有限活化的中共菁英循環

Abstract

本文以中國大陸1978至2008年出任各屆黨政正部級（含以上）職務的領導菁英為研究對象，探討中共高層官員的組成特徵與其演變趨勢。基於一系列的趨勢分析與模型檢驗，本文發現即使中共選拔年紀較輕、具專業技能領導幹部來回應黨經濟現代化建設的目標需求，但在黨務部門的菁英甄補卻存在著不變的政治考量：包括政府菁英專業化轉型先於黨務菁英：黨務、政府菁英政治性條件的差異迄今未出現系統性的改變；中共透過「黨職經歷」的政治篩選建立菁英接班的升遷管道等。這些強調政治憑證重要性的跨時趨勢，與既有文獻較偏重社會流動的論述存有一定程度的落差。為此，本文從政權屬性的視角嘗試建構「有限活化」的概念來予以解釋。本文除了闡述菁英的有限活化在政權演變上的意義，也討論其對中國大陸未來政治發展的意涵。

This paper addresses the changes and continuities of political elite configuration in China's reform era based on a dataset for the top Chinese leaders who worked on province or ministry level positions (and above) within the party or the government from 1978 to 2008. By applying a series of trend analyses and quantitative modeling, this paper finds that even though a large number of technocrats were recruited for their professional background in response to the demand for economic modernization, the CCP was still selecting the party elites by way of screening elites' political credentials. Specifically, the findings show that (1) the government recruited technocrats earlier than the party did; (2) there has been a lasting gap in individual political credentials between the party elites and the government elites; (3) the CCP has constructed a systematic mode for elite selection and elite cultivation by means of’ party-position appointment. These patterns highlight the importance of political credentials, but can not be systematically explained by the previous literature, which was mostly derived from the social mobility analysis. Accordingly, the author provides a preliminary explanation of "limited renewal" for the empirical findings, and discusses its implications on the regime evolution and political future in China.