

國立臺灣師範大學體育學系博士班

博士論文

Department of Physical Education

College of Sports and Recreation

National Taiwan Normal University

Doctoral Dissertation

國際運動總會對會員國家協會遵從策略之研究

Managing the Compliance of National Federations:

The Strategies of International Sports Federations

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中華民國 109 年 8 月

August 2020

謝辭 Acknowledgement

The completion of my dissertation says how much I am a lucky person. That I have all the luck in the world is the result of all the people who love me and who are by my side.

First, I have a supervisor, Prof. Tien-Chin TAN (湯添進教授), who is determined to guide me through my study regardless of the time difference and the five thousand miles of distance between us. He does not settle with my lame excuses of time limitations, and he does not allow me to settle either. His relentless supervision has enlightened my composing of the dissertation as well as my perspective on life in general. A big thank you to Prof TAN for everything. Second, I have five distinguished dissertation committee members, Prof. Chih-Fu Cheng (鄭志富教授), Prof. Ping-Kun Chiu (邱炳坤教授), Prof. Ping-Chao Lee (李炳昭教授), Prof. Chien-Shing Lee (李建興教授), Prof. Jinming Zheng (鄭錦明教授), who had offered me extensive guidance on my dissertation from the first proposal to the final version. I value the extended hours of research discussion and all committee members' generous comments. Then, I have my family, my mom and dad, sisters, and my grandparents, who sends me their best wishes. Their unconditional love has not only fuelled my pursuit of becoming a better researcher but also bolstered me during the occasional setbacks. During my nine years of study I have had a group of good friends and study mates, Yu-Hsien (郁嫻), Liang-Yi (小亮), Ying-Lien (瑛蓮), Pin-Chi (品齊), Che-Chun (哲君), Chen-Hsuan (承璇), Junjie, Alexandra, Ksenia, Yihuan and many more, who have always been there to help and, have never reserved their best opinions, and whose friendship I will continue to cherish. Feng-Chen (鳳禎), Te-Yu (德郁), Ting-Hsuan (庭瑄) and Wei (杜歲) who helped me tremendously in making everything possible. Last but not least, Freya, she challenges me intellectually, gives me confidence and helped me greatly in writing my dissertation in English. She is the parameter for everything in my life. If the Covid-19 pandemic has taught me anything, it is to love and to appreciate whenever possible.

國際運動總會對會員國家協會遵從策略之研究

2020 年 8 月 4 日

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摘要

國際運動總會所制定的政策對各國運動發展影響深遠，已儼然成為國際政權 (International regimes)。本研究旨在探究國際總會對國家協會的遵從策略，並驗證遵從理論在國際運動總會脈絡之適用性。本研究採質性研究透過半結構訪談蒐集資料，以立意取樣 8 個總會與 12 人受訪。研究架構是以 Tallberg 的管理-強制執法階梯遵從理論模型 (management-enforcement ladder) 為骨幹，Haas 的七種遵從引導面向為主要內涵，分別為：「高度覺醒」、「增能」、「上網」、「監督」、「核實」、「橫向連結」及「組織地位提昇」。該架構強調國際政權的遵從引導是有分階段性的。從預防到監督，並在違規發生後介入，如介入未果則祭出制裁。研究結果指出，在預防階段：一、總會頻繁辦理國際活動，並透過資助會員國參加活動以及提昇參與品質以加強會員協會對政策的理解與認同（高度覺醒）。二、總會補助會員協會舉辦國內活動、提供與其資源相應的政策目標以永續發展熱情、並強化與會員國內重要關係團體的關係以創造發展之綜效（增能）。三、總會透過補助會員協會舉辦國內活動以確保各國採用總會認證的國際標準、利用國際總會法理高度使洲際總會的政策與司法框架與總會一致化（上網）。在監督階段：一、總會透過其行政體系蒐集資訊建立國家協會評鑑制度以監督會員國遵從情況與評估發展需求，並透過既有橫向連結蒐集會員國遵從情況之必要資訊（監督）。二、發展出四種評估模式來核實國家協會對國家運動發展的真實承諾（核實）。違規發生後介入階段：一、在非正式協商階段強化國際總會的權威性。二、在正式階段利用既有橫向連結提昇總會組織地位以給違規會員國製造壓力（橫向連結、組織地位提昇）。在制裁階段：根據本研究分析，具不同行政資源、法源依據（政治意願）的國際總會對不同性質的違規案例有相應處置方式。研究結論指出，國際總會對會員國遵從策略具有階段性，在預防階段強調以增能手段取得會員對政策之理解與認同；在監督階段，著重發展評鑑制度以評估各國發展需求；並在違規發生後透過非正式與正式手段介入以給予違規者社會壓力；如正式介入未果則祭出制裁。根據研究結果，本研究建議國際運動總會的遵從系統架構可以遵從管理與違規處置兩階段呈現。

關鍵字：遵從、國際政權、國際運動總會、單項協會、國際組織、國際關係

Managing the Compliance of National Federations: The Strategies of International Sports Federations

August 2020

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Abstract

The influence of international sports federations (IFs) at the domestic policy-making scene reasonably places them in the position of international regimes. Applying international regime theory, specifically the theoretical concept of compliance, this research aims to explore the strategies of IFs to induce the compliance of their national federations. The theoretical framework of this research is developed based on the theoretical model of the ‘management-enforcement ladder’ (Tallberg, 2002) as well as Haas’ (1998, 2007) seven dimensions of compliance inducement, national concern, capacity building, nesting, monitoring, verification, horizontal linkages and institutional profile. Adopting a qualitative research approach, eight Olympic IFs with varying capacity were selected via purposive sampling and twelve of their staff interviewed via snowballing according to a semi-structured interview guideline that was informed by the theoretical framework. Based on the findings the IF compliance system is theorised into two stages, a compliance management system consisting of prevention and monitoring strategies, and a non-compliance responses system consisting of strategies for intervention and sanctions.

Key words: International regimes, compliance, sports, federations, international institutions

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Abbreviations

Abbreviations	Meaning
IOC	International Olympic Committee
LOC	Local Organising Committee
IF	International Federations
CC	Continental Confederations
NF	National Federations
ASOIF	Association of Summer Olympic International Federations
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
IAAF	International Association of Athletics Federations.
FINA	Federation Internationale de Natation
BWF	Badminton World Federation
UCI	Union Cycliste Internationale
ITU	International Triathlon Union
UWW	United World Wrestling
WA	World Archery
FIBA	International Basketball Federation
FIVB	Fédération Internationale de Volleyball
FISA	The World Rowing Federation
CAS	Court of Arbitration of Sports

Note: IAAF changed its name into ‘World Athletics’ in 2019.

Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Research Background

The initial fundamental roles of international sports federations (IFs) have been mainly regulatory and restricted to the matter of the international competitions at a global level. The modern functions of IFs, however, are expanding dramatically (ASOIF, 2019, p. 16). In fact, while IFs are substantively constituted through self-governing private norms (Casini, 2015), their institutional actions have an impact beyond the international competitions they organise. For example, the Olympic Charter or the World Anti-Doping Code are traditionally referenced in sports related national laws, which demonstrates a interpenetration of private norms and public authority from the regulatory, institutional and procedural perspectives (Casini, 2015). The examination of elite sports policy is no longer confined within national boundaries, rather it should take the “*international influence*” more into account (Houlihan & Green, 2005, p. 9).

Against this background, the international sports federations (IFs) can reasonably be regarded as regimes of international sports policy (Houlihan, 2009). Houlihan (2009) observed some unique regime features that are generally shared by these IFs: they demonstrate stable stakeholder relations and have processes in place enabling stakeholders’ voices to be heard (or ignored); they have the institutional capacity to set agendas, monitor policies, and review, verify, or enforce compliance; they also vigorously promote or police their own values. Moreover, their actions constitute at large the international influence observed at the domestic scene of

public policymaking (Houlihan, 2009). Given this observed influence exerted by international sports federations, it is particularly relevant to examine systematically, and in more detail, in what ways IFs exert their influence over the national actors.

While there is a divergence of opinions in the academic discussion of international regimes regarding the extent to which institutionalism matters (Hasenclever et al., 1997), this research assumes an institutionalist point of view that acknowledges the significant role IFs play in setting the norms of their international sports community through their institutional actions. Effectively, while modern IGBs interact with various stakeholders across private and public sectors (Chappelet, 2016; Henry & Lee, 2004), the majority of their policies and rules are affecting their national federations, and subsequently the individuals (coaches, athletes, competition officials, etc) and organisations (clubs, regional federations, schools) affiliated with the national federations. The researcher further argues that most national federations are inclined to comply, and the majority of non-compliance cases arises from a lack of resources. As a result, it is particularly intriguing to examine the ways in which the international sports policy regimes manage to exert their influence on the presumably autonomous jurisdiction of their national federations.

In general, scholarly investigations into the roles of international sports federations as a collective community are scarce, both in the field of International Relations (IR) and Sports Policy studies (Budd & Levermore, 2004; Keys, 2009), and too often the focus is placed on

unicorn organisations, such as the International Football Federation (FIFA) or the International Olympic Committee (IOC) (Clausen, 2018; Forster & Pope, 2004).

Furthermore, it is perhaps not only the lack of academic attention that causes this field being under-researched. Haas (1998) commented that the extent to which national actors comply with an international regime is particularly difficult to measure, and the causality between an international regime's institutional actions or international rules and national compliant behaviours is also difficult to prove.

However, one notable exception to the past lack of academic attention on international sports regimes is the increasing amount of research on the regime effectiveness of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) in the last decade (Fincoeur et al., 2015; Gray, 2019; Hanstad & Houlihan, 2015; Houlihan, 1999, 2004, 2014; Tan et al., 2018; Ulrich et al., 2018; Westmattmann et al., 2018). These studies about the international anti-doping policy regime offer a great starting point and inform the complexity and scope of international regime theory for this research. While the studies about the international anti-doping policy regime (Gray, 2019; Houlihan, 1999, 2014; Tan et al., 2018) may have a different focus from this research, their theoretical groundwork can certainly be extended to this research, particularly concerning the challenges of ensuring the effectiveness of and the compliance within a sports policy regime, as well as national actors' responses to an international sport regime's compliance requirements.

1.2 Research Questions

Two specific research questions are outlined as followed:

- a. How do international sports federations induce their member national federations' compliance?
- b. What are the theoretical implications of these strategies utilised by IFs with regard to the applicability of international regime theory in the context of international sports?

1.3 Research Aim and Objective

This research aims to examine the operation of IFs interfacing with their national federations in order to deepen the understanding of IFs' role as the sports policy regimes and the ways in which they exert their influence over their national federations. The objective of this research is to explore the strategies of international sports federations to induce compliance by their member federations, through the application of international regime theory, specifically the theoretical concept of compliance. Thereby, this research attempts to theorise the distinctive features of regime influence in the context of international sports.

1.4 Research Contribution

This research sheds light on an under-explored field of international relations and international sports. Using the perspective of international regime theory, it enhances the understanding of international sports federations' operation specifically concerning the ways in

which they interface with their national federations. Empirical evidence into the day-to-day operations of IFs is gathered to inform the theorising of IFs' role as sports policy regimes, and in the global development of sports worldwide.

Thereby, this research will also map out the distinctive features of regime influence in the context of international sports. These findings not only lay the groundwork for future research into international sports policy regimes, but also contribute to two practical dimensions for policy actors. First, from the perspective of international sports federations, the enhancement of knowledge towards compliance inducement may contribute to a more robust overall programme of regime governing, specifically with regard to the interactions with their memberships, and subsequently to more effective policy regimes. Second, national actors may also benefit from an enhanced understanding of interfacing with the international sports policy regimes. In the case of Taiwan, for example, these insights may inform the critical reflection on the effectiveness of its current international policy of sport aiming to "*take immense stride to the world*" (Sports Administration of Taiwan, 2017, p. 46), assist in formulating a national strategy, and help position sports at the heart of the state government's pursuit of a meaningful national presence in the international community.

Chapter 2 Literature Review

Placing international sports federations in the position of international regimes is the key premise of this research. As a result, it is relevant to first review the theoretical concept of international regime and present the context in which the Olympic International Federations reside that provides the foundation of their regime characteristics. Next, to answer the research questions, it is important to visit the theoretical concept of compliance in the context of international regimes and discuss how theoretical perspectives of compliance are applicable to international sports federations and to their interaction with their member national federations. Finally, based on this theoretical background, the researcher establishes an analytical framework for this research.

2.1 Theories of International Regimes

A consensus definition of international regime by Steven Krasner conceptualises regimes as: *“implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”* (Krasner, 1982, p. 185).

Critics of Krasner’s definition are mainly concerned with the components of the conceptualisation are rather indistinguishable operationally (Hasenclever et al., 1997). As it does not provide enough guidance or clarity when being applied in empirical studies of international institutions. Peterson (2012) explained that this 1982 definition indicates three principle elements: 1) an interrelated array of principles, norms, rules and decision-making

procedures, 2) a group of actors using that array to guide their expectations regarding their own and others' behaviour, and 3) an issue-area where that array and those expectations will be engaged.

Levy, Meyer and Rittberg (1995, p. 272) refined the definition of international regimes based on the extent of the formality of rules as well as the extent to which the expectations of actors converge. Asserting that an institution cannot be a regime without a minimal degree of formality of rules and convergence of expectation, they define an international regime "*as an social institution consisting of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, procedures and programs that govern the interactions of actors in specific issue areas*" (Levy et al., 1995, p. 274).

Based on these two dimensions, Levy, Young and Zurn (1995, p. 272) classified different regime types (s. Table 1, p 8). According to their conceptualisation a 'Classic Regime' exists when rules are explicit and regularly referred to, and rule-consistent behaviour is widespread (Levy et al., 1995). A 'Tacit Regime' refers to when norms and informal rules are being observed, yet not necessarily formalised, and a good level of expectation by members is maintained (Levy et al., 1995). Instead, a Dead-Letter Regime has explicit written rules, both procedural and non-procedural, yet the rules are generally not respected by the members (Levy et al., 1995).

Table 1 Regime Definition

		Convergence of Expectations	
		Low	High
Formality	Low	No Regimes	Tacit Regimes
	High	Dead-Letter Regimes	Classic Regimes

From “The Study of International Regimes,” by M. A. Levy, O. R. Young, & M. Zurn, 1995, *European Journal of International Relations*, 1(3), p. 272.

In *The Study of International Regimes*, Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (1997) have identified three main schools of thought within the realm of international regime studies as having fundamental differences in their respective approach, namely, the power-based realists, the interest-based neoliberals, and the knowledge-based cognitivists (s. Table 2, p 10).

Both neoliberal and realist approaches assume that the behaviour of state actors in the international society is based on their rational calculations, while the former emphasises a maximization of interests, and the later stresses relative gain of power (Hasenclever et al., 1997, p. 2). These rationalistic views (state actors maximizing or advancing their power or interests) have been the dominant theoretical perspective on compliance. In their view, compliance occurs either as a “*coincidence*” that is orchestrated by the most powerful nations (Hathaway, 2002, p. 1944), or simply as “*by-products of domestic politics*” which are considered to almost singularly shape a state’s action (Hathaway, 2002, p. 1952).

The sociological (cognitivist) view, on the other hand, argues that socialisation always comes before what may be perceived as rationalised decision-making (Hasenclever et al., 1997). The importance of norm is emphasised in the socialist argument that “*states are best understood*

as the product of a socialised environment”, that the socialisation or internalisation of social norms itself determines the interests of a perceived rational decision (Raustiala, 2000, p. 405). Hence, the cognitivist point of view takes into consideration both *principled beliefs*, i.e. normative ideas that specify measures separating right from wrong, just from unjust, and *causal beliefs*, i.e. cause-and-effect scientific arguments that guide people to achieve their own objectives (Hasenclever et al., 1997, p. 143). The power of idealism, referring to humanitarian sentiments and moral conscience can be explained as “*what starts as strategic incentive-based cooperation within international institutions often leads at later points to preference shifts*” (Checkel, 2005, p. 814). In this view, compliance is socially influenced and subject to the norm of the international community.

The major discrepancy separating these schools of thought is the extent to which they believe in “*institutionalism*”, i.e. that international institutions matter (Hasenclever et al., 1997, p. 2). The cognitivist school asserts that institutionalism does make a difference in international resolutions, while the realist and neoliberal schools put more emphasis on the states as the primary driving force for their interactions with international regimes.

While there is a divergence of opinions in the academic discussion of international regimes regarding the extent to which institutionalism matters (Hasenclever et al., 1997), this research assumes an institutionalist point of view that acknowledges the significant role IFs play in setting the norms of their international sports community through their institutional

actions. Effectively, while modern IGBs interact with various stakeholders across private and public sectors (Chappelet, 2016; Henry & Lee, 2004), the majority of their policies and rules are affecting their national federations, and subsequently the individuals (coaches, athletes, competition officials, etc) and organisations (clubs, regional federations, schools) affiliated with the national federations. However, we do not intend to denounce the interplay of states' power pursuit or maximisation of national interests in the political and decision-making process within international sport federations. Rather, in this research the state actors' role is seen as part of the regime compliance inducement scheme.

Table 2 School of Thoughts in the Study of International Regimes

	Realism	Neoliberalism	Cognitivism (especially “strong cognitivism”)
Central Variable	power	interests	knowledge
Institutionalism	weak	medium	strong
Meta-theoretical orientation	rationalistic	rationalistic	sociological
Behavioural model	concerned with relative gains	absolute gain maximiser	role-player

Note. Adapted from Theories of International Regimes (P. 6), by A. Hasenclever, P. Mayer, and V. Rittberger, 1997, UK, Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge.

2.1.1 Theoretical Perspectives on Compliance

In establishing a scheme of international collaboration, the question of the effectiveness of international institutions, which can be merely a set of rules with or without a formal organisational capacity, is often at the centre of a broader debate in international relations

theories (Bernauer, 1995; Haas et al., 1993; Keohane et al., 1993; Krasner, 1983). Much attention has been paid to the conditions under which states are able to establish collaborations, i.e. the process and conditions of forming an international institution (Bernauer, 1995; Stein, 1990; Young, 1989). Yet, it has become more relevant to investigate the role of international institutions and the ways their existence contributes to effective international collaborations (Bernauer, 1995; Gallarotti, 1991; Haas et al., 1993).

While compliance is often regarded as the focal contributing force to institutional effectiveness (Raustiala, 2000; Raustiala & Slaughter, 2002); it would be beneficial to clarify the conceptualisation of compliance in the context of international regimes as Houlihan (2014) noted for WADA's daily operations, it is not uncommon for the concepts of implementation and compliance being used interchangeably.


Young (2013, p. 104) defined compliance as the *“degree to which state behaviour conforms to what an agreement prescribes or proscribes”*, suggesting that compliance or non-compliance is not necessarily a binary choice, there is possibility of a partial compliance. Compliance is considered not uniquely applicable to legal rules and can be defined as *“a state of conformity or identity between an actor's behaviour and a specified rule”* (Raustiala & Slaughter, 2002, p. 539).

Houlihan (2014), Hanstad and Houlihan (2015) and Gray (2019) all emphasised that there should be a differentiation between adherence (ratification or acceptance) and implementation,

which take place prior to compliance. Adherence refers to an international legal rule being adopted and enacted as one that is valid at the national level (Houlihan, 2014). Implementation indicates a level of commitment of resources (Gray, 2019). Compliance hereby is referred to as *“the intensity of commitment to achieve the aim of drug-free sport.”* (Hanstad & Houlihan, 2015, p. 588).

Falkner et al.'s (2008) suggested that compliance can be observed through the domestic implementation phase of the international rules, i.e. EU directives, from transposition, enforcement and application (s. Figure 1, p 13). Transposition refers the stage where state actors adopts officially an international rule at the national level through a process of ratification, usually in the national parliament. Enforcement refers to the stage where the adopted law is actually enforced by the administration i.e. in the government's administrative procedures or police operations, and by the courts, i.e. rule according to the adopted law. Application refers to an internalisation process in which the adopted law, a behavioural prescription, is perceived normal. From the perspective of the institutions, Haas (1998) also points out that it is quite challenging for the international institutions to keep track of the implementation of an international law, except for observing changes in bureaucratic budgets and investment patterns; or as a less ideal indicator the number of rule enforcement.

Figure 1 Stages and Actors of The Implementation Stage



Note. Adapted from “Introduction: The Challenge of Implementation Research in the New Member States” by G. Falkner, O. Treib & E. Holzeithner, 2008, in G. Falkner, O. Treib & E. Holzeithner (Eds.), in *Compliance in the Enlarged European Union: Living Rights or Dead Letters?* (p. 8.), Hampshire, Ashgate Publishing.

2.1.2 The debate between enforcement and management approaches.

In general, the scholarly debate on compliance inducement is between the enforcement approach and the management approach (A. Chayes et al., 1998; A. H. Chayes et al., 1995; Downs et al., 1996; Tallberg, 2002). According to Raustiala and Victor (1998, p. 681), “*the two schools of thought reflect different visions of how the international system works, the possibilities for governance with international law, and the policy tools that are available and should be used to handle implementation problems.*”

The enforcement approach is derived from the rationalist point of view and asserts that

only a sanction costly enough could deter a carefully calculated non-compliance decision by a state (Haas, 2007). States choose not to comply when the benefits of shirking exceed the costs of being exposed; as a result, “*compliance problems are best remedied by increasing the likelihood and costs of detection through monitoring and the threat of sanctions*” (Tallberg, 2002, p. 611). Dorn and Fulton’s research (1997, p. 17) offers a typical enforcement oriented approach claiming that to whip an unwilling state there are two ways available, the “*the carrots and sticks*” or incentives and punishments.

To enforcement theorists, compliance entails states committing resources that could be otherwise used somewhere else. As there is a considerable distinction between the signature to an agreement and compliance, as states sometimes commit to an international agreement for the sake of participation, not for valuing the contents of the rules (Haas, 1998; Tallberg, 2002), enforcement is a must to ensure profound behaviour change. Tallberg (2002) backs the hypothesis that the larger the difference between the pre-existing national behaviours and the international standard for compliance is the less likely the member states make required adjustments to be compliant with empirical evidence from the EU. This depth-of-cooperation hypothesis also implies that the more extensive the required behavioural changes are by international rules, the greater are the incentives to shirk, in other words the greater punishment is required to support it (Downs et al., 1996; Tallberg, 2002).

Monitoring and sanctioning are considered as central elements to the enforcement

approach. Monitoring generally increases transparency and exposes potential violators. Sanctions raise the costs of shirking and make non-compliance a less attractive option. They are thus capable of deterring defections and compelling compliance (Axelrod & Keohane, 1986; Dorn & Fulton, 1997; Downs et al., 1996; Olson, 1965; Tallberg, 2002; Underdal, 1998).

The notion of the enforcement approach, especially in the context of modern international relations, relies fundamentally on legal rules. Nonetheless, the growing complexity of the international society has given rise to the increasing difficulty that the traditional approach of international law-making is facing in resolving problems (Shelton, 2007). As a matter of fact, the *“proposed solutions to problems are not always in the form of law”* in the international society of states (Shelton, 2007, p. 7). Responding to the need arising from this international reality, international law and international relations scholars’ attention is increasingly focused on different forms (Bilder, 2007; D’Amato, 2008; Guzman & Meyer, 2010; Haas, 2007; Shelton, 2007; Trubek et al., 2005) and content (normative or promotional) of international laws, and correspondingly on the extent to which different characteristics of laws induce compliance (Shelton, 2007, p. 4) or desired changes in state behaviour (Raustiala, 2000).

The management approach arises from the sociological view, claiming that it is the *“transformative power of normative discourse”* (Hathaway, 2002, p. 1957) and the frequency of interactions between international and national actors rather than the calculation of benefits that is responsible for the continuous effectiveness of international regimes (Hathaway, 2002,

p. 1957). The management approach argues that coercive actions, such as economic sanctions or threat of war, are both economically and politically costly and proven to be staggering procedural and operational progress; therefore, they should not be the primary mechanism to achieve compliance (A. H. Chayes et al., 1995; Hathaway, 2002). Consequently, it is best that non-compliance is addressed through a problem-solving strategy of capacity building, rule interpretation, and transparency (Tallberg, 2002). The management approach's main argument lies on the assumption that states are inclined to comply (A. H. Chayes et al., 1995; Downs et al., 1996; Haas, 2007; Tallberg, 2002). Non-compliance occurs mainly due to a lack of capacity rather than wilful disobedience (A. H. Chayes et al., 1995).

To reiterate, the difference between the management and enforcement approaches is rather a divergence regarding the reasons or causes for states' compliance and non-compliance. To the managerial theorists the incidences of apparent non-compliance are seen as a problem to be resolved; to enforcement theorists those are violations that have to be punished (Downs et al., 1996). Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom (1996) explain that sanctioning rarely happens in the international scene and that states appear inclined to comply because the international agreements tend to codify existing behaviour, rather than imposing extensive adjustment requirements (Downs et al., 1996; Tallberg, 2002).

Though the mechanisms of how transparency contributes to regime effectiveness are rather under-explored, it is generally acknowledged that transparency, the demand and supply

of information, is crucial to regime effectiveness (Mitchell, 1998). Moreover, Tallberg (2002) argues that both the managerial and enforcement theorists consider monitoring an integral part of the cures to non-compliance; however, the management approach emphasises monitoring for the benefits of exercising transparency whereas the enforcement approach stresses the importance of the coercive pairing of monitoring and punitive actions. By the same token, Tallberg (2002, p. 614) argues that to the managerial theorists “*dispute settlement is primarily viewed as clarifying common norms through interpretation and adjudication, rather than providing enforcement.*”

Haas (2007) argues that states’ willingness and capacity are the two parameters that could affect their choice to comply (s. Table 3, p18). The technical capacity of a state refers to a developed administrative system, competence or financial resources, etc. A state’s willingness refers to the political factors at play that signal the commitment to an important area of national concern, or reinforce a favourable political agenda with which the domestic leadership wishes to be associated. Additionally, the anticipated domestic resistance on the subject matter could be too grave and hence too costly to realise the commitment. Echoing the managerial view that implies that states are inclined to comply unless they are constraint by a lack of capacity, Haas (2007) argues that those states that are incapable yet willing may try to comply and expect to fail so that international institutions would likely step in to help build its technical capacity.

Table 3 Likelihood of State Compliance

	Costly Compliance	Compliance Not Costly
State is capable & willing	Possible	Most likely
State is capable but unwilling	Unlikely	Unlikely
State is incapable & willing	State may try to comply and expect to fail in order to attract resources from international institution to improve capacity	State may try to comply
State is incapable & unwilling	Highly unlikely	Unlikely

Note. Adapted from “Choosing to Comply: Theorizing from international relations and Comparative Politics” by P. Haas, 2007, in D. Shelton (Ed.), *Commitment and Compliance the Role of Non-Binding Norms in International Legal System*, (p.47) 2007. NY: Oxford University Press.

In addition, Haas (1998) notes that the extent to which the same sovereign state complies or not varies depending on the subject matter. For example, the International Boxing Association (AIBA) opened the door for professional boxers to compete in the Olympic Games Rio 2016. Such a rule change should be simple for strong nations such as the United States (USA) and Canada who normally were able and willing to comply with almost any rule changes in the past. However, this particular rule is in conflict with their domestic regulations that stipulate a strict separation of amateur and professional ranks. These two nations are not able to adopt this portion of the international rules until to date.

In line with the implications of the management approach, Haas (1998, 2007) argues that there are seven dimensions of institutional inducement that could exert influence over a state’s choice to comply, namely, monitoring, verification, horizontal linkage, nesting, capacity

building, national concerns, institutional profile:

1. **Monitoring:** monitoring is the mean to obtain valuable information about rules implementation at the national level and to inform the international institutions' decision-making (Haas, 2007). Monitoring provisions are often incorporated in an international treaty and can be done through member states' self-reporting through filling out a standardised questionnaire when the secretariat lacks resources. Self-reporting may lure member states' wilful misrepresentation (Haas, 2007). In these situations, a third party may be required to aid the monitoring for it to be impartial.
2. **Verification:** verification provides instant, accurate and credible information, which allows an early warning of a violation and increases the likelihood of detection (Haas, 1998). It also allows the institutions to publish monitoring results to create peer pressure among the member states by making other nations' actions transparent. Verification can be done by the regime itself or by NGOs serving as watchdogs. Surprise visits by independent inspectors are also utilised by some institutions.
3. **Horizontal linkage:** frequent interaction or some form of alliance among institutions, such as states, international institutions and international NGOs, creates a dense network that amplifies institutional legitimacy or discursive capacity (Haas, 1998). Horizontal linkage can entail reciprocal benefits from other areas of importance, or create an ambiance of solidarity to encourage conformity to an international norm, hence, compliance. For

example, the United Kingdom (UK) had been proven willing to compromise in the EU Large Scale Power Plant Directive because the UK had the need to avoid the reputation of being the 'dirty man of Europe'; a reputation that had hindered the UK's diplomatic efforts in other domains (Haas, 1998).

Horizontal linkage is especially evident within the international anti-doping movement. Huang and Tan (2015) point out that the intervention of several Western states helped create a global discourse of solidarity concerning the fight against doping. This global atmosphere of solidarity brought pressure to other states to conform and to become a signatory of the WADA Code.

In the international federations' community, it is likely that horizontal linkage is built around geographical proximity and the line of funding within the notion of "*systemic governance*" (Henry & Lee, 2004, p. 27), or the "*total Olympic system*" structure in the Olympic Movement (Chappelet, 2016, p. 747).

4. **Nesting:** nesting refers to "*the array of hierarchical influences*" (Haas, 2007, p. 57) which can be either conceptual or legal. Conceptual nesting refers to specific issue-related contexts that are causally connected to a broader concept of higher societal importance. For example, the question of having a joint women's Ice Hockey team by North Korea and South Korea in the Olympic Games Pyeongchang 2018 is a sporting issue, yet nested under the broader discussion of the resolution of two conflicted nations and a peace-making effort

by the IOC. Bearing the banner of world peace, the supposedly sporting issues, namely, the sacrifice of athletes' rights (reduced quota), the disturbance caused to team chemistry and the training schedule of both the North Korean and South Korean teams, had been put aside in the public discussion.

On the other hand, the hierarchical influences can be legally framed, as complying with one international law may mean an automatic legal obligation to another due to the hierarchy of the legal system. For example, the Olympic Charter serves not only as the statutes of the International Olympic Committee (IOC). It is also the “*basic instrument of a constitutional nature*” (Olympic Charter, 2018, p. 9) defining the main reciprocal rights and obligations of the three main constituents of the Olympic Movement, namely the IOC, the IFs, and the National Olympic Committees (NOCs), as well as the Organising Committees for the Olympic Games (OCOGs). Although the main constituents of the Olympic Movement do not include the national federations (NFs), article 29 of the Olympic Charter states that “*to be recognised by an NOC and accepted as a member of such NOC, a national federation must...be affiliated to an IF recognised by the IOC and be governed by and comply in all aspects with both the Olympic Charter and the rules of its IF.*” By signing up to become a member of an IF on the Olympic program, a national federation is legally obliged to comply with this Olympic Charter in all aspects.

5. **Capacity building:** the provision of capacity building resources upon compliance or the withholding of such resources due to non-compliance is a mean to encourage states to comply and remain compliant (Haas, 1998, 2007). The aid conditionality linked to the conceptualisation of capacity building can be interpreted as supporting either managerial or enforcement theory (Raustiala & Slaughter, 2002; Raustiala & Victor, 1998). The existence of providing assistance is an action embraced by the managerial theorist while the link between compliance and funding, which in practice has been critical to the success, is consistent with enforcement theory (Raustiala & Slaughter, 2002).

Capacity building resources include training, technology, monetary subsidies, etc. The majority of the EU's compliance inducement falls under a broader concept of capacity building. Examples are the filling of a knowledge void within and among national authorities or the issuing of interpretive guidelines targeting policy areas that lack certainty (Tallberg, 2002).

One capacity building technique that is rather common in the international sports community is revenue redistribution, as is done, for example, by the World Athletics' Foundation or the IOC's Solidarity Fund (Houlihan & Green, 2005, p. 10). Capacity building may genuinely resolve non-compliance cases resulting from a lack of capacity, if done properly. Storm and Solberg (2018) provide evidence from FIFA's redistribution of

revenue, arguing that the NFs whose administration is under-developed tend not to be able to benefit fully from the fund without sufficient monitoring and verification.

6. **National concerns:** national concern refers to the initiatives to reinforce the concerns of the mass public or social elites that already exist to pressure the state government to comply to its international commitment. An effective raise of national concerns is a type of norm creating initiative and internalisation process, in which members are educated in a way that they would be inclined to support a certain idea proposed by the international regime (Haas, 2007). A certain norm that has been existing for a long time, that people in the community take for granted or feel ashamed of when not being able to conform could be a sign of successful norm-setting. Institutional may publicise events and engage in public education to catalyse opinion about issues in a short term. In a long term, institutions may run information campaign to promote certain findings of epistemic community. For example, the International Boxing Association (AIBA) had run an extensive 'HeadsUp' campaign to promote the findings of Dr Charles Butler to defend its decision in removing headgears for elite men's category (AIBA, 2015; Wang, 2013). The key messages of the campaign were the health, education and careers of its boxers, are undoubtedly a long-lasting concern of the community. It is believed that the HeadsUp campaign had successfully led to the IOC to accept AIBA's recommendation to also remove headgear in the Olympic Games Rio 2016 (Nutley, 2016).

7. **Institutional profile:** Institutional profile refers to the technique that the international institutions raise their own profile so that the participating state leaders could gain political approval at the domestic level or the stakes of failing to meet international commitment are higher. The strategic partnerships between the IOC and the United Nations (UN) on the subjects of promoting peace, solidarity and respect (Jiwani, 2019) certainly help raising the institutional profile and the political importance of the IOC and consequently increase the Olympic Movement's relevance in the global discourse of peace-building and humanitarian efforts.

It is worth noting that these techniques arising from the dimensions above are not always implemented individually. Oftentimes, it is a combination of several techniques within a given administrative capacity. A prime example is the practice of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA). WADA launched the ISO Code Compliance Monitoring Programme in 2017 that includes the Code Compliance Questionnaire (CCQ) to be filled out by WADA Signatories. Furthermore, WADA expanded the program in 2018 to include an in-person audit, a Continuous Monitoring Program based on the WADA results management database (ADAMs), and technical assistance services by WADA staff to signatories. As can be seen, this Code compliance scheme includes the dimensions of monitoring, verification, and a certain level of capacity building.

In reality, especially monitoring and verification are often employed in a hand-in-hand fashion. For example, the Association of Summer Olympic International Federations' (ASOIF) governance assessment questionnaire requires the summer Olympic IFs to provide policy documents as well as evidence of implementation (self-reporting). Based on the evidence reported, an independent third party will then verify and assess their governance practice. This is a typical example of combining monitoring and verification.

The management-enforcement ladder

Examining the literature from both the management and enforcement approaches and analysing the empirical evidence from the European institutions' practices in inducing compliance of EU member states, Tallberg (2002) proposes a Management-Enforcement Ladder model to illustrate the compliance system of the EU. This model suggests that both mechanisms of enforcement and management, widely considered as two competing conceptions, are actually complementary and "*most effective when combined*" (Tallberg, 2002, p. 610).

Tallberg (2002) further argues that the compliance system of the EU challenges the antithetical positioning of enforcement and management strategies and that the coercive (enforcement) and problem-solving (management) strategies are mutually reinforcing each other. In addition, Tallberg (2002, p. 609) demonstrates that the day-to-day operation of the compliance system of the EU broadly involves the stage of informal consultation, negotiation,

or even adjudication before a case is brought forward to the stage of litigation in the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which he terms a '*path to compliance*'. Tallberg's view of a path to compliance echoes at large with Young's (2013) view that compliance is not a binary choice between clean-cut compliance and clean-cut violation.

While the EU's compliance system guides its member states to a path to compliance, a ladder of enforcement and management measures is formed, consisting of "*preventive capacity building and rule interpretation, systems of monitoring, legal proceedings against violators, informal channels of bargaining, and the final option of sanctions*" (Tallberg, 2002, p. 615).

The Management-Enforcement Ladder Tallberg (2002) proposes has four stages:

Stage I Violation Prevention: Several preventive measures such as capacity building, elasticity of rule implementation, i.e. granting longer grace periods of rule implementation for nations facing stronger national resistance, knowledge sharing among members to fill knowledge gaps, i.e. organising workshops among relevant national authorities, and rule clarification, i.e. issuing rule interpretation guidelines, are being utilised in stage I.

Stage II Monitoring: Tallberg (2002, p. 616) observed a two-track approach of monitoring. On the one hand, there is a systematic and active collection and assessment of information through in-house monitoring by the European Commission; on the other hand, there is a decentralised approach to monitor compliance through recording and examining complaints lodged by non-state organizations or individuals.

Stage III A Legal System Permitting Cases Against Non-Compliant States That Further

Clarifies Existing Rules: This legal system refers to formal infringement proceedings allowing the EU Commission to first conduct an informal consultation process aiming to “*weed out cases that may have arisen due to legal uncertainty and misunderstandings*” (Tallberg, 2002, p. 617).

This bargaining process, though informal, is institutionalised insofar as to which cases are reviewed in direct negotiation with state representatives. Then, once violations have occurred within the proceedings, the Commission would function as prosecutor and the ECJ as judge (Tallberg, 2002). In this phase, “*enforcement and management processes serve to turn up the pressure, making compliance an increasingly attractive option for member states*” (Tallberg, 2002, p. 617) by raising the cost of a violation or lowering its profit. For example, the Commission could declare its readiness to eventually use economic sanctions. Social costs might be imposed through an explicit Commission strategy to name and shame, most concretely, by issuing convicting press releases and scoreboards on non-compliance states. Tallberg (2002) notes that the sanctioning capacity of the EU makes being declared as non-compliant extremely costly, especially in a reputational sense. The likelihood of imposing these sanctions serves as deterrence and aids the implementation of various other compliance inducements (Tallberg, 2002). It is both the threat of resource-consuming litigation as well as the ramping up of social pressure that, according to Tallberg (2002, p. 617), “*provide for an environment highly hospitable to bargaining....*” As a result, negotiated solutions are not an alternative to

adjudication, but have become the main form of dispute settlement in the working philosophy and the daily practice of the Commission (Tallberg, 2002).

Stage IV Deterrent Sanctions as A Final Measure if States Refuse to Accept the Rulings of the Legal System. In Tallberg's (2002) empirical findings, a vast majority of the non-compliance cases are settled before they are referred to the ECJ as a result of the introduction of EU's new sanctioning power, economic penalties. As the sanctioning power serves as a pronounced deterrence mechanism, integrating the threat of it into the formal infringement procedure together with other preventive measures reinforces the compliance-inducing capacity overall.



2.2 International Sports Policy Regimes

International sports studies applying the concept of international regimes focus predominantly on the anti-doping policy regime, the heart of which is the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) (Fincoeur et al., 2015; Gray, 2019; Hanstad & Houlihan, 2015; Houlihan, 1999, 2004, 2014; Houlihan et al., 2019; Huang & Tan, 2015; Westmattelmann et al., 2018).

According to Houlihan et al. (2019), the majority of the studies of anti-doping policy focus either on the complex global network of organisations that form the policy regime, or on particular aspects of the policy implementation, i.e. the whereabouts system, CAS rulings, athletes' rights and the use of Therapeutic Use Exemptions (TUEs). From the perspectives of regime research paradigms (Hasenclever et al., 1997; Levy et al., 1995), the academic discussions about the anti-doping policy regime revolve around the paradigms of '*regime effectiveness*' (Hasenclever et al., 1997, p. 2) and '*regime consequence*' (Levy et al., 1995, p. 291). Regime effectiveness refers to the extent to which an organisation acts consistently with its stated aims and mission (Levy et al., 1995). For example, Waddington and Møller (2019) view WADA's performance as poor because the anti-doping policies it has instigated have failed to capture the true prevalence of doping in elite sports. Their view displays a singular point of assessment against WADA's stated aims and mission. On the other hand, regime

consequence refers to the extent to which an organisation has influences on the actors involved (Levy et al., 1995). Furthermore, Houlihan et al. (2019) also point out that a lack of normative change over time in doping culture in the global sports community can be seen as a sign of WADA's negligence.

In the next subchapter, we will discuss the characteristics of International Federations that form the basis of conceptualising them as international sports policy regimes.

2.2.1 Conceptualising international sports federations as international regimes

The notion of placing International Federations as international regimes appeared in Houlihan's article (2009) in which he discussed the non-domestic influence on domestic elite-sports policy processes. He identified the policy harmonising effort of the international sports policy regimes as being one of the key influences external to domestic policy processes.

However, general scholarly investigations into international sports federations as a whole are scarce and often focus exclusively on a handful of prominent organisations, such as FIFA (Clausen, 2018; Croci & Forster, 2004). Noticeably, increasing academic attention is being paid to the development of better governance practices and structure, and the professionalization of international sports federations (Chappelet, 2016, 2017;

Chappelet et al., 2020; Clausen, 2018; Clausen et al., 2017; Clausen & Bayle, 2017; Geeraert et al., 2015). Clausen and Bayle (2018) examined UCI's evolution of governance practice during the tenure of Hein Verbruggen's presidency and his successors. Chappelet, et al. (2020) also examined governance structures comparing four IFs of varying sizes, namely FIFA, UCI, FISA, and FIH. The focus of these studies is on IFs' structural variations, instead of their interaction and interfacing with other stakeholders, specifically their national federations.

While the notion is there, no one has formally conceptualised IFs as international regimes. However, there are many characteristics of IFs that can be argued to form the basis of IFs as international sports policy regimes. According to Levy et al. (1995), an international institution has to have a minimal degree of formality of rules and convergence of expectations to be seen as an international regime. With regard to the formality of rules, there is a pyramidal structure based upon which IFs exert influence over the NFs (ASOIF, 2019; Croci & Forster, 2004; Henry & Lee, 2004), as well as a policy network of organisations within which IFs and their NFs operate interdependently (Chappelet, 2016; Henry & Lee, 2004). With regard to the convergence of expectations, the purpose of the establishment of the international sports federation has been to organise international competitions and govern the sports worldwide, though their organisational roles and mission as a collective community are

expanding rapidly (ASOIF, 2019). In addition, IFs are facing common public expectations external to their existing structures which is considered to have a significant impact on IFs' late pursue of good governance principles. These features inform the characteristics of IFs as international sports policy regimes and are shared across all international sports federations.

The pyramidal structure of governance. With regard to the governing structure of international federations, a pyramidal governing structure is set up within which the international sports federations stand at the apex of a vertical hierarchy of governing bodies, while their national federations are the single point of contact at the national level interfacing with that of the continental or international body (ASOIF, 2019; Croci & Forster, 2004). Croci and Forster (2004) argue that recognising the IFs as the supreme governing body within this pyramid is crucial to uphold the ongoing existence and stability of the structure and the individual organisations in it. The blue arrows in Figure 2 demonstrate that the national associations (NFs) voluntarily uphold the rules and norms dictated by the IFs, the pyramidal structure is reinforced through a mutual legitimisation scheme (Croci & Forster, 2004). The NFs recognise the IF as the one and only representative governing body of the sport internationally, and the IF recognises one NF per nation as the governing body at the national level (Croci & Forster, 2004).




Figure 2 The Sport Governance Vertical Network

Note. Adapted from “Webs of Authority: Hierarchies, Networks, Legitimacy, and Economic Power in Global Sports Organisations” by O. Croci, and J. Forster, 2004, in G. T. Papanikos (Eds.), *The Economics and Management of Mega Athletic Events: Olympic Games, Professional Sports, and Other Essays*, (p.5.), Athens: Athens Institute for Education and Research.

Taylor (1988) argues that the way IFs organise themselves, i.e. democratically electing a board to represent memberships via the general assembly in accordance with the statutes to gain legitimacy and being chaired by politically and commercially connected figures, indicates that they are substantially the central government of a sport. Taylor’s view largely echoes the concept of ‘*political governance*’ (Henry & Lee, 2004, p. 38), which refers to a government steering and directing through regulation and

inducement rather than conducting a command of change to achieve its objectives (Henry, 2013, p. 8). Henry (2013) also points out that in addition to the measures in place to issue sporting provision, prescription and proscription, a sport government also imposes a mixture of moral and fiscal incentives to advance its policy objectives. On the other hand, the democratic system of international sports federations described by Taylor (1988) implies is that their national federations are also voters to IFs' leaderships; IFs' role to their national federations can be both governing and providing constituent services.

The role of continental confederations (CCs) in this vertical network is not extensively elaborated in the literature. From the European point of view, Chappelet et al. (2020) cited three existing models. First, there is the mega legal autonomous model, i.e. UEFA, FIFA's powerful European Confederation. The second model does not have a confederation in the institutional structure, which indicates a generally very weak and ineffective continental entity in the implementation of IF development policies (e.g., FISA). Last, in the third model continental offices are set under the direct control of IF headquarters (e.g., FIBA).

Highlighted as an underestimated factor of IF governance and in line with the aim of this research, Chappelet et al (2020) point out that the quality of collaboration between the levels of intervention in the governance of this pyramid (Figure 2, p 33) is

important to create the optimal conditions for the IFs' implementation of their development policies.

The policy network of organisations. Henry and Lee (2004) argue that this traditional hierarchy of the government of sport (s. Figure 2, p 33) is shifting to a “*web of interaction between stakeholders*” or “*systemic governance*” (2004, p. 28). In Chappelet et al.'s (2020) view, this shift marks the transition from regulating and coordinating actions that are rather centralised, hierarchical and vertical (government) to a horizontal network based on consensus, in some circumstances compromise, and a shared power with multiple actors. One important implication of this shift of governance models is that the sporting governing bodies no longer directly or fully dictate the outcomes to a group of passive recipients, they rather govern through negotiating preferable outcomes by virtue of their capacity (Henry & Lee, 2004, p. 29). Chappelet (2016, p. 747) proposes “*the total Olympic system*” concept that is specific to the Olympic Movement. It gives an overview of the policy network of organisations surrounding IFs and their interaction with the NFs (Figure 3, p 36). Chappelet (2016) argues that the linkages among these actors in the system are essentially capital, suggesting that IFs' governing influence may be subject to their power to mobilise these resources.




Figure 3 The Total Olympic System

Adapted from “From Olympic Administration to Olympic Governance” by Jean-Loup Chappelet, 2016, in *Sport in Society*, 19(6), p 747.

The notion of systemic governance, to a large extent, sheds light on the policy network of actors in which the IFs and their member national federations operate interdependently. Henry (2013) elaborated that to understand systemic governance, one has to understand the relationships between these stakeholders and the process of their interaction.

The process of interaction between IFs and their NFs is still predominantly based upon the pyramidal structure as set out in Figure 2. Nonetheless, understanding the actors within the policy environment is not insignificant in the interaction between IFs

and their NFs.

IFs' expanding roles and mission. According to the Association of Summer Olympic International Federations (ASOIF)'s publication 'Future of Global Sports', which outlines the evolution of the roles and responsibilities of IFs from their initial stage to the modern days, the initial fundamental responsibilities of IFs encompass: the definition and enforcement of sporting rules and regulations, the coordination of the international competition calendar in the interests of their members, the organisation of junior/grass-roots level competitions to underpin professional elite events, the organisation of world championships, and last but not least, the use their revenue to establish a solidarity mechanism and further develop the sport worldwide (ASOIF, 2019, p. 16). These initial fundamental roles and responsibilities reflect the 'traditional roles' of ruling/governing, organising/administering competitions, development/solidarity (ASOIF, 2019, p. 17).

ASOIF further outlines integrity, governance, medical/science, commercial delivery, technology, media/communication as the 'recent roles' of the Olympic IFs. Furthermore, Clausen (2018) refers to the political governance of IFs as having a board elected by and supposedly representing the interests of members as the social mission of the IFs for sports development. However, Clausen (2018, p. 21) also points out that there is ensuing organisational risks of having "*mission drift*" and "*goal vagueness*"

which she attributes to the interplay of IFs' traditional social mission vis a vis their members and the more recent revenue-generating drive.

Drawn particularly from the European Union example, Tallberg (2002) points out that access to dispute-settlement bodies is considered the central element of institutional design that affects the effectiveness of institutional efforts. In the international sports movement, a majority of IFs incorporate a constitutional provision referring to the Court of Arbitration for Sports (CAS) as its ultimate dispute-resolving body, a provision that is accessible to the national federations and individuals, such as athletes.

The public expectations. What is perhaps most relevant to mention is that the Governance Task Force (GTF) by ASOIF had been established upon the request of the IOC in 2015 (Chappelet et al., 2020). Apparently, there has been growing concern in the international sports community and in public opinion about the need to adopt good governance principles (Alm, 2013; Börzel et al., 2008; De Dycker, 2019). The principles of good governance are effectively “*normative ethical principles on how organisations should operate*” (Henry & Lee, 2004, p. 30). GTF has been created to monitor and assess the governance practice of the Olympic IFs through providing a standardised scoring system on IFs' governance practice. The growing concern of good governance is also evidenced in the European Commission's official communication (European Commission, 2011) stating in its acknowledgement of the social role of

sports that the autonomy of the sports organisation is only granted and earned on the basis of a set of good governance principles being upheld.

An overview of the development of the internal legal framework can be observed from the results of the ASOIF-run IF Governance Assessment (ASOIF, 2018b). Indicator 6.7 from the Assessment, “*(non-sporting) decisions made can be challenged through internal appeal mechanisms on the basis of clear rules*”, has an average score of 2.7 across ASOIF’s 28 full members. The score of 1 indicates ‘some opportunity for internal appeals’, 2 indicates ‘internal appeals policy in place’, 3 indicates ‘internal appeals policy in place, evidence of implementation’, and a score of 4 indicates ‘state of the art appeals policy, evidence of implementation, full decisions published’ (ASOIF, 2018b, p. 22). Although full details about the distribution of scores per IF is not published, it would be fair to say that on average the IFs have an internal appeals policy in place, but do not show significant evidence of implementation. Chappelet (2017) argues that to the value and integrity preserving efforts of the IFs within the movement of pursuing good governance reinforcing the wider international legal framework is particularly important.

At the particular period of time of this research it is expected that a good amount of empirical evidence regarding the dissemination of good governance principles to the NFs’ domestic practices as part of IFs’ own efforts of pursuing better governance

practice will be emerging from this research.

2.2.2 What we know and the research gaps.

In contrast to the rich body of research on the anti-doping policy regime (Houlihan et al., 2019), IF's international sports policies nor their implementation have been explored extensively academically.

What we know. Adherence referring to the ratification or acceptance of international rules at the domestic level is widely observed in the international sports policy regimes. The NFs commit to complying with their IFs' rules and ratify or adopt the rules at the national level through the admission process of membership. For example, the International Basketball Federation (FIBA), World Rowing (FISA), International Swimming Federation's (FINA) rules require the NFs to submit their statutes and other official documents for approval with a stipulated guiding principle of being "*consistent with*" (FISA, 2017, pt. Art. 12), "*not in conflict*" (FINA, 2019, pt. art. 7.3) with the international rules. FIBA General Statutes state that "*these General Statutes and International Regulations of FIBA shall form part of the member national federations' statutes and regulations*" (FIBA, 2019b, pt. Art. 9.3). International Triathlon Union (ITU) even requires NFs' statutes to include specific components (ITU, 2020, pt. Art. 8.1). What is perhaps more important to note is that in the case of conflicts or inconsistencies the international rules either prevail (FIBA, 2019; FINA, 2019; FISA,

2017) or at least receive deferential regards (ITU Constitution, 2020) over the national rules. The implications of this widely observed adherence are, first, the journey of achieving compliance to the international sports federations' rules does not necessarily start with ensuring national ratification, but rather with ensuring that the rules adopted are continuously being enforced and that any updates to international rules are being adopted and enforced at the national level in a timely manner. Second, considering that a regime is effective to the extent (1) that its members abide by its norms and rules (rule conformity), and (2) that it is achieving certain objectives or fulfilling certain purposes (the convergence of actors expectation) (Hasenclever et al., 1997, p. 2), rule conformity is probably not a real threat to IFs' regime effectiveness. Rather, achieving certain objectives or fulfilling certain purposes is the main battleground.

The problem of achieving compliance within the anti-doping regime, as it seems, is that actors' commitment to the WADA Code tends to be superficial. It displays a form of '*politics of appearance*' (Ritchie & Jackson, 2014, p. 204), which does not fulfil the purpose of the anti-doping policy regime. Houlihan (2014, p. 7) shared Ritchie and Jackson's (2014) argument in his examination of the effectiveness of the Code Compliance Questionnaire utilised by WADA, arguing that there is a loss of concentration on WADA signatories' "*depth of commitment*", or compliance.

In contrast, the notion of compliance to IFs does not concern the question of

whether rule conformity is enough. Rather, it pertains to the ways in which NFs' commitment can be deepened and the extent to which NFs' compliance ensures the fulfilment of IFs' regime purpose.

The research gap. While modern international sports governing bodies (ISGB), particularly the Olympic ISGBs, interact with various stakeholders across private and public sectors who may have an impact on the formulation of sports policies, the majority of the policies and rules are affecting IFs' national federations, and subsequently the individuals (coaches, athletes, competition officials, etc) and organisations (clubs, regional federations, schools) affiliated to the national federations. The pyramidal structure which frames the ways in which IFs interact with their NFs is what fundamentally defines the *raison d'être* of international sports federations. In line with Chappelet et al.'s (2020) observation the quality of collaboration between the levels of intervention in the governance of this pyramid (s. Figure 2, p 33) is considered to be crucial to the creation of the optimal conditions for IFs' implementation of policies. Even though a transition of structure from the pyramidal structure of governance (s. Figure 2, p 33) to the total Olympic system (s. Figure 3, p 36) is being observed, the governing bodies, by virtue of their central role in the historical development of sports, still claim a degree of power or authority in the governance structure (Garcia, 2020).

Thus, understanding the compliance inducement strategies of IFs could

potentially pave the theoretical foundation for the understanding of IFs' compliance system and the measurement of its effectiveness.

2.3 Establishing an Analytical Framework for This Research

In this subchapter, we establish a theoretical framework based on international regime theories.

2.3.1 Applying the management-enforcement ladder as the basis of the analytical framework

The model of the management-enforcement ladder is suitable to be applied to the investigation of IFs' compliance system for a number of reasons. First, it provides a framework that has been operationalised for analysis and is based on a good amount of empirical evidence as well as a rather holistic view on the reality of regime operations. In addition, this analytical framework acknowledges both the influences of the enforcement approach and the management approach and emphasises their combined effects.

Second, according to Tallberg (2002) the member states of the EU generally opt in to comply with the directive of the regime. This is comparable with the realm of international sports policy regimes where member national federations voluntarily uphold the norms and rules of the community (Crocì & Forster, 2004).

Third, it is not only that the pyramidal/vertical network within the IF governance

structure mimics at large political/governmental governance (Croci & Forster, 2004; Henry, 2013; Henry & Lee, 2004), but also that the international sports federations are facing increasing public pressure to fulfil their social missions and serve the public interest (Casini, 2015). For example, similar to the EU Commission who is provided with a legal instrument to function as the prosecutor should a violation of rules take place (Tallberg, 2002), IFs – with their expanding roles and mission – are expected to protect the integrity of sports and sort out claims brought forward (ASOIF, 2019).

In conceptualising an analytical framework for this research based on the Management- Enforcement Ladder by Tallberg (2002), it is also important to recognise the differences between the EU and international sports policy regimes.

First, IFs are increasingly operating within a policy network of organisations (Henry & Lee, 2004; Houlihan, 1999). It is not only that the IF-NF interaction is part of this supranational policy network, but also presumably an IF's interaction with other organisations does have an impact on the operation of compliance inducement. The model of the Management-Enforcement Ladder by Tallberg (2002) focuses predominantly on the interactions between the EU institution and its member states. Here, Haas' (2007) seven dimensions of institutional compliance inducement, theorised from international relations and comparative politics, provide us with a more horizontal view on international regimes' compliance inducement. As a result, his theoretical

conceptualisation (s. details Ch. 2.3.2) is incorporated into the analytical framework.

Second, the results of ASOIF's Governance Assessment implied that the IFs' administration may be subject to their varying capacities par rapport the establishment of a sturdy legal system in performing the legal function (ASOIF, 2020). The EU, on the other hand, is an inter-governmental organisation supported by individual state authority; hence, it acts with sturdy law enforcement capacity adhering to established national and European judicial systems. As such, it remains a question whether Stage IV can be differentiated as clearly in the IF context as for the EU institution.

2.3.2 Developing an analytical framework for this research.

Haas' (1998, 2007) conceptualisation is overlapping with Tallberg's (2002) at large, but the conceptualisations are angled rather differently. In this section, the seven dimensions of institutional compliance inducement by Haas (1998, 2007) will be discussed further and integrated with the staged framework of the Enforcement-Management Ladder by Tallberg (2002) to develop an analytical framework for this research.

The Enforcement Management Ladder of Tallberg (2002) outlines a four-staged framework. In Stage I the management approach is predominantly taken, i.e. preventive capacity building measures are employed. A monitoring scheme with centralised and decentralised features is exercised to detect violators in Stage II. Stage III happens when

non-compliance occurs. Then the international institution takes informal and formal measures to pressure the members to conform, making non-compliance an increasingly unattractive option. In Stage IV final sanctions are issued.

Stage I: Prevention functions as the stage where “*the preventive capacity building*” is conducted, seen by Tallberg (2002, p. 615) as measures to prevent the non-compliance caused by rule ambiguity or members’ capacity deficiency. In Tallberg’s (2002) conceptualisation of Stage I, members’ failure to understand the set of rules to be complied with may be caused by either the ambiguity of rules, which is not uncommon in international regulations, or the deficiency in comprehending the rules or gaps of interpreting the rules.

The strategies to prevent this failure of understanding outlined by Tallberg (2002) are: 1) to provide funds to encourage rule conformity and to alleviate particular domestic capacity deficiencies; 2) to negotiate transitional arrangements to allow more time for the members to adjust to new behavioural requirements; 3) to promote the exchange of first-hand problem-solving and administrative cooperation by establishing a network of contact points across member states on subjects concerning the implementation of EU rules; 4) to issues interpretative guidelines for specific policy issues where further clarity of rules is desirable. These strategies are meant to improve members’ ability to comply.

Haas' (1998, 2007) '*national concern*' dimension refers to the norm-setting and internalising process initiated by international institutions. An effective raise of national concerns is a type of norm creating initiative and internalizing process in which members are educated in a way that they would be inclined to support a certain idea proposed by the international regime (Haas, 2007). To a large extent, the third strategy of promoting exchanges on administrative problem-solving through network building in Tallberg's (2002) preventive capacity building is a promotional action of the rules, norms and standards in the system, which can be categorised within the dimension of '**national concern**'. Concerning this dimension, we will look at the ways in which IFs set norms to raise the national concerns of their NFs.

Furthermore, Haas' (1998, 2007) conceptualisation of capacity building emphasises that the international institution technically allocates resources to those that comply and withdraws benefits from those that do not comply through conditionality to induce compliant behaviours. While Tallberg (2002) stresses the building of capacity and less the withdrawal of resources, Haas (1998, 2007) emphasizes the manipulation scheme of the provision and withdrawal of benefits. It is clear that Haas' (1998, 2007) 'capacity building' requires being jointly implemented with both monitoring and verification schemes for an international regime to be alerted when non-compliance occurs and a withdrawal of benefits is necessary. To respect the four-staged analytical

framework of the Enforcement Management Ladder, this research will take into account only the notion of the building of capacity in Stage I and leave the withdrawal of benefits through conditionality to Stage III when non-compliance occurs. In terms of the terminology of this concept in Stage I, we will use “**the building of capacity**” for a clearer distinction.

Mentioned in Stage I by Tallberg (2002), the EU Commission executes a strategy to negotiate transitional arrangements to allow more time for members to adjust to new behavioural requirements which concerns the flexibility exercised to accommodate the members’ capacity level. This strategy is concerned with an important technicality with regard to policy implementation; as a result, it is placed within the dimension of the building of capacity.

Furthermore, the dimension of nesting that refers to “*the array of hierarchical influences*” (Haas, 2007, p. 57) either conceptual or legal. We find the strategy of issuing guidelines for rule clarity discussed by Tallberg (2002) can also be considered within the dimension of ‘nesting’ because it is actually the international institutions’ assertion of their interpretive authority of international rules or standards that reinforces and is based on the existing legal and conceptual hierarchy.

Haas (1998) has identified the enhancement of the contractual environment within which state choices are made (including voting rules, suffrage provisions,

number of parties, frequency of meetings, etc.) as one of the three principal analytic functions performed by international institutions. Though the contractual environment discussed by Haas (1998, p. 24) is referring to a nation's decision to sign up to a treaty or not, it is nonetheless associated with the notion of nesting. In the context of international sports policy regimes, even though rule adherence is widely observed (s. Ch 2.2.1), constant efforts to ensure an alignment between the international rules and national rules are important, especially when new rules or policies are introduced. We will look at the ways IFs seek alignment of their legal and policy frameworks with those of their national federations, specifically the national decision making process.

The principles of direct effect and EU law supremacy that falls under the dimension of nesting is considered as a background information in Tallberg's (2002) theory, even though it is considered to pave the foundation for a decentralised monitoring scheme for Stage II.

Stage II: Monitoring functions to monitor NFs' compliance behaviours to detect violators. According to Tallberg (2002, p. 616) members' compliance is monitored through actively collecting and assessing information (an in-house centralised monitoring) as well as recording and examining informal complaints lodged EU citizens or corporates (a decentralised monitoring). Haas (1998, 2007) differentiates the dimensions of **monitoring** and **verification**. Within the dimension of

monitoring, a self-reporting questionnaire can be used if the international institution has limited administrative capacity. Within the dimension of verification, third party watchdogs and/or surprise visits are credible sources that can be utilised to verify the compliance behaviours. Despite slight differences in their emphasis, both suggest that monitoring and verification can be conducted through either a centralised or a decentralised approach and provide for transparency and thus exposing the violators and creating peer pressure.

Stage III: Intervention functions as an institutionalised scheme to review potential non-compliance cases. According to Tallberg (2002) this stage includes an informal bargaining process and a formal infringement proceeding. In the informal process, cases are reviewed to effectively remove inadvertent cases. The formal proceeding consists of the international institution initiating a proceeding through a letter of formal notice, elaborating a legal opinion, and referring a case to the judicial body for a final decision (Tallberg, 2002). In this stage “*enforcement and management processes serve to turn up the pressure*” (Tallberg, 2002, p. 617), making non-compliance an increasingly unattractive option for the NFs. More concretely, the international institution declares its readiness to eventually sanction through issuing incriminating press statements and/or publishing scoreboards on violations to “*name and shame*” non-compliant members.

As far as social pressure is concerned, Haas (1998) proposes the dimension of **horizontal linkage** referring to frequent interactions or some forms of alliance among other actors that would create a dense network that amplifies the institutional legitimacy or discursive capacity. The notion of horizontal linkage corresponds to the social environment of IFs, which may serve to create a social environment either hospitable to conformity or unfavourable to unconformity.

We will look at the ways in which IFs' interactions with the existing horizontal linkages, i.e. the actors in the IFs' own pyramidal structure (s. Figure 2, p33) and the external policy network of organisations (s. Figure 3, p36) that form the social environment of the IF-NF relations, as well as in what ways these linkages are important to IFs' compliance inducement.

Furthermore, the dimension of **institutional profile** refers to international institutions raising their own profile so that the participating state leaders might gain political approval more easily at the domestic level or the stakes of failing to meet international commitments are higher (Haas, 2007). An example given by Haas(2007) is the international meetings to raise the institutional profile, given In our view, this dimension can be thought of as international institutions working on their social perception through the political advancement of the institution. In the context of this

research, the political advancement of an international sport federation may be associated to its Olympic status in the Olympic Movement.

We will look at which social perceptions of the institution are important to IFs and how they contribute to a social environment hospitable to conformity or unfavourable to unconformity. As can be seen, the dimensions of horizontal linkages and institutional profile may play a supporting role in Stage III, especially when social pressures need to be ramped up. Nonetheless, it is noted that the compliance-inducing effects of these two dimensions in Haas' (2007) conceptualisation are not limited to the social environment, they also reinforce the discursive authority or institutional legitimacy of international institutions in the international society.

As Stage III is about a legal system responding to non-compliance, the question remains in what ways and to what extent the legal system of IFs is developed to intervene, and what leverages, be it horizontal linkages or the institutional profiles among others are available to IFs when needed.

Stage IV: Sanction concerns the issuing of deterrent sanctions as a final measure if states refuse to accept the rulings of the legal system. The deterrence effect of sanctions should be strong enough to induce settlement. Tallberg (2002) argues that the EU Commission's ability to impose economic sanctions contributes to the EU's compliance system.

In general, we synthesise the remedies and sanctions available to IFs vis a vis their member federations into seven categories of ascending severity: 1) warning or reprimand, when ordered a period of time for corrective action or some prescribed steps to be taken in order to remedy the deficiency is given; 2) Removal of rights, including the rights to participate in competitions, official activities, perform a certain function (from office or selling tickets, etc.); 3) Disadvantage in competing internationally, deduction of points for the current games or future games, or disqualification from games; 4) Withholding grants or subsidies, or financial benefits; 5) Withdrawal of title or award; 6) Financial penalty (fine) or reimbursement to damage incurred; 7) Partial or full membership suspension and expulsion. This synthesis demonstrates that the most severe sanction an IF could issue within its jurisdiction is membership suspension and expulsion. Consequently, we examine the extent to which IFs impose sanctions in their compliance system.

Furthermore, Tallberg (2002, pp. 50–52) differentiates the sources of compliance into ‘*non-compliance due to capacity limitations*’ and ‘*non-compliance as a preference*’ based on the EU practices. According to Tallberg (2002), the former refers to the member states encountering obstacles in the legislative process domestically too formidable that leads to an inability to implement EU laws legally. The latter refers to the sturdy opposition from interest groups or the rigidity of bureaucracies that have

led to member states lagging behind a given timeframe or failing to apply a portion of the laws in operation. This distinction between non-compliance as a preference and due to capacity limitations is similar to Haas' (2007) model of the likelihood of state compliance (s. Table 3, p18) which also considers willingness and capacity as the parameters for states' choice to comply. In Tallberg's (2002) view, it is dependent on the degree of state behavioural adjustment required that makes a difference in states' willingness to comply, whereas Haas (2007) applies the costliness of compliance to both the capacity and willingness parameters, arguing that even if compliance is costly it is still possible that the capable and willing states comply. This research will examine specifically the general types of non-compliance and IFs' responses to them in order to identify their respective compliance inductive strategies.

The compliance system of international sports policy regimes is theorised as a four-staged framework, namely Stage I: Prevention, Stage II: Monitoring, Stage III: Intervention and Stage IV: Sanction. Table 4 (p 55) outlines the strategies from each dimension discussed above respectively in Stage I to IV and each stage's focus. This analytical framework constitutes the foundation for this research and informs the development of interview guidelines and the analysis of research results.

Table 4 *The Analytical Framework Theorised in Four Stages*

Stage	Dimension	Strategies	Focus
Stage I Preventive Capacity Building	National concern	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To promote exchanges about administrative problem-solving on specific international policy Other norm-setting initiatives, i.e. public campaign or education 	Preventive capacity building
	The building of capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To provide funding and to alleviate a domestic capacity deficiency Elasticity of rule implementation, i.e. to allow for more time to adjust behaviour) Other actions to improve capacity of members to help them comply 	
	Nesting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To issue guidelines for rule clarity Others actions to transpose international rules to the national level based on a hierarchical supremacy 	
Stage II Monitoring	Monitoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In-house monitoring, i.e. self-report questionnaire A complaint-lodging scheme 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitor to detect violators
	Verification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Third party watchdogs Surprise visits Other verifying strategies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Principle of transparency to expose violators
Stage III Intervention	Horizontal linkages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Informal process: Consultation / negotiation 	Ramp up social pressure against violators
	Institutional profile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Formal infringement proceedings to ramp up social pressures 	
Stage IV Sanction	Sanction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IFs formal responses to non-compliance cases. 	Deter non-compliance

Chapter 3 Methodology

Chapter 3 outlines the methodological process of answering the research questions, including research design and process as well as limitations.

The debate between the qualitative and quantitative research paradigms can be understood from the perspectives of ontology, epistemology and methodology (Bryman, 2003; Chen, 2009; Denzin, & Lincoln, 2011; Pan, 2003). From the ontological point of view, qualitative studies

3.1 The Choice of Research Paradigm for the Present Study

A paradigm stands for “*a patterned set of assumptions*” that either concerns the reality (ontology), the knowledge of the reality (epistemology), or the ways of understanding the reality (methodology)” (Crabtree, & Miller, 1999, p. 8; cited from Guba, 1990).

Guba and Lincoln (1994) argue that the existing inquiry paradigms can be summarised into the positivist inquiry, post-positivist inquiry, the critical inquiry and the constructive inquiry. To differentiate them one should look at the specific response given by each paradigm to the three fundamental questions, the ontological (concerning reality), epistemological (concerning the knowledge of reality) and methodological (concerning the ways of understanding reality) questions (Bryman, 2003; Chen, 2009; Denzin, & Lincoln, 2011; Pan, 2003).

Positivist inquiry is based on the realism paradigm that emphasises the search of an ultimate truth of reality and has informed the research of natural science and social science for 400 years (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Post-positivist inquiry holds a modified critical view of realism acknowledging the unlikelihood of grasping the ultimate truth and therefore seeking the best approximation of reality (Crabtree & Miller, 1999; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). In Guba and Lincoln's (1994, p. 109) view, the positivist and post-positivist paradigms essentially share the same set of ontological beliefs, there is a "*real reality*" to be captured. Both may be considered as the materialistic inquiry paradigm whose research process can be understood metaphorically as a linear ladder (Crabtree & Miller, 1999; Habermas, 2005).

Constructive inquiry forms the interpretivism/constructivism paradigm tradition. It builds upon the social construction of reality. It emphasises that the reality we get to know is contextual and dependent on the inquirer's perspectives or experience (Crabtree & Miller, 1999). The research process of the constructive inquiry is a circular process of data collection, data analysis, theory formation, and finally a reference to experience through which a constructed reality is understood (Chen, 2009; Crabtree & Miller, 1999).

The critical paradigm also agrees to a cycle of reality exploration yet focuses more on the social reality of a system that is concerned with social issues such as the

distribution of power, inequality across gender, race and class. Critical inquirers seek to distance individual/present experiences (false consciousness) and focus on revealing the system where social reality is formed (empowered/emancipated consciousness), believing that conducting historical analysis shall lead us closer to reality and erode ignorance (Chen, 2009; Crabtree & Miller, 1999; Guba & Lincoln, 1994).

The role of values in both the critical inquiry paradigm and the constructivist inquiry paradigms have “*pride of place*”, unlike the previous two paradigms who emphasise a value-free or value-neutral approach (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 114). Both the critical and constructivist inquiry paradigms see values as shielding reality construction for the rather powerless audience and thus as formative in an informed dialectical process, though the constructivist inquirers take a more participatory role in the inquiry process.

Over the years of paradigm war, the debate between qualitative and quantitative research methods has been elevated onto an epistemological level where qualitative and quantitative methods are considered as competing and non-compatible approaches (Denzin, & Lincoln, 2011; Pan, 2003). However, the materialistic inquiry intrigued (post)positivism does not necessarily represent or correspond to the quantitative research tradition nor do the other inquiries and their corresponding paradigms entirely represent the qualitative research tradition (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Pan, 2003). The

choice between a quantitative approach or qualitative approach is merely a choice of method and shall be determined by the purpose of the research (Chen, 2009; Crabtree & Miller, 1999). The paradigm choice and the methodology choice should be separated (Crabtree & Miller, 1999).

As a result, it is beneficial at this point to reiterate the aim and objectives, more importantly, the contextual environment of this research. This research aims to shed light on the operation of IFs interfacing with their national federations in order to deepen the understanding of IFs' role as sports policy regimes and the ways in which they exert influence over their national federations. Applying international regime theory, specifically the theoretical concept of compliance, the objective of this research is to explore the strategies of international sports federations to induce compliance by their member federations. Thereby, this research attempts to theorise the distinctive features of regime influence in the context of international sports. As can be seen, the nature of this research is essentially exploratory while utilising compliance theories, mainly from the international relations (IR) literature as the theoretical lens to aid our understanding of the subject.

Put into epistemological terms, this research assumes there is a reality to be captured, namely the strategies of IFs to induce the compliance of their national federations. In this research, international regime theory and related compliance

theories are the theoretical lens taken to assist our effort into knowing the reality. It is clear that this reality is socially constructed because the word ‘strategy’ indicates a sense of direction towards achieving an objective, in the context of this research, to induce the compliance of national federations. Therefore, the strategies, characterised as the reality to be captured, are highly dependent of the value imposed. The strategies not examined through the lens of inducing compliance would not appear to be part of the same reality. This value-dependent feature matches the beliefs of both the critical/constructivist inquiry paradigms (Guba & Lincoln, 1994).

Considering the features of this research, we principally follow a critical inquiry paradigm, which emphasises a dialectical cycle of experience-based observation, data collection, analysis and interpretation, and modification of the understanding / history (Chen, 2009; Crabtree & Miller, 1999). Nonetheless, while the intent of this research is indeed to lay down some ground work for future research to reveal the system where the reality of the international sports society is formed, and in a longitudinal term, emancipate the less powerful; the main research focus will be to explore the interfacing scheme between IFs and their NFs, and the compliance inducement dynamics involved.

3.2 Research Framework and Design

Framework. The research framework of this present study follows the dialectical cycle of the critical inquiry paradigm (Chen, 2009; Crabtree & Miller, 1999). The

research framework of this present study is presented in Figure 4 (p 62). This research was intrigued initially by our experience of being part of the policy review and reform process of an international federation. This experience-based reality triggered an extended process of delving into the academic discussions and theoretical perspectives pertinent to the topic. This process had paved the foundation for our identification of research gaps, the framing of research questions, and the creating of a theoretical framework on the basis of the international regime theories, specifically the compliance theories.

Then, we started to consolidate a research design that could guide us step by step to answer the research questions. The process of data collection was not necessarily linear, i.e. steps were informing each other, and included:

- 1) developing interview guidelines based on theoretical information with an aim to induce the interview participants to portray their experience and actions in full.
- 2) studying to understand the broader policy objectives of the IFs, especially those being interviewed, which helped the researcher identify the key policy areas concerning their national federations. On the basis of these findings, the researcher identified the areas of good governance and sports development as the two main functions where the IFs have the most interactions with national federations. These presumptions have been further verified by interview participants.

3) arranging the logistics of conducting interviews: the researcher probed into personal networks to gauge the possibility of obtaining relevant information and via representative informants and stronger referrals.

Last but not least, based on the analytical framework developed, the researcher analysed the interview data (transcripts produced from the audio interview files and presented and discussed the findings against theories and the literature review. The conclusion of the research shall bring about an enhanced understanding of the social reality and a refined theoretical perspective.




Figure 4 Research Framework

Design. The function of a research design is to ensure that the evidence obtained enables us to answer the research questions as convincingly as possible(De Vaus, 2001). “*A research design deals with a logical problem not a logistical problem*”(Yin, 2009, p. 27). To address the logic of this research, we identified four phases. (s. Table 5, p64)

After we confirmed the theoretical aspects of this research, in Phase 1 we conducted the desk study of the regime characteristics of international sports federations, specifically the Olympic IFs. Phase 2 consisted of two stages. In stage A, we conducted a desk study of the background information of the sampled IFs with regard to their governance performance based on ASOIF assessment, their NF related programmes, latest financial statement, strategic plans and statutes if available. In stage B, we did informal networking with IF staff who are in charge of NF development affairs and NF governance affairs through ASOIF organised thematic workshops for IFs, and identified key areas of IFs’ functions concerned the most with their national federations.

Phase 3 consisted of 4 stages, which include the recruitment as well as interviewing of interview participants and transcription of interviews, the collection and reading of internal documents provided by interview participants and their cross examination with the interview data, and the analysis of the data using thematic coding analysis. We also followed up with interview participants when new questions or

themes arose from the analysis of interview data.

In phase 4, we produced analysis reports, drew conclusions and theoretical implications.

Table 5 Research Design - Four Phases

Empirical Focus	
Phase 1	A desk study of the regime characteristics of international sports federations, specifically the Olympic IFs.
Phase 2	<p>A A desk study of the background information of the sampled IFs with regard to its governance performance based on ASOIF assessment, its NF programmes</p> <p>B Informal networking with IFs staff who are in charge of NF development affairs, and NF governance affairs through ASOIF organised thematic workshops for IFs. Identified key areas of IFs' functions concern the most with their national federations.</p>
Phase 3	<p>A Recruit interview participants, conduct interviews, and transcribe interviews.</p> <p>B Collect and read the internal documents provided by interview participants, and cross examine the documents with the interview data</p> <p>C Data analysis using thematic coding analysis</p> <p>D Follow up with interview participants if new questions or themes arise from the analysis of interview data</p>
Phase 4	Produce analysis reports, make conclusions, and develop theoretical implications.

3.3 Research Method

To seek the best approximation of the constructed reality, i.e. the strategies of IFs to induce the compliance of their national federations, there are two ways of investigation in the context of this research. The first is to collect and study the official information produced by IFs (technically their staff), i.e. official documents, strategic plans, official website articles outlining or disclosing their compliance inducement

strategies. The second way is to inquire IFs about their compliance inducement strategies directly, via interviewing or a questionnaire. For this research, the combination of a preparatory document analysis followed by semi-structured interviews was chosen.

3.3.1 Preparatory document analysis

The document analysis method used in this research is defined as preparatory because it plays a supporting role in the investigation of the research questions. There are three types of documents we collect to assist our understanding of the sampled IFs' missions and vision, of their declared compliance inducement strategies, and of the actual implementation of their strategies, namely the Statutes or Constitution, official strategic plans, IFs' internal reports or documentation of the implementation of strategies.

The researcher collected the statutes and/or equivalent documents that are statutory in nature and identified key components in their statutory rules. These include the following.

1. The set of rules with which the member federations are required to comply.
2. The act of commitment (legally binding or non-binding) that the member federations are required to undertake.
3. The degree of alignment between national and international regulations required, for example, the extent to which the national federations' official documents are required to reflect, refer to or be consistent with those of the international

federations.

4. IFs interference in implementation or IFs oversight of implementation, the extent to which the IFs monitor the situations of their member federations practicing rules that are in consistency with the international rules.
5. Sanctioning powers, the procedure and forms of punitive actions stipulated in the rules, and their enforcement.

This information helps us understand the current compliance situation of these international policy regimes from the legal point of view, which has been discussed in chapter 2 (s. 2.2.3). The membership admission process of IFs serves as an official procedure to ensure NFs have ratified, adopted or accepted the IF international rules prevail the NF national rules.

The official strategic documents of IFs are not scheduled as a binding instrument in IFs' statutory documents for their national federations to comply with. According to Weiss (2007, p. 535), they are a type of non-binding instrument with promotional content that is "*purposed to establish a consensus and later lead to binding obligations.*" Examples are FISA's strategy to "*ensure key stakeholders are represented in decision-making processes*"(FISA, 2018, p. 6) or ITU's aim to "*provide education on strong leadership practices to CCs & NFs.*"(ITU, 2018, p. 6). FINA's strategic plan manifests exceptional compulsion to assert its commitment:

...a culture of good governance must permeate every aspect of aquatic sports. ...

FINA will regularly scrutinise, and identify ways to improve, its own governance

and help its National Federations adopt and implement the principles of good governance (FINA, 2018, p. 10).

They all disclose an intention, the direction or the policy areas of importance or priority. However, using the analysis of the official strategic documents comes with certain issues of validity with regard to the investigation of reality. First, official strategic documents often represent the strategic ideas of IFs, not the actual implementation where the interfacing mechanism between IFs and their NFs is the most intriguing aspect to this research. In addition, the operational adjustments and the outcome of these strategic actions are not always updated to these documents or on the website. Second, the official strategic documents published on the official website are constructed to cater to IFs' public relations purpose; therefore, the analysis of the official strategic documents poses a risk of deviating from the actual implemented strategies. Thus, to capture said reality, the document analysis will be complemented by semi-structured interviews. However, the analysis of strategic documents and information can offer valuable insights into the strategic directions IFs are seeking to promote. As such it can be seen as an entry reference to guide our inquiry of the reality.

3.3.2 Semi-structured interviews

Given that the compliance inducement of international sports policy regimes is well under-documented and under-explored (Chappelet et al., 2020; Clausen, 2018,

2018; Croci & Forster, 2004), the adoption of a qualitative approach is an obvious choice for three reasons. The first concerns the exploratory nature of this research where relevant information is not (yet) widely available. Secondly, the research questions concern an issue that requires an uncovering a thick context and procedures, and thirdly, the aim of this research is to identify strategies which often are descriptive and contain certain values and beliefs of the actors exercising the strategies (May, 2011; Sarantakos, 1998). It makes sense to use a theory-informed investigation tool, i.e. a semi-structured interview guideline, which allows for new emerging aspects but also approaches the reality in a relatively structured way. We adopt a semi-structured interview so that the interview can be proceeded in a conversational setting (Brinkmann, 2013; Magnusson & Marecek, 2015).

The interview guideline is developed based on the analytical framework adapted for this research where the key compliance strategic elements from each stage are listed in Table 4 (p55). The interview guideline consists of three main lines of questions: policy objectives, compliance inducement strategies, and hypothetical questions. A list of interview questions (in brief) is outlined below in Table 6 (p69).

Based on the analytical framework, a semi-structured interview guideline is developed to encourage interview participants' elaboration of compliance inducement strategies. The interview data also serve as an important source for capturing the actual

implementation and actions that are often dynamic and adjusted on a rolling basis. The use of a semi-structured interview guideline is considered the most ideal for this research because its open ended questions allow the interview participants to provide contextualised information their day-to-day actions and the researcher to identify the strategies still within the given structure (Galletta, 2013; Magnusson & Marecek, 2015; Marshall & Rossman, 1999; May, 2011). Most importantly, it allows the researcher to explore an under-explored field that is also not accustomed to being completely transparent in the documentations. In most interviews, the researcher deliberately created the room for the interview participants to tell their own story, the achievements, and the challenges and the ways to rise to these challenges. This way, the interview participants often answer more than one interview question altogether in the same narrative. The researcher seeks to establish a trustworthy relationship with the interviewees, paving the way for them to elaborate on the implementation of their organisational strategies, specifically the challenges and the ways they are managed, and what is required to manage the challenges more effectively.

Table 6 Interview Guideline

[Policy objectives]: Could you elaborate on the policy objectives of your organisation with regard to your interaction with the national federations?

Stage	Dimension	Interview Questions (in Brief)
Stage I	National concern	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> How does your organisation interact with

Stage	Dimension	Interview Questions (in Brief)
Prevention		your national federations?
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How does your organisation induce your member federations to behave in a desirable way? • How do you inform your member federations about your new policies? • How do you guide your member federations to behave in a desirable manner?
	The building of capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does your organisation provide some forms of subsidies or aide (education, training, technology, monetary aid) to help the member federations to comply? In what ways?
	Nesting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Do you apply the same set of rules, principles, standards, to all your member federations? If different, how? • How do you ensure your member federations apply the international rules, principles or standards at the national level?
Stage II Monitoring	Monitoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How does your organisation monitor your member federations? • Do you think ensuring transparency of information important in advancing your policy objectives?
	Verification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How do you verify the actual situation at the national level?
Stage III Intervention	(Horizontal Linkages)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the challenges when you and your team try to achieve your policy objectives? • When non-compliance occurs, what are your responses?
	(Institutional profile)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent do you utilise your continental or regional bodies to facilitate the work? • To what extent do you think that the alignment of your organisational objectives with that of the IOC, United Nations initiatives facilitate your work in advancing

Stage	Dimension	Interview Questions (in Brief)
Stage IV	Sanction	policy objectives?
Sanction		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In what cases does your organisation impose some forms of punishment on your member federations?

[Hypothetical question]: If you had more resources at hand, which area of your work would you spend these resources on with regard to your national federations?

3.4 Research Subjects

Among the many international sports organisations that would be able to claim an international regime status, the domestic policy influence of the Olympic International Federations is especially visible due to the political and economic magnitude of the Olympic Games. Therefore, this research focuses on the International Federations that govern an Olympic sport (or a number of sports) at the global level, particularly those sports that are established on the Sports Programme of the Summer Olympic Games (s. Table 7, p 72). In addition to their obvious Olympic association, these Olympic International Federations also share a similar sports governance vertical network (Crocì & Forster, 2004) (s. Figure 2, p33) as well as an external environment as one of the initial actors of the now ‘*total Olympic system*’ (Chappelet, 2016, p. 747); (s. Figure 3, p36). As suggested by Forster and Pope (2004), these international federations serve a collective role in the global civil society and should be considered as a group. As a result, purposive sampling is required to ensure that the data collected

reflect the compliance strategies adopted in the field. In this section, we will first give a general overview of the summer Olympic sports federations and discuss the significance of their Olympic status. Second, we will identify relevant indicators to sample the researched Olympic IFs. Amongst the international sports federations, we intend to draw particular attention to the Olympic IFs on the Summer Olympic Programme. Table 7 (p72) provides a full list of all 28 Olympic IFs.

Table 7 List of IFs on the Sports Programme of the Summer Olympic Games

Federation Title	Acronym	Official Website	HQs Locations
Fédération Internationale de Natation	FINA	fina.org	Lausanne (SUI)
World Archery Federation	WA	worldarchery.org	Lausanne (SUI)
International Association of Athletics Federations	IAAF	iaaf.org	Monaco (MON)
Badminton World Federation	BWF	bwfbadminton.org	Kuala Lumpur (MAS)
Fédération Internationale de Basketball	FIBA	fiba.basketball	Mies (SUI)
International Boxing Association	AIBA	aiba.org	Lausanne (SUI)
International Canoe Federation	ICF	canoeicf.com	Lausanne (SUI)
Union Cycliste Internationale	UCI	uci.ch	Aigles(SUI)
Fédération Équestre Internationale	FEI	fei.org	Lausanne (SUI)
Fédération Internationale d'Escrime	FIE	fie.org	Lausanne (SUI)
Fédération Internationale de Football Association	FIFA	fifa.com	Zurich(SUI)
International Golf Federation	IGF	igfgolf.org	Lausanne (SUI)
Fédération Internationale de Gymnastique	FIG	fig-gymnastics.com	Lausanne (SUI)
International Handball Federation	IHF	ihf.info	Basel (SUI)
International Hockey Federation	FIH	fi.h.ch	Lausanne (SUI)
International Judo Federation	IJF	ijf.org	Budapest (HUN)
Union Internationale de Pentathlon Moderne	UIPM	pentathlon.org	Monaco (MON)

Federation Title	Acronym	Official Website	HQs Locations
Fédération Internationale des Sociétés d'Avion	FISA	worldrowing.com	Lausanne (SUI)
World Rugby	WR	worldrugby.org	Dublin (IRL)
World Sailing	WS	sailing.org	London(GBR)
International Shooting Sport Federation	ISSF	issf-sports.org	Lausanne (SUI)
International Table Tennis Federation	ITTF	ittf.com	Singapore (SGP)
World Taekwondo	WT	worldtaekwondo.org	Seoul (KOR)
International Tennis Federation	ITF	itftennis.com	London (GBR)
International Triathlon Union	ITU	triathlon.org	Lausanne (SUI)
Fédération Internationale de Volleyball	FIVB	fivb.com	Lausanne (SUI)
International Weightlifting Federation	IWF	iwf.net	Budapest (HUN)
United World Wrestling	UWW	unitedworldwrestling.org	Vevey (SUI)

The Olympic Status: International Sports Federations. With our exclusive focus on the Olympic IFs, it is helpful to outline the significance of the Olympic Status to international sports federations. By Olympic Status, we refer to the extent to which an international sports federation is associated with or has an influence within the Olympic Movement which is centred around the IOC and the Olympic Games.

Thorpe and Wheaton's (2019, p. 469) research on the international governing bodies seeking to become Olympic sports shows that their greatest concern is the "*loss of autonomy and control over the development and directions of their sport.*" There are two implications of Thorpe and Wheaton's (2019, p. 469) research. First, the status of

an Olympic sport entails certain restrictions imposed on how IFs govern their sports.

Second, there is a difference between governing an Olympic sport and non-Olympic sport. Furthermore, there are also differences between the 28 Summer Olympic Federations with regard to their political influence and economic significance to the Olympic Games or the IOC. There are two indicators that show this.

First, the Olympic Revenue Groupings demonstrate, largely, the commercial contribution of each IF to the summer Olympic Games. Only these 28 full members of ASOIF whose Olympic Status is claimed through being referenced in the bylaws of Rule 45 in the Olympic Charter are eligible to receive a share of the Olympic Games revenue (ASOIF, 2018a). Table 8 (p75) displays the criteria used to evaluate the performance of each sport during the Games period which are then translated into the Games Revenue Groupings (Table 9, p76). These 28 members of ASOIF are grouped into A, B, C, D and E (Ryan, 2017). The grouping indicates their corresponding share of revenue, hence their Olympic Status. A represents the group that received the highest share of the Olympic revenue.

Table 8 Olympic Revenue Share Indicators

Criteria	Weight	Indicators
Television	40	Total maximum TV audience
		Average viewers per minute (AMR)
		Viewer hours
Internet	20	Page views on most popular websites
		Page views on the Games' official website
		Number of internet searches
		Unique viewers on most popular websites
		Video views on YouTube
		Social media user generated content - mentions
		Social media publication content - reactions
		Page views on olympic.org
General Public	15	Favourite sports among the general public
Spectators	10	Number of tickets requested in host country
		Percentage of available tickets sold
Press	10	Number of press articles
		Favourability - tone of press articles
Universality	5	Number of National Federations that organized National Championships
		Number of continents that won medals

Adapted from “The International Olympic & Sports Movement”, by Ryan A., Executive Director, ASOIF, a presentation document for the International Academy of Sport Science and Technology (AISTS) 2017, p. 33.

According to Ryan (2017, p. 35), the sport of track and field is estimated to receive about 40 million for the cycle of Rio 2016, swimming and gymnastics each 32 million. The sports in the groupings B, C, D and E respectively receive 25, 17, 15, and 13 million for the same cycle. It is fair to say that the higher the share of Olympic revenue of an IF, the higher is a sport’s contribution to the commercial success of the

Games; consequently, the higher its Olympic Status.

Table 9 Olympic Revenue Groupings

Category	Sports
A	Swimming, track and field, gymnastics
B	Basketball, cycling, football, tennis, volleyball
C	Archery, badminton, boxing, judo, rowing, shooting, table tennis, weightlifting
D	Canoeing, equestrian, fencing, handball, hockey, triathlon, wrestling
E	Modern pentathlon, golf, rugby

Note. Adapted from “The International Olympic & Sports Movement”, by Ryan A., Executive Director, ASOIF, a presentation document for the International Academy of Sport Science and Technology (AISTS) 2017, p. 34.

The second indicator concerns the athletes’ quotas of each IF at the Olympic Games which particularly indicates the pertinence of a sport in the Olympic Games (s. *Table 10*, p76) because the total athletes’ quota is capped at 10,500 (Olympic Charter, 2018, p. 84). As can be seen, athletics and aquatics sports represent the higher percentage of athletes, 17.9 percent and 13.3 percent, respectively. The team sports, namely, football, volleyball, basketball, hockey, rugby, and handball, in general have less events than individual sports.

Table 10 The Olympic Games Tokyo 2020 Athletes Quota by Sports

	Sports	Athlete Quotas	%
1	Athletics	1,900	17.9%
2	Aquatics	1,410	13.3%

	Sports	Athlete Quotas	%
3	Cycling	528	5.0%
4	Rowing	526	5.0%
5	Football*	504	4.7%
6	Judo	386	3.6%
7	Hockey*	384	3.6%
8	Volleyball*	384	3.6%
9	Shooting	360	3.4%
10	Basketball*	352	3.3%
11	Sailing	350	3.3%
12	Handball*	336	3.2%
13	Canoe	328	3.1%
14	Gymnastics	324	3.1%
15	Rugby*	288	2.7%
16	Wrestling	288	2.7%
17	Boxing	286	2.7%
18	Fencing	212	2.0%
19	Equestrian	200	1.9%
20	Weightlifting	196	1.8%
21	Badminton	172	1.6%
22	Table Tennis	172	1.6%
23	Tennis	172	1.6%
24	Archery	128	1.2%
25	Taekwondo	128	1.2%
26	Golf	120	1.1%
27	Triathlon	110	1.0%
28	Modern Pentathlon	72	0.7%
	Sum	10,616	100.0%

Note. Adapted from

<https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Games/Summer-Games/Games-Tokyo-2020-Olympic-Games/Tokyo-2020-event-programme.pdf>.

Copyright 2017 by IOC. * stands for team sports.

Sampling International Sport Federations. The international sport federations

examined in past research were often selected based on a sampling of critical or politically important cases (Chen, 2009). Therefore, unicorn policy regimes such as the International Football Federation (FIFA) or the International Olympic Committee (IOC) were almost exclusively chosen to signify the entire sports movement (Clausen, 2018; Forster & Pope, 2004; Sugden & Tomlinson, 1998, 2002; Tomlinson, 2014). This research aims to proceed with a maximum variation sampling approach (Chen, 2009) which ought to cover a wide range of IF organisational capacities, i.e. annual revenues or operating budgets. Then, interview participants are reached out to through a snowballing approach in order to gain access to those informants with an abundance of relevant information (Chen, 2009). While this research intends to include a wider range of IFs with varying capacities, there are not many existing parameters that are suitable as sampling criteria. The Association of the Summer Olympic International Federations (ASOIF) conducts a biannual assessment of its member IFs and has put in place a categorisation in the *Second Review of International Federation Governance* by ASOIF (2018b). There, the IFs are categorised into small, medium and large based on the staff number and annual revenue which are self-reported by the IFs. Eight (8) out of twenty-eight (28) IFs are categorised as small IFs, twelve (12) as medium, and another eight (8) as large (ASOIF, 2018b). Table 11 (p79) gives an overview of the categorisation.

Table 11 Olympic IF Categorisation by ASOIF

Category	Criteria	Number of IFs (28)
Small	<20 staff (<8m CHF revenue with 1 exception)	8
Medium	20-49 staff (revenue varies)	12
Large	>49 staff (revenue >20m CHF)	8

Adopted from the “*Second Review of International Federation Governance*”, by ASOIF, 2018, p. 25. Copyright 2018 by ASOIF.

There is evidence of a correlation between this categorisation (based on staff number /annual revenue) and an IF’s performance in overall governance practice, i.e. how developed their policies and procedures are and how far these policies are implemented (ASOIF, 2018b). Therefore, the ASOIF categorisation is considered as the most relevant indicator of IFs’ compliance inducement capacity; however, the figures of individual IFs are not published in full in the ASOIF report.

According to Table 11 (p79), there are eight small IFs that have less than 20 staff and less than eight million (CHF) revenue with 1 exception, twelve medium IFs that have 20-49 staff and eight large IFs that have more than 49 staff and over 20 million annual revenue among the 28 summer Olympic IFs. Table 12 (p81) shows the basic information collected about the sampled IFs in this research. The capacity of the sampled IFs ranges from two large, four medium, to two small IFs. We consider this sample as highly corresponding to the actual distribution of IFs’ capacity levels.

Besides the ASOIF categorisation, we consider the operating expenditure an

even more relevant indicator because it indicates the amount of money an IF actually spends every year. We extracted the information of IFs' operating expenditure from IFs' audited financial statements published on the respective official websites. We are able to obtain the operating expenditure of all sampled IFs except for FIVB and FIBA. For these two IFs the researcher estimates a 50 million operating budget based on the staff numbers and their Olympic Groupings As can be seen in Table 12, the operating expenditure of the sampled IFs also shows a wide range from 6.5 to 50 million (s. Table 12, p81).

Although we do not consider the Olympic Revenue Grouping a particularly precise indicator of IFs' capacity, it does give us some supplementary information to approximate the true capacity level of IFs, especially considering that we do not have the full picture of all the sampled IFs' ASOIF categorisation and operating expenditures.

We rank the indicators available according to their relevance, i.e. to what extent the indicator tells us about IFs' capacity. The ASOIF categorisation (ASOIF, 2018b) is ranked the highest, followed by the average operating expenditure extracted from IFs' published audited accounts, and then the last is the Olympic revenue groupings. As can be seen, the first two parameters roughly correspond to each other. However, it stands out that FINA has a large operating expenditure and is ranked in the highest group in the Olympic Revenue Groupings but chooses to remain small in terms of staff number,

and is categorised as a medium IF in the ASOIF Categorisation. After consulting all indicators available to us, we are able to put together Table 12 (p 81), in which we rank the IFs' capacity level, from high to low, as FIBA, FIVB, FINA, BWF, ITU, FISA, UWW, and WA. Overall, the sampled IFs are diverse enough to be considered as representing the 28 Summer Olympic International Federations.

Table 12 The Basic Information about the Sampled IFs

	FIBA	FIVB	FINA	BWF	ITU	FISA	UWW	WA
ASOIF categorisation	L	L	M	M	M	M	S	S
Avg. Operating Expenditure	50*	50*	44.3	23	7.3	7	8.9	6.5
Olympic Revenue Grouping	B	B	A	D	D	C	D	C
N. of NFs	213	221	208	190	172	156	176	163
N. of staff	150	65	45	45	26	21	18	15

Note. ASOIF's categorisation does not disclose information about individual IFs. The ASOIF categorisation labelled for each IF in table 12 is based on an estimation arising from staff numbers verified by the interview participants. The data on average operating expenditures (annually) are marked in million and based on the financial statement of 2017 to 2018 published on the IFs' official websites. FIBA and FIVB's financial statement is not published; 50 million is an estimated number based on the researcher's best guess. The data about the number of member federations is from ASOIF's official website. <https://www.asoif.com/>

3.4.1 Selection of Interview Participants

The selection of interviewees is based on two criteria, their job function and their seniority or information abundance via purposive and snowball sampling (Chen, 2009):

(1) Job Functions: The researcher targeted staff who are responsible for the relevant functions of an IF, mainly development, legal, governance and membership service, and general administration.

(2) Seniority and information abundance: The researcher aimed to interview staff members serving in the same organisation or targeted function with at least a good level of operational decision-making authority preferably for a minimum of one Olympic Cycle.

In total, 12 interviews have been conducted over the period of February to June 2020 across the eight IFs. All twelve participants are senior staff in leading roles of their relevant functions or of the IF organisation.

We have identified the job junction general administration (top management of an IF) as the most relevant to answer the research questions. When we were not able to approach the top management, we identified the function of NF development as the next relevant to shed light on stage 1 and II. For the strategies in stage III and IV, we identified the function of legal and governance affairs to be the second relevant (s. *Table 13*, p83).

Table 13 Identification of the Best Candidates For Interviews Within Each of the Four

Stages of the Theoretical Framework

	Best Candidate	Second Best Candidate
Stage I	The top management positions, i.e. general secretary, CEO or equivalent	Leader or senior staff in charge of national federations development affairs
Stage II	The top management positions, i.e. general secretary, CEO or equivalent	Leader or senior staff in charge of national federations development affairs
Stage III	The top management positions, i.e. general secretary, CEO or equivalent	Leader or senior staff in charge of national federations legal and/or governance affairs
Stage IV	The top management positions, i.e. general secretary, CEO or equivalent	Leader or senior staff in charge of national federations legal and/or governance affairs

Among the final twelve interview participants (s. Table 14, p84), eight are responsible for the function of development, whose job title includes head of the department, director or senior manager. Of these, five participants have five to ten years' experience in the same function, and three participants have well more than ten years of experience. Another three of the interview participants are holding a high administrative position. With regard to the function of general administration (top management of an IF), the job titles of participants include (deputy) general secretary, executive director or managing director, etc. Only one of the interviewees works in a legal or governance function. The fact that not more interviewees with these functions could be recruited is likely due to the sensitivity of the legal or governance function.

Overall, the two criteria have been fulfilled by the interview sample. The total number of interview participants and IFs was determined based on the level of information saturation, i.e. no more interviews were conducted when additional interviews no longer added any new emergent themes (Chen, 2009; Saunders et al., 2018).

To ensure personal data is well protected, any summary interview content or direct quotations from the interviews that are made available through academic publication or other academic outlets will be anonymised so that the interviewees cannot be identified, and care will be taken to ensure that other information in the interview that could expose their identity is not revealed.

Table 14 The List of Interview Participants

#	Function, Seniority & Relevance	Date	Duration	Via
A	Senior role in development, five years,	9 Feb	42m46s	Face-to-Face
B	Leading role in development, ten years	17 Feb	1h55s	Face-to-Face
C*	Leading role in development, five years	20 Feb	1h13m6s	Face-to-Face
D	Leading role in development, 15 years	2 Mar	38m6s	Conference call
E	Top management, 15 years	10 Mar	33m	Conference call
F*	Leading role in legal and governance, five years.	12 Mar	43m9s	Face-to-Face
G*	Leading role in development, 15 years	23 Mar	32m36	Conference call
I*	Leading role in development, ten years	20 Mar	1h8m21s	Conference call
J	Top management, five years	15 May	1h12h44s	Conference call
K*	Top management, 15 years	2 May	1h45m31	Conference call
L*	Senior role in development, 5 years,	17 April	42m35s	Conference call
N*	Leading role in development, 20 years	1 June	1h 15m30s	Conference call

Note. All interviews were conducted in the year of 2020. *The participants who answer the researcher's follow-up some questions with emails

3.4.1 Interview process and data treatment

As of February 2020, the researcher started to identify potential interview participants based on the selection criteria set out in 3.4.1, and sent out invitations to schedule an interview meeting. In the invitation, the interview participants were provided with the interview questions, the research topic and objectives, as well as the ethical standards applied regarding anonymization as well as data storage. A research consent form can be found in Annex A. Most of the interview participants and the researcher were acquainted due to previous professional encounters. However, to be able to interview the senior staff of international sports federations, the researcher reached out to ASOIF for stronger referrals.

In the daily context, ‘compliance’ is often referred to as a legal matter, having the connotation that non-compliance entails consequences, such as sanctioning. The working definition of compliance in this research is the inducement of compliant behaviours of member federations, which includes but is not limited to the legal proceeding implied in the daily context. Therefore, the working definition of compliance is specifically elaborated before the interviews to avoid reservation of the interviewees.

The interviews were recorded with an audio recording device and transcribed using a certified software Sonia.ai, an online automatic transcription service based on

artificial intelligence computing techniques. The average transcription accuracy of said service is around 80 percent. For each processed interview transcription, the researcher then manually edited the script according to the audio or video file.

After anonymising personal or specific subject information as well as cleaning colloquialism, an edited transcript of the interview was sent back to the interviewees for review, a common '*member checking*' validity procedure utilised in qualitative study (Creswell & Miller, 2000, p. 127).

According to the ethical standards in qualitative research (Wiles, 2013), we ensure full anonymization of the interview participants, and a data treatment protocol is in place. First, any information that could disclose their sports is neutralised. Second, specific activities and terms used in their statutory documents, for example, congress, general assembly, or general meeting that are equivalent to one another in terms of their statutory status, are randomly used to replace one another. Third, if specific countries are mentioned, only the continental information will appear in the interview transcript quotation, e.g., an African Country. Not only anonymization protects the privacy of interview participants, but also the promise of proper anonymization by the researcher can increase the trust from interview participants to disclose more trustworthy information. Gaining the trust of the interview participants is crucial, as the context of international sports federations is highly political.

One major obstacle amid the interview invitation process was the outbreak of Covid-19 Coronavirus pandemic. As of March 2020, Switzerland had imposed a strict social distancing restriction. Not surprisingly, the inconvenience of daily mobility as well as the ongoing public health concerns were an added complication to interview data collection. A number of the face-to-face interviews had to be rescheduled to a much later date and changed into an on-line conference call. Without face-to-face interactions, some of the emotional nuances of the interviewees might not have been optimally grasped (Janghorban et al., 2014; Salmons, 2014; Weller, 2017), but it did provide us with an opportunity to interview participants outside of Switzerland.

3.5 Coding and Analysis Approach

The method of conceptualised thematic analysis (Chen, 2009; Linneberg & Korsgaard, 2019; Saldana, 2015) was adopted to analyse and code the transcripts based on the analytical framework developed for this research (s. Table 4, p55). Coding procedures involved the operation of separating the qualitative material into codable units and of establishing systems of categories which can be applied to the unitized material (Guetzkow, 1950).

First, we coded the relevant sections from the transcript using the existing categorisation of a) the building of capacity, b) national concern, c) nesting, e) institutional profile, f) horizontal linkage, g) monitoring, h) verification, i) legal system

and sanctions. Second, with this categorisation in mind, the researcher then coded the dependencies surrounding, the elements embedded into, and the factors encompassing the above categorisation, in terms of the actions, purpose of actions, funding, etc. Then, these codes were analysed further to identify the connections between themselves, and potentially diagrammed as a hierarchy diagram.

Identifying the purpose of the action is very important in the coding because it distinguishes one dimension from the other. For example, one of the main activities IFs provide to its NFs is international coach certification/education. As providing education and knowledge is a typical capacity-building activity conducted by international institutions to the states in need, this unit could be easily coded as ‘the building of capacity’. However, when looking into the purpose of these international coach certification/education activities, it became clear that the purpose was to ensure that the certified coaches, who are very likely a member of the national delegation to international competitions, are exposed to sports integrity-related content, i.e. awareness of the international safeguarding regulations or the consequences of violating the code of conduct. As a result, this unit would be coded with the primary purpose of ‘national concern’ and the secondary purpose of ‘the building of capacity’.

Specifically, within each dimension and in each stage, the strategic actions, their purposes and the sources of funding have been identified. As, according to Chappelet

(2016, p. 747), the linkages among the actors in “*the total Olympic system*” are essentially capital, identifying the source of funding is particularly important to find out whether IFs join force with other actors to advance their compliance inducement.

The process of transcript analysis, as illustrated with the above example, may seem linear; however, the actual process was rather a “*reconstruction in retrospective consciousness*” (Chen, 2009, p. 426) that involved several rounds of coding and attribution.

Figure 5 (p 90) and Figure 6 (p90) displays the relational diagram of the codes set out and the labels connected to each dimension in stage I and Stage II. From Figure 5, three key lines of argument or strategies as per the theoretical framework are identified. First, all three types of international activities are administered with an aim to raise the national concern. Second, the dimensions of nesting and the building of capacity appear in a hand-in-hand manner in the compliance inducement of IFs. Third, the main purposes linked to the dimension of horizontal linkage in stage I are either to reinforce or maintain existing relations which suggests the need for IFs to consolidate these relations. Although at this stage, it is not yet clear how the consolidated relations would contribute to compliance inducement.




Figure 5 The Example of Coding for Stage I




Figure 6 The Example of Coding for Stage II

3.6 Research Limitations and Mitigation

The limitations of this research are discussed below, specifically addressing the research design, the authenticity of data, the researcher's identity, and the logistic arrangement.

Regarding the research design, first, there is a lack of longitudinal aspects in data collection. This research collects the latest compliance inducement strategies of IFs. However, every IF has its own history of organisational evolution prior to its current form, and cultural norms pre-exist in the respective global sports community. As a result, the research focuses on the analysis and presentation of their current compliance strategies and avoids comparing the effects of these strategies across the IFs. Second, there is an obvious implication that strong sporting nations are highly represented in the political process. For example, BWF gives stronger voting strength to the nations that are more involved in the international sports activities (BWF, 2016). These political processes have an impact on the formulating of the rules or standards with which the national federations are expected to comply. However, due to limitations of time and resources, the exploration of the formulating process of rules is not included in the scope of the research. Not having elected officials as interview participants is mainly due to the limitation of their accessibility. The focus of the interview data is on the operational aspect.

As the interview data may be biased by interview participants' personal experience and opinions, they may not reflect the full picture of IFs' compliance strategies. To mitigate the risks of deviation, the researcher utilised internal reports and website information to reference with interview data. Where possible, the interview data from the same IF is also cross checked.

The researcher was employed by one IF for a period of three years. Although not currently involved, the researcher can still be considered somewhat of an insider. Being an insider to the field can be an advantage or a disadvantage (Chen, 2009). On the one hand, the researcher's personal network certainly increases the accessibility to a domain scarcely explored by academia, and brings convenience to arranging interviews and obtaining documents and relevant information. A number of the participants were kind enough to let the researcher ask follow-up questions should further clarification be needed. In addition, theoretically speaking, the researcher's insider identity also increases the interpretative validity of this research (Chen, 2009) because the researcher's insider knowledge certainly aides the understanding of the interviewees' environmental context and terminology as well as informs this research in a contextual manner. In order to mitigate the potential risk of having a presumptuous position in analysing the collected data, the researcher is engaging in dialogues with the theories and other research colleagues.

As the Olympic Movement has been dramatically shaken by the postponement of the Olympic Games, some of the potential participants who hold relevant positions in the IFs became suddenly less accessible. Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic control measures directly resulted in the change from face-to-face interviews to on-line virtual conference calls, which may have had an impact on the researcher's comprehension of subtle emotional nuances of the participants.

However, overall and as far as the number of the participants and the quality of information is concerned, a satisfactory level of saturation has been achieved that is necessary to validly answer of the research questions.



Chapter 4 IFs' Strategies to Induce the Compliance of their

National Federations

According to the analytical framework developed for this research (s. Table 4, p55) IFs' compliance system is theorised in four stages taking into account both the management and enforcement approaches as complementary to each other. We will discuss the results of the analysis stage by stage.

4.1 Stage I: Prevention

In *Stage I: Prevention* the actions arising from the management approach are predominantly used. Primarily, we identify IFs' strategic actions through the dimensions of national concern, the building of capacity, and nesting. We will mainly discuss the most prominent strategies identified for each dimension.

4.1.1 The strategies within the dimension of national concern

With regard to the dimension of national concern, we focus particularly on the ways in which IFs set norms and promote a certain principle, standard or value to raise the concern of their NFs. As it appears, IFs' engagement with their national federations requires sustained efforts and regular maintenance given that there are great capacity discrepancies across their more than 100 member national federations across five continents. The most effective way to increase engagement is believed to be organising international events that create face-to-face meeting opportunities between IFs and their

NFs and between their NFs. For example, Participant I (Interview, 23 Mar 2020) explained: “*we use basically the full spectrum of all of these two [digital and face-to-face] to be in touch with [the NFs]...now we can replace many things through [virtual conference tools] through digital channels, but ...meeting them in person... still has a great value.*” As a result of this, the most prominent strategy of IFs’ inducement of NF compliance, within the dimension of national concern, is to organise regular international events and international development activities and then provide their NFs with an increased access to and an enhanced participation in these events and activities. This strategy corresponds to the managerial view, claiming that it is the frequency of interactions between international and national actors that brings about the “*transformative power of normative discourse*” and makes a difference to the institutional compliance inducement (Hathaway, 2002, p. 1957).

Regularly organise international events and development activities.

Traditionally as part of IFs’ mission, IFs organise international competitions, i.e. world championships, and corporate events, i.e. general assemblies (or congresses), conferences for the NFs. Both types are categorised as official events. In addition to the official events, IFs also organise international development activities that are meant to educate or certify the individuals who participate in the official events, such as training camps for athletes, certification or education programmes for coaches, referee and

judges (or empire) and competition technical officials. More and more governance and sport management themed workshops or seminars are also organised for the NF elected officials and management.

The sophistication of development activities varies from IF to IF from a complete certification programme with a systematic renewal and a review system with a performance pathway, i.e. minimum requirements such as three years of national officiating experience, etc., to a one-shot thematic workshop or seminar, i.e. anti-doping conference or good governance workshop. Synthesised from the interview data, Table 15 (p96) gives an overview of the international events and activities organised by IFs.

Table 15 An Overview of the International Activities Organised by IFs

Type	Event	Main Attendees	Programme Examples
Official events	Congress, NF conference	NF leaderships (elected officials, management),	Membership affairs, governance practices
	Championships, international competitions	Coaches, athletes, technical officials (referees, judges, empires, etc), NF delegates	Competition
Sports Development activities	Training camps, clinics, scholarships	Coaches and athletes	Sports training
	Thematic workshops	NF delegates	Anti-doping conference, gender equality seminar, good governance forum
	Certification/ education	Coaches, athletes, technical officials, NF delegates	Coaches' education programme, competition technical officials certification programme, sports manager education

Note: Synthesised from the interview data

Providing the NFs with an increased access to international events and development activities. IFs' attempts to enhance their engagement with the national federations is evident. This tendency of attempting to increase engagement and advance relations with national federations through international events and activities is observed across all interviewed IFs regardless of their resources. One general strategy is that the access to the international activities is universally offered to every member, i.e. no participation fee charged or travel expenses entirely or partially funded.

For example, according to Participants K and C from two rather resourceful IFs (Interview, 2 May 2020; 17 Feb 2020) and D from a less resourceful IF (Interview, 2 Mar 2020), to fund travel and accommodation of the participants is the main strategy to bolster the participation and this strategy is working very well. According to Participant D *"these training opportunities are subsidised by the IF, ...now we have really drastically increased the number...every year the numbers are increasing"* (Interview, 2 Mar 2020). Participant C (Interview, 17 Feb 2020) also shared that: *"we have the record of participation in world championships... 203 federations participated, almost all...except one country that didn't participate because of their political issue with the hosting nation."*

It seems that these measures are aimed at providing universal access. No apparent differential treatment was uncovered from the interview data. Through providing an

increased access to the international events, a high number of participating countries can be achieved, and high participation is seen by IFs as a sign of success. In addition to providing direct funding of the travel to these events or activities, there are some operational varieties. For example, IFs may also organise official activities in conjunction with development activities, i.e. to affix sports training camps to world championships (D, Interview, 2 Mar 2020; G, Interview, 23 March 2020), or a governance workshop to an annual general assembly (K, Interview, 2 May 2020; N, Interview, 1 June 2020). These operational varieties by IFs are aimed at using the funds more efficiently because the majority of the NFs do have an annual budget to travel to their IF's official activities. Organising multiple activities in conjunction and offering to provide for the extra days of stay is relatively less expensive to IFs and less expensive and time-consuming to NFs compared to organising two event separately (K, Interview, 2 May 2020; D, Interview, 2 Mar 2020). Sometimes IFs send staff to existing events (without organising costs to IFs), such as the continental congresses and other third party corporate events. Participant I (Interview, 23 Mar 2020) mentioned the use of a corporate event of a francophone sports association as *“an additional opportunity to talk to the NFs.”* One IF uses online webinars to increase the frequency of engagement without incurring significant costs. Participant J (Interview, 15 May 2020) shared that online webinars hosted by IF key staff *“really have a direct connection with the*

federations.”

Providing the NFs with an enhanced participation in the international events and development activities. The provision of translation services for the activities is believed to be an important step to enhance engagement. Participant N (Interview, 2 May 2020) explicated that these measures aim to include all members:

What was clear from a development point of view, to be effective, we needed to translate resources... on the basis that those three official Olympic languages and as an Olympic sport, we should have English, Spanish and French. But obviously then...it's got much broader...the [General Assembly], for example, there's simultaneous translation with...English plus six languages. And also the resources that we've developed for participation for school programs, coach education programs are also all translated.

Participant G (Interview, 23 Mar 2020) also said that there has been an increase in the frequency of organising conferences for the NFs at the continental level to engage with the “*regional challenges*” and minimise the linguistic barriers. Also, Participant K (Interview, 2 May 2020) shared that they use a grouping based on the capacity of nations:

[At the forum the members] were grouped according to level...the higher level group was the red group...the most mature and most resourced...the most evolved. And then down to the Blue Group, which were, you know, more grassroots and so on. And we had them in different groups...[with] a facilitator.

The measures of subsidising or providing translation services may appear merely

technical, but they play a very important role to include all members regardless of their capacity “...so more people feel involved, empowered to speak, to participate...members feel that there are ... tools to help them develop the sport in their own country” (N, Interview, 2 May 2020).

The logic behind IFs’ efforts in providing the NFs with an increased access to and enhanced participation in the international events and activities seems quite simple. Even without particular arrangement on the event programme, Participant C (Interview, 17 Feb 2020) said that they believe through simply participating in the World Championships would help a national federation to get public funding, “a lot of good things will come.”

Organising regular international events and international development activities and then providing their NFs with an increased access to and an enhanced participation in these events and activities are categorised as strategies within the dimension of national concern for three reasons.

First, through the NFs participating in these events, it helps to raise the NFs’ awareness of the policies of importance or priority. For example, Participant G (Interview, 23 Mar 2020) shared that these conferences for NFs are to encourage dialogue and share information “on the process of change ... to the Olympic and Paralympic Programme, changes to harmonise the different World Championships,

changes to rules, introduction of Safeguarding Policy among others”.

Second, it helps to promote a set of international standards, norms or values. For example, according to Participant K (Interview, 2 May 2020) the IF organises a NF forum, which allows the NFs to *“compare stories about, you know, how they operate their national federation,”* and the IF can promote a desirable culture when *“we put some members up on stage to showcase some of the great programs they are doing. So it's a way of showcasing excellence”* (K, Interview, 2 May 2020). This so-called excellence is defined by the international norms.

The international development activities are also organised to facilitate the promotion of value-based norms such as safeguarding (health, safety, and wellbeing), anti-doping, or the prevention of match-fixing, that are being incorporated into the programmes (C, Interview, 20 Feb 2020; E Interview, 10 Mar 2020). For example, Participant E (Interview, 10 Mar 2020) proudly presented that *“every development activity we run, anti-doping is included. We make sure all the participants are exposed to anti-doping information.”* Participant G (Interview, 23 Mar 2020) also said that the topics around event safety and safeguarding are in fact the reason behind their recent refocus on the Level One Coach Education.

Last, it helps to reinforce IFs’ normative authority in the community. For example, Participant J (Interview, 15 May 2020) shared how these direct communications and

engagement contribute to the IF's community leadership:

Leading by example, I think, is one of the best ways to really make [the NFs] understand why do we ask something from them. Because, for example, if we tell them that communication is important, that you need to interact with your members [at the national level]... Then we need to show them the same. And that's why we have the monthly calls. ... **We're trying to make them understand why we ask them to do the things that they do because we live by the same principles.**

Participant I (Interview, 23 Mar 2020) also shared the same opinion that the engagement leads to the establishment of a norm in the community, which facilitates policy implementation:

[Regarding a launch of a new policy] ...the first communication is coming from the President of the IF. ... Then we used to send two reminders just reflecting [the] communication that came from the President. Then I see that we are still behind [in policy implementation]. **Then I start contacting them...because I have such a personal connection by now with them, you know, they feel ashamed and they say sorry...** I could even show you some statistics [after] I send out the reminder within 24 hours... (I, Interview, 23 Mar 2020).

There is also concrete evidence indicating that, through these international activities, IFs' normative authority is expanded to the areas that are normally at the discretion of the NFs. For example, Participant G (Interview, 23 Mar 2020) elaborated on an approach of "*proactive encouragement*" where IF staff advise the NF regarding

their approach to the national development programmes:

It's very rarely have we told federations they shouldn't...they can't come. But sometimes we'll say, okay, you really need to work on your junior athletes or we want to see by next year that you have worked on allowing some female athletes to reach a level that they are able to take part in ...a continental event or an international event, but it's more **proactive encouragement** I would call it.

This proactive approach also takes place in the area of identifying talents, which is normally NFs' own affair, "*[either the NFs] select the coaches to attend courses ...or we will identify them [the] people, we think, who have high potential and ask their approval...*" (G, interview, 23 Mar 2020).

Participant I also shared a similar consultation process (Interview, 20 Mar 2020):

I see that the National Federation is nominating a coach to come onto the [training] camp who didn't go through any kind of [IF certified] coaching education. Then it's easy for me to go back [to say]...'OK, guys, it's fine. You have a new talent... But then ...**the next step...I want to see that coach to come back and take our courses. Just make sure that this coach has the knowledge or up to the standards that the IF is expecting to have...[especially] when we are financing another project with his or her presence.**

These suggestions given by IF staff in the context of an administrative consultation process, though advisory and often not forceful, have met with little defiance by the NFs. In addition, Participant G (Interview, 23 Mar 2020) expressed that these

international coaches who came to participate in the international coaching education are often the local sports community leaders, and organising international coaches' education is aiming to *“then cascading that learning level onto the other [grass-roots] coaches....”*

However, this influence exercised through consultation on NF's national processes has its limit on NFs' actual domestic behaviours. For example, Participant C acknowledged that, even though clear Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are developed to measure the impact of these development activities, these KPIs do not necessarily lead to the intended impact: *“there might be coaches that would be very good, [who have been participating in our programmes], they will never make it to the national team [because of decisions from the] political level...”* (Interview, 20 Feb 2020). The appointment of national team coach is still the responsibility of the NFs.

Discussion. Within the dimension of national concern, we are interested in IFs' norm setting initiatives. We have identified that reinforcing the engagement with the national federations is the main strategy by IFs, under which three key strategic actions were identified. First, IFs regularly organise international events and development activities. Second, IFs provide an increased access to international events and development activities. Third, IFs provide an enhanced quality of participation in the international events and development activities. Through the implementation of these

three strategic actions, (1) IFs raise the NFs' awareness and understanding of the policies of importance or priority, (2) IFs promote a set of international standards, norms or values, and (3) IFs' normative authority in the community is reinforced. The three strategic actions by IFs focus on creating a setting, i.e. the international activities and events, that is welcoming and inviting for participation, where the set of normative values upheld and promoted by IFs are socially incorporated into the plenary sessions to discuss common challenges and visions. In addition, the dissemination of this set of normative values is not restricted to the participants of these events, who are already the leading figures in domestic sports community, i.e NF presidents or national team coaches. The participation of a nation federation to flagship events itself is considered to be able to send a message to other key national stakeholders, e.g. governments, that the sport(s) each IF is responsible for promoting should be put (higher) on the national agenda, and also on a subtler note, higher than other sports on the national agenda.

The importance of norms lies in the socialist argument that "*states are best understood as the product of a socialised environment,*" that the socialisation or internalisation of social norms itself determines the interests of a perceived rational decision; therefore, state behaviours shall not be reduced to the calculation of material costs and benefits (Raustiala, 2000, p. 405). Bilder (2007) argues that an international normative system is manifested "*in the very process of norm formation,*" and that

international norms are implemented through consensus rather than a coercive process.

While the international norms may be changeable over time and perceived ambiguous, flexible and unruly; they, inherent to international rules, also provide a firm base for states' long term planning and permit some level of prediction of states' behaviours (Bilder, 2007). Such a norm consensus may be seen in the form of a legal binding instrument, i.e. stipulated in the statutes that exercising good governance is a requirement to be a legitimate member (J, Interview, 15 May 2020), or non-legal binding, i.e. the good governance commitment of an IF propagated in the annual congress (K, Interview, 2 May 2020).

There are two implications arising from the interview data within the dimension of national concern. First, the concern-raising activities organised by IFs at the international level for their NFs are purposed to instigate their behaviour change, but the effect of which can be limited or at least inapplicable to some. According to the depth of cooperation hypothesis (Downs et al., 1996; Tallberg, 2002), the larger a required behavioural adjustment is the more likely it is that nations shirk. Most interview participants attribute this tendency of NFs' inertia to behavioural change to cultural differences and that the international normative system is western (I, Interview, 23 Mar 2020; N, Interview, 1 June 2020), and the implications to practice concepts such as good governance are not universally and uniformly understood (K, Interview, 2 May

2020). Second, the data show that state actors may not always understand clearly or realise the subsequent obligation or expectation of behaviour change at the conclusion of the consensual process. As a result, we clearly see follow-up efforts being made by IFs within the dimensions of the building capacity and nesting (s. details in Ch. 4.1.2 & Ch. 4.1.3) to ensure that the policies of importance, in the case of this research, good governance and sports development, are implemented according to the set of international standards.

4.1.2 The strategies within the dimension of the building of capacity

It has been a long-standing tradition in international organisations to provide technical assistance for the implementation of international rules or standards (Sand, 1996). Building the capacity of member states is important to international institutions because capacity is a central factor for the implementation of member states' international commitment and the extent to which the international rules and standards are applied domestically (Haas et al., 1993; Raustiala & Victor, 1998; Sand, 1996; VanDeveer & Dabelko, 2001).

Within the dimension of the building of capacity in Stage I of the theoretical framework we identify the ways in which IFs help to improve their members' ability to comply, i.e. provide funding to alleviate members' particular capacity deficiencies or elevate members' capacity in general. The tendency of IFs attempting to influence NFs'

behaviours at the national level is observed across all interviewed IFs regardless of their resources. As it appears, three key strategies within the dimension of the building of capacity are identified. First, IFs provide specific NFs with domestic support programmes to improve their capacity. The second strategy is to retain members through providing appropriate policy objectives. Third, IFs create synergies among national key stakeholders while implementing domestic support programmes.

Providing specific NFs with domestic support programmes. The implementation of these support programmes is usually entirely or largely funded by IFs. The programmes typically last 6 to 24 months, while the international development activities mentioned within the dimension of national concern typically last one to two weeks. As can be judged from their duration, the investment involved in implementing the domestic support programmes is high and it is believed that the domestic support programmes can improve a nation's capacity to comply more sustainably. Evidently, the provision of domestic support programmes is widely welcomed by NFs. For example, Participant B (Interview, 17 Feb 2020) said, *“I do not know...any national federations that would say no to help from the IF.”*

Typically, IFs' domestic support programmes include: 1) equipment donation (J, Interview, 15 May 2020; K, Interview, 2 May 2020; A, Interview, 9 Feb 2020; G, Interview, 23 Mar 2020; L, Interview, 17 April 2020), 2) subsidies to the organisation

of national development activities, such as foreign national team head coach recruitment (L, Interview, 17 April 2020), key NF staff recruitment (B, Interview, 17 Feb 2020), event or competitions organisation training (N, Interview, 1 June 2020; I, Interview, 23 Mar 2020), administrators' courses (N, Interview, 1 June 2020; J, Interview, 15 May 2020; C, Interview, 20 Feb 2020); train the trainer programmes (K, Interview, 2 May 2020; N, Interview, 1 June 2020), or promotional grass-roots activities (L, Interview, 17 April 2020); and 3) NF statutes/ regulation review services and governance consultation services (F, Interview, 12 Mar 2020; B, Interview, 17 Feb 2020; C, Interview, 20 Feb 2020; K, Interview, 2 May 2020; N, Interview, 1 June 2020). Table 16 (p109) outlines the types of domestic support synthesised from the interview data which largely correspond to the international aid done by other international regimes termed as 'legislative assistance' and 'administrative capacity-building' (Sand, 1996).

Table 16 Types of Domestic Support Provided by IFs

Types of Domestic Support	Examples
Legislative Assistance	Provision of service to review NF statutes/ regulation and governance
Administrative capacity-building	Subsidised domestic development programmes or activities: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Foreign national team head coach recruitment 2. Key NF staff recruitment 3. Event or competitions organisation training 4. Administrators' courses 5. Train the trainer programmes 6. Grass-roots activities 7. Donation of sporting equipment

Note: Synthesised from interview data

Considering that the offer of domestic support programmes is widely welcomed by the NFs and that the implementation of these programmes naturally applies international standards (s. details ch. 4.1.3), this strategy is considered effective in ensuring the application of international rules and standards; however, the implementation of this strategy is costly.

As it appears, the less resourceful IFs tend to provide domestic support on a case-by-case basis or on a rather limited scale. For example, Participant D (Interview, 2 Mar 2020) from a less resourceful IF shared that their approach is to identify the underperforming developed nations whom they consider able to yield the best return to the IF's investment given that the number of under-performing developed nations is small and their domestic sports development resource structures are more developed.

Also, Participant I from a less resourceful IF (Interview, 23 Mar 2020) shared that they have a start-up package in place for the newly admitted members (the number of new members usually is small). Participant A (Interview, 9 Feb 2020) from a less resourceful IF shared their case-by-case approach, *“the NFs may apply for equipment donation, and we [the IF] will decide to donate or not depending on the funding available”*.

In contrast, the more resourceful IFs tend to have dedicated domestic support

programmes that are run systematically (applicable to most of their NFs), on a larger scale (less on a case-by-case basis), and are more likely to involve direct monetary subsidies. For example, according to Participant L from a large IF (Interview, 17 April 2020), the IF had approved 113 out of 123 NF domestic support applications in the previous year, and the remaining 10 were not rejected because of the IF's funding availability, but because the required criteria were not met by the NFs.

Despite the more resourceful IFs tending to have more systematically run domestic support programmes, the question of resource allocation is an underlying factor substantial to every IF. Participant C from a resourceful IF (Interview, 20 Feb 2020) helps to put this into perspective, *“despite we do have a large budget for [developing] the NFs, when we divide the budget into four (4) years, multiple disciplines and [twelve] development programmes and more than 100 national federations, at the end, it is not much each NF will get.”* This reality reflects that the amount of NF development resources *“never is enough, never is enough”* according to Participant E who repeated this twice to emphasise (Interview, 10 Mar 2020). It has led to the fact that even though the strategy of providing domestic support has been used largely as an incentive for the NFs to take up international values or standards, the provision of domestic support programmes is nonetheless less universal (comparing to the provision of access to international activities discussed in Ch. 4.1.1) and more

selective.

In terms of the selection strategy, Participant A shares an opinion that it is believed to be most ideal to invest long-term and more in the “*lower hanging fruits*” (Interview, 9 Feb 2020). Participant B (Interview, 17 Feb 2020) also said that they focus on those NFs with “*significant growth potential*.”

Participant N (Interview, 1 June 2020) said that the national federations are divided into ten categories, and “*the NF beneficiaries to our domestic support programme do not include the top and bottom categories*.” Participant G (Interview, 23 Mar 2020) also stated that there is a distinction between “*development countries and non-development countries and the list of which we review every four years*.”

The selection of the NFs for providing domestic support is largely informed by the monitoring data collected and analysed concerning NFs’ development level. The process of this selection and the strategies within the dimension of monitoring is further detailed in Stage II: Monitoring.

Retaining members through providing capacity-appropriate policy objectives. It is quite evident that there is a philosophy shared across the interview participants toward NFs’ development: The IF’s role in this system is “*to assist, not to judge*” (B, Interview, 17 Feb 2020), “*...not be the policeman...not to beat them every time they do not do things like we would like to them to*.” Participant D (Interview, 2

Mar 2020) stressed that:

...we've put ourselves **in the skin of the service provider** and not the one who is imposing certain expectations [to the NFs who are] without having, say, the proper infrastructure, whether it's human resources or training and sporting facilities.

This shared attitude may be reflecting the reality in the domestic implementation of international rules or standards. The global playing field in elite sports may be perceived level, but the starting point of each nation is certainly uneven. As a result, a level of flexibility in policy advancement, particularly with regard to the implementation of sports development goals, is required to ensure the effectiveness of an IF's compliance system.

Regarding the policy objective of sport development, Participant I (Interview, 20 Mar 2020) elaborated that it is important for the IF to set realistic goals for the NFs. For example, producing an Olympic champion would be too much to ask of some nations, but aiming to send athletes to compete at the continental level or participating in the sporting formats that are better fit to their national profiles would be realistic and sustainable. As it seems, creating or utilising sporting formats that are more development friendly, i.e. require less investment in resources by the NFs, is a common approach, e.g., beach volleyball versus indoor volleyball, 3 x 3 basketball versus 5 x 5 basketball, duathlon / aquathlon versus triathlon, beach wrestling versus traditional

wrestling.

In addition to the discrepancies in NFs' capacity, the distance between where a nation is and where the international standards are set may result from cultural differences or local geographical or political conditions. For example, Participant N (Interview, 1 June 2020) explained the challenges in the advancement of good governance practices:

...trying to persuade them to take a structured approach....in many regions, ...coming from a European background it is obvious for me to have a plan...but if I come from an African or a Pacific or even an Asian background...you maybe have a two-week plan, maybe not a four-year plan. The planning tends to be very short term in many regions of the world. ...We are trying to create resources and trying to educate and to encourage them to think longer term, to be more structured in their approach, to have some goals, objectives, vision and mission...just to get them to create their own visions, missions of what they want to do, which then helps them decide how they're going to do it. You know, it gives them a guideline...these things take a long time to instil in some cultures.... **It's not the norm in their cultures.**

Participant I (Interview, 23 Mar 2020) shared the same view that the so called international standards are “*western*”, and that there are local specifics that must be respected when implementing policies:

I must mention that we have to be very careful with our western mind, because I still see travelling around all these tiny nations that probably the development that

we see in our mind probably is not what they need...or other customised approach would result [in] more developments that we see or we measure with a **Western mind**. So I think this is also something that **we have to respect and see carefully when we set certain standards or goals to nations...**

The strategy of elastic policy implementation in the context of international sports federations refers to IFs' efforts of minding the distance between a NF and the international standards, of setting realistic goals or proposing an appropriate position for an NF in the system. Meanwhile, the international standards are positioned as a recommendation, not a hard criterion. It is clear that the strategy of elastic policy implementation is not purposed to prevent non-compliance but rather to retain members of varying capacities in the compliance system that aims to induce deepening commitment instead of rule-conformity.

IFs assist the NFs to create synergy amongst key national stakeholders. In this section, we will discuss how IFs use or accumulate relations with the key national stakeholders to facilitate the implementation of domestic support programmes. The linkages with national stakeholders such as the government or the NOC are considered very relevant to IFs' compliance system. What is perhaps more important is that without harmonious relations with the national stakeholders, it is unlikely that a nation's sport development will be able to thrive. For example, Participant F (Interview, 12 Mar 2020) said that the lack of harmony within the national network of linkages can be the main

hindrance of sports development:

The main thing would be the willingness of the stakeholders, local stakeholders, to collaborate with each other and with the IF, because in absence of that, no matter how good a solution [the IF] thinks it might have if it's not being implemented at national level with the willingness of all parties involved. That is not going to be successful.

As a result, IFs seek to strengthen relations with these national stakeholders, or to help the NFs to do so. For example, Participant B (Interview, 17 Feb 2020) outlined the multi-lateral scene of national sport development:

...if we really want to talk about developments, **we cannot just have one stakeholder in front of us, which is the National Federation. We have to be inclusive...** the main purpose is to develop the National Federation...but we are here also to help the federation to realise certain opportunities to facilitate or to open doors for some others...

We have identified ways that IFs use to help the NFs to establish a harmonious linkage with the national stakeholders. First, it is to implement the domestic capacity-building programmes in conjunction with them. Participant L (Interview, 17 April 2020) presented an example:

We visited an Asian country and discussed with the ministry, National Federation and the NOC saying that... this is the plan we have to work. ...there is a good Brazilian ...coach. She will be there for one year working with your national team. [the IF] will be paying her salary, [the] Ministry will take her ...

accommodation and the National Federation would be paying local meals and transportation... **a multi-lateral project.**

Participant B (Interview, 17 Feb 2020) presented another example of finding common interests to synergise the efforts with national stakeholders as important to NFs' sustainable capacity building:

[In some neighbourhoods] crime is the biggest issue, especially in the youth and a specific hour. ... the federation decided to put an activity every Friday nights and instead of... letting those kids being on the streets and doing crimes and the robberies and all that... they have voluntarily puts jointly efforts to create competitions or events on the Friday nights with those kids. ...What happened, surprisingly, is that the crime started to decrease...And then one day [there] was a change of governments and they stopped this program. What happened? Crime went up and then they realised it was a mistake. So then they did it again and the crimes went down...So it was a perfect match between the need of the federation to increase participation and the need of the government to reduce crime, because crime is also a cost for governments and also for the society is not good. So it was a common interest.

Generally speaking, having strong relations with the national stakeholders helps the effectiveness of the capacity building programmes and helps advance the national sporting agenda of the NF. For example, Participant A (Interview, 9 Feb 2020) said that it would be a lot easier to involve the government in a constructive way, such as for building facilities. The example given by Participant A (Interview, 9 Feb 2020) where

a strong-worded official letter declaring the IF's intention to withdraw funding was issued to the local government because of a non-compliant NF. This type of exchange is based on their prior collaboration with said government.

Second, in many instances, an IF's presence, with its normative authority over sporting matter, can help to "*put people in the room*," according to Participant B (Interview, 17 Feb 2020). Participant C (Interview, 20 Feb 2020) also shared that the IF's presence can help amend the fences, i.e. some lack of communication at the national political level:

[The IF is] available for [the NFs] to be mediators and to help them establish these relations [with other national stakeholders]. Next week...I [will] have lunch with the minister of [Sports] of an African Country... and the NOC. The NF is not coming, but they have arranged everything for us to meet so that we can explain them all what the National Federation is doing and all what [the IF does]. So we are ... always very keen on doing that, always through development, other departments...**we take the role in this sense of working in these international relations, and at the same time, national relations.**

From the perspective of the pyramidal structure, the NFs are the point of contact to a nation to IFs. Nonetheless, the work to induce a nation's deepening commitment takes more than interfacing with the national federations. On other words, there are multiple state actors in sight with whom IFs ought to interact to advance their agendas, i.e. the development of the sports. As can be seen, being present at the national scene

or providing domestic support programme is an entry point for IFs to harmonise these relations across national stakeholder.

Discussion. Within the dimension of the building of capacity, we have identified primarily three key strategies. First, IFs provide specific NFs with domestic support programmes. Second, IFs retain the NFs through providing capacity-appropriate policy objectives. Third, IFs assist the NFs in creating synergy amongst key national stakeholders for their NFs.

The first and second strategies both involve a level of differential treatment to the NFs based on their capacity or local constraints. In the first strategy, IFs provide only specific NFs with domestic support programmes. This strategy indicates that IFs' provide technical assistance only to a selection of NFs. For example, one water sport IF differentiates its NFs into development countries and non-development countries, and only the countries classified as development countries are deemed to be the beneficiaries of its international technical assistance programme. One other IF is also facing a great disparity in the sport's development level across countries; there is a small group of super strong nations dominating the medal tallies who are classified as developed. There is another small group of dormant members that have never participated in any level of international competitions. The beneficiaries of this IF's international technical assistance programme are exclusively those who are in neither

the super nation nor dormant nation group.

Nonetheless, to what extent an IF is able to assess the NFs' need of capacity building and to what extent an IF can provide the NFs with resources to build the capacity is limited by the IF's own capacity, i.e. human and financial resources.

The second strategy, IFs retaining the NFs through providing capacity-appropriate policy objectives, indicates that the IFs cater to the local social constraints of the nations who are receiving international technical assistance by providing an appropriate target to reach.

Differential treatment to states of various capacities is not uncommon to other international regimes, particularly the environmental regimes and economic development or trade regimes (Castro, 2016; Cullet, 1999, 2003; Mitchell, 2001; Pauwelyn, 2013). In present time, whether a country gets classified as 'developed' or 'developing' has major implications for international development assistance, preferences in trade, commitments to climate change and a host of other obligations and/or privileges regarding domestic legislation and international treaties (Pauwelyn, 2013). Though from a legal point of view all signatories are equal (legal equality), different treatment is introduced because in practice states vary vastly in wealth, population, resources endowment and technology, etc., which affects especially the developing states' ability to implement what is required to fulfil their international

commitments (Cullet, 1999, 2003). At the policy making level in the example of the EU, it has been observed that a certain amount of flexibility and variation is required, i.e. a regulatory method containing compulsory minimum standards, and possibilities for derogations and non-binding recommendations are being adopted in order to find policy solutions that are applicable to all member states (Falkner et al., 2005). Even rules and uneven practices are commonly seen within the EU states (Toshkov, 2008; Versluis, 2007).

In the environmental regimes, different treatment is given to developing nations with an aim to improve the recipients' performance in complying with their obligations (including national administrative implementation and data reporting), and eventually to enable the developing countries to meet the standards for being bound by environmental regimes in the future (Sand, 1996). Also, we see a more tailored treatment for each nation being developed in the environmental regimes: *“differentiation is not made for all developing countries as a group but a more detailed sliding scale is used to distinguish between countries based on objective, issue-specific criteria”* (Pauwelyn, 2013, p. 29). Similarly, in the context of the international sport policy regime, the focus of IFs' implementation rather is on creating a social system that caters to as many of its 'NF residents' needs by assigning an appropriate position or policy objectives to each in order to retain their interests in staying in the system in

a substantial manner.

As part of the third strategy, IFs assist the NFs in creating synergy amongst key national stakeholders for their NFs. The efforts of strengthening the NF and its national stakeholders' relations can be considered as a follow-up action pursuant to the participation of a national federation to the IFs' flagship events, i.e. world championships (s. 4.1.1). It has been discussed within the dimension of national concern that the participation itself sends a message to the key national stakeholders. It is believed that IFs' interaction and accumulation of relations with the key national stakeholders can help the NFs advance their national agenda.

4.1.3 The strategies within the dimension of nesting

In Ch. 2.2.1, we have reviewed the regime characteristics of international federations. Of the regime characteristics, the pyramidal governance structure (s. Figure 2, p 33) with the IFs at the apex, the CCs at the mediating position and the NFs at the bottom plays a significant role within the dimension of nesting. With regard to the dimension of nesting, we look at the ways IFs ensure that international rules (standards, norms, values) are adopted and applied by their national federations (via the CCs) on the basis of the legal and conceptual hierarchical privilege permitted by the pyramidal structure.

We have identified that the key strategy of IFs to ensure that international rules

or standards are applied is to align the legal and policy frameworks between the actors in conjunction with the building of NF capacity. IFs' alignment of legal or policy frameworks has two aspects. First, IFs streamline the administrative procedure between the NFs, the CCs and IFs, which is most visible in the process of development grant applications (the building of capacity) and the legal proceedings of non-compliance cases. Second, it is about ensuring that international rules are applied when funding the implementation of domestic support programmes.

IFs align their policy and legal frameworks with the CCs through capacity development. It appears that when a set of new rules or principles is introduced, IFs use their legal hierarchy to first provide the actors in the pyramidal structure with rules application guidelines, and then provide funds to entice the adoption of new rules. While the pyramidal governing structure (see Figure 2, p33) of IFs already suggests a strong legal supremacy of IFs over the NFs, the actors in the structure, nevertheless, are independent entities, in most cases (s. details in [Chappelet et al., 2020](#) for exceptions). It appears that for the moment the more robust efforts in aligning the legal and policy frameworks predominantly take place between the IFs and their CCs, and that the discussion of funding between the actors is always an integral part of this alignment. For example, Participant K (Interview, 2 May 2020) said that aligning policies and objectives is to ensure IF funding for building the capacity of the NFs is going to an

end directed by the IF:

Our methodology was about building the capacity of CCs [continental confederations] through development, ...First of all, aligning the priorities that we all agreed ... **We [both CCs and the IF] all agreed that we [the IF] would invest in building the resources. So we've got a red line between what they are doing and what we are doing in terms of development.** Otherwise, we wouldn't have the confidence to push money to those organisations. **So I think alignment is a really important concept that you bring as part of the same family...with the same objectives and the same direction. Otherwise, you're lost in the wilderness...**

Participant E (Interview, 10 Mar 2020) also shared a similar practice regarding the IF passing money to the NFs via the CCs. Participant E (Interview, 10 Mar 2020) said that for each annual transaction of the development fund a legal contract is signed between the IF and each CC in order *“to formalise the relation ... it is also to increase their commitment, but the most important is to control how much and how the resources are being used.”* By signing a legal contract, the originally non-binding policy objectives become legal-binding deliverables for both parties.

It is reported that an aligned structure that is guided by explicit rules has some advantages for organisational efficiency. For example, according to Participant K (Interview, 2 May 2020), procedurally, if the rules, such as code of ethics and code of conduct, are shared between the CCs and the IF, the resources injected into the judicial

procedures, i.e. an independent panel, can also be shared across the entities.

Participant B (Interview, 17 Feb 2020) shared a past challenge of not having an aligned framework:

“[when the legal framework was not aligned] ...it was actually sometimes going in the opposite direction. Since we have moved to this [new governance structure] ...**we have established a new curriculum...that prevails for all the continents.** So we have been able **to harmonise the education system** for coaches worldwide.”

The reason why alignment is important is the great diversity across the CCs and NFs. Participant K (Interview, 2 May 2020) explained that while good governance principles are well recognised and supported community-wide, there are cultural nuances in understanding the concept *“The notion of good governance is kind of...not a universal concept. If you talk about the notion of conflicts of interest, there are different ways of thinking about...what is acceptable and what's not acceptable behaviours for an elected official.”*

IFs ensure that the international standards are applied when implementing the IF funded domestic support programmes. The types of domestic support programmes IFs fund to improve the NFs’ capacity to comply have been outlined in Ch. 4.1.2. Table 16 (p109) further shows that the domestic support programmes funded, designed and programmed by IFs arrive at the nation with a built-in international

standard; as a result, through implementing them at the national level, the international standards are naturally practiced by the NFs (s. details about the domestic support programme in Ch. 4.1.2) . For example, Participant L (Interview, 17 April 2020) said that the IF funds the recruitment of an international coach to the NFs' national team. The candidate of this recruitment is always a coach certified by the International Federation.

Furthermore, when the IF offers legislative assistance, i.e. to review the NF statutes/regulations and governance structure, naturally, NFs' official documents are reviewed according to the IF's good governance standards or guidelines. Participant N (Interview, 1 June 2020) elaborated the statutes reviewing process “*[we make sure] they've got good governance...that they meet our criteria for what we consider to be of good governance. So that's ...where...that's the baseline.*” Applying the international standards formulated by the IF at the NF level, i.e. to align the NF statutory frameworks with that of international standards, is seen by IFs as a way to “*raise the bar*” (J, Interview, 15 May 2020), which once again represents IFs' prevailing role or rule interpretative authority in the community.

Table 17 International Standards Applied in Domestic Support Programmes

Types of Domestic Support	Examples	Application of International Standards
Legislative Assistance	Provision of service to review NF statutes/ regulation and governance	IF issued good governance guidelines or IF staff review
Administrative capacity-building	Donation of sporting equipment	IF licenced equipment
	Foreign national team head coach recruitment	IF certified coach
	Key NF staff recruitment	IF approved candidate
	Event or competitions organisation training /	IF certified instructor
	Administrators' courses	
	Train the trainer programmes	IF certified instructor IF certified instructor and teaching materials
	Grass-roots activities	Using IF licensed equipment

The compliance inducing strategies of IFs in Stage I: Prevention are examined from the perspectives of the dimensions of national concern, the building of capacity, and nesting. Through the dimension of national concern, we have captured IFs' efforts in seeking to increase engagement with their NFs through regularly organising international activities and events where an increased quantity and quality of their interaction with the NFs is possible. This increased engagement is considered to contribute significantly to the setting, promoting and upholding of a set of international norms. What is worth mentioning is that the norm-setting events and activities captured within the dimension of national concern are universally provided to the NFs. There

was no explicit different treatment emerging from the interview data, i.e. exclusively funding the developing nations' travel expenses to a congress. The strategies within the dimension of national concern are commonly observed across all researched IFs.

Within the dimension of the building of capacity, we have recorded that IFs' provision of domestic support to their NFs consists of legislative assistance and administrative capacity building, such as funding the national team coach recruitment and donating equipment. In addition, as the NF-national stakeholders' relation is considered by IFs as one important aspect of NF capacity (s. 4.1.2), IFs also offer to facilitate these relations. At the same time, IFs' horizontal linkages are accumulated through these interactions with NFs' key national stakeholders, i.e. government and NOC. These linkages form a social environment hospitable for conformity, as well as contribute to raising IFs' institutional profile (s. details in 4.7).

Furthermore, IFs' strategies in inducing compliance within the dimension of the building of capacity show two visible features. First, IFs' provision of domestic support programmes is exclusive to only a selection of their NFs, i.e. the top and bottom nations excluded as beneficiaries or only those with significant growth potential included. This tendency is a result of IFs' limited resources as well as IFs' increasing awareness of the efficacy of resource allocation. Second, NFs are given a tailored policy prescription or objective for their capacity development. According to the empirical data, this tailoring

strategy is meant to retain the NFs' interests and enthusiasm to follow IFs' guidance.

Regarding the strategies within the dimension of nesting, we have revealed that the alignment of legal and policy frameworks between IFs and NFs (via the CCs) is executed in conjunction with the provision of capacity building benefits. We have also noted that IFs' strategy to ensure that international rules or standards are applied is to make the alignment of legal and policy framework between IF and the NFs (via CCs) a prerequisite before IFs provide them with capacity building resources to induce rule conformity.

Overall, the findings in stage I correspond to what Tallberg (2002) described as the "*preventive capacity building*" purposed to prevent the non-compliance caused by the ambiguity of IFs' expectations of the NFs or of the international standards, and the deficiency of NFs' capacity. The strategies from each dimension are outlined in Table 18 (p130). It becomes apparent that even though in Stage I: Prevention the empirical evidence is examined through the dimensions of national concern, the building of capacity and nesting, the majority of the strategies identified within each dimension show a somewhat collective characteristic. IFs advance their policy objectives, i.e. ensuring the application of international standards and raising the awareness of specific policies of priority, through providing the NFs or sometimes the CCs with funding resources to improve their ability to comply or to alleviate certain capacity deficiencies.

Table 18 Overview of The Compliance Inducement Strategies In Stage I

Stage	Dimension	Strategies
Stage I Prevention	National concern	<p>IFs increase the engagement (quantity and quality of interaction) with the NF through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regularly organising international events and development activities • Providing the NFs with an increased access to these international events and development activities • Providing the NFs with an enhanced participation at the international events and development activities
	The building of capacity	<p>IFs provide resources to improve NFs' ability to comply through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Providing specific NFs with domestic support programmes. • Providing appropriate policy objectives to retain the NFs • Assisting the NFs to create synergy amongst key national stakeholders.
	Nesting	<p>IFs to ensure international rules are applied domestically through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aligning with the policy and legal frameworks with the CCs through providing resources/capacity development. • Ensuring the international standards are applied when implementing the domestic support programmes (the building of capacity).

4.2 Stage II: Monitoring

In *Stage II: Monitoring* violators are detected and a principle of transparency is applied to expose violators. We will examine the strategies of IFs' compliance inducement from the dimensions of monitoring and verification.

4.2.1 The strategies within the dimension of monitoring

With regard to the dimension of monitoring, we focus particularly on IFs' monitoring scheme of NFs' compliance, and in what ways, centralised or decentralised, it contributes to IFs' NF compliance inducement. As it appears, the monitoring scheme of IFs consists of a centralised monitoring scheme, evaluating the NFs through an in-house monitoring scheme, and a network of information collection through the existing information outlets.

IFs evaluate the NFs through an in-house monitoring scheme. IFs' primary monitoring scheme is handled by IFs' secretariat in-house. The information is collected through a self-report questionnaire by the NFs and NFs' participation in the international development activities. The analysis of the data is aimed at evaluating the NFs against the international standards, which allows IFs to get a clearer picture of NFs' compliance. Obtaining a set of data to monitor the national federations is beneficial to IFs' compliance system for four reasons. First, this set of data can be used to assist IF staff's dialogue with the NF and to give relevant suggestions. For example,

Participant I (Interview, 23 Mar 2020) said that the goal to develop an evaluation system is to have a persuasive conversation with the NFs based on quantified, objective figures, not perception.

Second, it can be used to develop an evaluation system that assists the allocation of precious IF resources. For example, Participant N (Interview, 1 June 2020) said that the NFs are categorised into ten levels, the resources are injected only towards the NFs from level two to level nine, the bottom dormant members and the top nations are eliminated. As another example, ITU has been developing a NF ranking system in which 150 indicators are assessing eight areas of focus. Among the 150 indicators, 88 come from the NF self-reporting questionnaire, 62 come from the international activities database (Annex C). The ITU ranking system also has hard criteria in place. NFs may have scored high and enough to be ranked as top nations, but if one of the hard criteria (standards) set by ITU is not met, they will not be ranked as top nations in this ranking system. These hard criteria set by the ITU reflect what is important to ITU policy objectives, i.e. the gender representation at a NF board or the competence to organise high-quality events.

With regard to the allocation of resources, the monitoring and evaluation scheme also helps to measure the “*return in investment*” which is important for the sustainability of a programme, according to Participant N (Interview, 1 June 2020) “...it

does give us a lot more information and it helps us to measure the effectiveness of the funding, where it's going. What it does. What we're achieving, areas working well for us...areas that are not working so well” and, which is “*a positive spiral thing*” that the IF leadership will have more confidence in injecting funds in NFs’ development (N, Interview, 1 June 2020).

Third, the evaluation that is based on the criteria and standards designed and endorsed by IFs, i.e. good governance, gender representation, functions as an actual policy prescription. For example, Participant N (Interview, 1 June 2020) said, “*we produce document of the evaluation results, their score relative to the other NFs globally and within their region, for each nation to take as reference...we help them sort out their priorities....*” As can be seen, the evaluation system, in which a tailored policy prescription of each nation is produced, can be a strong compliance inducement tool to promote international standards, especially if the results of the evaluation are fully published.

Last but not least, the monitoring scheme assists in detecting violators, a typical function of monitoring. For example, Participant N (Interview, 1 June 2020) said:

There were a few **red flags** for us, obviously, you know, to be a member of the IF ...you have to have a constitution... And when we first did the survey we found we'd got like 12 countries that obviously said they had a constitution...But when we asked for a copy of it, they haven't got one. ...We've got a lot of countries

who...have got an all-male council and things like that. You know ... **It does flag up a lot of things for us.**

In addition, the purpose of the monitoring strategy, from a theoretical point of view, is to allow international institutions to publicise the violations and create peer pressure which enhances the likelihood of compliance (Haas, 2007; Tallberg, 2002). Yet, complete transparency is considered a double-edged sword in the context of IFs' operation. Across the IFs, there is a variety of transparency policies being adopted.

Participant I (Interview, 23 Mar 2020) from a smaller IF is positive towards full transparency, explaining that publishing the evaluation results helps in several ways. First, in this specific IF's situation, NFs' development is not exclusive to the developing nations. *"Those top sporting nations would also be interested in improving their ranking; the title of the number one ranked national federation by the world governing body has its significance after all"* said Participant I (Interview, 23 Mar 2020). Second, it creates a sense of competitiveness among the nations, and pressures them to better seize the opportunities available to them (I, Interview, 23 Mar 2020).

On the other hand, Participant C (Interview, 20 Feb 2020) explained that the NF development-related rankings of the NFs are either not published or only the big figures are published at the end of the quadrennial period because of the potential political effect. *"These could affect negatively some federations that are working hard, but they*

are not at the level yet” (C, Interview, 20 Feb 2020). Participant N (Interview, 1 June 2020) also shared the same view and elaborated on the potential “*detrimental effect*” to some nations, if the ranking results were published in full:

I don't think it's good practice to share in individual members because they've all got their own specific issues... governance in some countries is a real difficult area, you know...It's complex for them to meet those criteria. So we work with them. But on the other hand, they bought into the process and they're doing a really, really good job in participation where they're doing a really interesting job is in female participation so they can score points in those areas...I wouldn't want people looking at that particularly....it's a very individual situation that you have to have quite a deep understanding of where they are to be able to interpret...And I think it has quite a **detrimental effect** because [one NF] might focus on one area [just] because they want to be better than their neighbours in one area, whereas actually what they actually need globally is something else.

In general, the more resourceful IFs tend not to adopt full transparency. One explanation could be that they also tend to allocate resources according to the evaluation results which can be highly political.

It is important to note that, regardless of the level of transparency adopted or monitoring actions taken, none of the researched IFs' monitoring scheme is deliberately purposed to catch violators or expose non-compliance. Rather, they are mainly purposed to facilitate IFs' collaboration with their NFs, i.e. inform resource allocation decisions, tailor policy prescription, or track progress.

Collecting information about NFs' compliance through existing information outlets. A secondary monitoring scheme is realised through existing information outlets, mainly the CCs from IFs' own pyramidal structure and external organisations from the external policy network of organisations.

The roles of the Continental Confederations (CCs) in compliance inducement varies across the eight interviewed IFs in their respective structure. However, whenever IFs need to gather verified information, the CCs are the ones they approach first. The actual roles of continental or regional bodies in the compliance system vary from IF to IF. Depending on the IF's internal political structure, most of these regional bodies within the IF structure serve at the very least as the liaison conveying policy-related messages to their respective regions. They may play multiple other roles. Their roles according to the levels of involvement in a descending order include:

An executive role. As an extended arm of the IFs, the regional bodies implement the projects associated with particular policy objectives of the IFs in their respective regions (E, Interview, 10 Mar 2020; I, Interview, 23 Mar 2020; B, Interview, 17 Feb 2020). For example, Participant I (Interview, 23 Mar 2020) gave an overview of the global process working with the CCs:

...in the grants that we are giving to the continents in order to develop the national federations, they are between the IF and the National Federation...I have personally a weekly call with each Continental Confederation ... to make sure

that all the development projects that we signed off through these continental agreements, ...are...in a good standing, in a good execution.

Participant B (Interview, 17 Feb 2020) also described an extensive executive role of CCs, “...*the regional bodies are always included in the activities we do everywhere we go....so we are always together as a team and we implement and run activities jointly.*”

A consultative role. The regional bodies also function to provide the IF secretariats with advice on sporting or non-sporting matters based on their regional linguacultural knowledge and geopolitical specifics. For example, Participant L (Interview, 17 April 2020) explained that the regional representatives in relevant commissions are extensively consulted before a budget is earmarked for a specific nation: “*they can provide us with more insights, information [such as] how is the federation doing? And how is the national team performing? [before allocating fund].*”

The consultative role of a CC is to be the ears of IFs. For example, Participant N (Interview, 1 June 2020) said that when the self-reported data from the NFs does not look realistic, the CCs become useful to verify the data. The CCs’ consultative role is important in the overall verification of the NFs.

A liaison role. Most of the CCs in the IFs’ political structure play at least the liaison role, or the lips of IFs, to facilitate policy communication to the NFs in the region. For example, Participant C (Interview, 20 Feb 2020) explained the CCs’ role in policy communication:

...when the application periods are launched and that's being sent to Continental Associations who then subsequently send it to the National Federations and then National Foundations contact us or the contact us through the Continental Association. But Continental Association plays a big role...[for example] An NF is not answering us...we contact the continental Association...who will then have a closer contact.

The CCs are, in most cases, independent entities, and can be considered horizontal in terms of the regional proximity of the NFs within the continental or regional scope of governance. IFs' relations with the CCs help to extend IFs' reach to the region, and to collect valuable information when necessary and implement IF policies. To what extent the regional bodies are involved in the policy objective advancement is subject to each IF's internal governance structure and politics, and a "*political decision*", according to Participant K (Interview, 2 May 2020). Furthermore, apparently, the roles of CCs are not fixed. Participant L (Interview, 17 April 2020) revealed that the executive role of the regional bodies in the IF has been reduced in order to increase global administrative efficiency. On the other hand, Participant K (Interview, 2 May 2020) revealed that the IF is also building the capacity of their CCs, in order for the CCs to carry out the executive missions in addition to the existing consultative role. There is no specific pattern found indicating a difference in the roles of CCs between larger or smaller IFs.

External organisations can also be a valuable information outlet. For example,

Participant D (Interview, 2 Mar 2020) mentioned that the Ministry of Sports, NGOs, the different branches of the United Nations, i.e. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the IF-accredited educators/instructors who are sent around the world to deliver technical/educational courses can provide relevant information. This process of getting valuable information can be seen as the initial phase of an investigation before a non-compliance case escalates to Stage III: Intervention.


4.2.2 The strategies within the dimension of verification

The dimension of verification encompasses the institutional inducement that extracts reliable information about members' compliance. IFs' strategies concerning verification are twofold: one, it is about verifying the accuracy of self-reported data; second, it is about assessing the true commitment of their NFs before they inject domestic support benefits.

The information provided by a member federation poses a risk of not being entirely accurate; nonetheless, the inaccuracy of data submitted does not necessarily contain ill intentions. Participant A (Interview, 9 Feb 2020) thinks that it can be because the NFs themselves may not know the true data of the sport at the national level. In other words, the inaccuracy of information reported may not be intentional. As a result, they can only provide an estimate or rounded up numbers. There are a couple of models developed to

increase the reliability of the self-reported information.

IFs verify NF self-reported information via questionnaire design and /or linking data provision to funding benefits. First, IFs would ask their NFs to provide the source of the reported information, and only those data issued by reliable sources, i.e. a national statistics bureau, are included in the final results of the survey, according to Participant C (Interview, 20 Feb 2020). The same verifying effect can be produced with the design of the questionnaires. For example, Participant J (Interview, 15 May 2020) explained that the design of the questionnaire requires evidence to support the data to be also submitted:



In 2017, we started a huge questionnaire here [from HQ] to all of our federations...It was asking about their governance, their structure...very general things about their federation. But the questions were presented in a way that you couldn't answer subjectively...for example, if we ask 'Do you have [the] constitution published on your Web site?' If they answered 'yes', we ask them to provide us with the link. If they answered 'no', then we asked 'Have you at least sent it to your members or your members already have one?' So this kind of questions, which is very easy to verify.

Second, the accuracy of the self-reported data is linked to the subsequent reward of funding, a strategy used predominantly by the more resourceful IFs. For example, Participant N (Interview, 1 June 2020) believes that if members realise that completing the data would entail potentially being granted development funding from the IF as a

reward, they would be more motivated to complete it and make an effort to be accurate.

In the same vein, Participant L (Interview, 17 April 2020) said that submitting misinformation would jeopardise the NFs' subsequent funding subsidy, therefore there should not be a motivation to cheat.

Assessing NFs' real commitment via cost-sharing, physical inspection, by-instalment and prevention models. In general, IFs implement domestic support programmes designed to improve NFs' capacity. While these programmes, entirely or partially IF-funded, are widely welcomed by the NFs, the demand is high.

It has been discussed previously that the results of the NF evaluation help IFs to identify the needs of the NFs. In addition to acquiring NFs' needs and given that the impact of most of these programmes can only be maximised if the NFs also commit a significant amount of resources to sustain the effect, the evaluation results are used to determine to what extent which NFs are allocated resources. NFs' commitment is often an important determinant to IFs' decisions. Nonetheless, it appears challenging across both more or less resourceful IFs to assess NFs' real commitment, particularly from the human resources aspect in the NFs.

For example, Participant A (Interview, 9 Feb 2020) from a smaller IF commented, *“we say people, knowledge and equipment are the three key elements to develop a sport. Knowledge transfer is not that difficult, equipment can be expensive; however, to find*

the correct, smart, capable people is very challenging” (A, Interview, 9 Feb 2020).

Participant C (Interview, 20 Feb 2020) from a resourceful IF shares the same view:

...we know that [there] will be Federations that would really take advantage of [Sport Manager Forum]. There will be few federations that will take less advantage or even any advantage of that. So ... **this is linked absolutely to the person that is going to lead this change, ...people [are] the problem people [are] the solution.**

Haas (2007) explained that the likelihood of state compliance is dependent on the capacity and the willingness of the nation (see Table 3, p18). The human resources aspect of an NF is perhaps an issue mixed of capacity and willingness.

Participant A (Interview, 9 Feb 2020) shared a frustrating experience where the Olympic Solidarity was in place to fund a development project, and the IF was involved in the planning and knowledge transfer, *“then nothing happens...so that is the main problem you create work.....”* The attributions to this lack of commitment can be *“they are volunteer-based and they have other paid jobs to feed their family,”* according to Participant A (Interview, 9 Feb 2020). This is typically a lack of capacity example.

Participant B (Interview, 17 Feb 2020) described that sometimes there is an inertia in the NF environment, *“a lack of momentum or vision”* which the IF hopes to break with the authoritative presence of IF funding and knowhow. The above cases of an apparent lack of commitment all indicate an insufficiency of capacity, i.e. full-time paid

human resources or a NF's administrative competence, according to Haas' (2007) model likelihood of state compliance (see Table 3, p18).

As can be seen, the true commitment by the NFs' administration is difficult to assess accurately especially prior to injecting support. There are four models developed by IFs to diversify the risk. The first is a Cost-Sharing model, which involves both parties, the IF and the NF, to cover a share of the expenses of the project implementation.

Participant I (Interview, 23 Mar 2020) elaborated on that:

We require a certain percentage or certain area from the National Federation to commit to that, because I think it's very important that [both the IF and the NF] **have a common responsibility in the project**. Otherwise that they don't feel that this is their own project as well... it's their own interest to make [the development project a] success.

Gray (2019) and Houlihan (2014) argue that adherence and implementation come before compliance. Gray (2019) specified that implementation indicates a level of resources commitment. The cost-sharing model is typically a way to ensure a level of resources commitment by the NFs.

Second, there is a By-Instalment model which splits the agreed financial support into several instalments, and requires the NF to fulfil reporting duties to an agreed standard within an agreed timeframe; otherwise the subsequent instalments will not be realised according to Participant L (Interview, 17 April 2020) and Participant C

(Interview, 20 Feb 2020). A similar scheme addresses the design of the development programme, which affects the IF's capacity to monitor. For example, Participant B (Interview, 17 Feb 2020) described a process of mutual contribution to a project plan that is divided up into "*smart objectives...they must be specific, measurable, achievable, reliable and time-bound*" (B, Interview, 17 Feb 2020) and a person is assigned to be in charge of each objective in the NF. This will allow the IF to keep track of the delivery of those objectives. This by-installment model is based on the fact that IFs do provide financial/monetary support which already suggests that this model is mainly observed by the more resourceful IFs.

Third, there is a Physical Inspection Model where the IFs pay physical visits by sending a crew of inspectors to the nation to gather necessary information, according to Participant B (Interview, 17 Feb 2020). These visits may be done in a short-noticed manner, according to Participant L (Interview, 17 April 2020). While the on-site inspection is considered the most effective to verify information, the IFs' operating budget is clearly a prominent limitation. Only the more resourceful IFs use physical inspection for verification.

The fourth is a Prevention Model that is adopted exclusively by the more resourceful IFs whose investment is high and therefore more is at stake. The Prevention Model adopts a robust and agile managerial assessment that includes all physical

inspections, by-instalment and cost-sharing models mentioned above. Participant B (Interview, 17 Feb 2020) shared that they are always vigilant in identifying those national federations who are serious enough for the IF to invest in. In addition, they do not invest anything before they have all signs of commitment, such as:

Do they answer when we send e-mails and ... when we ask for Skype calls or... or documents to be provided...are these provided in a timely manner? There are some federations which are not doing this, and this already tells me how poorly committed they will be in the programme. And I cannot afford going in places like that where...where I'm not sure that the federation is going to be fully committed. And then it's also the quality of information and the quality of work that they put together.

In brief, the Prevention Model looks for signs of commitment. According to Participant L (Interview, 17 April 2020) it is a good sign of commitment if the national federations take the initial steps to approach the IF for assistance “*so we are providing the information on the website, but **we are not going to the National Federation one by one saying what do you need** ...the hunger should come from the national federations.*”

The analysis in Stage II: Monitoring are angled from within the dimensions of monitoring and verification. With regard to the dimension of monitoring, we have identified two strategies to induce NFs' compliance: first, evaluating the NFs through an in-house monitoring scheme; second, monitoring the NFs through the existing

information outlets. With regard to the dimension of verification, two scenarios are identified. First, it is about verifying the accuracy of self-reported data by NFs. Second, IFs assess NFs' true commitment via four models. Table 19 (p146) outlines the strategies within each dimension.

Table 19 Overview of the Compliance Inducement Strategies In Stage II

	Dimension	Strategies
Stage II: Monitoring	Monitoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IFs evaluate the NFs through an in-house monitoring scheme • IFs monitor the NFs through the existing information outlets
	Verification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IFs verify NF self-reported information via questionnaire design and /or linking data provision to funding benefits • IFs assess NFs' real commitment via cost-sharing, physical inspection, by-instalment and prevention models

Overall, through the execution of the four strategies, the key function of Stage II: Monitoring corresponds to the stage's theoretical focus of detecting and exposing violators (Tallberg, 2002). In addition, it becomes apparent that even though the empirical evidence is examined from both monitoring and verification dimensions, the strategies identified within each dimension show a common characteristic. IFs monitor and verify the compliance of NFs primarily to identify the NFs' needs to better improve their capacity deficiencies and propose an appropriate policy objective for the NFs. Detecting and exposing the violators is only a secondary purpose of monitoring, and

IFs do not seem keen on publicly exposing violators and imposing sanctions.

In Stage II, IFs monitor their national federations systematically through NFs' self-report questionnaires and data collected through NFs' participation in international activities. The monitoring actions, i.e. self-reporting questionnaires, are mainly purposed to facilitate IFs' strategic allocation of resources and the administration process, though they may have raised some red flags along the way. While the more resourceful IFs perhaps are more motivated to develop sophisticated evaluation systems for the purpose of allocating resources, ITU's example proves that less resourceful IFs may also use a complex evaluation system to induce compliance, especially of the stronger nations.

The need to verify arises in the self-reporting process, when assessing a NF's commitment prior to the provision of a national capacity-building benefit, and in situations where a non-compliance case may potentially occur during the implementation of a programme. Various techniques to verify NFs' self-reported information and four models of verification strategies have been identified as being used to induce and affirm a good commitment by a NF before injecting support to the implementation of domestic capacity-building programmes. Verification is necessary because the great diversity of national realities in IFs' members is not easily grasped in full through solely the monitoring scheme.

4.3 Discussing IFs' Strategies in Managing NFs' Compliance

As it has been discussed, the managerial theorists emphasise the “*transformative power of normative discourse*” (Hathaway, 2002, p. 1957) and the importance of taking a problem-solving strategy of capacity building, rule interpretation, and transparency (Tallberg, 2002). It became apparent that the strategies within the dimensions outlined in both stage I and stage II are predominantly ‘managerial’. The dimension of national concern speaks to the normative role of IFs, the dimension of nesting speaks to the authority of rule dictation. The dimension of monitoring speaks to transparency, though both the managerial and enforcement theorists consider monitoring and transparency an integral part of the cures to non-compliance (Tallberg, 2002). Furthermore, Stage II: Monitoring functions as a transitional stage where the violators detected emerging from the monitoring scheme may either escalate to a non-compliance intervention in Stage III, or remain in Stage I and II where they would be responded to with preventive capacity building measures and continuously monitored.

Within IFs' strategies in managing the compliance of their national federations (Stage I and Stage II), there are a number of issues that we consider worth being discussed.

The first concerns IFs' compliance inducement of the strong national federations. Within the dimension of the building of capacity, the domestic support programmes

provided by IFs tend to be exclusive to a selection of NFs, those NFs that are classified as in need of assistance to comply. Furthermore, within the dimension of nesting, we have also noted that IFs' strategy to ensure that international rules or standards are applied is to make the alignment of legal and policy framework between IF and the NFs (via CCs) a prerequisite to their provision of capacity building resources/ domestic support programmes. With these two findings combined, the question arises how IFs ensure that the developed strong nations also comply.

We asked the interview participants this question to find out in what ways their compliance inducement strategies differ from strong nations to developing nations. We were able to gather a similar approach from two interview participants who hold top management positions, Participant E (Interview, 10 Mar 2020) and Participant K (Interview, 2 May 2020). They both said that their IFs have a more collaborative relation with the strong nations, especially in hosting or organising international competitions.

We consider that IFs' strategy to form a collaborative relation with the strong nations in hosting or organising international competitions primarily falls under the dimension of national concern. There is an ongoing academic discussion about the impact and political attribution of hosting international events to hosting nations, see for example, Emery (2002), Kobierecku & Strozeki (2020). In general, we think there is some level of alignment between the rights holders/IFs and the hosting nations in

terms of common interests in bolstering sports awareness and showcasing the national federation's accomplishments, creating synergies across key national stakeholders, etc. Organising regular international events has been one of IFs' key strategies identified within the dimension of national concern. Working with the strong nations to organise international events is effectively to incorporate or recruit the strong nations into IFs concern-raising mission. In addition, the role of strong nations was briefly mentioned as the torch-bearer of international norms and standards, which was evidenced in IFs' efforts in bridging strong and weaker nations for technical assistance (s. details in Ch.4.4.3), and strong NFs used as the benchmark nations in the evaluation system (s. details in Ch. 4.1.2).

Furthermore, Haas' (2007) model of the likelihood of state compliance (s. Table 3, p 18) may provide us with some theoretical insights to this question. Haas' model indicates that states' likelihood of compliance is dependent on the costliness of compliance; as a result, reasonably, the capable and willing nations are more likely to comply. With regard to the strong nations, IFs may spend less resources/attention on managing their compliant behaviours and more on inducing more commitment into developing sports.

A second issue worth discussing is the role of transparency. While the monitoring enabled transparency is considered important to both managerial and enforcement

theorists (Tallberg, 2002), IFs, for some reasons, appear to have a divergence of attitude towards transparency and in general do not embrace a high level of transparency regarding exposing their NFs' non-compliant behaviours. We have rendered that the political factor may be one likely explanation for this tendency. The national federations are not only the signatories of an international regime; they are also the constituents of the IF leadership who are voted every electoral cycle to be the leader of the regimes. This voter-political relation may well refrain IFs from adopting the theoretically most effective compliance inducement strategy.

4.4 Stage III: Intervention

Should non-compliance inevitably occur, *Stage III: Intervention* functions as an institutionalised scheme to review and respond to potential non-compliance cases brought forward from Stage II. We will examine the strategies used by IFs to ramp up social pressure, taking into consideration (1) their interactions with the entities external to IFs' own pyramidal network, as guided by the dimension of horizontal linkages, as well as (2) IFs' political advancement as a sport, as guided by the dimension of institutional profile.

Stage III: Intervention is supposed to be consisting of an informal consultation/bargaining phase, where non-compliance is reviewed and misunderstandings are cleared, and formal infringement proceedings, where actions are

taken as per a rule-based legal procedure. The focus of Stage III is to pressure non-compliant federations to conform.

4.4.1 Strategies in the informal process

The informal process is a phase preceding the formal infringement proceedings where non-compliance cases are reviewed and maybe negotiated mainly to eliminate inadvertent cases. We have identified one strategy in this informal process: IFs aim to reinforce their authoritative role. This strategy is categorised within the dimension of institutional profile. It is argued that the strength of institutional profile is often determined by the level of states' involvement in international institutions, i.e. whether only low-level bureaucratic coordination is involved or a periodic ministerial conference is being held (Haas, 2007). According to the empirical evidence, we gathered for this research, we argue that the factors affecting IFs' institutional profile are not exclusive to the state actors. We will discuss the substance of the dimension of institutional profile further in Ch. 4.4.3.

IFs reinforce their authoritative role. IFs reinforce their authoritative role in two ways. First, IFs proceed with a direct conversation with the violators. It can be a rule-based conversation which is close to the EU example (Tallberg, 2002). For example, Participant K (Interview, 2 May 2020) suggested that applying and following the rules is fairer to all parties involved:

...it's really got to be rules based...And it's got to be consistent, consistently applied. If you apply something different over here to over there, then you're going to lose credibility... We respect your autonomy, but **you also have to follow our rules because you are a member...But we have a framework of rules that we both work with.**

It can also be a rather unique style of exhortation that is similar to 'parenting', i.e. with good intentions and disciplinary. For example, Participant L (Interview, 17 April 2020) shared a case where non-compliance took place in the middle of a domestic support programme, and it was the President of the IF who made a call to that NF's leadership and solved the issue. Participant F (Interview, 12 Mar 2020) also provided a brilliant interpretation of the IF-NF relation:

It's like when you have a naughty child, you know, like the parent kind of knows what's best for the child, but the child is adamant that he does not want to go to sleep. So then you have to not punish the child, but you have to give the child consequences for his behaviour. It's kind of like that. ...We care...We love our children...We care about them. But at some point, we have to discipline them when they are being naughty.

Once again, it implies a tremendous authoritative normative role of IFs in their respective vertical network, especially when the IFs have advantageous resources to aid the other actors.

Second, IFs would withhold funding or certain entitlements as a provisional measure should non-compliance occur. This is a mechanism in place to ensure the capacity-building benefit or other entitlement/rights associated with the membership in general will be immediately stopped or denied access to should the IF's monitoring system send an alert or indicate certain issues. For example, Participant K (Interview, 2 May 2020) explained that if a member does not pay their membership fee by the due date *“we switch off their ability to enter players into international competition until they pay....”* These provisional measures are taken simultaneously with the consultative phase and are considered to add leverage to IFs' negotiation in the consultation.

As another example, Participant A (Interview, 9 Feb 2020) said, *“one national federation we know they have many governance issues requested for an equipment donation, we would ask them to sort out their governance issues before we talk about donation.”* Similarly, Participant N (Interview, 1 June 2020) shared *“there is not much of a stick but certainly rewards. If they [the flagged NFs] want the funding [from the IF], they have to address those issues.”* Participant B (Interview, 17 Feb 2020) shared that when circumstances arise, *“whenever it's the right decision to make, we freeze their activities and then we reopen them later on [when the issue is being resolved].”*

Another *“carrots and sticks”* strategy shared by Participant C (Interview, 17 Feb 2020) is to encourage NFs to participate in the world championships. This IF also offers

25,000 U.S. dollars per year to each NF that has participated in previous championships in addition to subsidising NF delegates to travel to world championships. If an NF does not participate in a world championship, it will lose the funding and the right of being considered for the universality team quota to the Olympic Games, “*there is a long line of consequences*” said Participant C (Interview, 20 Feb 2020).

4.4.2 Strategies in the formal infringement proceedings

This section outlines the strategies used by IFs to ramp up social pressure against the non-compliant federations within the dimension of horizontal linkages and institutional profile. We have identified two strategies; first, IFs leverage the existing horizontal linkages to ramp up pressure against non-compliant federations, which is a typical strategy within the dimension of horizontal linkages. Second, IFs reinforce their institutional profile through increasing their political representation at all levels, which we categorised within the dimension of institutional profile.

IFs leverage the existing horizontal linkages to ramp up pressure against non-compliant federations. In the EU’s compliance system, the EU Commission would issue incriminating press releases to “*declares its readiness to eventually use economic sanctions*” or publish scoreboards on state violations to “*name and shame*” (Tallberg, 2002, p. 617). While using the policy of transparency to ramp up social pressure against the violators is not widely adopted by IFs (s. details in ch. 4.2.1.), IFs’

existing relations with other organisations in the larger policy network (s. Figure 3, p36) alternatively create a social environment that puts pressure on NFs to conform.

In the EU's compliance system, the declaration of sanctioning intentions is made directly by the international institution to the member states or to the public (Tallberg, 2002). In the context of international sports federations, sanctioning intentions can be made clear through an existing horizontal linkage. For example, Participant A (Interview, 9 Feb 2020) shared a case where a strong-worded official letter declaring the IF's intention to withdraw funding was sent to the local government with whom they had worked with in the past, to leverage pressure on a NF that has not complied with several official requirements. In many instances, when non-compliance occurs, the existing horizontal linkages become information outlets where IFs can get valuable information about a non-compliance case from (s. Ch. 4.2.1).

IFs reinforce their institutional profile through increasing political representation at all levels. It appears that the extent to which a sport is recognised as a global sport, in comparison to other sports, is politically represented in the Olympic Movement, i.e. at NOC board level, or is important in the national sports policy, enables or hinders an IF's and the NFs' advancement at the national level, particularly when non-compliance occurs.

Particularly, for an institutional profile lacking a certain strength can hinder an

IF's advancement in the domestic political agenda, or undermine an IF's ability to wield influence over a non-compliant NF. After discussing a non-compliant case, Participant I from an IF that is less resourceful and with a relatively short Olympic history (Interview, 23 Mar 2020) commented that to the IF or many other IFs in a similar position it is a global issue and a struggle to get recognised at the NOC and national policymaking level. In the same vein, Participant E from an IF that is less resourceful and with a relatively short Olympic history (Interview, 10 Mar 2020) said that it is of strategic importance to the IF to ensure the president or high-level officials of the IF hold strategic or political positions at the IOC, NOC and ASOIF levels to reinforce the IF's global leadership. Participant E (Interview, 10 Mar 2020) added, "*we also encourage our athletes to become athletes' commission member at all levels, especially to their NOC.*" Participant A (Interview, 9 Feb 2020) implied that the presence of the IF's elected officials at strategic events, such as the continental multi-sports games, is the main political work to elevate the presence or status of a sport. Some efforts of raising institutional profile may seem far from a compliance inducement measure but they are politically important to IFs in terms of strengthening the institutional profile.

Overall, in Stage III: Intervention, one strategy has been identified regarding the informal consultation, IFs aim to reinforce their authoritative role. With regard to the formal infringement proceedings, we have identified two strategies. First, IFs leverage

the existing horizontal linkages to ramp up pressure. Second, IFs reinforce IFs' global leadership through raising institutional profile.

4.4.3 Discussing the dimensions of the strength of international institutions

In Haas' (1998, 2007) seven compliance inducement dimensions, the conceptualisation of 'horizontal linkage' and 'institutional profile' is distinctive from others. First, these two concepts focus more on the strength less on the actions of the international institutions. Second, the strategies within these two dimensions play a role across IFs' entire staged compliance system.

In this subchapter, we aim to first discuss the aspects in relation to the dimensions of horizontal linkages and institutional profile that have not been mentioned previously. Second, we aim to summarise the strategies within these two dimensions across the stages to highlight their significance to compliance inducement, as well as to discuss in what ways these two dimensions contribute to the strength of international institutions.

The dimension of horizontal linkages. The horizontal linkages dimension is concerned with institutions' efforts in creating "*a dense network of institutional factors*" (Haas, 2007, p. 56), including the number of institutions involved and the frequency of interactions. This dense network amplifies the institution's legitimacy and discursive

capacity that are considered to be contributing to a higher level of compliance (Haas, 1998).

From the literature review, we have understood that IFs' interactions with their existing horizontal linkages, i.e. the CCs in IFs' own pyramidal structure (s. Figure 2, p33), and with actors in the external policy network of organisations, i.e. NOCs (s. Figure 3, p36), form almost the entire social environment of the IF-NF relations. However, our discussion on IFs' compliance inducement so far has been concentrated more on the actors inside the pyramidal structure, even though IFs' interactions with external entities have also been mentioned several times as part of the strategies within other dimensions (s. 4.2.2, and 4.5.1).

According to the research data, we argue that the accumulation of horizontal linkages is a social process indispensable to the environment of international institutions. First, we see the effects of these accumulated linkages most visibly in Stage III when social pressure is ramped up against the violators (s. 4.5.2). However, the formation and maintenance of these linkages with external entities can be traced back to the operations in Stage I: Prevention and Stage II: Monitoring. Within the dimension of horizontal linkages, we particularly look at the ways in which horizontal linkages within the total Olympic system (Chappelet, 2016) are important to IFs' compliance inducement (s. Figure 3, p36).

We have identified two additional aspects of horizontal linkages. They prominently emerged from the interview data and are highly related to IFs' compliance inducement. First, it is the horizontal linkages with the Olympic organisations in a broad sense, such as the Olympic Solidarity. Second, it is the horizontal linkages reinforced across or between the national federations.

IFs reinforce the linkages with the Olympic stakeholders. The research subjects of this research are summer Olympic IFs. Their association with the Olympic Games or the Movement is obvious and easily taken for granted. It appears that the Olympic status of an IF is quite relevant in IFs' advancement of development objectives at the national level. According to Participant A (Interview, 9 Feb 2020), the fact the IF is on the Olympic programme helps tremendously because an Olympic sport has higher political and financial leverage to attract public funding, hence an IF or NF of an Olympic sport is more likely to advance its political agenda at the national level.

When carrying out their missions, IFs tend to make an effort to work with the Olympic organisations. For example, Participant G (Interview, 23 Mar 2020) said that “[when donating equipment to an NF] *we are strongly in favour of having the NOC involved in our equipment donation process, i.e. assists in custom clearance.*” This is typically a strategy within the dimension of horizontal linkage which are considered to contribute to higher level of compliance.

Furthermore, the sporting interests around the Olympic-related major events are wide. The large multi-sports games in the Olympic System, i.e. Asian Games, and their qualification events create an important traction for regional sporting stakeholders and development. For example, Participant I (Interview, 23 Mar 2020) shared that the next upcoming Youth Olympic Games will be in Africa. The YOG qualification events are therefore seen as the golden opportunity to mobilise the African NOCs and NFs. In other words, the development policy target is prioritised on the African nations. For example, Participant C (Interview, 20 Feb 2020) also said that the IF funds a training centre located in the next YOG hosting city *“to help the locals develop their international relations.”* Participant A (Interview, 9 Feb 2020) also shared that the IF often utilises the upcoming events as a reference for leading a discussion about a domestic support programme.

In addition, IFs' partnership with Olympic Solidarity is an integral part of the compliance inducement process. The Olympic Solidarity provides the NFs via their NOCs with financial support for sports technical programmes. The size of this financial support may be significant for especially the smaller IFs. However, the significance of working with the Olympic Solidarity to both larger and smaller IFs goes beyond the funding relations. It is not just about the money. The relation itself matters, too. For example, Participant I from a smaller IF (Interview, 23 Mar 2020) explained that

“maximising the Olympic Solidarity opportunities with our national federations through their NOCs” is part of the strategy to reinforce the presence and position of the sport/the IF in the Olympic Movement. Participant B from a resourceful IF (Interview, 17 Feb 2020) also emphasised the importance of maintaining and reinforcing the relationship with the Olympic Solidarity:

The Olympic Solidarity is extremely helpful...and so we are extremely grateful for that. But, you know, **it's part of the relationships we have with them**...we explain the vision we have so we can better synergise the efforts for their interest in our interests.

In addition, the way the Olympic Solidarity (OS) funding for technical programmes works forms a social environment that is hospitable to conformity or unfavourable to unconformity. According to the description of the global network of partners in the OS Strategic Plan 2017-2020 (International Olympic Committee, 2017, p. 19), for a technical programme's application to pass, usually, it requires all of the four entities involved, the Olympic Solidarity, NOC, NF, and IF, to have a streamlined administrative/funding releasing and monitoring process. The multilateral characteristics of OS technical programmes matches with the dense network of institutional factors that is emphasised in the conceptualisation of horizontal linkages by Haas (2007).

IFs strengthen their authority through reinforcing the linkages between

national federations. A bilateral collaboration scheme has been adopted by the international anti-doping policy regime, according to Tan, Bairner and Chen (2018), through which the strong nations are able to showcase their soft power, and the weaker nations are able to improve their capacity. In Tallberg's (2002) EU case, technical knowledge exchanges take place rather systematically having a programme of coordination centres and contact points among member states in Stage I.

In the context of IFs, in most cases, IFs are the main facilitator of these international exchanges, but somehow we did not observe a widely adopted systematic cooperation scheme set up by IFs. For example, Participant I (Interview, 23 Mar 2020) shared that the IF attempts to establish a coaching technical community to ensure the newly certified international coaches and officials can continue their learning outside the technical educational programme:

...just got the level one coaching course. You have to have two years in practice to be able to be eligible to apply for the next level...over these two periods of time, you can come back to a camp or you can have a person who is helping you on a daily basis. So this is the **mentor ... mentoring program** that we are setting up to create a network, a global network for coaches, technical officers, and also in leadership, for people to have an opportunity for a continuous learning out of the organised course environment.

Participant I did not specify the relative roles of developed or developing nations in this technical exchange scheme. However, Participant I did depict an epistemic

community of sports technical knowledge where the more knowledgeable guide the less knowledgeable.

On the other hand, Participant A (Interview, 9 Feb 2020) said that the IF had attempted to establish a mentoring programme between the stronger and weaker nations. However, in a bilateral mentoring programme it is practically very difficult to manage the outcome. Compared to similar cases of bilateral cooperation schemes in the anti-doping policy regime, i.e. Handstad & Houlihan (2015) and Tan et al. (2018), there is less incentive for stronger nations to showcase their soft power in developing sports because medals speak louder, nor have there been incentives to help another nation, a potential opponent on the field of play, to grow a sport systematically.

Second, IFs can play a role in bridging nations to cooperate for humanitarian aid. For example, Participant D (Interview, 2 Mar 2020) shared that this international bridge-building between the NFs for humanitarian causes would not have happened without the IF's participation:

...it's just creating those bridges, which they would have never done it directly... If I may share, we've had this experience with a Caribbean Country following that hurricane...because they are one of our strongest leading [sporting] nations in the Americas...they were not reaching out to anybody [to ask for help for building gyms and donating equipment] ...They wouldn't...And now all of a sudden, [the IF] putting them in relationship and saying [the IF is] willing to pay the shipping fees...[say to] the North American Countries..., 'can you collect

your second [hand] sporting equipment’, and then they did it.

In this case, the IF is seen as being able to mobilise precious resources internationally that would not otherwise be mobilised. It is in a way reinforcing the IF’s legitimacy and perceived capacity in the pyramidal structure; in other words, raising the institutional profile.

Chappelet (2016, p. 747) argues that the linkages among the actors in “*the total Olympic system*” are essentially capital. What is seen from this research is that IFs’ frequent interaction with their existing horizontal linkages contributes to IFs’ compliance inducement by creating and maintaining a social environment favourable to conformity. Operationally speaking, an increasing number of institutions are extensively involved in carrying out a compliance inducing mission within this social environment. Conceptually speaking, being perceived as having frequent interactions with relevant stakeholders also reinforces legitimacy, hence, IFs’ institutional profile.

The dimension of institutional profile. The notion of institutional profile is concerned with the strength of the international institution that is often constructed by the level of states’ involvement in the international institutions, i.e. whether only low-level bureaucratic coordination of states is involved or a periodic ministerial conference is being held (Haas, 2007). Haas (2007) views institutional profile to be able to influence states’ choice to comply, meanwhile, the effect of which is also contingent on

domestic factors.

According to the empirical evidence, we gathered for this research, we argue that the factors affecting IFs' institutional profile are not exclusive to the level of state actors' involvement. Rather, we have gathered four aspects of institutional factors that may even have a larger contribution to IFs' institutional profile.

First, IFs' institutional relations with other key horizontal linkages, notably the Olympic stakeholders, contribute greatly to their institutional profile (s. details in Ch 4.4.3). Second, the political representation of a sport/an IF in the Olympic Movement has an impact on its institutional profile (s. details in Ch 4.5.3). Third, the resource-mobilising ability of an IF is instrumental to its institutional profile. Last but not least, the perception of an IF as having a good governance enhances its institutional profile.

IFs' resources-mobilising ability reinforce their institutional profile. Having a strong commercial viability contributes to IFs' independence from the Olympic revenue as well as IFs' presence in the Olympic Movement. According to Participant K (Interview, 2 May 2020) “...[commercial viability brings about the possibility of] capacity building [of the NFs] ...That's the IF as well. We're building our own capacity to do things better.” In addition, IFs' relations with their commercial partners, such as equipment manufacturers, can provide IFs with material support that would otherwise not be mobilised when implementing domestic support programmes, i.e. equipment

donation. This material support usually comes from either Value in Kinds (VIK) agreements, according to Participant L (Interview, 17 April 2020) or a subsidised purchase agreement with the IF-licensed equipment manufacturers or brands, according to Participant G (Interview, 23 Mar 2020). This is another example of IFs being the bridge between the NFs receiving material support for their grass-root programmes and the brands expanding to new territories through their presence in a capacity-building programme.

IFs' resource mobilising ability has the most impact within the dimension of the building of NFs' capacity. It is not only about the resource abundance of an IF, i.e. annual revenue, but also about its ability to tap into external resources, i.e. OS, equipment manufacturers, or humanitarian aid from other nations, for the benefit of building NFs' capacity.

IFs aim to be perceived as having good governance practice. There are two aspects to the good organisation perception emerging from the interview data. Participant K (Interview, 2 May 2020) elaborated that good governance has been much emphasised in the past decade and that is where IFs project a perception of having an aligned policy objective with the IOC. For example, Participant K (Interview, 2 May 2020) shared that:

I think the institutional profile is highly connected to the **governance practices...the notion of credibility** is really important...external credibility is

really essential that ...because of our good governance practice...all of those are incredibly important for our relationships with the IOC. **It's about perceptions and ...how we are acting as an international federation in the Olympic movement.**

Participant K (Interview, 2 May 2020) said that the IF's response to a high-profile case of a sport integrity violation taking place during the Olympic Games was widely considered as instant and tough. This created the foundation of the institution's credibility today, especially concerning its institutional relation with the IOC. This point of view is also supported by Participant J (Interview, 15 May 2020) who attributes the IF's authority to the IF's willingness to sanction according to the rules. Sand (1996) argues that when flagrant non-compliance occurs it can be an opportunity for international institutions to flex the rarely used coercive muscles otherwise it can become a threat to be perceived as impotent to respond.

The other aspect to IFs' good governance practices concerns the positive institutional reputation that is free of corruption scandal. Participant K (Interview, 2 May 2020) shared *"our commercial partners are very, if you like, sensitive around governance practices and they don't want any surprises. They don't want a scandal in the sport where they're a major investor."*

Table 20 (p 170) outlines all strategies within the dimensions of horizontal linkages and institutional profile and in which stage of the compliance system these

strategies have a more visible impact. The content of this table shows that the strategies within these two dimensions are part of IFs' overall compliance inducement mission. They enable the formation, maintenance and reinforcement of a social environment that is hospitable to NFs' conformity. In Stage I: Prevention and in Stage II: Monitoring, IFs seek interaction with the Olympic stakeholders, i.e. OS or NOCs, while exercising several compliance inducing strategies, most notably those within the dimension of the building of capacity and the dimension of monitoring. Such interactions sometimes bring about more funding, i.e. OS technical programmes, sometimes political influence, i.e. the involvement of NOC/government when implementing a domestic support programme, both of which contribute to create a positive perception of IFs' resource-mobilising ability as well as horizontal linkages in the Olympic movement; hence, they raise IFs' institutional profile.

In Stage III: Intervention and Stage IV: Sanction, these accumulated relations with external actors (horizontal linkages) can be used for ramping up necessary social pressure against the violators. In addition, the research data show that the extent to which an IF can intervene in a domestic process is determined at large by the strength of its institutional profile / Olympic status, and its handling of non-compliance cases.

Table 20 The Roles of Horizontal Linkages and Institutional Profile in IFs' Compliance Inducement

	Horizontal Linkages	Institutional Profile
Stage I: Prevention	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interacting with OS for providing the NFs with technical assistance programme (<i>the building of capacity</i>). - Accumulate relations with NFs' key national stakeholders when implementing domestic support programme (<i>the building of capacity</i>). - Utilising upcoming Olympic events (i.e. YOG in Africa), to mobilise environ NFs (<i>the building of capacity</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - IFs' (sports) institutional profile with regard to their Olympic status enables their NFs' to advance a political agenda domestically (<i>the building of capacity</i>) - IFs' resource mobilising ability raises their institutional profile (<i>the building of capacity</i>) - IFs' frequent interactions with the Olympic stakeholders contribute to raising their institutional profile
Stage II: Monitoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interact with the NOCs and other actors to collect information about the NFs regarding their (non-)compliant behaviours (<i>monitoring</i>) 	
Stage III: Intervention	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - IFs leverage their existing relations with NOCs or governments to ramp up social pressure against violators (<i>formal process</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - IFs' (sports) institutional profile with regard to their Olympic status enables their NFs' to advance a political agenda domestically (<i>formal process</i>)
Stage IV: Sanction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - IFs interact with NOCs or governments to manage the restoration of suspended memberships 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - IFs' handling of non-compliance cases enhances or undermine the institutional profile.

Note. Synthesised from research data.

4.5 Stage IV: Sanction

Different ways of intervening and sanctioning can be made use of to address different types of non-compliance. In this section, the sources of non-compliance and the ways IFs respond to these non-compliance cases, including Stage IV: Sanction that addresses sanctions, are considered as final measures to deter violators as part of the formal proceedings.

Haas' (2007) model of the likelihood of state compliance (Table 3, p18) is once again referred to when examining the sources of non-compliance from the perspectives of a lack of capacity or willingness. Basically, Haas' (2007) model (Table 3, p18) outlines three major types of non-compliance in the context of this research. The non-compliance that arises from a lack of capacity concerns the insufficiency of administrative capacity, including funding, human resources as well as the competencies concerning NF management (administrative negligence). Non-compliance that arises from a lack of willingness concerns the political factors at play that hinder the progress of a NFs' organisational governance (governance issue). Though categorised into two types, in reality, the issues of administrative inability are often intertwined with governance dysfunction. With regard to the cases lacking both the capacity and willingness to comply, 'dormant members' (inactivity) were identified as the representative cases in the context of IFs. Table 21 (p171) below outlines the

conceptualisation of these three types of non-compliance in relation to Haas' (2007) capacity-willingness model.

Table 21 The Types of Non-Compliance Based on Haas' Capacity-Willingness Model

	With capacity	Lack of capacity
With willingness	Compliant	Administrative negligence
Lack of willingness	Governance issue	Inactivity

Note. Adapted from “Choosing to Comply: Theorizing from international relations and Comparative Politics” by P. Haas, 2007, in D. Shelton (Ed.), *Commitment and Compliance the Role of Non-Binding Norms in International Legal System*, (p.47) 2007. NY: Oxford University Press.

Additionally, there are integrity-related violations by individuals affiliated with the NFs. These are also classified as non-compliance cases in the context of this research, but they apply to all national federations regardless of their capacity or willingness. This subchapter will discuss each type of non-compliance with examples and IFs' responses uncovered from the interview data.

4.5.1 IFs' responses to inactive NFs

The category of dormant members refers to members that exhibit long-term inactivity, i.e. some may just exist as a post code, are not fulfilling members' minimum

duties, i.e. overdue membership fees, administrative fines, penalties, or are not attending official activities and responding to IFs' institutional actions or correspondence.

The source of this type of non-compliance is identified as both a lack of capacity and willingness considering that the financial dues or administrative burden is usually insignificant and attending the official activities is often funded. Some inactive cases can be more towards a variation of lacking capacity, according to Participant J, (Interview, 15 May 2020):

The federation had been just like fading. You know, we have federations which are fully volunteer-based. ...and if someone who is in a position where they should be doing the work but have lost the interest to do it. They are volunteer-based. There is nobody else who wants to come [fill the void] instead. Then it's understandable.

After IFs exhausted attempts to reactivate dormant members, such as “*contact the NOC to see what the situation is*” (Participant N, Interview, 1 June 2020), or “*call every possible number... try to reach them every way*” (Participant J, Interview, 15 May 2020), they arrive at the point where a final sanction normally should be considered and issued. However, IFs' attitudes towards handling dormant members diverge.

In Participant N's view (Interview, 1 June 2020), expelling dormant members will lead to a decrease in membership, which is not considered a positive message to the

IF's leadership: *"there is no political will to eliminate inactive members."* On the other hand, Participant J (Interview, 15 May 2020) said expulsion showcases a strong political will to address non-compliance *"we don't want just members who are existing on paper ...We want members who are strong members, more active members."*

According to Participant J (Interview, 15 May 2020), an expulsion can be a wake-up call to inactivity:

...we expelled one of those from our membership and now they are working on getting back with our membership. So in a sense... It kind of was **a wake-up call** for them...[the expulsion] probably was needed to bring up a change.

Both Participant I (Interview, 23 Mar 2020) and Participant K (Interview, 2 May 2020) consider the insufficiency of rules as the reason not to handle inactive members, Participant K (Interview, 2 May 2020) said, *"there is no rule authorising us to deregister a member which is an odd thing in our Constitution."* Participant I (Interview, 23 Mar 2020) revealed there has been a rule reviewing to reinforce the legal framework to manage inactive members, showing there could be a political will in the IF.

Participant N (Interview, 1 June 2020) gave an explanation for dormant members from a historical point of view in that the majority of the now dormant members had been brought in to aide an electoral campaign in a past era where proxy voting was still allowed in the election.

Considering the administrative costs are low to suspend or expel a dormant

member, a likely explanation for shelving the dormant members is probably found in its ensuing political costs. In addition, having dormant members listed in the books does not necessarily undermine the legitimacy or the role of IFs as international sports policy regimes. A lack of rules to further intervene in inactive non-compliance cases can also be seen as a variation of the lack of political will from the IF leadership.

4.5.2 IFs' responses to NFs' administrative negligence.

In the context of this research, a lack of capacity rarely becomes a reason for being officially declared non-compliant. This is probably one major difference in the compliance system of the international sports policy regimes from the EU. The one case of negligence recovered from the interview data is shared by Participant C (Interview, 20 Feb 2020):

There has been one case as of now where the IF has sent an [independent] audit control to the [national] federation. ...**The federation has been instructed on what was missing, what was not correct...and then they are given a deadline** ...[to] make up their mistake [of accounting]. And once this mistake...in that case, **the mistake was sorted out...but it could go down the road... to our ethics panel...** Our ethics panel exists for case like this. But in that case, the development committee considered [it is] best is to send a warning through the IF...in our constitution, the suspension of a federation is at the IF's discretion.

The cause of this negligence case is a lack of capacity, i.e. administrative competence. Although this type of non-compliance happens rarely, taking intervening

actions, i.e. order an international independent audit control, to resolve a negligence issue, obviously requires significant resources. In this case, the willingness to cooperate was obviously there after the IF issued a warning and correctional guidance was given. Usually, when the NF is willing to cooperate, this type of non-compliance is likely to be resolved through IFs taking intervening actions in Stage III: Intervention.

4.5.3 IFs' responses to NFs' governance issues

Those non-compliance cases caused by a lack of political willingness refer to organisational governance issues, i.e. contested elections or external political interference. Participant F (Interview, 12 Mar 2020) elaborated on this obstacle:

I think most people act in good faith...sometimes that they don't understand or don't believe that what we're asking is possible or they just don't agree with the strategy that the IF proposes. But I don't think in many instances that it's because they don't want the same objective. They mostly do. **It's just they might be just really stubborn and just don't listen. This stubbornness could be due to political or personal agendas that are not related to the sport but may still affect it.**

In reality, the issues of administrative inability are often intertwined with governance dysfunction. For example, Participant I (Interview, 23 Mar 2020) shared a non-compliance case similar to the negligence case:

It happens rarely, but it does happen. We have one case where the NF had received the domestic support fund to execute a project this year, but the project was

postponed because this person who had the money left the federation with the money... **This happens when there is an instability within the federation and any political change would result in such issues.**

The tools and remedies available to IFs to intervene to resolve issues arising from governance dysfunction of an NF seem broad. Participant F from legal affairs (Interview, 12 Mar 2020) stated:

...not all federations obviously will require intervention from the IF. And then even in those that do require intervention, the level of intervention will be completely different depending on the situation. So in a Country from the Americas, for instance, we had a complete task force but this didn't replace the operations of the federation. It was just to find a solution with all of the relevant stakeholders in the country and the IF. But in for instance, in an African Country, we just sent a fact-finding mission there... we obviously try and try to help find a solution, but there was no formal constitution of a task force or anything like that.

In addition, the issuance of legal remedies is always incremental; Participant F (Interview, 12 Mar 2020) depicted the process before a sanction is issued:

It's rarely that a federation is suspended before they've had maybe three or four opportunities to rectify whatever [deficiencies they have] ... the range of, say, remedies available to us is broad, but we would never go from zero to a hundred in overnight. That is always, always incremental.

Except for the inactivity cases, the resources required to intervene extensively in non-compliance cases that are often complex are inevitably significant. It can be

observed that there is an implicit difference between the less resourceful and the more resourceful IFs. Participant F (Interview, 12 Mar 2020) from a large IF talked about the administrative resources allocated to resolving non-compliance cases:

You have to engage the local [expertise]. So, I mean, that's an added expense for [the IF]...It might not be money in their pocket, but it's investment because we want to improve the federation. But, you know, **it's easily overcome if we spend money**. ...And there are lots of federations, especially the ones that have had issues...[the IF] has invested a lot of money in trying to resolve these issues and trying to improve the federations...

Participant I (Interview, 23 Mar 2020) and Participant G (Interview, 23 Mar 2020) both from less resourceful IFs expressed a degree of impotence to further intervene to resolve a complex non-compliance case with issues beyond sports, i.e. countries battling human survival issues, or governance dysfunction. Participant G (Interview, 23 Mar 2020) said:

We have a couple [of NFs] that have been having internal wars for five or six years, literally... And ... it's the same ones all the time...it's maybe symbolic of bigger issues politically in most countries...But I've come to the conclusion that some of them just...they're good at having arguments with each other...**I don't know how they're going to get through it**, because ...some of the arguments seem to have been going on for many years...**I think they have to find their own way forward because there's so many things sometimes at the national level and also with national laws that you can't as a person on the external side do too much** until they've decided that they're going to find a solution

between themselves.

Participant I (Interview, 23 Mar 2020) explained:

We tried to track down where the moneys went with the new National Federation or whoever came on board of the federation to get that money back. **But I don't think we can avoid that if I want to be very honest**, but we can minimise those cases [through] the education and the collaboration with the national federations. **we have less tools to influence...**

To some extent, some IFs may choose take the least costly intervention available for a good reason because even when IFs are resourceful enough to commit to intervene and the remedial tools seem broadly available, the effectiveness of interventions to the domestic governance issues is questionable. For example, Participant F (Interview, 12 Mar 2020) revealed that one NF was suspended, but really had had every reason to comply because the consequence was grave: they would lose their right of competing in major continental multi-sport games as the hosting nation. The consequence of being suspended by the IF does not seem to effectively encourage compliance in some particularly problematic cases. In Participant L's view (Interview, 17 April 2020), domestic political issues present an unavoidable nature similar to the integrity-related violations, commenting that education and knowledge enhancement probably would not make too much of a difference to prevent the NFs' political issues from happening.

In addition, an intervention may involve external entities, for example,

Participant F (Interview, 12 Mar 2020) explained that when a NOC is suspended by the IOC, the IFs are required to subsequently suspend the NFs affiliated to the suspended NOC:

There might be more at stake than just the sport in some countries. For instance, ...the whole of the country was suspended. So we, **in that instance, relied on a lot of information from the IOC and allowed the IOC to ... take the lead in it.**

The same case was reported by several other interview participants. to deal with this specific case, there is a close liaison between IFs, the NOC and the IOC formed which not only concerns the collective action suspending of the membership to begin with but also the restoring process of the suspended membership.

As intervening in domestic governance issues requires a large amount of resources and intervention largely does not seem effective, it is quite plausible that the smaller IFs may well choose to shelf – or engage in the least costly way with – those cases that do not require immediate actions.

It seems that the non-compliance cases resulting from a lack of political willingness to comply are most likely escalated to stage IV: Sanctions, as the final measure. For example, Participant J (Interview, 15 May 2020) revealed that:

...usually it (a punitive action taken by the IF) would lead the federation to lose

at least some part of their national funding...I can't imagine any ...stronger driving force for them [to conform]. **So if they haven't responded to nice warnings, then it would probably be something that's needed.**

Participant F (Interview, 12 Mar 2020) also explained that sanctioning becomes the only option when all remedies are exhausted, *“there's only so many times you can ask someone to do something or explain why you're asking. So then we get to the final result, which is sanctioning.”*

Regarding the different considerations for sanctioning, Participant J (Interview, 15 May 2020) addresses that the IF considers a separation between rights of sporting participation and political participation:

[if an NF is suspended] their athletes can't participate at international events, which is... we are careful because it would be punishing the athletes for something that the bad management of their federation is causing. Making this decision very tricky ...what we did with an Asian Country was to allow [their] athletes to compete under a neutral flag to be able to qualify for Olympic Games.

Traditionally, IFs' structures are organised based on the pyramidal structure (s. Figure 2, p33) which means that when a national federation's membership is suspended by the IF, all the entitlements in connection to this membership are lost, i.e. right to send a delegation of athletes to compete. What a separate consideration of the right of sport participation and that of political participation entails is a loosening up of the pyramidal structure, where the political interests represented by the national federation

in international sports are unhooked from athletes' or teams' individual interests. Whether this separation contributes to or undermines the deterrence effect of sanctions is a legal and an academic debate.

From a theoretical point of view, sanctions' deterrent effects are highly dependent on the willingness of the nation (the national federations and its surrounding public and private actors) to comply and be part of the international sports policy framework. If there is no willingness, no sanction would have the intended deterrent effect; in other words, the deterrent effect of sanctions is strong when nations remain wanting to be part of the international sports policy framework.

There is an overwhelming proficiency in the literature regarding, for example, the increasingly intensified international competitions at the Olympic Games (De Bosscher, 2008; Green & Oakley, 2001; Houlihan & Zheng, 2013; Park et al., 2016), why the Games matter to nations (Grix & Carmichael, 2012; Tan & Green, 2008) and its political implications (Cho, 2009; Hong, 1998; Tsutsui & Baskett, 2011). Houlihan (2009, p. 61) argues that the “*sheer dominance*” of the Olympic Games is enough to affect policy in many countries. It is certain that not having a delegation of athletes and officials representing the nation at the Olympic Games means more than an NF's organisational interests at stake. Any portion of the full right at the Games, either the right to sport participation or political participation (being represented nationally at

Games), being stripped would mean a major diminishment to national interests. Consequently, the fact that the majority of nations is highly interested in participating in the international sports policy framework makes the mere threat of sanctions an effective way to induce compliance.

4.5.4 IFs' responses to the integrity related violations

Integrity related violations are somehow independent from the other three types of non-compliance because they are usually related to issues concerning the conduct of individuals who are affiliated to the national federations, such as doping, match-fixing, corruption, safeguarding, or retaliation against whistle-blowers. It is less common that a sport integrity issue is so dire that it escalates to the suspension of a national federation's membership; nonetheless, there have been some high-profile cases.

IFs address these integrity issues from two dimensions. The first dimension is related to the preventive and awareness/concern raising efforts taking place mainly in Stage I: Prevention. For example, it was briefly discussed that the value-based content is widely incorporated in the international and domestic educational programmes and development activities. Essentially, however, the integrity-related violations are crime-like. They require a formal judicial procedure in which IFs act as a prosecutor. With regard to doping violations, they are regulated by the international anti-doping policy regime within which WADA is at the centre (Houlihan et al., 2019). IFs' role in

concerning anti-doping matters is bound by WADA Code. According to Participant K (Interview, 2 May 2020):

If you have a relationship with any organization, you actually give up some of your autonomy...with World Anti-Doping...**We actually are part of a community that is a signatory to a global harmonised code, which is not really about you can do what you want. We actually doing it within a framework.**

With regard to other types of misconduct, Participant K (Interview, 2 May 2020) gave an example, *“we believe that they have gone against a whistle-blower and we are... looking at that as a case...a whistle-blower who assisted in a corruption case is now being punished for being a whistle-blower. ...an ethics related situation.”*

In many instances concerning an integrity violation, when non-compliance occurs, IFs may not be entirely aware of the facts; therefore, the first step towards resolving integrity-related violations is to investigate. Participant K (Interview, 2 May 2020) shared that a confidential reporting scheme is essential to send alerts to the IF and lead and inform the investigation, and an independent judicial system is in place to deal with cases brought forward. In the judicial procedure presented by Participant K (Interview, 2 May 2020), the IF functions as a prosecutor, i.e. running the investigation, building cases, or bringing cases forward to a judicial panel. Participant F (Interview, 12 Mar 2020) also implied a prosecutor role of the IF in the process: *“the secretariat will never*

impose something without a decision being thoroughly thought about by the board...[or] by the time [a case] gets to the board, we have a wealth of information available to us.”

As can be seen, the nature of the integrity related violation is crime like. In the judicial procedure, IFs act as the prosecutor. The legal resources of an IF become the key parameter to determine to what extent an IF can address integrity violations.

Participant J from a smaller IF (Interview, 15 May 2020) shared that the IF’s effort in addressing integrity-related violations is largely subject to the abundance of resources:

...a lot of integrity questions become quickly legal questions. And we don't have a legal department in our office. We go to our lawyer to whom we pay a lot when we need to know something. And I feel this is not something we can make mandatory in a very near future for our federations.

Participant D from a smaller IF (Interview, 2 Mar 2020) shared another approach where there is a clear ground rule in place saying that the NF is the single one point of contact interfacing with the IF:

...our key message being that all the inquiries always need to come from the National Federation. We do not take individuals' inquiries. So there is a coach or an athlete claiming about something. They have to officially write it and that, you know, and then copy their national federation to us. But like we would never, how can I say, go over the national federation’s authority or the leaders... you know, there was specific demand or an inquiry about a development program...we've underlined this several times...that our partner or our main stakeholder of that

country is the National Federation. And those who have been elected and appointed are those that we, you know, we deal with. But **no individuals, because it's quite challenging and it's not what we are about.**

Participant D was referring to the national process concerning the NF's participation in the international development programmes. It may not be precisely an integrity related violation. However, this ground rule reflects the mechanism in the traditional pyramidal structure (s. Figure 2, p33) which can be quite disadvantageous to nurturing a decentralised complaints lodging system which according to Tallberg (2002) has seen growing success in the EU's compliance system. Yet, this ground rule could also be a strategy developed to manage compliance with limited administrative capacity.

Similar to other types of non-compliance, IFs' resources largely affect to what extent they can intervene. However, IFs may not be able to shelf the integrity related non-compliance cases, mainly because there are external forces pressuring IFs to address the issues. For example, Participant K (Interview, 2 May 2020) elaborated on the driving force for the IF to start addressing integrity issues seriously:

Having to deal with significant sport integrity cases – more complex cases which are more like criminal investigations and prosecution - and needed robust rules to deal with this **to be in line with the anti-match manipulation rules [a legal provision from the Olympic Charter].”**

There have also been high-profile cases where several IFs take subsequent actions as a collective punishment against a nation because of an anti-doping ruling by WADA or a governmental interference ruling by the IOC. The researcher will not go further into these cases as they are larger than what this research aims to address.

In Stage IV: Sanction the extent to which an IF intervenes to resolve non-compliance is dependent on the IF's administrative capacity, legal capacity/political willingness, and on the extent to which the IF is facing external social pressure. The administrative capacity pertains to IFs' resources for conducting necessary investigations, i.e. competent staff members or a designated operating budget. The legal capacity concerns the question of whether the existing legal framework enables IFs to enforce compliance. Moreover, IF intervention is also subject to the extent to which the existence of unresolved non-compliance cases undermines the legitimacy of IFs as international sports policy regimes. Hurd (1999, p. 381) describes the notion of legitimacy as a "*subjective quality, relational between actor and institution, and defined by the actor's perception of the institution.*" This perception may come from the substance of the rules or the procedure or source by which they were formulated, and is also referred to as "*the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed.*"

4.6 Discussing IFs' Strategies in Responding to NFs' Non-Compliance

Overall, the research data analysed show that IFs' compliance environment is ideal for the management approach as the majority of the state actors opt in to comply (Haas, 2007; Tallberg, 2002). For example, according to Participant F (Interview, 12 Mar 2020) from the legal affairs of a resourceful IF *"there haven't been too many federations where the situation in the country is so dire that even the best leadership wouldn't help it out...or where they are non-compliant with [the article in the Statutes on members' obligations]."* The occurrence of non-compliance is rare. However, should non-compliance inevitably occur, Stage III: Intervention functions as an institutionalised scheme to review potential non-compliance cases brought forward from Stage II: Monitoring, and contains the informal consultation process and the formal infringement proceedings.

What has been discussed in Stage III and IV has demonstrated that the non-compliance response system of IFs is comprised of informal and formal processes to pressure the violators to conform. According to Mitchell (2001), the non-compliance response system shall provide proportional response based on the assessment of non-compliance behaviours against the violators' obligations. For the non-compliance response system to be effective, Mitchell (2001) argues that differentiated responses to the intentional or good-faith violators are necessary to ensure that the compliance

inducement is not counterproductive. Sand (1996) also argues that when flagrant non-compliance occurs it can be either an opportunity for international regimes to flex the rarely used coercive muscles or it becomes a threat to be perceived as impotent to respond. The existence of both the exercise of coercive authority and managerial measures is important to regime effectiveness.

Table 22 (p190) outlines IFs' actions of intervention responding to different types of non-compliance arising from the interview data. It is likely that IFs intervene to resolve both the non-compliance cases of administrative negligence and governance issues. However, to intervene or not, or to what extent an IF intervenes, i.e. ordering an independent account audit to suggest corrective actions or ordering a formal composition of an interim committee, is dependent on an IF's resourcefulness. Regarding the non-compliance cases resulting from long-term inactivity, IFs are likely to intervene but may choose not to because the intervention may have ensuing political costs or is subject to the limitation of rules. All of these three types of non-compliance cases may not lead to final sanctions because non-compliance cases are rare and having rare unresolved cases does not necessarily undermine the legitimacy or role of IFs as international sports policy regimes.

Regarding the integrity-related violations, IFs are very likely to intervene with formal legal proceedings, though they still are limited by their level of resources at hand.

There may be strong and increasing external political pressures that drive an IF's decision to take actions responding to integrity-related non-compliance. The final sanction is issued as part of the formal infringement proceedings only after other remedies available are exhausted.

Table 22 The Likelihood of IFs' Intervention and Sanctions

IF Action Type of Non-Compliance	Intervention (Informal or Formal)	Sanctions
Lack of capacity but willing (administrative negligence)	Likely to intervene but subject to IF's administrative resources	Rarely
Lack of capacity and willingness (inactivity)	Likely to intervene but subject to IF's political will/legal capacity	Less likely
Lack of willingness but capable (political/governance issues)	Likely to intervene but subject to IF's administrative resources	Likely
Integrity related violations	Likely to intervene but subject to IF's administrative resources and external political pressure.	Very likely

Note: Synthesised from the interview data

It becomes apparent that IFs with less administrative capacity tend to choose the least costly intervention available especially responding to the non-compliance cases whose existence is not considered as undermining their regime legitimacy.

Chapter 5 Conclusion

Using the evidence gathered in the research, this chapter provides an evaluation of the utility of the analytical framework developed based on the management-enforcement ladder. To reiterate, the research questions to answer are:

1. How do the international sports federations induce their member national federations' compliance?
2. What are the theoretical implications of these strategies utilised by IFs with regard to the applicability of the international regime theory in the context of international sports?

5.1 How do International Sports Federations Induce Their Member National Federations' Compliance?

Regarding the first research question, we use the analytical framework developed for this research which is based on a staged compliance system, the management-enforce ladder, operationalised by Tallberg (2002). It is based on his argument that the management and enforcement mechanisms of compliance inducement are complementary to each other and “*most effective when combined*” (Tallberg, 2002, p. 610). Additionally, considering the differences in the EU's compliance inducement environment from the IFs', the framework also incorporates the seven dimensions of institutional inducement developed by Haas (1998, 2007) to guide the analysis of the

empirical evidence (s. Table 4, p55).

According to the framework, the compliance system of an international institution is staged. In Stage I: Prevention preventive capacity building measures are taken to improve members' ability to comply and/or alleviate a particular capacity deficiency of members. In Stage II: Monitoring violators are detected and exposed. Stage III: Intervention concerns the international institution's responses to non-compliance. If the response is met with resistance by the non-compliant members, sanctions take place as the final resort in Stage IV: Sanction.

In *Stage I: Prevention*, within the dimension of national concern we focus particularly on the ways in which IFs set norms and promote a certain principle, standard or values to raise the awareness and concerns of the NFs, and have identified primarily three key strategies of IFs. First, IFs organise regular international events and development activities. Second, IFs provide the NFs with an increased access to the international events and development activities. Third, IFs provide the NFs with an enhanced participation in the international events and development activities.

Within the dimension of the building of capacity, we have identified primarily three key strategies. First, IFs provide specific NFs with domestic support programmes. Second, IFs retain the NFs through providing appropriate policy objectives. Third, IFs assist the NFs with creating synergies among key stakeholders when implementing

domestic support programmes.

With regard to the dimension of nesting, we have identified primarily two key strategies. First, IFs ensure that international standards are applied when implementing domestic support programmes. Second, IFs align their policy and legal frameworks with the CCs through providing resources and capacity.

In *Stage II: Monitoring*, where violators are supposed to be detected and a principle of transparency is applied to expose these violators, we examined the compliance inducement strategies of IFs from the dimensions of monitoring and verification. Within the dimension of monitoring, we focus particularly on IFs' monitoring scheme in a centralised or decentralised form. We have identified two strategies. First, IFs evaluate the NFs through an in-house monitoring scheme consisting of self-reporting and activity databases. Second, IFs monitor the NFs through the existing information outlets.

Within the dimension of verification, we focus on the ways in which the international institutions extract reliable information about members' compliance. Two aspects of the verification strategy have been identified. First, IFs verify the NF self-reported information via questionnaire design and linking data provision to funding benefits. Second, IFs assess the NFs' true commitment via cost-sharing, physical inspection, by-instalment, prevention models.

Stage III: Intervention consists of the informal consultative process and formal infringement proceedings when non-compliance occurs. We focus particularly on the ways in which IFs ramp up social pressure against the violators. We have identified one strategy that IFs use in the consultation process, reinforcing their authoritative role. When cases enter the formal infringement procedure, two strategies are identified. First, IFs leverage the existing horizontal linkages to ramp up pressure against non-compliant federations. Second, IFs reinforce their institutional profile through increasing political representation at all levels. Table 23 (p194) outlines all of the compliance inducement strategies used by IFs identified in this research.

Table 23 Overview of IFs' Strategies of NF Compliance Inducement

Stage	Dimension	Strategies	Focus
Stage I Prevention	National concern	IFs increase the engagement (quantity and quality of interaction) with the NF through: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regularly organising international events and development activities • Providing the NFs with an increased access to these international events and development activities • Providing the NFs with an enhanced participation at the international events and development activities. 	Preventive capacity building
	The building of capacity	IFs provide resources to improve NFs' ability to comply through: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Providing specific NFs with domestic support programmes. • Providing appropriate policy objectives to retain the NFs. • Assisting the NFs to create synergy 	

Stage	Dimension	Strategies	Focus
		amongst key national stakeholders.	
	Nesting	<p>IFs ensure international rules are applied domestically through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Aligning with the policy and legal frameworks with the CCs through providing resources/capacity development. Ensuring the international standards are applied when implementing the domestic support programmes (the building of capacity) 	
Stage II Monitoring	Monitoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IFs evaluate the NFs through an in-house monitoring scheme consisting of self-reporting and activities databases IFs collect information about NFs' compliance through existing information outlets (horizontal linkages) 	Monitor to detect violators
	Verification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IFs verify NFs' self-reported data via questionnaire design and linking data provision to funding benefits. IFs assess NFs' true commitment via models of cost-sharing, physical inspection, by instalment, prevention models. 	
Stage III Intervention	Horizontal linkages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Informal: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> IFs reinforce their authoritative role (institutional profile) 	Ramp up social pressure against violators
	Institutional profile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Formal: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> IFs leverage the existing horizontal linkages to ramp up pressure against non-compliant federations (horizontal linkages) IFs reinforce their institutional profile through increasing political representation at all levels (institutional profile) 	
Stage IV Sanction	Sanction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IFs respond differently to four types of non-compliance 	Deter non-compliance

If IFs' responses to non-compliant cases meet with resistance, the cases enter *Stage IV: Sanctions*. IFs' responses to four main types of non-compliance have been identified. In principle, to what extent an IF intervenes in a non-compliance case is largely dependent on the IF's administrative capacity, legal capacity or political will, as well as on the external pressure for conviction.

In addition, the dimensions of horizontal linkage and institutional profile from Haas' (1998, 2007) seven compliance inducement dimensions, play a role across IFs' entire staged compliance system. In other words, accumulating horizontal linkages and raising institutional profile are both a social process indispensable to the environment and compliance inducement of international sports federations in all stages.

Even though the strategies within the dimension of horizontal linkages as well as the dimension of institutional profile appear not to be the core of IFs' operation, they tend to have a high political significance and show a significant influence in IFs' compliance inducement.

Most notably, in Stage III and IV when social pressure is supposed to be ramped up against the violators, IFs' accumulated relations with the relevant external stakeholders become a strong advantage to serve the purpose (see examples in 4.4.2). When an IF lacks an established network/accumulated horizontal linkages and/or has a relatively young or low Olympic status, the advancement of the sport's political agenda

or the intervention in a non-compliance case that requires extensive influence at the NF's domestic level can be floundering (s. details 4.6.3). On the other hand, the formation of such accumulated relations can be traced back to the operations in Stage I and Stage II (s. details in 4.1.2 & 4.2.1).



5.2 What are the Theoretical Implications of These Strategies Utilised by IFs with Regard to the Applicability of International Regime Theory in the Context of International Sports?

In this research we developed an analytical framework which is based on a staged compliance system, the management-enforce ladder, operationalised by Tallberg (2002). Additionally, considering the differences in the EU's compliance inducement environment from the IFs', the framework also incorporates the seven dimensions of institutional inducement developed by Haas (1998, 2007) to guide the analysis of the empirical evidence (s. Table 4, p55). This chapter we will discuss the applicability of the analytical framework concerning the compliance inducement of the international sports policy regimes.

Overall, it can be argued that international regime theory and the management-enforcement ladder have provided a valuable framework for understanding and theorizing the IF compliance system for three reasons. First, the framework is developed based on the staged and gradually forceful compliance system by Tallberg (2002). As can be seen in the discussion of this research (s. Ch 4) the gradually forceful design and the equal footing provided to both approaches (enforcement and management) correspond at large to the reality of the institutional compliance inducement of IFs, particularly at the operational level. Second, the mechanisms of both

the management and the enforcement approaches are taken into consideration in the framework and considered complementary and most effective when combined (Tallberg, 2002). This characteristic of the theoretical framework provides us with a good foundation to examine the compliance system of IFs, and a future opportunity to measure the effectiveness of the system. Third, Haas' theoretical concepts have guided the analysis of empirical evidence, which gives a horizontal view on the compliance inducement of international regime.

While fundamentally applicable to international sports policy regimes, this research has provided us with insights into the operation of IFs that can help us adjust the research framework to better fit the context.

Proposing a Two-Stage Framework. We propose a two-staged framework for two reasons. First, the complexity of IFs' compliance inducement is not as sophisticated as in the EU case. For example, in the context of this research, membership non-compliance cases are ruled by an internal panel, i.e. FIBA's Disciplinary Panel, BWF's Hearing Panel, and rarely escalate to an external dispute settlement body, such as CAS. As a result, Stage IV: Sanction forms part of the formal infringement proceedings in Stage III: Intervention. Second, it appears that the strategy of evaluating the NFs in Stage II: Monitoring is purposed to support the implementation of domestic support programmes in Stage I.

In sum, the empirical evidence uncovered from this research suggests 1) a distinction between IFs' compliance management and non-compliance responses, 2) a mutually enhancing role of Stage II and Stage I, and 3) Stage IV: Sanction as part of the formal infringement proceedings in Stage III: Intervention.

While the four-staged framework provides us with a clear view on the gradually forceful mechanism, it makes more operational sense to establish a two-staged framework merging Stage I and Stage II as Stage A: Prevention and Monitoring, and Stage III and IV as Stage B: Intervention and Sanction.

As a result, a conceptual framework of the compliance system of IFs is outlined in Figure 7 (p201) in which the four-staged compliance system is modified into two stages, Stage A: Prevention and Monitoring and Stage B: Intervention and Sanctions.

In Stage A: Prevention and Monitoring, IFs seek to induce deepening commitment from the vast majority of the national federations who opt in to comply through strategies within the dimensions of national concern, the building of capacity, nesting, as well as to monitor potential non-compliance and the progress of compliance management in general through the strategies within the dimensions of monitoring and verification. When non-compliance occurs, the cases escalate to Stage B Intervention and Sanction, where informal measures are first taken to make non-compliance an unattractive option and create an unfavourable environment for unconformity, and then

formal measures are taken to address the unsettled cases. This modification is believed to be well suited to capture the compliance inducement system of international sports policy regimes.

In addition, the dimensions of horizontal linkage and institutional profile, both refer to the strength of the international institutions, play a transversal role across IFs' entire staged compliance system. In other words, both the accumulating horizontal linkages and raising institutional profile are a social process indispensable to the environment and compliance inducement of international sports federations in all stages.

The strategies within the dimension of horizontal linkages as well as the dimension of institutional profile tend to have a high political significance and significant influence in IFs' compliance inducement.




Figure 7 A Conceptual Framework for the Compliance System of IFs

In fact, the differentiation between a regime's response system and management system is not novel. To form a compliance system, it is important to have three levels of subsystems in place, namely, a primary rule system, a compliance information system and a non-compliance response system (Gray, 2019; Mitchell, 2001; Mitchell & Chayes, 1995). The primary rule system of a regime refers to a system providing "*obligational clarity*", in term of "*who must do what*" (Mitchell, 2001, p. 228). The compliance information system refers to the subsystem aiming to ensure a high level of transparency where high-quality and relevant data is rigorously collected, analysed and extensively circulated, through which "*performance clarity*" in terms of what behaviours are desirable and what outcome is expected shall be provided (Mitchell, 2001, p. 228).

The non-compliance response system is comprised of informal and formal processes to pressure the violators to conform (Gray, 2019; Mitchell & Chayes, 1995). According to Mitchell (2001) the non-compliance response system shall provide proportional responses based on the an assessment of non-compliance behaviours against the violators' obligations.

We argue that IFs' strategies outlined in Stage A: Prevention and Monitoring serve as the compliance information system at large, disseminating relevant policy information and policy prescriptions based on an analysed outcome. Furthermore, the

theorised Stage A performs further functions in managing and activating the level of commitment / compliance across members. In other words, Stage A is rather a compliance management system in which the dissemination of information is central to its effectiveness.

On the other hand, the theorised Stage B: Intervention and Sanctions functions as the non-compliance response system where exactly informal and formal processes are involved to resolve non-compliance.

A compliance system focused on rule conformity? While the management-enforcement ladder proposed by Tallberg (2002, p. 637) is oriented towards inducing maximised “*rule conformity*” across the member states, it is argued that the focus of compliance by international sports policy regimes is rather to induce deepening commitment to sports by nations.

A compliance system that is aiming to maximise rule conformity is essentially rule-based and more obliged to apply the rules equitably across member states. In the example of the EU, the flexibility of rules is present when the EU Commission allows flexible timeframes for member states to enact and implement EU rules at the national level (Tallberg, 2002). In contrast, a compliance system that is aiming to induce deepening commitment as in the case of IFs adopts an approach of elastic policy implementation to extensively accommodate the capacity discrepancies among

members. This implies that the international standards of sports are not imposed consistently across all members. The policy implementation of IFs is apparently more elastic, and the international standards are rather advisory. Most likely, the elastic policy implementation of IFs as well as the differences seen in the policy of transparency both result from a lack of consistency in imposing international standards across nations. The more consistently international standards are applied across the national actors, as in the case of ITU, the more an IF can work towards complete transparency, i.e. publishing NF evaluation results in full.

IFs' compliance inducement is also in contrast to another example in the sports world. The international anti-doping policy regime focuses predominantly on rule conformity and tends to be adversely affected by a loss of focus on "*the depth of commitment*" (Houlihan, 2014, p. 1), and a lack of change in doping culture is observed (Houlihan et al., 2019), whereas IFs' normative authority and influence are shown in many examples in this research (s. Ch. 4.1.1). The formation of such a compliance system as evidenced in the case of IFs may result from the fact that rule adherence is widely observed and that most national federations opt in to comply. This prerequisite also shows a major difference in the compliance system between the international anti-doping policy regime and the international sports policy regime; the anti-doping regime has been established to prevent a behaviour from happening, i.e. doping, whereas the

sports policy regimes have been founded to promote and encourage certain behaviours, i.e. more (committed) participation in international competitions. Houlihan (2009) ascribed the anti-doping regime to the broader concept of the global prohibition regime. As the author of this concept, Nadelmann (1990, p. 481) suggests that “*the most important inducement to the creation of international prohibition regimes is the inadequacy of unilateral and bilateral law enforcement measures in the face of criminal activities that transcend national borders.*”

However, this tendency of IFs does not substantially undermine the applicability of the framework because Tallberg’s (2002) management-enforcement ladder was chosen precisely for its combination of both the management and enforcement approaches. As it appears IFs are increasingly taking on a rule-based enforcement approach due to the increasing complexity of noncompliance cases, i.e. integrity-related issues, and due to the fact that some of the NF governance issues arising are in the grey zone of an ethical and political issue.

It is relevant to restate, however, that a regime is effective to the extent (1) that its members abide by its norms and rules, and (2) that it is achieving certain objectives or fulfilling certain purposes (Hasenclever et al., 1997). Both formality of rules and convergence of expectations are fundamental to an international regime (Levy et al., 1995). The difference in focus between rule conformity and deepening commitment is

perhaps a question of which contributes more to the effectiveness of the international regimes.

The role of strong sporting nations in IFs' compliance inducement. While the analytical framework is designed to give no differential treatment to any of the members, a focus of rule conformity, IFs' interaction with strong sporting nations is in any case quite different from developing nations, and the role of strong nations in the IF compliance system is not fully captured.

Haas' (2007) model of the likelihood of state compliance (s. Table 3, p18) can provide some theoretical insights. Haas' model indicates that states' likelihood of compliance is dependent on the costliness of compliance. Applied to the context of this research, it is less costly for the capable and willing nations to deepen their commitment to sports; thus, strong nations are most likely to comply and IFs are less likely to allocate attention to strong nations' compliance situation.

The role of strong nations was briefly mentioned as the torch-bearer of international norms and standards, which was evidenced in IFs' efforts in bridging strong and weaker nations for technical assistance (s. details in Ch.4.4.3) and using them as the benchmark nations in the evaluation system (s. details in Ch. 4.2.1). The strong nations' involvement in policy making and its impact on the compliance system of IFs may not be the focus of this research, but it is an interesting avenue for future

exploration.

5.3 Recommendations and Reflection

Based on the research conclusion detailed in Ch. 5 we would like to reflect on the implications of this research and make recommendations for future academic studies, the International Sports Federations, and Taiwan.

Some directions for future academic studies. According to Tallberg's (2002) assumption, a compliance system that has this management-enforcement complementarity developed should display an increased capacity for managing compliance and provide access to dispute-settlement bodies as the central dimension to the institutional design. In addition, the international institution's authority to decide over its power to engage in capacity building, monitoring, and sanctioning is also an important dimension to an effective compliance system (Tallberg, 2002). As can be seen from the research findings, there is an increased access to dispute-settlement bodies internally, i.e. ethical panels, disciplinary commissions, and externally, i.e. CAS. IFs also have a high degree of discretion to decide over the ways in which to engage in capacity building, monitoring, and sanctioning. However, the measurement of effectiveness of a compliance system is much more complex. This research, to a large extent, validates the applicability of the management-enforcement compliance system in the context of international federations and their national federations, and lays the

initial foundation for future studies to develop measures with both quantitative and qualitative indicators. Systematically collecting empirical data has been difficult in the past. As there is a greater pursuit of transparency and good governance practices being observed in international sports, it is increasingly easier to shed light on the effectiveness of IFs' compliance system. What this research truly contributes is the theorizing of IFs' compliance system through revealing IFs' compliance inducement strategies, thus building the foundation for future explorations of the regime effectiveness of international sports policy regimes.

In addition, this research makes two further contributions. First, this research includes subjects that are not just the unicorn organisations but a sample representative of the cluster of international sports policy regimes, even though it is still an under-researched field deserving more research attention. Second, this research contributes to expanding the conceptualisation of 'institutional profile' from being constructed by the level of state actors' involvement to other institutional aspects that affect the overall strength of institutions. It may appear that IFs are perceived in this research as predominantly authoritative, while in reality the perception of IFs can be changeable depending on which stakeholders they interact with, i.e. strong sporting nations versus developing nations. This view on the research subject can be due to, first, the source of the data are interviews with IFs' staff who provided a rather singular view of IFs'

compliance inducement and mainly referred to the NFs with lesser capacity. Second, Stage I: Prevention has focused on improving members' ability to comply. While the focus of the stage is on improving the states' capacity, it may have naturally overlooked the fact that these preventive measures makes a much larger difference to the developing nations compared to the developed nations. While IFs are portrayed predominantly as the provider in the context of compliance inducement, it could cause the unitary portrayal of IFs as authoritative in this research. Academic research on institutional legitimacy has gained increasing recent attention, see for example Dellmuth et al. (2019). All the above mentioned gives us an even better reason to investigate into the source and the construction of legitimacy of International sports federations. Specifically, the Olympic sports institutions can be a particularly interesting context to study the construction of their institutional profile and of their institutional legitimacy, as they are truly global, i.e. more than 100 member federations, and influential, i.e. evidence of them affecting domestic policymaking by Houlihan (2009).

The Takeaways of Compliance Inducement for International Sports Federations. It has become apparent over the research process that the roles and missions of IFs are indeed expanding and IFs are adapting continuously to a shifting convergence of social expectations to fulfil their regime purposes. This adaptation may

include the frequent review of resource allocation and its return in investment. As a result, we would like to share a few takeaways from this research. First, from a theoretical point of view, the evaluation of the national federations (s. details in 4.2.1) is useful itself even without its supporting function to the allocation of resources because it raises the concern of the national federations and provides for a standardised assessment on how far they are from the international standards. Given that developing an evaluation system is not excessively costly, it is also not a measure exclusive to the more resourceful IFs. Second, it appears that the strategy of providing domestic support to national federations works best when the strategies of monitoring and verification are executed together (s. Ch.4.2), which include the capacity development (**the building of capacity**), assessing NFs' true commitment (**verification**), and withdrawal or denied access to funding (**monitoring**). It is beneficial to compliance inducement when these three dimensions are jointly considered when implementing a capacity building programme and allocating resources. Last but not least, according to Tallberg (2002), the management approach emphasises the benefit of transparency from exercising monitoring whereas the enforcement approach stresses a coercive pairing of monitoring and sanction. It can be seen that monitoring is important to both approaches, yet there is a divergence in the opinions concerning the purpose of monitoring. From the analysis of the empirical data, IFs have neither embraced a principle of transparency

nor favoured sanctions to pair with their monitoring measure. This can lead to the compliance inducement of IFs to be less effective. It is suggested that monitoring and subsequently verification should be considered as an integral part of the compliance system, being integrated in the programme design, i.e. budgeting a physical inspection in domestic support programmes of larger scale.

Realising the aspirations of Taiwan as the nation and the national federations in Taiwan. From the research findings, we have identified several implications that can be useful for Taiwan as a nation and the national federations in Taiwan to develop their strategic approach. With regard to Taiwan as a nation, before determining what strategic approaches Taiwan wants to take interfacing with IFs, it is prudent to consider the costs and benefits from a policy perspective by asking two key questions: 1) Is there a good reason for Taiwan to commit further and for what purposes? More specifically, what other purposes are there in addition to elite sport development would conforming to the international standards beneficial for Taiwan as a nation? 2) On the basis of the previous question, to what extent is Taiwan willing to commit further? Then, before committing resources that could otherwise be used somewhere else, it is important to understand enough about what the international standards are to be able to determine the pros and cons of conforming to them.

For example, a rhythmic gymnastics coach from Taiwan has been given a one-

year ban from participating in any International Gymnastics Federation (FIG) events for exhibiting violent behaviours to discipline athletes (Etchells, 2020). According to a Central New Agency (CNA) report (Lung, 2019), the punished athlete “*admitted that it was her careless attitude in training to be blamed not the coach’s disciplining*” and “*the coach is like the mother to us, she does that for our own good*”. From this incident, we see a clear clash of Western and Eastern cultural differences in the disciplining behaviours of coaches to athletes. Once established a strategic position, the sports community and Taiwan as a nation will be able to determine what this difference between local practices and international standards mean and in what ways to respond. While the International Federation of Gymnastics (FIG)’s Code of Conduct for Coaches are formulated predominantly by experts from western nations, in what ways Taiwan can ensure its voice being heard and views represented in the standard-making and sanctioning process. On the other hand, should Taiwan want to be portrayed as a supporter to a universal value of athletes’ human right and make initiatives to accommodate this differences.

For the national federations in Taiwan, first, the international events and development activities, i.e. congresses, championships, training camps, organised regularly by IFs are the best avenues to understand IFs’ current policies of importance or priorities. Second, the information obtained from attending these international

activities can be utilised to align the international influence with NFs' national sporting agenda. For example, it can be beneficial for the national federations in Taiwan to leverage IFs' domestic support programme to raise the awareness of the public and relevant national stakeholders. In addition, the evaluation ranking by IFs could also be a leverage point for Taiwan's NFs to showcase progress under a wider range of indicators for organisational performance. Last but not least, as it has been acknowledged that the international standards are essentially western or Eurocentric in the case of the good governance principles (s. details in Ch. 4.1.2), it becomes crucial for nations like Taiwan to take part in the standard-making process to make the standards truly global.

Reflecting on the identity of researcher as somewhat an insider. The international sports federations' decision making and operations have high impacts and can be highly political. Not only that the culture of transparency is not yet a norm in this community, but also these IFs have every reason to be cautious in taking interviews because anything they say can reveal information that may have significant political implication, that can be scrutinised against them, or that would not otherwise be made public.

In addition, there is a general sentiment in the IF (staff) community to avoid being compared with other IFs. It is in any case very hard to compare these IFs due to

the sheer differences of their resources, capacity, social status as a sport and historical development. Any comparison can be at best clueless or out of context and at worst creates unnecessary political turmoil. In order to clear the doubts of the potential interview participants, this research adopted a stringent anonymisation and confidentiality policy. Under this circumstance, some of the interview participants needed to get an internal authorisation done before they can speak to me. Some of the internal documents either was redacted before being shared with me, or they let me review on site and take notes. Luckily, I was able to gain the trust of my interview participants. They felt comfortable enough to share their bittersweet experiences in capacity development, the evolution and changes of their organisations, etc.

On the other hand, while being somewhat an insider helped tremendously in obtaining information in a tight timeframe, I needed to make a constant conscious effort to hold firm the researcher position and let theories guide my analysis.

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Annex A Interview Consent Form (Sample)



National Taiwan Normal University
College of Sports and Recreation
Department of Physical Education

Interview Consent Form

Research Title: *Managing the Compliance of Member Federations: The Strategies of International Federations*

Research Investigator: Wan-Ching CHO

Supervisor(s): Dr Prof Tien-Chin TAN and Dr Prof Chih-Fu CHENG

Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed as part of Wan-Ching CHO's PhD dissertation research. The interview will take 30 to 60 minutes. Your participation is voluntary. You have the right to stop the interview at any time. This consent form is to ensure that you understand the purpose of the research and that you explicitly agree to participating in the interview.

Please read the accompanying information and then sign this form to certify that you approve the following:


- the interview will be recorded and a transcript will be produced
- you will be sent the transcript and given the opportunity to correct any factual errors
- the transcript of the interview will be analysed by Wan-Ching CHO; access to the interview transcript will also be limited to Wan-Ching CHO
- any summary interview content, or direct quotations from the interview, that are made available through academic publication or other academic outlets will be anonymized so that you cannot be identified, and care will be taken to ensure that other information in the interview that could identify yourself is not revealed
- the actual recording will be kept until the research is completed by July 2020, and will then be deleted permanently.
- any variation of the conditions above will only occur with your further explicit approval

Research Participant: (Full Name)

_____ (Signature)

_____ (Date)


Annex B NF Evaluation System Example (ITU)



ITU WORLD TRIATHLON NATIONAL FEDERATION SURVEY 2018

- Piloted in 2017
- Updated scoring system KPIs
- Survey in two formats: online and postal
- Gender equity added to the main areas
- Two methods of data collection
 1. ITU National Federation Survey in 3 languages (English, Spanish, French) offered the various options to the National Federations
 2. ITU Technical Officials, coaches, facilities, performance classifiers, events, results, etc.)
- 150 indicators
 - 100 indicators in 8 main areas:
 - Administration Management & Governance
 - Gender equity
 - Technical Officials, coaches, facilities
 - Performance classifiers, events, results, etc.
 - Marketing, Media, Communication
 - Technical Officials & Events
 - Coaches
 - Athletes
 - Development
 - Minimum 20 % of female EB members
 - ITU Accredited Coach Education Programme (ACEP)
 - ITU Accredited Technical Officials Programme (ATOP)
 - At least one continental or world class events development

RESULTS OF THE 2018 NF SURVEY




National Federation Participation

As of now ITU has 171 affiliated National Federations on the five continents. In cases of ETU are special NFs as they are not affiliated to their respective Continental Confederation.




- National Federation Groups
 - 1. Established National Federations (NFs)
 - 2. Established and functioning NFs
 - 3. NFs established and functioning NFs with Development Programs, Youth and Junior
 - 4. Continental Event participation
 - 5. Continental NF Structures Education Program
 - 6. Continental Class Activities in all ages
 - 7. Developed with High Performance Programmes
 - 8. Systems, High Gender Equity, ITU Gendered Event Hosting
- The below KPIs are used requirements to achieve Group 5 ranking. If any of these KPIs is missed, the NF cannot get Group 5 recognition regardless the total number of points.
- In good standing with the International Triathlon Union (ITU)
- Minimum 20 % of female EB members
- ITU Accredited Coach Education Programme (ACEP)
- ITU Accredited Technical Officials Programme (ATOP)
- At least one continental or world class events development

Developed NFs
30 NFs - 18%



Developing NFs
141 NFs - 82%



The ITU World Triathlon National Federation Survey 2018 will be launched in early January 2020.

Submission deadline is 10 February 2020.

REMEMBER

- Non-responding NFs are not eligible to apply for any ITU membership or development projects until the National Federation Survey completion/submission to ITU is approved by ITU EB.
- Non-responding NFs are not eligible to host any ITU/continental sanctioned event until the National Federation Survey completion/submission to ITU is approved by ITU EB.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- To be considered as Annual Report
- Decrease probabilities of receiving duplicated questionnaires at ITU and Continental level
- Consider the current Survey in the ITU Development grant application to the Continental Confederations
- One Group 1-5/3 NFs are eligible to get development support from the ITU Development Grant
- The ITU National Federation Survey must apply to ALL Continental Confederations
- National Federation solutions should be developed and implemented by ITU and Continental
- After completed revision of affiliation status of the National Federations update the membership status of the NFs on the ITU constitution
- Consider the survey results as a tool to develop their own resources to develop triathlon in a more effective way within their own territories

MEDIUM-TERM STEPS (by end of 2021)

- Yearly data collection
- Random checks on submitted surveys of the National Federations
- Launch the ITU National Federation Development Grant
- Review the National Federation Development Grants
- Consider and implement the outcomes of the ITU National Federation Survey (ITU Olympic Cycle vs Tokyo Olympic Cycle) in the next ITU Strategic Planning (2022-2025)

SHORT-TERM STEPS (by end of 2019)

- Individual Feedback & NF assessment to be sent to all NFs, mapping C2's Presiders (CONE)
- Publish and share the ITU National Federation Survey and its results by the ITU Congress in Lausanne (CONE)
- Add the NF profile on triathlon.org (CONE)
- Update and optimize the list and the weight of indicators (IN PROGRESS)
- Further investigation in the status of the non-responding NFs (IN PROGRESS)
- Develop a user-friendly survey (IN PROGRESS)
- Develop a user-friendly survey (IN PROGRESS)

OBSERVATIONS

- Annual follow-up of the Survey shall increase gradually
- Missing answers or misinterpreted questions that should be addressed
- Homogeneous gaps between continents
- Further and continuous research, analysis and
- NFs between category 3 & 4 require further investigation
- Participation (83.04 % on a global scale) has been increased
- Non-responding NFs (28) in 3 categories:
 - Non-responding/non-active
 - Under readjustment/reallocation
 - Responding without final submission