列維納斯˙動物倫理˙德希達
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Date
2008/08-2009/07
Authors
梁孫傑
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Abstract
本計畫將分成兩部分實施，從列維納斯和德希達的觀點來探討動物問題。第一部 分延續本人之前對於列維納斯倫理學和動物的研究，藉助德希達的看法，探討列 維納斯無法確定動物是否有面貌所呈現的倫理困境；第二部分則折返列維納斯的 觀點來回應德希達的批判，期望能開展兩者之間充分的對話空間，並從動物倫理 的立場，試圖轉圜迂旋兩者對話之後延生的議題。現分述如下： （1） 雖然列維納斯聲稱他的倫理哲學是「人類」的倫理哲學，對於動物他無法 多談，但是就如本人最近一篇論文〈要不要臉〉所得到的結論，動物卻在 我和他者的邂逅上扮演舉足輕重的關鍵角色。對於動物這種功成身退的機 制，我們擬從德希達所揭露的「犧牲」的概念切入，探究列維納斯犧牲動 物成就人類倫理的來龍去脈。所牽涉到的議題，將會包括感知意識、殺戮、 吃食，以及它們和人類主體建構的關係。「汝勿殺」是臉龐對我說的第一 句話，但這似乎暗示著我被允許去殺戮非人類生物。對於這樣合法的謀殺 定律，以及延生出來的問題（如同質化、干預、侵略、剝削、吞噬、吃食 等），我們將從德希達的觀點來檢視列維納斯的絕對他者。 （2） 列維納斯曾以「交錯排列」（chiasmus）來說明德希達的論述風格。計畫 第二部分，擬從此觀點回應德希達在動物問題上對列維納斯的批判。德希 達認為我們必須挖掘出遭到人類中心主義長期扭曲的動物經驗。他稱這些 經驗為「如深淵般的斷裂」；更有甚者，德希達逆向思考基督教創世神話， 並從「被動」的角度詮釋邊沁（Bentham）「動物會受苦嗎？」的提問， 主張只有當人類跟隨動物，只有當人類看到自己被動物看到時，才算是人 類。雙方凝視的契合（correspondence）開啟解構人類中心主義絕對被動 的可能性。在倫理關係上，列維納斯則是以我之為他者的人質來指稱這種 絕對被動性。
This project will be divided into two parts. The first part is a continuation of my previous study on the animality in Levinas’s ethics. By using Derrida’s views on animals, I’d like to explore Levinas’s ethical dilemma, shown in his uncertainty of the face of the animal. The second part would focus on Levinas’s possible response to Derrida’s critique on the issue of animals, hoping to open up a dynamic dialogue between the two influential philosophers; the subsequent issues spawned by their chiasmatic dialogue will be further discussed under the rubrics of animal ethics.What follows are the outline summaries of the two part of my project: (a) Levinas claims that his ethical philosophy is the ethical philosophy of/for human beings, and he can’t really say anything about the animal, especially the face of the animal; nevertheless, as shown in the conclusion of my latest essay, “Losing Face?”, the animal plays a crucial role in the encounter between the I and the Other. I’d like to explore this expendable nature in the light of Derrida’s idea of the sacrifice (or the sacrifice of the sacrifice); I’ll focus my study on the way Levinas sacrifices animals to establish (or erect for that matter) human ethics. The issues will involve such topics as cognitive consciousness, killing, eating, and their relationship with the establishment of human subjectivity. If “Thou shalt not kill”is the first utterance of the face to the I, the utterance also implies that I am allowed to kill non-human beings.We will investigate the problematic of Levinas’s absolute Other and its relevant issues (homogeneity, intervention, invasion, exploitation, carnivorous desire, and eating) from Derrida’s viewpoints. (b) Levinas once said that Derrida’s discursive style is stemmed on “chiasmus.”I’ll take this as the point of departure to respond to Derrida’s critique of Levinas’s idea of the animal. To Derrida, we have to excavate the animal experience that has been long distorted by anthropocentrism. He calls this experience “abysmal ruptures”; moreover, Derrida provides another reading of the animal’s status in Genesis, arguing human beings can become human beings only when they follow animals, only when they are seen seen by the animals. This absolute passivity, together with Derrida’s echo to Bentham’s eternal rhetorical question, “Can the animal suffer?”, opens up the possibility of a correspondence between the human beings and animals through their gazing at each other. In terms of the absolute relationship, Levinas understands this absolute passivity in terms of the encounter between the I as the hostage and the Other who holds hostage. I intend to examine the difference between the two kinds of absolute passivity, and to see whether this difference can also contribute to our understanding of the animal ethics.
This project will be divided into two parts. The first part is a continuation of my previous study on the animality in Levinas’s ethics. By using Derrida’s views on animals, I’d like to explore Levinas’s ethical dilemma, shown in his uncertainty of the face of the animal. The second part would focus on Levinas’s possible response to Derrida’s critique on the issue of animals, hoping to open up a dynamic dialogue between the two influential philosophers; the subsequent issues spawned by their chiasmatic dialogue will be further discussed under the rubrics of animal ethics.What follows are the outline summaries of the two part of my project: (a) Levinas claims that his ethical philosophy is the ethical philosophy of/for human beings, and he can’t really say anything about the animal, especially the face of the animal; nevertheless, as shown in the conclusion of my latest essay, “Losing Face?”, the animal plays a crucial role in the encounter between the I and the Other. I’d like to explore this expendable nature in the light of Derrida’s idea of the sacrifice (or the sacrifice of the sacrifice); I’ll focus my study on the way Levinas sacrifices animals to establish (or erect for that matter) human ethics. The issues will involve such topics as cognitive consciousness, killing, eating, and their relationship with the establishment of human subjectivity. If “Thou shalt not kill”is the first utterance of the face to the I, the utterance also implies that I am allowed to kill non-human beings.We will investigate the problematic of Levinas’s absolute Other and its relevant issues (homogeneity, intervention, invasion, exploitation, carnivorous desire, and eating) from Derrida’s viewpoints. (b) Levinas once said that Derrida’s discursive style is stemmed on “chiasmus.”I’ll take this as the point of departure to respond to Derrida’s critique of Levinas’s idea of the animal. To Derrida, we have to excavate the animal experience that has been long distorted by anthropocentrism. He calls this experience “abysmal ruptures”; moreover, Derrida provides another reading of the animal’s status in Genesis, arguing human beings can become human beings only when they follow animals, only when they are seen seen by the animals. This absolute passivity, together with Derrida’s echo to Bentham’s eternal rhetorical question, “Can the animal suffer?”, opens up the possibility of a correspondence between the human beings and animals through their gazing at each other. In terms of the absolute relationship, Levinas understands this absolute passivity in terms of the encounter between the I as the hostage and the Other who holds hostage. I intend to examine the difference between the two kinds of absolute passivity, and to see whether this difference can also contribute to our understanding of the animal ethics.