有限活化的中共菁英循環
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Date
2011-07-31
Authors
黃信豪
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中共如何在快速經濟發展下自我調整，以維持一黨專政的地位？中共甄補菁英的邏 輯為何？不同職務菁英是否有所差異？黨如何在考量社會結構多元化、分化的脈絡下選 拔幹部以維持其統治正當性？本研究計畫將以中共改革開放時期的「政治菁英循環」為 觀察標的，系統性分析菁英結構演變趨勢。 本研究計畫認為，中共的改革開放調整路線主要來自於領導人更換下的偏好改變。 在未被迫適應環境調整下，任何因應黨路線而來的人事調整，將必須限制在維持黨專政 的根本目的內。如此的邏輯使得改革開放時期中共黨政的菁英循環出現「有限活化」的 特色。首先，本計畫預期在宏觀層面上80 年代以降黨員組成以及中央委員，應顯露與 社會結構分化的一致趨勢；在微觀層次上黨、政高官的專業化轉型應也是相當明確的。 然而，菁英的多元化與專業化轉型將依職務重要性，在政治審查的篩選下出現時序差 異；黨、政領導菁英的政治憑藉差異至今也並未出現系統性的改變。即使近年外界多強 調中共幹部甄補的專業考量與其技術官僚特徵，但本研究計畫將揭露中國大陸如何在菁 英活化過程中存在著維持專政的思維。
How did the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adjust itself to maintain one-party dictatorship during the reform era? What is the inner-logic governing the elite recruitment in the CCP? Does the recruitment criterion vary for different positions? How did the party recruit cadres in correspondence to social differentiation so as to legitimatize its representativeness? This research project attempts to focus on China’s elite circulation in the reform era and to explore the issues of elite configuration on both the Marco-level and Micro-level. Given the perspective of regime evolution, the proposal argues that the adjustment of party course in 1978 was initiated and designed according to the party leader’s preference. Since the CCP was not forced to fundamentally change its party course, the breadth and depth of membership adjustment would be constrained by the purpose of maintaining CCP’s dictatorship. This organizational rationale generated a consistent pattern of elite circulation—“Limited Renewal”, which has guided both the elite turnover and transformation over time. I anticipate that, at the macro-level, the composition of party members and Central Committee, would reflect the change of social structure, and at the micro-level, both party and government elites would reveal notable transformation towards technocracy after the early 1980’s. However, both trends in the elite formation were controlled with significant timing differences varying with the level of political power. While the transformation of the Central Committee lag behind that of party members, the latter fell behind the transformation of government elites. Furthermore, there exist longstanding and consistent differences in political credentials and the degree of specialization between party and government elites. Even though the rise of technocrats has recently drawn much attention from literature, the proposal finds the process of elite renewal was much more restricted by CCP’s grip of power. Nevertheless, this pattern of elite circulation has reflected the unique way of regime evolution in China, which balances between the survival prerequisite of one-party dictatorship and the functional device of economic development.
How did the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adjust itself to maintain one-party dictatorship during the reform era? What is the inner-logic governing the elite recruitment in the CCP? Does the recruitment criterion vary for different positions? How did the party recruit cadres in correspondence to social differentiation so as to legitimatize its representativeness? This research project attempts to focus on China’s elite circulation in the reform era and to explore the issues of elite configuration on both the Marco-level and Micro-level. Given the perspective of regime evolution, the proposal argues that the adjustment of party course in 1978 was initiated and designed according to the party leader’s preference. Since the CCP was not forced to fundamentally change its party course, the breadth and depth of membership adjustment would be constrained by the purpose of maintaining CCP’s dictatorship. This organizational rationale generated a consistent pattern of elite circulation—“Limited Renewal”, which has guided both the elite turnover and transformation over time. I anticipate that, at the macro-level, the composition of party members and Central Committee, would reflect the change of social structure, and at the micro-level, both party and government elites would reveal notable transformation towards technocracy after the early 1980’s. However, both trends in the elite formation were controlled with significant timing differences varying with the level of political power. While the transformation of the Central Committee lag behind that of party members, the latter fell behind the transformation of government elites. Furthermore, there exist longstanding and consistent differences in political credentials and the degree of specialization between party and government elites. Even though the rise of technocrats has recently drawn much attention from literature, the proposal finds the process of elite renewal was much more restricted by CCP’s grip of power. Nevertheless, this pattern of elite circulation has reflected the unique way of regime evolution in China, which balances between the survival prerequisite of one-party dictatorship and the functional device of economic development.