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Title: 論Ronald Dworkin法政哲學中的民主觀:建構、爭議與批判
A Study of Ronald Dworkin’s Democratic Thought of Law and Political Philosophy:Construction, Controversy, and Critique
Authors: 陳文政
Wen-Cheng Chen
Ming-Hsiang Chen
Keywords: Ronald Dworkin
Jürgen Habermas
Ronald Dworkin
partnership democracy
human dignity
egalitarian liberalism
political community
Jürgen Habermas
deliberative democracy
Issue Date: 2010
Abstract: 本論文旨在縷析美國當代法學家Ronald Dworkin法政哲學中的民主觀。有 別於多數民主,Dworkin宣稱民主不只是多數決,更是一項公民以夥伴關係集體參與政治的自治事業。本文將論證夥伴民主融合了Dworkin法政理論中的許多觀念,包括人性尊嚴、倫理個人主義、平等自由主義、政治社群、權利主張、原則論、整全法、以及對憲法的道德解讀等,從而拓展和改觀我們對民主的既定看法。透過更宏觀地尋繹「民主是什麼?」,本文希冀深入闡釋Dworkin的道德、政治及法律概念,對哲學上的重大爭議進行論辯,並且進一步批判反思夥伴民主的立論,以此,來回答法理學古老的命題「法律是什麼?」。 全文主要有三個部分。首先,在建構詮釋部分,我們依次討論了Dworkin的人性尊嚴倫理學、平等政治哲學與整全法理論中的主要概念,梳釐出Dworkin民主觀的理論基礎、背景圖像與概念關係,進而透過憲政民主與夥伴民主的辯證,證成Dworkin的夥伴民主學說。其次,本文針對Dworkin思想中的個別觀點及其爭議做出辯護,包括:(1)人性尊嚴是客觀而普遍的嗎?(2)自由與平等是相容的嗎?(3)自由主義能形成政治社群嗎?(4)訴諸良善仍可以主張國家中立嗎?(5)法律與道德的關係是什麼?(6)司法審查違反民主精神嗎?(7)憲政主義與民主是衝突的嗎?關於這些價值衝突的調解,顯示了Dworkin多元整體論的融貫立場。最後,則是批判與對話:藉由Jürgen Habermas的審議民主來對夥伴民主進行挑戰。在筆者看來,Dworkin刺蝟型民主觀,強調多元價值能整合在一個整體倫理學架構中,這個理想是高貴的,但欠缺某些民主實踐的元素。換言之,夥伴民主若能補強審議民主的核心論點例如公共領域、公民社會、論辯或溝通原則,將是一個更有吸引力的理論。
This dissertation attempts to analyze Ronald Dworkin’s democratic thought of law and political philosophy. Instead of the majoritarian democracy, Dworkin claims that a genuine democracy means not only majority rule but also the people govern themselves each as a full partner in a collective political enterprise. I will argue and elucidate that “partnership democracy” comes from many ideas of Dworkin’s political and legal theorysuch as human dignity, ethical individualism, egalitarian liberalism, political community, rights, principle, law as integrity, moral reading of the constitution and so on. For Dworkin, partnership democracy has expanded the meanings of democracy. In search of “what is democracy?”, the thesis constructed Dworkin’s main conceptions of moral, political, and law, discussed the philosophical controversy, and critically reflected his theory to answer the jurisprudence questions: “what is law?”. There are three parts included in my arguments. First, in the constructive interpretation for democracy, I investigate Dworkin’s ethics of human dignity, political philosophy of equality, and law as integrity. They manifest the theoretical grounds, political background and conceptual relations of partnership democracy. By debating on “constitutional democracy” and “partnership democracy”, the thesis justified Dworkinian theory of partnership democracy. Secondly, the thesis defends philosophical controversy below: (1) Is human dignity objectivie and universal? (2) Do liberty and equality conflict? (3) How is liberal community possible? (4) For the good life, is it still neutrality of state? (5) What is the relation between law and moral? (6) Is a judicial review undemocratic? (7) Is there any conflict between constitutionalism and democracy? From holism, Dworkin’s coherence arguments deals with the conflict of these values. Finally, based on Jürgen Habermas’ deliberative democracy that criticizes and challenges partnership democracy, I think that Dworkinian “hedgehog” democracy aimed at integrating all values into a whole of ethic framework is noble and ideal, but democracy practice requires more than this. In other words, I argue that if there are public sphere, civil society, discourse or communicative action in partnership democracy, Dworkin’s thought is much more convincible and attractive.
Other Identifiers: GN0892100042
Appears in Collections:學位論文

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