨政正部級領導職務菁英的仕途發展模式。雖然近年來外界關注到中共菁英日益具備高學歷、技術專業化的共同背景，然而既有文獻僅關注菁英組成的特徵演變，菁英仕途發展模式成爲被忽略的研究課題。基於政權演變與組織邏輯的理論視角，本文闡述中共如何在緊握專政的基本原則下，呈現兼顧經濟、社會發展與治理需求的人事安排。本文認爲，由於中共改革開放的調整路線主要來自於領導人更替下的偏好改變，在未迫適應環境的調整下，任何因應黨路線轉變的人事調整，將必須限制在維持黨專政的根本目的內。因此，不受到黨政治忠誠認可的專業菁英，將隨著時間不斷遭到更替；而能夠快速晉升至領導人者，也多是黨透過黨職歷練以確保其政治忠誠的領導幹部。這些仕途發展模式，透露出爲何中共得以在改革開放後追求經濟成長與現代化建設，亦能維持一黨專政的獨特演變路徑。This article studies the career paths of China's political elites in the reform era, through quantitative analyses of the elites who have held on to provincial gubernatorial or ministry level positions within the Chinese government and communist party over the period from March 1978 to March 2008. Even though the rise of technocrats has recently drawn much attention from scholars, the career path of political elites remains an overlooked topic, which has not been explored systematically. Given the organizational logic, the author argues that the adjustment to the party's course in 1978 was basically initiated and designed according to the party leader's preferences. Since the CCP was not obliged to fundamentally change its party's course, the intension and extension of member adjustment would be limited to the purpose of maintaining the CCP's dictatorship. This organizational rationale has led to a consistent pattern of career paths for elites in China since 1978. Specifically, the technocrats without the political loyalty approved by the CCP would be replaced over time while those who hold strong political credentials, such as party-position experience could be promoted quickly. Such a career pattern reveals the unique way in which the regime has evolved in China, which seeks a balance between the survival prerequisite of one-party dictatorship and the functional target of economic development.中共  菁英甄補  政權演變  組織邏輯  競爭性風險China�lite recruitment�areer path�egime revolution�Organizational logic�ompeting risk